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Editor's Note 
Bv AROUND the turn of the century, the Pacific Islands had been 
divided among several colonial powers, and the colonization of the 
region had been completed. With the exception of the interiors of the 
largest Melanesian islands and some small and remote islands and 
atolls, missionaries had penetrated most of the region, and traders 
had long been established almost everywhere. 
During the first four decades of the twentieth century, the Pacific 
was a peaceful and quiet backwater far removed from the main-
stream of world events. Communication with the metropolitan capi-
tals was slow, infrequent, and mostly by ship. Colonial administra-
tors, planters, and traders often lived in artificial worlds that were 
poor imitations of the domestic routines and social arrangements of 
their homelands. 
The Europeans in the Pacific were convinced of their own superi-
ority and their right to rule and convert the heathen. They also suf-
fered certain illusions as to what the future would bring. The post-
European decline in indigenous populations had ceased, and a slow 
but steady regeneration of island populations had begun during the 
first three decades of the twentieth century. By and large, this trend 
had gone unnoticed, and Europeans had the notion that Islanders 
were dying out and the Pacific was to become a white man's lake. 
During the 1930s, the influential R. W. Robson, founder and editor 
of Pacific Islands Monthly, called for the formation of a regional associ-
ation to serve the commercial interests of Europeans and prepare the 
way for larger white settlements. 
World War II shattered both the peace in the islands and the pre-
v 
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vailing colonial mindset. The inability of the colonial authorities to 
halt the advance of the Japanese forces caused Islanders to question 
the power and status of their European rulers. At the same time, 
Islanders observed the great power and wealth of the American mili-
tary forces, together with the egalitarian behavior of American 
enlisted men toward themselves. They questioned the former colo-
nial order and its social inequities. For many Islanders, involvement 
in the war took them far away from their home communities, 
expanding their opportunities for new experiences and giving them 
a larger perspective on at least their own island world. The Pacific 
could never be the same again. This volume examines the experi-
ences of Pacific Islanders in the war and their remembrances of it 
-as observers, as laborers, on patrol, and sometimes under bom-
bardment. As the different chapters indicate, the worldview and 
conceptions of self of many Pacific Islanders were altered forever. 
The publication of the Pacific Islands Monograph Series is subsi-
dized by private funds raised by the University of Hawaii Founda-
tion. From the outset, the Foundation's staff members have shown 
great interest in and support for the series, and their assistance and 
that of the Foundation is greatly appreciated. 
RoBERT C. KISTE 
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Preface 
WoRLD WAR n has not been a traditional topic of research among 
anthropologists. This may be because the experience seems "too 
near" -both too recent and too much of our own making as Ameri-
cans, Japanese, or members of the other metropolitan societies that 
waged the war. Yet almost anyone who has carried out anthropologi-
cal work in the Pacific Islands in the last forty years has encountered 
the war's legacy of stories and songs. It was thus not surprising that 
our suggestion of a war ethnohistory session at the annual meeting of 
the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania (ASAO) met 
with an enthusiastic response. Even though few scholars had focused 
their research on war experiences, many indicated that they had 
gathered relevant materials in the course of other ethnographic work 
in the Pacific. 
An ASAO Working Session was organized under the same title as 
this volume for the 1985 annual meeting held in Salem, Massachu-
setts. In addition to the authors represented here, that session also 
benefited from contributions by Judith Fitzpatrick (Torres Straits) 
and Wari Iamo (Keakalo, Papua New Guinea). The ASAO format 
of comparative discussion proved to be an effective way of pursuing 
the cultural significance of the war in various regions, and partici-
pants at the Working Session decided to revise their papers for a for-
mal symposium the following year. The formal symposium, held at 
the 1986 ASAO meeting in New Harmony, Indiana, profited greatly 
from remarks added by Lawrence Fo'ana'ota, Eugene Ogan, and 
James Watson and from commentary by William Davenport, acting 
as discussant. 
XIII 
XIV Priface 
A number of photographs from the Pacific War have been selected 
from official archives and personal collections and distributed 
through the book. Some of the photographs portray people or events 
discussed specifically in a chapter; others relate more indirectly to 
the text, but they provide a valuable pictorial supplement insofar as 
they portray occurrences elsewhere in the Pacific theater that paral-
lel events described here. 
Our work on the comparative anthropology of the Pacific War is 
part of a larger project carried out at the Institute of Culture and 
Communication of the East-West Center. We are grateful to the for-
mer institute director, Mary Bitterman, and to the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities for their support of that project. The 
present volume has benefited from contacts and discussions with a 
broad range of people under the rubric of the Center project. We 
would like especially to thank Hugh Laracy, Hank Nelson, and john 
Waiko for their historians' advice and perspectives. The National 
Archives of the Solomon Islands and the U.S. Naval Historical Cen-
ter have been most helpful in providing relevant documents. We 
would like to give special thanks to Ismael Isikel and Vasiti Donita 
Simmons for their careful work on the index for this volume, and 
Joan Larcom for suggesting its title. We also take pleasure in ac-
knowledging extensive assistance with manuscript preparation from 
Edith Yashiki, Louise Ishibashi, Wesley Oasa, and Michael E. Mac-
millan. 
GEOFFREY M. WHITE 
LAMONT LINDSTROM 
PART I 
Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
War Stories 
LAMONT LINDSTROM 
AND GEOFFREY M. WHITE 
CoNVERSATIONs with older men and women on many Pacific 
Islands not uncommonly call forth memories of how things were 
during the war. Whether it's called bata eo, daidowa, sahaya kana tuta, 
or taemfaet, World War II has sedimented into an intense-if narrow 
-band in the stratigraphy of social and individual histories. Some-
times exciting, sometimes tragic, wartime events made vivid and 
enduring impressions. 
The war is still the gist of good talk today. Many personal recollec-
tions dating from the war have frozen into narrative accounts. For-
malized by frequent retellings, these war stories compose a historical 
archive. They store local experience and interpretation about the 
events and consequences of the war. The postwar generation has 
acquired an understanding of wartime events, unparalleled since, 
through the war stories of its elders. This historical knowledge repos-
itory also includes war songs-both local and exotic. For example, 
sitting in a village clearing on certain islands, one may be taken 
aback to hear older men and women burst into "God Bless 
America" or Japanese anthems from the 1940s. 
This book presents a collection of studies of the sociocultural 
effects and meanings of World War II in the Pacific Islands. While 
the military history of the Pacific War is thoroughly documented, 
the experiences of Islanders who were profoundly affected by their 
encounters with thousands of troops and tons of war equipment have 
been largely overlooked. It is these experiences and thei'r conse-
quences that the contributors to this volume have been concerned to 
document. We base our analyses on anthropological fieldwork that 
3 
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tapped into a recent but nonetheless rich oral tradition: the conflux 
of war stories and songs that continue to circulate about the Pacific 
today. Our purpose is twofold: to examine the significance of war-
time experiences within the framework of island cultures and to 
examine island cultures within the frameworks imposed by the war. 
Like briefer moments of crisis, the war presented many societies 
with an extended period of novelty and disruption that evoked, chal-
lenged, and sometimes transformed basic social and cultural struc-
tures. The contributors to this volume are interested in the war 
because it interests Islanders, remaining a topic of conversational 
and even ceremonial attention forty years later. 
World War II was a watershed event in the history of the Pacific 
region (Oliver 1961; Grattan 1963). These islands witnessed some of 
the most prolonged and ferocious fighting. To wage their military 
campaigns, the Allies and the Japanese poured hundreds of thou-
sands of troops and millions of tons of materiel into islands once iso-
lated on the colonial fringe. A sudden confrontation with the mili-
tary power and economic resources of America and Japan left deep 
and enduring marks on postwar history and culture. In many areas, 
intense wartime experiences and cross-cultural interactions have 
been linked to subsequent struggles for increased autonomy, power, 
and wealth-struggles to redefine economic and political relations 
with ruling colonial authorities (see, e.g., Worsley 1968). 
In addition to first encounters with new goods and technologies, 
the war occasioned first encounters with new kinds of people-espe-
cially with Americans and Japanese. Islanders' previous experience 
with outsiders had been limited, in general, to interactions with 
planters (e.g., Carris 1973; Bennett 1987), traders, missionaries, 
and government officers. During the war, instead of routinized, 
regimented, and hierarchical interactions with plantation managers 
and colonial agents, Islanders encountered exotic military outsiders 
in a wide variety of roles and situations. Some who had worked in 
colonial police forces, for example, served as armed scouts and sol-
diers in island regiments, fighting side-by-side with Americans and 
Australians (Kais 1974; Ravuvu 1974; Lord 1977; Sesiguo 1977; 
Nelson 1980a). Others served as japanese Army auxiliaries (Somare 
1975; Higuchi 1986). A far greater number were recruited as carri-
ers or laborers. Thousands of Islanders joined wartime labor corps, 
rubbed shoulders with military servicemen, and engaged jointly in 
work and the novel informalities of eating, trading, playing, and 
worshipping. 
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The events of the war were not equally distributed. Some islands, 
such as Peleliu-flashpoints at which the two opposing forces 
clashed-experienced near total destruction of villages, plantations, 
and landscape. Other regions, away behind the lines, caught only 
whispers and echoes of battle. The war's particular effects on people 
around the Pacific depended on the nature of their prewar accom-
modations with colonial authorities and their situation vis-a-vis the 
often rapid movement of the front through the region. In addition, 
the continuing significance of the war for island societies depends 
very much on the social and cultural frameworks of understanding 
brought to bear on making sense (and making history) of often 
anomalous and unexpected events. 
Chapters in this volume describe the war, its consequences, and 
its stories in a number of societies located in Polynesia, Micronesia, 
and Melanesia. Our concentration is on the latter two culture areas, 
which were affected more seriously by invasion and counterinva-
sion, although events in behind-the-line areas (such as Samoa and 
Vanuatu) that were the sites of major Allied bases or the staging 
points for invasion are also described. (The Philippines, equally 
important within the Pacific theater, are not included here.) 
We are now in a period of World War II anniversaries and 
remembrances. The fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor is on the 
horizon. As these dates approach, they bring to mind important 
questions about the meaning of the war-the "good war" as Studs 
Terkel (1984), noting the irony, has recently named it-and about 
the social and cultural consequences of war in general. The problem 
for us is to discern the Pacific War's effects on contemporary social 
and international relations by examining its place within the lives of 
those people it swept up, challenged, and, in some cases, trans-
formed. 
In this period of war reanalysis, the erstwhile combatants-the 
Allies and the Japanese-are rephrasing interpretations of the war 
in attempts to define its place within their histories more clearly. 
Reinterpretation never occurs within a political vacuum, as interna-
tional protests concerning the revision of Japanese high school his-
tory textbooks and the visit of an American president to a German 
war cemetery have proved. Multiple readings of the war sometimes 
jostle against one another. 
It is opportune and useful that the Islanders who both served and 
suffered the Pacific war effort also find a voice in this recollection 
and reanalysis. Although ethnographers have commented fre-
6 LAMONT LINDSTROM AND GEOFFREY M. WHITE 
quently on the war's events, this commentary has been, in general, 
ancillary to other research concerns. Military historians writing 
about the Pacific War, for their part, have ignored wholesale the 
people living on the islands over which the armies were "hopping." 
We can augment and enrich reinterpretations of the war by listening 
to the stories, songs, and personal recollections of some of the thou-
sands of Pacific Islanders who took part in the events of the 1940s. 
Their stories, too, compose a valuable historical archive. 
The chapters that follow, although geographically diverse, find 
common ground in their concern to document the war's conse-
quences for two areas of prewar village life: challenges, alterations, 
and even confirmations of local images of "self" and "other" set in 
motion by encounters with wartime outsiders; and disruptions and 
transformations of prewar social relations and structures within and 
beyond the village. These changes in village society were to a large 
extent precipitated by new relations of exchange and production 
brought about by the war economy. Islanders on both sides of the 
battle lines were recruited as fighters and workers. These topics, 
which span the particularities of the war on the different islands 
described here, are introduced in turn. 
Island Selves and Wartime Others 
Alongside the experience of new military means and relations of pro-
duction, the encounter with military personnel-new sorts of people 
-had perhaps the most profound transforming effects on concep-
tions of self and community. Before the war, Pacific Islanders held 
certain understandings of Europeans, Americans, Japanes~, and 
other outsiders, just as the outside world, for its part, entertained 
notions of "South Seas natives." The events and encounters of the 
war had important consequences for these images. Expectations 
about the other became unsettled. More significantly, as conceptions 
of the other changed and deepened on both sides, so did understand-
ings of the place of the self in the postwar world. 
As colonial powers, the Australians (in New Guinea and Papua), 
Americans (in Samoa), New Zealanders (in Samoa), British and 
French (throughout the South Pacific), and the japanese (in Micro-
nesia) were known to Pacific Islanders. The war, however, changed 
things in three ways. In place of the relatively small numbers of colo-
nial administrators, settlers, traders, and missionaries, thousands of 
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ordinary men and women recruited into the several militaries found 
themselves on islands "somewhere in the South Pacific." These peo-
ple had less commitment to maintaining prewar relations of inequal-
ity between metropolitans and locals; old hands in more than one 
colony were scandalized and dismayed by what they perceived to be 
indiscriminate and dangerous mixing between Islanders and mili-
tary personnel. 
Secondly, the Japanese and the Americans, in particular, spilled 
over prewar borders to inundate large portions of the Pacific basin. 
Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere extended as far east 
as the Gilbert (Kiribati) and Solomon Islands. In counterpoint to the 
Japanese thrust, the Americans reinforced their presence on Samoa 
and established bases on Tonga, Fiji, New Caledonia, and Vanuatu 
and eventually pushed northward through the Solomons, New 
Guinea, and the Philippines and westward from Hawaii through 
Micronesia. 
Finally, these new outsiders were bent on killing one another. 
Because of this, the tenor of the military's relations to Islanders, its 
interest in acquiring lands and labor, were part of planning for the 
short rather than the long term. All of these factors distinguished 
these new others from those known previously in the region. 
Islanders had, of course, cultural understandings they could use 
in attempting to size up military newcomers and calculate what they 
were up to. Warfare and raiding were not uncommon in precolonial 
Pacific societies. For some, the battles of the Pacific War might be 
seen as grander versions of traditional tribal fighting. Certainly, 
many Islanders drawn into the war practiced war magic to protect 
themselves and employed traditional skills of fighting to ambush and 
attack the enemies of their new allies (chapter 14). For example, the 
Fijian First Commandos, who distinguished themselves in the fight-
ing in the Solomons, quickly obtained a reputation for bravery, 
ferocity, and skilled jungle combat. As one American sailor wrote 
home: "We also have some Fiji Islanders fighting here .... they 
love to cut the J aps up. One Fiji had 40 J ap dog tags which he had 
taken from theJaps he killed ... "(Fahey 1963, 46). 
Traditional enemies in the Pacific generally were acquainted with 
each other; often, they might be related by marriage. This was less 
likely in World War II's Pacific theater. Here were brought together 
a cast of characters whose knowledge of one another was superficial, 
based primarily on a number of stereotypic motifs. Many service-
men first experienced the Pacific through the flattest of imagery: 
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island landscape was fetid, dangerous jungle; Islanders themselves 
were either amorous maidens or stewpot cannibals. Once in the 
region, however, servicemen also encountered other representations 
of Islanders, those of the dominant colonial world. In some cases, 
American personnel reacted to colonial presumptions. In the view of 
an American journalist: 
Here, "Out East," as the British put it, a European clerk or shop-
keeper at home could become, because of the color of his skin, an 
absolute monarch. His native vassals-and he had swarms of them-
were each paid four cents a day .... If he was single he hired a mis-
tress by the week .... (Manchester n.d., 85, cited in Weeks 1987) 
For their part, the British and other long-resident colonials looked 
askance at American attitudes toward the locals. As one coastwatch-
er observed, 
... the blossoming of the varied talents lying dormant in the island-
ers until the war called them forth was more easily understood by the 
Coast Watchers and others who had been in the islands for some time 
than by the Americans, who were inclined to equate them as some-
what intellectually below the Negroes of the United States. (Horton 
1975, 146) 
Islanders themselves could not avoid knowledge of the prewar 
images of" savage" and "native," which were the cross-cultural cur-
rency of understanding in this world. There is some evidence that 
Islanders occasionally used these stereotypes to their advantage dur-
ing the war. In chapter two, White, decoding a war narrative from 
Santa Isabel, discovers an ironic mixture of humorous self-depreca-
tion and superior. cunning. By playing the role of "native," the 
heroes of the story escape from a dangerous encounter with the J ap-
anese. Here, the image of "savage" is accepted on one level to be 
denied on another, establishing an ironic counterpoint characteristic 
of much of the war's oral literature. Falgout also recorded war 
stories from Pohnpei that celebrate getting the better of Japanese 
bosses, and she notes how people used songs to encode plans to avoid 
Japanese treachery (chapter 12). In these narratives, ruling images 
are rewritten, and purported relations of inequality between self and 
other inverted. Nero recorded similar tales from Palau (chapter 5). 
In chapter 10, Thune notes that irony is the primary mode of stories 
told by Normanby Islanders about the time a small Australian mili-
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tary base was established nearby. Anecdotes such as that of an old 
man boiling an unopened tin of meat, eating the label, and throwing 
away the "bone" (only to have his children retrieve the can, open it, 
and consume the contents) point to generational differences within 
the village that are also related to changes in relations with the out-
side world. 
Something of the content of prewar images of colonial masters 
and island subjects can be glimpsed in the 1943 publication You and 
the Native: Notes for the Guidance of Members of the Forces in their Relations 
with New Guinea Natives. This, written by an Australian, was distrib-
uted to troops in New Guinea. Alongside practical instructions on 
what to do if lost in the jungle were exhortations to maintain the co-
lonialist images of self and other when interacting with "natives." 
Note 14 commanded: "Always therefore maintain your position or 
pose of superiority, even if you sometimes have doubts about it." 
Note 22 instructed: "Don't clasp him round the neck. Brotherhood 
is all right. But don't act like a twin brother. Be very much the big 
brother." And Note 23, concluding a section called "Conduct 
Towards Natives in General," prescribed: "Always, without overdo-
ing it, be the master. The time may come when you will want a 
native to obey you. He won't obey you if you have been in the habit 
of treating him as an equal." 
These notes attempted to initiate thousands of newcomers to the 
Pacific into the niceties of prewar etiquette so that r.elations between 
Islanders and outsiders might be reproduced. Wartime encounters 
threatened established symbols of separation and inequality. A 
sumptuary code regulated interaction between Islanders and colo-
nists. This informal but profoundly charged code restricted Island-
ers' access to particular foods, set alcohol off limits, and prohibited 
eating at the same table with colonists, the wearing of certain types 
of clothing such as long trousers, the speaking of some styles of the 
dominant colonial language, or otherwise engaging in acts that 
served to maintain symbolic boundaries between colonizer and col-
onized. A small example of this code in action came when members 
of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, accustomed to wearing shirts with 
rank insignias, were transferred to the First New Guinea Infantry 
Battalion, where laplaps (the prewar dress of plantation labor) were 
the official uniform. The order that they simply sew badges of rank 
on their laplaps sparked a brief uprising in which two Australian 
officers were injured (Barrett 1969, 496; see also Robinson 
1981, 79). 
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Japanese, American, and Australian servicemen, fresh from 
home countries, generally had little.knowledge of prewar symbolic 
conventions or interest in protecting these symbols of inequality. 
Military commanders-beset by agitated colonial officials-issued 
numerous orders that forbade troops to fraternize with locals, to 
overpay island laborers, or to give away military supplies. For 
example, a memorandum issued by U.S. Major General Alexander 
M. Patch on Guadalcanal began: 
It has come to the attention of the Commanding General that certain 
practices on the part of military personnel prejudicial to the full utili-
zation of native labour and the control of natives by the British 
authorities are becoming prevalent. These practices include-over-
payment for services or commodities, employment of casual labour 
without adequate supervision or control, failure to provide for neces-
sary rotation of natives so that their gardens can be maintained and 
permitting casual natives to wander through camps and military areas 
and encouraging this latter bad practice by feeding or making gifts to 
these casual natives. (Patch 1943) 
As several authors in this volume point out, servicemen com-
monly ignored these orders and violated the symbolic boundaries of 
inequality. Perhaps the most significant of these symbols were 
restrictions on commensality. Islanders from many areas still re-
count their surprise and pleasure when asked to share a meal with 
servicemen. A former member of the Solomon Islands Labour 
Corps described laborers' encounter with Americans: 
They invited us inside [their tents], and when we were inside, we 
could sit on their beds. We got inside and they gave us their glasses so 
we could drink out of them too. They gave us plates and we ate with 
their spoons. That was the first we had seen of that kind of thing. 
(Fifi'i and Akin 1988, 224) 
Given the traditional significance of food as a medium of ex-
change used to form social relationships in many Pacific societies, it 
is not surprising that war stories throughout the region take special 
note of food sharing and exchange. The following chapters show that 
for many societies the principle of reciprocity played a central role in 
org:mizing interactions with the military newcomers. In chapter 2 
White observed that the absence of reciprocity is a major theme in rec-
ollections of encounters with japanese in Santa Isabel-a theme that 
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Ulithi Islanders dining in a military mess hall at Falalop, 22 May 1945. 
(U.S. Marine Corps) 
stands in complementary opposition to memories of relations with 
Americans reported in many of the other chapters. 
A major dimension in images of military others encountered dur-
ing the war, and contrasted with prewar colonials, is generosity ver-
sus meanness. Particularly in many Melanesian societies where 
political stature is acquired through the distribution of resources, 
giving out food, cigarettes, clothing, and military supplies accrued 
considerable prestige to the givers. Many U.S. servicemen engaged 
in profligate exchange of goods, ranging from cash or barter transac-
tions for souvenirs and local foods to the giving-away of unwanted 
personal or military supplies. The Americans, who imported the 
greater tonnage of war materiel into the area, were best known for 
their generosity-generosity (with taxpayer-supplied goods to be 
sure) that sparked a local image of American character that many of 
the elder generation oflslanders still embrace today. 
One legacy of these attributions of abundant surplus wealth is 
rumors of hidden caches of wartime goods left behind by the Ameri-
cans. Stories of the war that marvel at the spectacle of vast amounts 
of war machinery and supplies that passed before people's eyes occa-
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sionally speculate about the possibility of rediscovering America's 
abandoned wealth. Thus, Counts in chapter 8 told of Kaliai efforts 
only a few years earlier to dig up goods believed to be buried near 
the beach where U.S. Marines departed, and Gegeo listened to for-
mer labor corps workers tell of their belief that well-oiled machinery 
remains, unknown to government authorities, in good working 
order in underground warehouses on Guadalcanal today. Specula-
tions such as these are not limited to island Melanesia. A visitor to 
Christmas Island, where the Americans developed a major air base, 
was told that "a million dollars worth of delicate scientific instru-
ments" had been secretly stashed in an underground location known 
only to U.S. officials (Howell1957, 169). 
Islanders-save for those who suffered most from the war-on the 
whole constructed positive images of troops in counterpoint to pre-
war colonials (see Read 1947). Robinson, drawing on oral histories 
he collected from people in Papua New Guinea, noted: 
They said they got on well with them [Americans] and they recalled 
that both black and white troops stood up for them when ANGAU 
[Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit] officers called them 
'boys.' The Americans had said, 'They should not call you boys, you 
are men already.' The carriers also liked the American troops because 
they spoke with them in a friendly fashion, paid good prices for carv-
ings and always welcomed them into their camps to eat or even to 
sleep. (1981, 80) 
In his description of Americans, the Solomon Island laborer quoted 
previously was explicit in contrasting these new military others with 
prewar varieties of white men. He went on to say, 
We talked about it like this, "Those people like the British and the 
whites before, it was terrible because they were not kind to us! These 
people here are really nice to us. We can all sit on one bed and we all 
eat together." (Fifi'i and Akin 1988, 224) 
These same contrasts were again drawn in a very pronounced way 
at the end of the war when officials in many areas reasserted their 
authority by expropriating much of the wartime booty that laborers 
had accumulated (Robinson 1981, 79, 173). For example, British 
overseers on Guadalcanal went into labor tents one day, piled up 
surplus clothing, and burned it while workers were off on assign-
ments. Whatever the reason for the burning, it is remembered as a fla-
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grant example of British domination that angered both Solomon 
Islanders and their "American friends" (Fifi'i and Akin 1988, 225; 
Keesing 1978, 48). Such ungenerous acts evoke the most bitter 
memories and harshest criticisms today. 
The war is also notable for the variety and complexity of new rela-
tions with outsiders, beyond the stark contrast of prewar colonials 
and wartime soldiers. People compared Australians with Ameri-
cans, blacks with whites (see below), and British with Americans, as 
well as Allies with Japanese. Solomon Island laborers working on 
Guadalcanal noted that they were categorized as "British" along 
with New Zealanders, Australians, and Fijians, whereas the Ameri-
can forces included whites, blacks, Hawaiians, and even Japanese-
Americans (serving with the former Hawaii National Guard unit 
called up for army duty). In chapter 12, Falgout discusses the man-
ner in which the Kitti people recruited by the Japanese on Pohnpei 
found themselves working on Kosrae along with Kosraens, Kore-
ans, and Gilbertese, all ordered according to a distinct, Japanese-
imposed system of social stratification. In Papua New Guinea, more 
than five thousand Indians captured in Singapore accompanied the 
Japanese occupiers along with conscripted Chinese and Indonesian 
laborers (Nelson 1980b, 251). 
The exact quality of image of other expressed today in war stories 
is shaped by the details of interpersonal encounters which in turn 
depended largely on a community's position vis-a-vis the warring 
powers. In parts of Micronesia previously administered by the J apa-
nese, representations of the colonial era are often positive, darken-
ing only during the logistical exigencies of the latter part of the war. 
In Melanesia, where the Japanese drove out prewar colonial 
authorities, presenting themselves as liberators, the same trend 
appears even more sharply drawn, as initially positive or neutral 
relations deteriorated along with Japan's military fortunes. In areas 
where Islanders met both Japanese and Allied personnel, the image 
of one plays off against the other. Falgout has described the revision 
of images of Americans on Pohnpei from inept bumblers to clever 
strategists as they brought increasing offensive pressure to bear on 
the island. 
Representations of military others are everywhere complex, 
shaded by ambivalences that mute glowing impressions of Ameri-
cans and humanize memories of Japanese. Both Americans andJap-
anese are frequently recalled for their efforts to protect Islanders 
from unnecessary risk Uust as surely as their efforts to recruit labor-
12"N 
152"E 156°E 
EASTERN CAROLINE 
& 
MARSHALL ISLANDS 
160°E I64°E 168°E 172"E V Taongi 
ty1ARSHALL 
ISLANDS 
1 Bikar 12"N 
()Enewetak 
Bikini ........, Rongelap Utirik 
·-· Q.,. . ~ 
Ailinginae ..o Rongerik Taka 
-1' -:P • ~~~luk · Mejit 
Wotho • ~<"/. "' ..... >:~Likiep 
""Ujelang Kwajalein ';.(- >'1'- 0 Wotje 
Namon~ HALL ISLANDS 
"'-" Fayu . o-.D Murilo 
8"N Nom win 
-.Nama 
1 Pulap 
.. Puluwat ~Truk 111::1 Oroluk 
'\ Pulusuk Neo;hY · • Losap 
~S' /'<".;9~ 
4"N 
MORTLOCK ISLANDs 
Namoluk • 
Eta) ~Lukunor 
Satawan. 
c4/i' Ot I.IJI£ 
1St-4Nos 
oNukuoro 
Pakin ~ •• Pohnpei • Mokil 
Ant ., Pingelap 
.:a. Sapwuahfik 
4' 
G Kapingamarangi 
152"E 156°E 160°E 
Map 1 
• Kosrae 
-~("> '1\Erikub 
Ujae ' •lae \) ~ C>-y '\) Maloelap 
lib. -t- ~/,z,.. QAur a•N 
Namu' 
Ailinglaplap d b ,;rno 
Namorik • 
)aluit l) 
Kili. 
o Ebon 
Majuro 
QMili 
Knox" 
4"N 
0 50 100 250 500 750 km 
__ _._-J 
0 50 100 250 500 mi 
No
t fo
r re
pro
duc
tion
 wi
tho
ut p
erm
issi
on
War Stories 
ers and scouts exposed Islanders to those same risks). As military 
forces, positive images of Americans and Japanese blend with attri-
butions of violence. Americans are widely seen as both violent and 
friendly, just as people of Sapwuahfik (Ngatik) remember Japanese 
as "kind" and "cruel"-a distinction that people elsewhere ascribe 
to differences between Japanese officers and soldiers or between one 
type of military unit and another (Silata 1988, 64). In more relaxed 
settings, away from the theaters of combat, more alluring images 
could be played out, as in the songs composed by Sikaiana women, 
inverting the American stereotype of seductive island girls, rhapso-
dizing over alluring American boys! 
Images of military others depend on preexisting cultural under-
standings, as well as on the details of exchange and other wartime 
encounters. In the Marshall Islands, for example, the American 
image in war stories is positive despite the disruption and death 
Islanders met during the invasion of Enewetak. Here, people 
reached into local cultural interpretations of the nature of force and 
of alien, sacred chiefs in order to understand America and its power. 
Islanders stretched the mythical itinerary of the culture hero-trick-
ster Etao to the United States in order to account for American 
"force." By capturing the wandering Etao-so went the revised 
story-the Americans became the strongest country in the world: a 
country strong enough to contrive the hydrogen bombs subse-
quently detonated in Enewetak Lagoon. 
Similar reworkings of traditional mythic figures and themes to 
make sense of extraordinary wartime events occurred in many other 
Pacific locales. On Tanna, Vanuatu, people traced their own affini-
ties with America in the travels of John Frum-a more recent cul-
ture hero who appeared in island political discourse and gossip just 
before the war. Like Etao, John Frum purportedly journeyed to 
America, establishing a special kinship between the two peoples. In 
part because of this relationship, Islanders recruited willingly to 
work at the U.S. base on Efate. In chapter 9 Lepowsky has traced 
parallel extensions in stories of Alagh that circulate about southeast-
ern Papua New Guinea. Here again, America becomes the land of 
the dead and of cargo to which Alagh travels and from which ema-
nate American army and navy personnel. Davenport has reported 
the reworking of myth in the Santa Cruz Islands so that the culture 
hero Lata, originator of overseas cargo canoes, is credited with hav-
ing invented steamships and taken his invention to America. 
Islanders employed a range of other devices to account for mili-
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tary others in traditional terms. If some Micronesians relied on tra-
ditional notions of chiefly hierarchy and mythic force in order to 
make sense of the newcomers, others found answers in history. Peo-
ple on Sapwuahfik, whose sense of community derives from com-
mon historical understandings of the past, used these understand-
ings to sketch an image of Americans. Because they speak a pidgin 
English (a linguistic curiosity stemming from a nineteenth-century 
massacre of most of the men on the island), these Islanders asserted 
a special relationship with American personnel. This founding of a 
wider social solidarity on common history (Americans were key 
players in the massacre) and common language is also the basis of 
the narrower shared identity of the island. For the people of Sap-
wuahfik, World War II contacts provided an opportunity to affirm 
the distinctiveness of an identity based in earlier historical events. 
Elsewhere, the extraordinary World War II period is regarded as 
one of two major epochs of contact experience, second to the arrival 
of missionaries. In Santa Isabel, recollections of encounters with the 
Japanese fit within a literary genre of contact narrative, but invert a 
number of themes expressed in stories of Christian conversion. 
There, as with the Laboda villagers described by Thune, the more 
idiosyncratic stories of World War II have not been incorporated 
into collective representations to the same extent as legends of mis-
sionary heroes who produced more enduring transformations. 
In Melanesia (where chiefdoms are less common than in Microne-
sia), people turned to notions of shared kinship to account for the 
other. Kinship is an idiom of political alliance. In some cases, one 
may hear Islanders refer to significant military others as "fathers," 
with connotations of benevolence and dependency. For example, the 
man who led the postwar Maasina Rule movement on Santa Isabel 
talked about the influence of his American "father," met during 
labor corps work in the Russell Islands. More frequently, the casual 
relations enjoyed with military others are phrased in an idiom of 
brotherhood. In Vanuatu, the motif of shared kinship with Ameri-
can troops is an important theme in local war stories. An elder from 
Nguna recounted his recollection of a conversation with Americans 
on their departure from Efate: "But they said, 'Don't feel bad. 
Sometime we'll come again in peace. We'll be brothers; we'll have 
good times' "(Schutz 1968, 312). 
The importance of brotherhood in Pacific cultures, fortuitously, 
may have harmonized with a loose usage of the term "brother" 
common within black and other varieties of American English. The 
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word has a cognate, brata, in Melanesian Pidgin English. Former 
labor corps members from Vanuatu, for example, told of their 
encounters with black Americans: "When they called out, they 
called us 'brother.' 'Brother,' their brothers they didn't say that we 
were no good" (chapter 17). 
Whatever the facts oflinguistic coincidence, the presence of black 
American troops-particularly in Melanesia-contributed to a posi-
tive image of military others. Approximately two hundred thousand 
black military personnel served in the Far East and the Pacific. 
Although the greater number of these-given the fact that the U.S. 
Army and Navy both remained segregated-served in service units 
(transportation, engineer, quartermaster), some were members of 
coast artillery or infantry units that engaged the Japanese in combat. 
Melanesians saw for the first time skilled American servicemen look-
ing at least superficially similar to themselves: made, as it were, in 
their own image, but already possessing the knowledge and accou-
trements of Western culture. The perceptions recorded in this vol-
ume make it clear that it was not the physical segregation of the U.S. 
forces that made an impression on island memories but their "simi-
larity of condition" in terms of styles of dress, food, and work. The 
obvious abilities and achievements of American blacks personified 
the prewar aspirations of many Islanders. 
Reports vary as to the nature of Pacific impressions of blacks as 
persons. This is a topic deserving of more study, but accounts of 
Islanders' wariness and fear of black soldiers (Koch 1978, 30) are at 
least as numerous as the inference that "They liked black troops 
because they had the same colour of skin" (Robinson 1981, 80). 
War era imagery of military others, which we read embedded in 
war narrative and song, still shapes apperceptions of new outsiders 
in the Pacific. The anthropologist is one of these. The war, as shared 
heritage if not tputual experience, enjoins reflexivity-compelling 
the anthropologist to examine expectations and images held by the 
ethnographic other. Certainly the warm welcome accorded many 
anthropological strangers newly arrived in Pacific villages stems in 
large measure from wartime experiences. But there are also liabili-
ties associated with inherited World War II images. For example, 
Counts reports discovering that he disappointed his new hosts when 
he arrived without hand grenades-a much appreciated wartime 
technology for killing fish (chapter 8). And how could Lindstrom, 
newly arrived on Tanna, be American if he did not take up resi-
dence in a John Frum village (Lindstrom 1979)? Descendants of 
War Stories 
Anthropologist Camilla Wedgewood and children, Port Moresby, 23 
November 1944. Wedgewood was a lieutenant-colonel in the Australian 
Army's Directorate of Research. (Australian War Memorial) 
wartime Americans nonetheless, we violated the image of our mili-
tary forebears. More worrisome still, is the image of anthropologist 
as spy. And Lepowsky, working with a people who conflated wartime 
others with their own dead ancestors, found herself suspected of 
being a wayward ghost (chapter 9). 
In that most of the contributors to this volume are American, it is 
perhaps not surprising that Islanders produced tales that lauded the 
powers and generosity of American ancestors. Along these lines, 
Zelenietz and Saito explore the effects of storytelling context (the 
identity of audience, in particular) on the content of war stories. 
Kilenge (New Britain) storytellers crafted their tales to suit the 
nationality of their anthropologists and that anthropologist's per-
sonal feelings-positive or negative-about the war. Zelenietz and 
Saito have also noted the moral function of war narratives. The cen-
trality of exchange and generosity in these stories provides a clue. If 
war stories encode historical understandings, they can also serve as 
useful parables; gentle hints that anthropologists in a village ought 
morally to emulate the philanthropy of their wartime ancestors. 
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Not only anthropologists suffer vis-a-vis images of powerful war-
time actors. As Counts has pointed out, postwar government offi-
cials-both colonialist and independent-often come up second best 
when compared with military personnel (who have the further 
advantage, in most regions, of having gone away). The mundane 
regularities of contemporary life pale beside an intense period of 
traumatic events, heroic actions, movements of massive amounts of 
goods, and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of newcomers dur-
ing the 1940s. 
Tourists are another sort of postwar other. De Burlo has suggested 
that tourist-Islander interaction is flavored in part by people's war-
time images of military others. Many tourists are themselves ex-ser-
vicemen now grown old, on pilgrimages to the sites and relics of the 
battles of their youth (see Manchester 1979). De Burlo has pointed 
to current generational differences in the evaluation of tourists 
between older Islanders, who encountered military personnel them-
selves, and their children, who know the war and its actors only 
through stories. 
Changing images of the other, affected by the arrival of japanese, 
American, Australian, and New Zealand troops, have turned back 
to influence the images Islanders have of themselves. The war had 
an important impact on a generation of men and women (e.g., Grif-
fin, Nelson, and Firth 1979; Lacey 1985). The war years were a 
transitional period in the life histories of many individual Islanders. 
Culturally formed images of self and aspirations for the future were, 
for many, transformed significantly. Evidence for this is to be found 
in published autobiographies of present-day island leaders that inev-
itably devote a chapter to World War II experiences (e.g., Somare 
1970, 1975; Zoleveke 1980; Osifelo 1985). 
In some parts of the Pacific, a comparison of self with· seemingly 
all-powerful military others had humbling consequences, weakening 
people's self-images. In Sikaiana a sense of smallness and remote-
ness is projected in ironic humor. In Enewetak, too, people were 
shunted aside after the American invasion and made little contribu-
tion to the subsequent war effort. They felt belittled vis-a-vis Ameri-
cans; resultant self-images differed from earlier, more positive evalu-
ations stemming from relations with the Japanese, who had needed 
their labor to fortify the island. 
Elsewhere, however, prewar images of self in relation to other 
improved. Self-esteem and self-respect resound in many war narra-
tives that assert local contributions to the war effort. In these stories, 
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people stress the reciprocity of wartime exchange and document the 
help they offered to the Allies and the Japanese. 
In the Japanese territories of Micronesia, the need for fighters and 
skilled labor elevated the role of Islanders in the empire. In some 
islands images of warrior status were rekindled, increasing identifi-
cation with Japan. Already in 1937 Islanders from Rota, Saipan, 
and Pohnpei had petitioned to be allowed to participate as Japanese 
in the war with China (Higuchi 1986, 43). In World War II, when 
Palauan recruits were organized into a military unit, a member of 
the corps composed a patriotic song with the verse, "On our shoul-
ders rests the name of Palau, the opportunity for us to devote our-
selves to the Emperor's country, Japan, has come" (Higuchi 1986, 
44; chapter 5; and see chapter 12 for the experience of people of 
Pohnpei recruited to fight in New Guinea). 
Similar patterns emerge in the Allied colonies. Solomon Island-
ers, for example, took note of the sudden, expedient shift in prewar 
racist attitudes among colonial officers now dependent on them for 
survival. One coastwatcher's observations are typical of many dur-
ing this period: "They revealed qualities of body and mind which 
had not been suspected prior to the war and carried out tasks which 
had previously been thought to be beyond their capacities" (Horton 
1975, 226; and see British Colonial Office 1946). Many other exam-
ples could be cited of the effect of wartime involvements, especially 
the performance of combat roles, on images of Islanders, among 
both Europeans and Islanders themselves. Many Maori today see 
the raising of the Maori Battalion in New Zealand as an important 
benchmark in the revitalization of Maori identity in the twentieth 
century. Certainly Fijians look with great pride at the heroic actions 
of the much-decorated battalions that fought in the Solomons 
(Ravuvu 1974). To a somewhat lesser degree, the same can be said 
for the Solomon Islands Defence Force (White et al. 1988, chapter 3) 
and the Pacific Islands Regiment in Papua New Guinea. 
The sense of relatedness and mutual respect engendered by 
Islander contributions to the war effort was signified in a wide vari-
ety of ceremonial events. Military authorities recognized individual 
heroics with the award of decorations and medals. War heroes such 
as Sergeant Yauwika of Bougainville and Sergeant Major Jacob 
Vouza of Guadalcanal attained international prominence on the 
basis of media attention-creating suitable imagery for a new type of 
stereotype ofloyal and dedicated subjects (see, e.g., British Colonial 
Office 1946). 
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Islanders, however, went about the business of acknowledging 
and affirming their newfound relations with military others by orga-
nizing collective presentations of traditional and not-so-traditional 
gifts to various Allied "big-men." These events included untold 
numbers of feasts in which military men were given food, bestowed 
with gifts, and regaled with customary entertainment. For example, 
Tongans and Fijians repeatedly welcomed American officers with 
kava ceremonies; Fijian troops presented a whale's tooth to U.S. 
Major General Oscar W. Griswold on Bougainville; Solomon 
Islanders in 1943 took up a collection and gave American command-
ers a donation for the American Red Cross (Laracy 1983, 17); mem-
bers of the Defence Force presented Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch with 
a plaque inscribed with the words, "To the United States Navy with 
appreciation from the people of the British Solomon Islands, 
Guadalcanal, 1943"; and people from Guadalcanal, Vella Lavella, 
Green Island (Nissan), and other Christian communities near Allied 
bases erected churches and dedicated them to the units they had 
interacted with. Implicit in all of these actions is the recognition of 
mutual relations formed with significant wartime others. 
In general, a wholesale violation of symbolic boundaries of 
inequality was perpetrated: the idiom of brotherhood with military 
others, the joint engagement in similar wartime activities, and the 
example of black American troops all contributed to transformations 
in images of self. As brothers, as equals, Islanders could more 
clearly justify demands to retake control of their own homelands and 
to acquire a place within the modern world system, along with some 
of its benefits. The war in the Pacific, as in colonial areas around the 
world, impelled movements towards independence that eventually 
culminated in the political emancipation of most of the region's col-
onies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These alterations in image of 
self and other,. on the personal level, parallel the war's disruptive and 
transformational effects on Pacific politics and economy, on the 
social. 
The Local Scene: Disruptions and Transformations 
The war influenced and continues to influence conceptions of his-
tory in many Pacific societies. In the most extreme case, it partitions 
time into two eras: before the war and after the war. Like other his-
toric events meaningful enough to continue to resound in the 
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present (such as first contact with Westerners), the war serves to 
organize people's maps of the past, just as their maps of the past 
serve to organize understandings of the war. 
War disrupts everyday life, sometimes fatally. People trapped 
between two large forces intent on destroying one another will obvi-
ously find their lives disturbed by attack and counterattack, shell-
ings, and bombings. Even more disturbing in the Pacific, however, 
were the new relations of exchange and production that the war 
economy demanded. Islanders were drawn out of distant villages to 
take part in new activities and encounters. 
After the war's fronts had swept over or around particular islands, 
and after bases were rolled up, many of the people sank back into 
ordinary quietude. Social organization and the main character of 
everyday existence drifted back into prewar routines. In many com-
munities, the expansive social networks enjoyed during the war 
years shrank back to normal. Elsewhere, however, basic elements of 
village life had been undermined, if not transformed by the war, 
leading to transformations of postwar society. In the Micronesian 
islands (apart from Guam and Kiribati), thirty years of Japanese 
rule gave way to a continuing American military presence. In Papua 
New Guinea, a new breed of Australian administrators replaced 
their prewar colleagues. 
For some Islanders the war years brought death and the destruc-
tion of homes and gardens. People suffered greatly, especially on 
islands that experienced extended jungle warfare (such as Bougain-
ville and north coast New Guinea) or·amphibious assault (such as 
Enewetak). Many of the Islanders who had joined local defense 
forces and labor corps also came under fire, sometimes fighting 
other Islanders, recruited on the opposite side of the conflict. Not 
only did New Guineans fight New Guineans at various stages of the 
war, but Fijians fought Bougainvilleans (Ravuvu 1974) and Pohnpei 
people fought New Guineans serving with the Australians (Higuchi 
1986). The prolonged fighting in New Guinea left many villages 
caught in the middle, suffering extremes of deprivation, physical 
injury, and death. In several cases, new treachery was perpetrated 
along the lines of old rivalries. Ninety-six men and one woman sus-
pected of collaboration with the Australians were massacred at the 
Iatmul village of Timbunke by people from other Sepik villages act-
ing under Japanese orders (Gewertz 1983, 137). Others were cap-
tured, imprisoned, and even executed as spies by one side or the 
other. Testimony at the postwar trial of the Japanese commander on 
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New Ireland revealed that forty New Guineans had been executed 
under his command. And the executions did not stop with Allied 
victory. When the Australian authorities resumed control, ten Papu-
ans were hanged for treason (Nelson 1980b, 254; and see Waiko 
1988). 
Hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties resulted from the bomb-
ing of villages by both the Allies and Japan. Both sides targeted vil-
lages thought to be either harboring or collaborating with enemy 
forces, causing hundreds of villagers in occupied New Guinea and 
Bougainville to lose their lives. In the Solomons, where the Japanese 
occupation was briefer, villages on Choiseul were bombed for sus-
pected collaboration, and there were numerous incidents of indis-
criminate bombing. For example, Allied planes bombed Malaita vil-
lages two days in a row, resulting in at least twenty-four deaths. On 
the second occasion, the British resident commissioner wrote in his 
diary, "7 U.S. planes bombed Laulasi village-18 killed-most 
inexplicable as no enemy reported there" (Marchant, 7 August 
1942). On Santa Isabel, Defence Force scouts threatened to cease 
their coastwatching work after Allied planes bombed their home vil-
lage (Kuper 1946). 
If they became separated from sources of supply, servicemen of 
both sides were taught to live off the land-that is, off people's gar-
dens and domestic animals, in the main. In New Guinea, thousands 
of Japanese, cut off from their supply lines for months, were led in 
desperation to exploit the local communities (e.g., Lawrence 1964, 
11 0) and commit numerous atrocities. Islanders' perceptions of J ap-
anese weakness produced an increase in guerrilla actions and collab-
oration with Allied forces, which in turn evoked further retributions. 
Perhaps the most ignominious fate was that of the Arapesh individu-
als who were killed and eaten by starving members of the Japanese 
Eighteenth ArJTiy in 1945 (Tuzin 1983, 63). In Dutch New Guinea, 
where cult activity was widespread before and during the war, and 
where many actively resisted the Japanese, hundreds were killed in 
executions and punitive massacres (Worsley 1968, 142-143). 
As well as causing death and injury, fire fights damaged houses, 
gardens, and plantations. Moreover, the military preferred to situ-
ate airfields on lands already cleared (i.e., gardens). Where fighting 
was intense, people obviously had difficulty planting and harvesting 
and sometimes left their homes behind, taking to the hills to escape 
as the battle approached. Life was also hard on Japanese-controlled 
Micronesian islands that the Allied forces decided to "neutralize" by 
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cutting off supply lines. Falgout's and Nero's descriptions in this vol-
ume of the consequences of this strategy on the local populations of 
Pohnpei, Kosrae, and Palau testify to experiences of deprivation 
throughout Micronesia. 
Experiences of uprooting are frequently depicted in terms of 
oppositions of culture and nature. People who had been forced to 
abandon the order and safety of the village for life in the bush 
described that time as a liminal period of danger and uncertainty. 
For many of those living on the coast, the movement represented an 
inversion of the principles of established cultural life: they found 
themselves scattered in interior regions, eating raw foods, unable to 
worship in church, and fearing the destructive effects of war-either 
from the invaders or from a resurgence of traditional fighting (see 
chapters 9 and 11). 
Perhaps the most disruptive effects of the war were felt by Island-
ers evacuated or removed from their homes by the armies. For 
example, the Americans shipped nearly the entire population of Nis-
san (Green Island) to Guadalcanal, where many died of malaria. At 
Ulithi, site of a large Allied naval base, Islanders were concentrated 
on a few of the atoll's islets, as they were at Enewetak and elsewhere. 
Similarly, after the Americans had taken Guam and the Marianas 
from the Japanese, Islanders were gathered for a time into concen-
tration camps. 
Villages that provided workers for military labor corps also expe-
rienced at least temporary disruption of their demographic and 
social structures. Men either volunteered or were pressed into labor, 
leaving behind villages of women and children and the elderly or 
infirm. As whole regions were depleted of able-bodied men, the 
women left behind frequently composed laments to their missing rel-
atives (Waiko 1986). On Santa Isabel, the women of one area com-
posed a song cursing the recruiter, a "Mr. Jack," who appeared 
periodically in his landing craft ("open-mouth boat") to recruit 
young men. Falgout has noted among the effects of this absence of 
men in the Kitti district of Pohnpei, how visions of women's work 
capacities and roles in society were enhanced (chapter 12). 
The war precipitated other changes in island social structure and 
everyday life. In some cases, people discovered themselves caught 
up in two wars: the withering of colonial government controls per-
mitted traditional enmities to break out once again (see Gewertz 
1983, chapter 7). Lepowsky has reported how people on Sudest 
(Vanatinai) vacated coastal villages in fear of intergroup ambushes 
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The American landing on Nissan Island, 15 February 1944. (U.S. Marine 
Corps) 
and revenge killings . In the Santa Cruz Islands, although people did 
not revive warfare, with the melting away of government and mis-
sion agents some men took the opportunity to challenge and revise 
traditional social structures. On Nidu, people established a "New 
Law" movement, which deregulated marital and sexual relations 
between men and women (chapter 11 ). 
On the whole, these injuries, deaths, property damages, and pop-
ulation movements occasioned fewer enduring transformations of 
Pacific societies than did other, less cataclysmic episodes of the war. 
The consequences of the war included improved economic and polit-
ical infrastructures as well as alterations in people's skills, aspira-
tions, and self:images. To wage war, the combatants imported into 
the Pacific new technologies-part of the martial mode of produc-
tion-more complex than any seen before in the region. Alongside 
weaponry, Islanders encountered new means of communication and 
transportation as well as many novel tools and machines. On many 
islands, army engineers and naval construction battalions left 
behind improved roads, bridges, docks, new airfields, waterworks, 
and telephone systems. 
The concentration of troops in each base area created new market 
opportunities. Many Islanders living near large bases went into 
business as petty traders. On 7 May 1943, on Guadalcanal, Father 
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Emery ue Klerk wrote in his diary of observing "a whole fleet of 
native canoes travelling toward Lunga to trade with American sol-
diers." The trade in local artifacts markedly raised prices of items 
such as walking sticks, mats, and grass skirts. In Tonga, the inflation 
was gauged at 400 percent (Weeks 1987). In many areas, the influx 
of cash was a major incentive for new projects. In the words of Neli 
Lifuka of Vaitupu (Tuvalu, formerly Ellice Islands), his efforts to 
organize his people's purchase of an island in Fiji began during war-
time work for the Americans: "When I was in Funafuti, I saw that 
the Americans paid a lot of money for our mats and baskets; maybe 
two or three, sometimes five dollars. When I saw that, I made up my 
mind to collect all the money for the people in Vaitupu" (Koch 1978, 
45). On Vanatinai, government agents paid people to g;ther copal 
gum, used as varnish on naval vessels (chapter 9). M >reov<:r, the 
war's economy required large amounts of labor; recn 1ts took part 
not only in new relations of exchange with Japanese and Allied ser-
vicemen, but in novel relations of production as well. 
Across much of the Pacific, the war furthered the encroachment of 
the modern world economy. The availability on a large scale of 
imported goods such as manufactured clothing and cigarettes altered 
local consumption patterns. War stories chronicle a leap in the level 
of local integration into the world economy in this respect. Franco, 
for example, has documented the importance of military work 
opportunities in Samoa in furthering both the economic skills and 
the aspirations of Islanders. He has shown the significance of the 
World War II experience for the subsequent emergence of interna-
tional networks of Samoan movement and migration centered on 
American naval bases in Hawaii and California. 
One facet of integration into the world economy is the growth of 
tourism in the Pacific. The war left behind a legacy of airfields, 
roads, and jet-plane technology that constitutes the infrastructure of 
regional tourism. Moreover, the seashells, ersatz traditional grass 
skirts, and other curios people learned to.make and sell to service-
men in the 1940s are now offered to tourists instead. 
The war affected political relations as well. In some areas, colonial 
penetration and control of island societies were enhanced. In gen-
eral, improved communication and transportation systems facilitat-
ed colonial control when the administrations were restored after the 
war. For instance, on Vanatinai, government agents and mission-
aries were able to establish a continuing presence for the first time 
and proceeded to reorganize settlement and subsistence practices. In 
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some areas, the positive image Islanders had constructed of British 
and Australian servicemen became tarnished. Postwar colonial 
agents, reestablishing real and symbolic relationships of inequality, 
confiscated much of the cash and other goods Islanders had received 
from servicemen. Many war stories in this volume include bitter 
comments on this negative exchange (see also Robinson 1981, 79, 
173; White et al. 1988). 
Although the war may have enhanced the ability of colonial gov-
ernments to control village life, it also fueled local movements that 
disputed that authority. The demographic consequences of large-
scale mobility-set in train by wartime labor recruiters-precipi-
tated new social unities. Despite obvious dangers, the war greatly 
improved transportation and communication in the Pacific, and 
many Islanders traveled (sometimes voluntarily, sometimes not) as 
they had not before and have not since. Increased mobility furthered 
people's access to knowledge. Moreover, the recruitment of men 
from various islands broadened social as well as informational 
exchange networks. 
For much of the Pacific, the war came at a time of increasing rest-
lessness with entrenched colonial regimes (Read 194 7; Inglis 1969). 
Local autonomy and participation in political structures were 
already expressed issues of concern (Keesing 1978). Many have 
noted the importance of the war for subsequent political develop-
ment and the formation of independent island nations (e.g., Bel-
shaw 1950, 70; Guiart 1951; Oliver 1961, 395; Grattan 1963, 516; 
Brookfield 1972, 96-97). Others have suggested that anticolonialist 
ideals were circulated in wartime encounters between Islanders and 
servicemen-particularly Americans (e.g., Laracy 1983, 36). Brit-
ish authorities in the Solomon Islands, concerned with increasingly 
vocal demands for political autonomy, attributed much of their trou-
ble to the corruptive influence of American servicemen. One writer 
commented that Solomon Islanders "had been saturated with foolish 
anti-European-British propaganda by some-quite a lot-foolish 
Americans" (Burrows 1950, 37, quoted in Fifi'i and Akin 1988, 
217). Even more important, no doubt, were the increased and wider 
opportunities for Islanders to converse with one another. 
New solidarities among Islanders were apparent in a number of 
strikes organized by labor corps bosses in New Caledonia and on 
Guadalcanal (White et al. 1988). Ideas and aspirations shaped by 
wartime encounters were also articulated by ex-laborers who joined 
postwar movements around the Pacific, including that led by Pouva-
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Alex Kwaisufu observing Lieutenant Charles Schuman filling out an 
absentee ballot on Guadalcanal, October 1943. (U.S. Army Signal Corps) 
naa in Tahiti; Maasina Rule in the Solomon Islands (Keesing 1978; 
Laracy 1983); the movement led by Buriga in the Calvados chain of 
Papua New Guinea, advocating the killing of all Europeans and 
part-Europeans (chapter 9); and the John Frum Movement in 
Vanuatu (chapter 1 7). 
On Enewetak, an annual rite of intensification, Raan in Kamolol 
'day to be thankful', brings together the war's survivors and their 
descendants to celebrate the anniversary of the end of the battle for 
the island, serving to affirm island solidarity. Here, a wartime event 
stands as a core unifying symbol for a people who have come 
through both the disruptions of the war and the subsequent use of 
their atoll as a site for postwar atomic testing. Exchange visits 
between villages in Palau, during which people tell war stories and 
enact shared deprivations in skits and songs, play a similar unifying 
role. 
On a personal level, wartime encounters drew to the fore a new 
generation of island leaders, many of whose political goals were 
enlarged by these experiences. Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo have pur-
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sued this theme of personal transformation: the effect of the war on 
the lives of those who lived through it. They followed the life histo-
ries of two men from Malaita, Arnon Ngwadili and Isaac Gafu, and 
the opportunities the war provided for these men to attain and 
strengthen the personal roles each desired. 
Similarly Zelenietz and Saito have described the war's signifi-
cance for the career ofTave, a New Britain leader. A parallel case in 
the Santa Cruz Islands is that of Mepuke, a community leader and 
advocate of modernization, who volunteered to work at an Ameri-
can coastwatching station (chapter 11 ). Conversely, island leaders 
who responded favorably to the japanese repulsion of European col-
onists lost their positions, and sometimes their freedom or their 
lives, after the war. For example, one of the most prominent Solo-
mon Islanders of his time, George Bogese, a literate and educated 
man who was among the first native medical practitioners trained in 
Fiji, was interned in Australia for three and a half years during the 
war. Later he was sentenced to another four years in prison for trea-
sonous acts (which were probably aimed at settling old scores with a 
domineering colonial officer). 
Many of the relics of war-smashed planes, beached landing 
barges, sunken ships, and abandoned weaponry-are still visible at 
important battle sites. Other "relics" of war are those movements in 
village political and economic life the war set into play. Not always 
obvious, nor always immediate, the war's transformational effects 
are nonetheless preceptible in Pacific societies, oral traditions, and 
individual life histories today. For many people, these changes began 
when they joined the war to fight and work. 
Joining In: Fighting and Working 
Some of the most sustained wartime encounters were those of fight-
ing and working. Instead of experiencing intense, brief encounters 
with passing combat units, Islanders became absorbed by the war 
effort, participating in its martial economy as scouts, soldiers, 
coastwatchers, and workers. Falgout, for example, has told of 
twenty-seven Pohnpei people recruited by the Japanese to fight in 
Papua New Guinea; twenty-three of them died there. Franco has 
discussed the wartime enlargement of American Samoa's Fitafita 
guard and its training to defend the island from attack. In Samoa, 
opportunities for military recruitment-much augmented during 
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Members ofB Company, First New Guinea Infantry Battalion on their way 
to Pomio village on Jacquinot Bay, New Britain, to establish their head-
quarters, 6 November 1944. Company Sergeant Kube stands with knife. 
(Australian War Memorial) 
the war-have been transformed into a permanent employment 
(and retirement) strategy. Many young men today follow their 
fathers or grandfathers into the U.S. military. In Fiji, Fijians 
enlisted eagerly into new combat battalions. More than 2200 partici-
pated in the Allied campaign in the Solomons, where they fought as 
guerrilla units as well as more orthodox infantry troops (Ravuvu 
1974, 57). In Papua New Guinea, more than 3500 Melanesians had 
served in the Pacific Islands Regiment (Papuan Infantry Battalion 
and the First and Second New Guinea Infantry Battalions) by the 
end of the war (Nelson 1980a, 19) . The Solomon Islands Defence 
Force, formed in 1939, grew to about .four hundred men as it 
absorbed members of the Armed Constabulary and other hastily 
trained recruits to work as scouts and fighters stipporting coast-
watchers and Allied military units (Horton 1975; Lord 1977; White 
et al. 1988). 
In chapter 14, Boutilier has documented one of the most active 
units of island soldiers: a small "army" of Solomon Islanders who 
served under the harsh and eccentric British colonial officer Donald 
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Kennedy. As the only British presence in the Western Solomons dur-
ing the early months of Japanese occupation, Kennedy moved his 
operations from place to place, eventually establishing a base at 
Seghe on New Georgia. He recruited men from several islands, 
including Rennell, Santa Isabel, and New Georgia to coastwatch, to 
scout enemy positions, and to rescue downed flyers. His men also 
went into action against the enemy. Boutilier has described a num-
ber of successful engagements in which Islanders killed or captured 
Japanese soldiers and sailors (see also British Colonial Office 1946; 
Bennett, Gegeo, and White 1988; Lord 1977, 201). 
Other Islanders joined wartime labor corps in large numbers. In 
many cases they eagerly sought out opportunities to work for the 
Japanese or the Allies. However, many in Papua New Guinea, 
Guam, and elsewhere in Micronesia during the latter years of the 
war found themselves forced into labor (Robinson 1981; chapter 
12). The length of time their labor was required varied from place to 
place. In Papua New Guinea and some Micronesian islands, many 
recruits did not see their homes again for more than two years. Else-
where, tours of duty were short-officially, three months in Vanu-
atu. Even so, working encounters in many cases had lasting effects. 
In many areas of Japanese Micronesia, Islanders volunteered to 
work for victory (Higuchi 1986). In occupied Melanesia, the Japa-
nese also employed local people. Behind the Allied lines, the U.S. 
military employed some 1500 New Caledonians out of an indige-
nous population of approximately 30,000. In Vanuatu, nearly 2000 
worked at various times at the American bases on Efate and Espiritu 
Santo. In Fiji, 1375 men had joined the First Battalion, Fiji Labour 
Corps, by the end of 1942. A company of these men subsequently 
embarked for Bougainville to work as stevedores at the base at 
Torokina. 
In the Solomon Islands, more than 3700 men worked o.n Guadal-
canal, Tulagi, the Russells, and New Georgia (White et al. 1988). 
Those on Guadalcanal were joined by 400 Gilbert Islanders for-
merly employed on the Lever plantations but prevented from 
returning home by the Japanese advance. Monthly labor strengths 
in Papua New Guinea peaked at nearly 38,000 men in June 1944 
(just prior to the war the total number of Papua New Guineans 
working on plantation contracts was only about 50,000 [Nelson 
1980b, 248]). The wartime figure does not count an unknown num-
ber of other laborers working for the Americans as well as for the 
Japanese in what was then Dutch New Guinea. As late as January 
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Solomon Islands Labour Corps workers packing a trunk with clothing and 
other possessions, Guadalcanal , 16 September 1943 . (U.S. Marine Corps) 
1945-after the action of battle had shifted far to the northwest-at 
least 700 men still worked for the Americans in Samoa, 229 in Fiji, 
and 137 at Funafuti, Tuvalu . In addition to regular labor corps 
recruits, large numbers oflslanders worked for the military as casual 
or day-laborers. 
At these bases, workers established new and extended social net-
works. In general , the war's communicative and transportation sys-
tems contributed to a widening world. People from Sapwuahfik 
moved to work for the Japanese on Pohnpei. There, they met and 
established enduring social relations with both Pohnpeians and their 
co-workers from other islands of Micronesia. Some also went as far 
as the Marshalls. Meanwhile, nearly two hundred men from Kitti 
district, Pohnpei, were shipped to Kosrae, where they encountered 
Koreans and Gilbertese already working for the Japanese. The 
Allies' base at Milne Bay attracted workers from many of the islands 
of southeastern Papua New Guinea, including Vanatinai. Young 
men from Normanby also worked at Giligili and other Milne Bay 
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Province bases. Recruits from the Santa Cruz Islands traveled west 
to work on Guadalcanal alo:1gside hundreds from Malaita and 
Guadalcanal itself. A thousand men from Tanna shipped north to 
the U.S. base on Efate. 
World War II-in Pacific perspective-might be considered an 
alien affair, the outcome of disputes over resources and sea lanes 
between competing imperial powers. It was nevertheless fought on, 
over, and around the homelands of Pacific Islanders. Many were 
caught up and transformed by supporting the Japanese or the Allies 
as workers and fighters. In documenting these contributions, island 
war stories assimilate alien events into local systems of historical 
understanding. 
Conclusion: The Pacific Theater 
In the Pacific theater, Islanders were much more than spectators. 
They were actors in a double sense. First, many took part in the play 
of battle as fighters, scouts, coastwatchers, carriers, stretcher-bear-
ers, and victims-roles mostly unknown before 1941. More impor-
tantly, Islanders have continued to enact the events of the war in the 
retelling. The Pacific theater survives only as long as its stories. The 
war exists now in Pacific communities as story, and "warriors" as 
storytellers. The active, continual retelling maintains, and also 
reworks, the script and the meanings of the war. Island storytellers 
are dramatic agents, who, continually booking the theater, serve to 
reinterpret the past so that it makes useful sense in the present. 
Will these war narratives and songs survive, particularly given the 
passing of the generation for whom they record personal experience? 
There are generational differences in interpretations of th~ war and 
its various actors. The perspective of those who lived through the 
war is fed from ·more sources than that of the younger generation, 
who know it only through the stories. Older people in Vanuatu, for 
example, entertain images of the United States that are considerably 
more charitable (some might say bemused) than those held by their 
sons and daughters educated in Suva or Port Moresby. Through its 
stories, the older generation may also lay claim to intimate acquain-
tance with cataclysmic events, marvels unknown since, and a daring 
spirit it sees lacking in the young. 
Rights to stories, however, are complex. Where the hero still 
lives, he alone may control the right to draw ultimate conclusions 
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Marshall Islands children read American magazines on Majuro, 1945. 
(U.S. Navy) 
from the tale. Although others may tell his story, his is the right to 
correct (Lindstrom 1984). But stories are property and are inherited 
as such in many Pacific societies. Where a person's heroic narratives 
are not inherited, war stories may eventually be silenced by the pass-
ing of their heroes. However, in many of the societies in which the 
war first played, the Pacific theater might expect a longer run. 
It is not uncommon in Pacific narrative traditions for the teller to 
assume the place of the hero; the tale is told using the first personal 
pronoun "I" ( cf. Sahlins 1983, 523). In this manner, those born 
after 1945 may sometimes take on wartime roles of worker, fighter, 
or spectator of prodigies. Ultimately, the personal recollections that 
war stories store and circulate transform in this way into shared his-
torical understandings of the past, of time, of self, and of the relation 
of that self to the outside world. 
The survival of war stories and songs-the inheritance of the iden-
tity "war hero" -hangs upon their meanings in the present. Those 
that endure may possess various utilities. If some of them continue 
to capture the imagination of local audiences in the Pacific, it is 
because they encapsulate common conceptions of history that con-
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tribute to a sense of self. These stories have become a facet of Island-
ers' shared identity, worked out across a long span of history encom-
passing the war epoch. Other war stories are like traditional myths 
and legends in that they transmit key pieces of culture from one gen-
eration to another. These, too, are good to remember. And others, 
in recoding events of an anomalous time, offer meaningful commen-
tary on the current state of social relationships within a society, and 
with the much larger world outside. Drama in the Pacific theater can 
have many plots. 
The capacity of war stories to shoulder these several semantic 
loads is not surprising given their content. They are tales of cultural 
contact of the most massive sort. Cross-cultural encounters are par-
ticularly salient foci for the production of narrative and the elabora-
tion of histories. As Basso (1979) and others have demonstrated, 
local accounts of interactions with outsiders frequently express key 
moral problems and delineate the bounds of collective identity. 
Insofar as they sediment into memory, stories about the Pacific 
War become part of the historical "archives" of Pacific societies (see 
Waiko 1986). Formalized as accounts of individual experiences and 
encounters, they compose an interpretation of world events in such a 
way that they speak to and affirm the village community; they repre-
sent an accounting and domestication of alien but deadly powers, a 
construal of exotic others that makes sense of the self. It is fitting that 
this volume interpret and extend the multiple lines of narrative 
thought that continue to affirm the distinctive identity and history of 
local Pacific communities. 
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PART II 
Island Selves and 
Wartime Others 
CHAPTER 2 
Histories of Contact, Narratives of Self: 
Wartime Encounters in Santa Isabel 
GEOFFREY M. WHITE 
THE ANTHROPOLOGY of the Pacific Islands indicates that first 
encounters with outsiders mark significant moments in local cultural 
histories (Young 1977; Sahlins 1985; Waiko 1986). This is especially 
so for contacts with powerful others who pose dilemmas for existing 
structures of power and meaning. The retelling of these historic con-
tacts provides an idiom for self-representation-a means by which 
people make statements about themselves in relation to a wider 
world (Basso 1979). Because World War II led to massive contacts 
with exotic new outsiders, it generated an extensive oral tradition of 
war stories about cross-cultural encounters. In this chapter I suggest 
that interpretation of these histories may shed significant light on 
broader aspects of island culture, society, and conceptions of self. 
One of the most consistent themes in discussions of the effects of 
the war on Island cultures is the importance of interpersonal 
encounters with the military personnel of America, Australia, and 
Japan. As Kenneth Read ( 194 7) noted in his discussion of the after-
math of the war in the Markham Valley of Papua New Guinea, the 
infusion of large numbers of Australian troops whose behavior 
toward New Guineans was quite different from that of their colonial 
predecessors induced a restructuring of cultural categories used to 
code relations with outsiders. Understanding the local significance 
of wartime encounters, and determining their sociohistorical effects, 
requires a look at the ways they have been interpreted, remembered, 
and reproduced within island forms of narrative and history (Sahlins 
1985). 
Santa Isabel stories about wartime others fit within a genre of his-
torical narrative concerned with first contacts. The prototype for this 
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genre is the story of th~ arrival of ~issionaries and _conversion to 
Christianity-a story With many vanants as people m each locale 
retell the legendary exploits of missionaries and ancestors who first 
brought Christianity to their region (White n.d. ). In both epochs of 
contact-the arrival of missionaries and World War II-certain 
events, encoded in narrative, have taken on mythic status as they 
have been retold over time, sometimes in ceremonial contexts ( cf. 
chapters 3, 10). This chapter examines one such story, an account of 
the arrival of Japanese forces in the Maringe Lagoon. The analysis 
asks what social and moral messages are represented in the narrative 
and what communicative forms are used to deploy them. As others 
have noted (Fussell 1975), the literary forms used to retell the past 
shape the meaning of events represented. The narrator of this text 
makes artful use of humor and irony to describe interactions with 
wartime others and convey his portrait of self and community ( cf. 
chapter 10). 
War Comes to the Solomons 
The experiences of Pacific Islanders with the warring forces during 
World War II vary greatly. Some of the differences depend on geo-
graphic position in relation to territories occupied by the Japanese 
that subsequently became the sites of major battles as Allied forces 
pushed them out. The four thousand or so people of Santa Isabel 
found themselves located between two major battlegrounds-Gua-
dalcanal to the east and New Georgia to the west-and host to one of 
the largest Japanese bases established in the Solomons, a seaplane 
base and barge-staging point at Suavana plantation on Rakata Bay 
(usually spelled Rekata in war histories). The Japanese began sur-
veying the Isabel base during the month prior to the American land-
ing on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and used it extensively in 
their efforts to retake that island. At its peak, Rakata is estimated to 
have supported between three and four thousand troops (Andresen 
n.d., 6), nearly equal to the total indigenous population of the island 
at that time. Although the Japanese did not occupy other parts of the 
island, their arrival by the thousands and the presence oflarge num-
bers of ships and planes marked a unique period of massive intru-
sion by outsiders. The story told here focuses on the moment when 
Japanese forces first contacted people in the Maringe area-the day 
eleven Japanese ships sailed into their lagoon. 
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In contrast, the Americans never established a base on Santa Isa-
bel, although their presence was felt almost daily as planes flew over-
head, frequently bombing Rakata and its surroundings. In addition, 
ships passing on the horizon and distant explosions rumbling 
through the night were constant reminders of the conflict raging on 
neighboring islands. The American presence on Santa Isabel was 
limited to occasional downed pilots and a couple of reconnaissance 
patrols sent in after the Japanese evacuation. An American landing 
on Isabel was avoided when the Japanese withdrew from Rakata in 
the face of the Allied advance up the Solomons chain. By the end of 
August 1943, just one year after the Japanese moved in, they had 
completely evacuated their forces from Santa Isabel. During the 
period of Japanese occupation, the primary contact between Isabel 
people and Americans came as island scouts and villagers joined in 
efforts to rescue downed fliers and return them to their bases (Kuper 
1946; Lord 1977; Zaku et al. 1988). The greatest amount of sus-
tained contact with Americans came as hundreds of able-bodied 
Islanders recruited during 1944 and 1945 to work at U.S. supply 
bases, primarily the base established in the Russell Islands. Any-
where from half to three-fourths of the men in the Maringe villages 
signed on for six-month contracts in the Solomon Islands Labour 
Corps. 
To put wartime experiences in cultural perspective, it is necessary 
to step back and see the war in relation to the longer sweep of colo-
nial history. Like others in island Melanesia, most people in Santa 
Isabel considered themselves, by the 1930s, part of a wider world, 
living lives changed markedly by missionary and colonial institu-
tions. In 1942 everyone on the island was a baptized Christian, par-
ticipating extensively in Christian ceremonial life (specifically, the 
Anglican Church of Melanesia). In keeping with the entrepreneurial 
spirit that has been described throughout Melanesia, many Island-
ers were actively seeking material improvement through agricultural 
and commercial endeavors. The first organized rumblings of discon-
tent with the colonial government were heard in the late 1930s as 
local leaders ofboth church and government sought educational and 
economic advancement (White 1980). 
Prior to the war, experience with outsiders was largely limited to 
interactions with missionaries, plantation managers, and colonial 
officers of either British, New Zealand, or Australian extraction. 
Contact with the wider world was routed through mission institu-
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tions, with numerous young men educated in mission schools in 
other parts of the Solomons and the South Pacific. For others, ave-
nues to experience outside Santa Isabel included signing on as plan-
tation labor or ship's crew. In most cases, young men returned home 
after only a year or two away. 
By early 1942, Santa Isabel was an island profoundly altered by 
conversion to Christianity, but only minimally affected by economic 
changes occurring elsewhere in the region. Because it was regarded 
as fixed firmly within the orbit of the Melanesian Mission, it had 
been largely ignored by the colonial government (except for the 
imposition of taxes initiated in 1921 ). No roads had been built and 
most transportation was by foot or canoe. No more than a handful of 
Europeans lived on the island-one missionary teacher (Emily 
Sprott, the widow of a priest), several plantation managers, and a 
district officer who occasionally resided at the district station at 
Tataba in the Bughotu area. 
Their relative isolation did not dampen people's fascination with 
news of the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the Allies. 
Since even the combatants were amazed at two great powers turning 
a remote chain of islands into a major battleground, it is not surpris-
ing that the Islanders may have been baffled by news of impending 
conflict. The representatives of the British empire did their best to 
put the Japanese advance into perspective. After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, and with the Japanese military moving relentlessly toward 
the Solomons in January 1942, District Officer Donald Kennedy 
(see chapter 14) was given responsibility for touring the entire West-
ern Solomons, including Santa Isabel, to instruct villagers about the 
likelihood of Japanese occupation. The message was essentially that 
Japanese forces might well occupy the area, forcing a temporary 
withdrawal of the colonial government, but the American military 
would not be far behind to assist with reestablishment of British rule. 
The story presented here refers to the government's (i.e., Kenne-
dy's) instructions to evacuate coastal villages in the event of Japa-
nese landings and to await eventual assistance from the Americans. 
People living along the coast, such as those of Buala village on the 
Maringe Lagoon, waited in suspense to see whether the Japanese or 
the Americans would arrive and what would happen next. The story 
focuses on just what did happen next: the arrival of Japanese ships in 
the lagoon. It is difficult to fix the precise dates of the events referred 
to in the text, but it is clear that the encounter occurred in the period 
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ofJuly-August 1942, at a time of maximum uncertainty, when Brit-
ish administrators had withdrawn, the Americans had not yet 
arrived, and the Japanese were moving into the Solomons. 1 
Prior to the Battle of the Coral Sea ( 4-6 May 1942), when J apa-
nese plans for a naval invasion of Port Moresby were thwarted, the 
Solomon Islands played only a minor role in the much larger drama 
unfolding in Papua New Guinea. But, as Rabaul was turned into 
the largest Japanese base in the South Pacific-an armed fortress 
with port facilities and numerous airfields-pressure quickly mount-
ed on the besieged British protectorate to the south. Only forty miles 
southeast of Isabel, the capital at Tulagi on N ggela was bombed 
repeatedly beginning in January 1942, hastening evacuation of 
European residents. These activities culminated in the unopposed 
Japanese occupation of Tulagi on 3 May. In anticipation, Resident 
Commissioner William Sydney Marchant had already moved his 
headquarters across the Indispensable Strait to Auki on Malaita. 
With the arrival of the Japanese at Tulagi, Marchant and most of his 
group, including the Anglican bishop of the Melanesian Mission, 
moved farther into the Malaita bush, where they remained until 
after the American counterattack (see chapter 15). A few former dis-
trict officers and other colonial auxiliaries, supported by cadres of 
Solomon Islanders (mainly former police), began operations behind 
the lines on Japanese-occupied islands as coastwatchers, radioing 
reports on the movements of Japanese ships, planes, and troops (see 
chapter 14; Horton 1975; Lord 1977). 
Two coastwatching posts were established on Santa Isabel. The 
first was set up by Geoffrey Kuper, a part-European medical practi-
tioner, at Tataba, former site of the district office at the southern end 
ofthe island. Kuper was sent out with a radio set on 18 August 1942, 
less than two weeks after the American landings on N ggela and 
Guadalcanal, anq just as the Japanese were moving into their base 
at Rakata Bay. At that time, only three other coastwatchers operated 
beyond Kuper in the critical area north of Guadalcanal-Kennedy 
on New Georgia (chapter 14) and two others on Bougainville. 
Kuper and his party of twelve Isabel scouts were kept busy rescuing 
downed American fliers2 but soon realized they were too distant 
from the Rakata Bay base in the northwestern sector of the island. 
So early in January 1943 a second coastwatching station was set up 
by an Australian officer3 supported by Isabel scouts and former 
police. It was positioned literally on top of the Japanese base, located 
on a hill (Mogao) about four and one-half miles inland, overlooking 
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the Rakata facility. With these two radio posts as the nuclei for 
reconnaissance, virtually the entire island was mobilized to relay 
information about Japanese troop movements and assist with the 
return of American pilots during the year of Japanese occupation 
(Kuper 1946; Zaku et al. 1988). 
The single wartime activity that touched the lives of many Santa 
Isabel people in their own villages was the rescue of downed pilots, 
both American and Japanese. The narrator of the story that follows 
referred to the evenhanded attitude of the time: American pilots 
were picked up and delivered to Geoffrey Kuper, and Japanese 
pilots were often returned to their base at Rakata Bay (although 
scouts on Santa Isabel were also active capturing Japanese pilots and 
turning them over to Allied forces). In the story, the motivation for 
this humanitarian practice is explicit: "fear" that one side or the 
other would regard the local populace as allied with the enemy and 
take retribution. The attitude of many Isabel people toward the war 
is best summed up in a local string-figure game called "big fight," 
which depicts two armies annihilating each other. 
A small number of Isabel men, primarily those who had been 
police prior to the war, served as members of the Solomon Islands 
Defence Force, 4 working closely with the coastwatchers in the day-
to-day coordination of reconnaissance. One man in particular, the 
headman at Buala, was charged with organizing local surveillance of 
the Rakata Bay area and is remembered for his incredible success in 
deceiving the Japanese commander. He is said to have formed a 
friendship with the commander that gained him access to the full 
layout of the base. On repeated visits he noted the location of arma-
ments and troops and relayed the information back to the Allies 
through the coastwatchers. His success in this deception has become 
part of island lore about the war (see Zaku et al. 1988) and has fig-
ured in written histories of coastwatching activities (Horton 1975, 
146-147; Lord 1977, 166; Feldt 1979, 112; Rhoades 1982, 43). Isa-
bel police or scouts also captured several Japanese pilots and, on one 
occasion, attacked and killed twenty-five Japanese attempting to 
return by barge to the Rakata Bay base (Kuper 1946, 6; Zaku et al. 
1988; PIM 1973). 
These more dramatic activities of the Isabel coastwatchers and 
scouts-capturing and attacking Japanese-make up a significant 
portion of the stories about the war that continue to circulate. Once I 
expressed my own interest in recording war stories, I was referred to 
surviving members of the main group of scouts as the source of 
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important recollections. But the story that is the focus of this chapter 
is somewhat less dramatic. It is about the experiences of ordinary 
people who encountered the Japanese and the interactions that fol-
lowed. The narrator self-mockingly told how he chose to flee rather 
than face these warriors. His story has attained legendary status 
through frequent retelling and through being encoded in a ballad 
commemorating the same events. 
The Story 
When I arrived in Santa Isabel for the first time in 1975, I went to 
Buala village, the seat of the district government, to make the 
acquaintance of various local leaders before taking up residence in 
an outlying village. One of the people whose names I had been given 
was Nathaniel Hebala, the most respected chief in the area and third 
son of the island's first indigenous Christian priest, Hugo Hebala. 
In line with his reputation as the leading entrepreneur in local poli-
tics and business, Hebala quickly became my host, informant, and 
adviser. He also acted as advocate for my studies of language and 
"custom," suggesting appropriate people to seek out on points of 
tradition and history. 
Although he frequently deferred to others on matters related to 
precontact traditions, Hebala talked enthusiastically about his own 
life history and the changes that have occurred on the island since he 
was born in 1913. During the many hours we spent sitting on his 
verandah, Hebala would frequently slip into a narrative mode and 
recall events of the past, either his own or that of the community. His 
stories often dealt with local history, how things had come to be the 
way they are, how church and government had come to the island, 
epidemics that once decimated whole populations, and, especially, 
World War II. · 
As a topic of anthropological investigation, war stories did not at 
first particularly interest me. Yet, Hebala enjoyed telling them, and 
others besides myself enjoyed listening to them. One reason these 
stories made for good storytelling sessions during my visit was that 
they established a link between myself and my hosts-particularly 
those who recalled the time other Americans first arrived in signifi-
cant numbers. The villagers' questions about what my father had 
done during the war and my answers about his part in the European 
theater provided confirmation of some degree of mutual knowledge, 
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of possible connections between otherwise disparate worlds (see 
chapter 7). 
However, the ease with which the war became the topic of conver-
sations between Santa Isabel people and myself indicates that more 
was going on here than people reaching for some form of connection 
with an American visitor. Many stories and songs about the war cir-
culate among Isabel audiences without the presence of an outsider. 
Some have become routinized through repetition and even ceremo-
nial performance. During my second visit to Buala, Hebala ar-
ranged for a group of women to sing a number of songs deemed 
suited for the "anthropological record." One of these, composed by 
Hebala's eldest brother, was about the war. Like many such histori-
cal ballads, it commemorated the war era in terms of significant 
places and events, sketching relations among its key actors-in this 
case Islanders, Japanese, and Americans. 5 
When I returned to Maringe for a brief visit in 1983, I again 
found myself sitting on Hebala's verandah listening to some of the 
very same stories I had first heard nearly ten years earlier. Only this 
time I came with a specific interest in recollections of the war, so I 
asked Hebala to repeat some of his stories for tape recording. He 
gladly agreed and set about "setting the stage" for telling and 
recording the stories. That evening, he invited two other men 
known for their wartime experiences to gather with family members 
and assorted others in his house for a session of storytelling and tape 
recording. Once everyone was settled and the tape recorder situated 
prominently on a table in the middle· of the room, Hebala launched 
into his narrative. The story is given in translation in the appendix. 6 
Hebala's narrative is built around one incident: the arrival of 
eleven Japanese ships in the Maringe Lagoon and subsequent events 
involving the people of Buala village. Hebala, whose house today 
sits about thirty yards from the lagoon shoreline, played a key role as 
one of two men who first made face-to-face contact with the Japa-
nese. In other words, he is an engaged storyteller, reenacting his 
own experiences with a sense of drama and humor. Based on my 
recollection of his account of these events on other occasions, the 
recorded version given in the appendix closely matches earlier tell-
ings. To summarize briefly, the story is about Hebala's encounter 
with the Japanese, followed by their coming ashore to collect food 
and water supplies. After five days they make a hasty exit as two 
American dive-bombers attack and sink several ships outside the 
lagoon. The narrative concludes with brief reference to the activities 
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of coastwatchers on the island. Although Hebala did not stop talking 
at the end of the text shown in the appendix, he did give closure to 
the story. Even though he had, at the end of the story, begun talking 
more broadly about the various fantastic events that occurred during 
the war, he twice framed the major topic of interest: the first encoun-
ter with Japanese. At one point he said, "That's how it was, we just 
saw the Japanese, the first Japanese to come here, in 1942." And, 
after briefly raising the topic of coastwatching and rescuing downed 
pilots, he again concluded, "That's how it was. That's all I know 
about. That's how we saw the Japanese when they first came." 
The Ironies of Power 
Like most stories of the war on Santa Isabel, this one begins with ref-
erence to the oncoming Japanese occupation. The list of occupied 
regions, including Bougainville and Guadalcanal, makes it clear 
that, at the time of the story, 7 Isabel was inside the perimeter of J ap-
anese-held territory. By stating that the rumored American coun-
terinvasion had not yet occurred, the story locates its events in a 
period of heightened uncertainty when the colonial world was dis-
solving and people were waiting for the arrival of yet unseen forces. 
This uncertainty sets up a framework for the story's humor and 
irony as Hebala and his companion set out to greet the newly arrived 
ships, thinking they may be American. 
The story begins to evoke laughter from its audience with the sud-
den revelation, conveyed by the storyteller's startled amazement, 
that the ships are Japanese. Of the two canoes that ventured out 
from different points to meet the ships, the larger one, with several 
men aboard, just kept on paddling, fleeing to one of the lagoon 
islands. This imi?ediate, fearful reaction, fleeing into the distance, 
establishes the vulnerability of the local populace and sets the tone of 
humorous self-deprecation that characterizes much of the narrative. 
The rapid withdrawal of the larger canoe signifies local inabilities 
that seem all the more amusing for their exaggerated proportions in 
the presence of a major military force ( cf. chapter 6). If the sudden 
departure of the large canoe is amusing, the panic and confusion of 
Hebala and his partner in their small dugout canoe are even more 
so. Once they realize their mistake, the duo suddenly begins pad-
dling in opposite directions in an uncoordinated effort to flee. 
Hebala not only describes this confusion, but enacts it, with frantic 
paddling gestures accompanying the conversation in the canoe. 
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The humor, evident in Hebala's display of desperation, stems in 
part from the incongruous juxtaposition of a small dugout canoe and 
eleven Japanese warships. This overwhelming force establishes a 
sense of danger, as well as providing the background against which 
Hebala's response and those of others take on further meaning as the 
narrative progresses. The foreign military force is obviously an omi-
nous and superior power, but the ultimate failure of that force to 
enter into enduring (exchange) relations with Maringe people cre-
ates an ironic counterpoint to the themes of fear and intimidation 
(see below and cf. chapter 10). 
That the Japanese force was regarded as seriously threatening is 
undeniable. The sudden intrusion of warships and armed troops 
established the kind of imminent danger that frames many stories of 
wartime events. Hebala's narrative clearly portrays a life-and-death 
situation, not just by referring to the guns trained on him and his 
companion, but by quoting the characters' thoughts as they recog-
nize that they may die but decide to proceed anyway (a standard 
rhetorical device in local narrative): 
[T]he Japanese are looking our way and holding their guns like they 
want to shoot us. They say, "Come! Come! If you don't come we'll 
shoot you now." So, of the two of us, one man paddles [forward] and 
one man goes backward. "Hey! Man, now we are going to die!" "If 
that's the case, it doesn't matter if we die, whether we go back or 
whether we go on, we're going to die anyway." "Let's go ahead." 
Of course, the narrator and his companion did not die. With a bit 
of what Americans would call "fast talking," the two paddlers made 
their escape back to shore. After telling the Japanese what they 
apparently wanted to hear-that there was plenty of food in the area 
available for the taking-Hebala and his partner were allowed to 
return to shore with the understanding that they should begin to 
gather food. Once ashore, however, Hebala "just ran away, to the 
bush," while the other man "looked all over the place for oranges." 
Reciprocity Denied 
Hebala's account of his interactions with the Japanese does more 
than describe a single tense encounter and a narrow escape. It con-
denses much broader understandings about relations between Isabel 
people and outsiders (cf. Basso 1979; chapter 3). Hebala succinctly 
portrays a posture of engagement with the Japanese occupiers that 
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Tulagi people selling grass skirts to sailors on the USS Nicholas anchored in 
Purvis Bay, 22 August 1943. (U.S. Navy) 
was characteristic of the war era and evident in other Isabel stories 
as well. While seeming to comply with the powerful outsiders, 
Hebala and his partner perpetrate a deliberate deception that allows 
them to escape. An important element in this deception is the pre-
tense of compliance, enacted as a gross caricature of the ignorant 
and foolish "native," willing and even eager to give away food 
resources for the asking. 
In spite of their fear, Hebala and his companion paddle forward in 
compliance with the beckoning Japanese. Hebala then responds to 
their inquiries about the availability of food with eager and rapid 
agreement, repeating "Ya, ya, ya" with an exaggerated nodding of 
the head . The interaction is portrayed as a rapid sequence of ques-
tions and answers in which the Japanese inquire about the availabil-
ity of various foods and Hebala promises whatever they ask for-in 
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abundance. Hebala's answers, given without hesitation or qualifica-
tion, exemplify feigned submission, displayed with the goal of stay-
ing alive: 
"Are there any oranges (ashore)?" 
"Ya, ya, ya, oranges!" ... 
"What about papayas?" they ask again. 
"Oh, plenty of papayas in Buala." 
"What about yams, chickens?" 
"Oohhh, really a lot!" 
That's how the two of us stayed alive. 
It is significant that the opening scenario in this first encounter 
involves a transaction for food. Although this may seem incidental to 
the narrator's concern with saving his life, food and the transactions 
that surround it constitute the essence of the relationship (or lack 
thereof) emerging in the story between the Japanese and the people 
ofBuala village. Food, or rather the exchange offood, is the primary 
medium for the creation and expression of mutual social relations in 
Isabel society (cf. chapter 15). The Japanese quest for food and their 
failure to enter into exchange relations constitute a denial of reci-
procity that runs throughout the story. The Japanese, superior in 
military power, seek food, the very symbol of sociopolitical status 
and prestige in the context of Isabel traditions. However, as is well 
known in the Melanesian region, it is not food per se, but the ability 
to accumulate and distribute food among followers and exchange 
partners that establishes relations and accrues prestige to local lead-
ers. The Japanese, in their pursuit of provisions, manifest an inver-
sion of this principle by using their power to acquire food supplies 
rather than distribute them, failing to acknowledge or compensate 
owners. 8 These actions contrast with the generous actions of the 
Americans, who are remembered for giving in excess (chapters 
15, 17). 
The denial of reciprocity implicit in Hebala's first encounter with 
the Japanese becomes increasingly flagrant as the narrative pro-
ceeds, underscoring the irony of the Japanese position: a military 
power lacking food and unable to establish an exchange relationship 
with its "hosts." The Japanese are depicted as proceeding single-
mindedly in their quest for food, at first failing to give adequate 
compensation and later resorting to intimidation. After the Japanese 
initially present Hebala and his partner with cigarettes, sugar, and 
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tea, some Buala people (who presumably had not evacuated their 
village) send out a canoe loaded with fruit. However, they are disap-
pointed in the response-the Japanese "simply didn't pay, just gave 
cigarettes. A full canoe and they didn't even pay, just gave ciga-
rettes." 
While the villagers may be disappointed with cigarettes as a 
medium of exchange, matters deteriorate even further as the Japa-
nese come ashore to replenish their stocks of fresh food and water. 
They begin killing chickens and forcing people to climb trees for 
coconuts. The quoted dialogue mirrors Hebala's shipboard encoun-
ter. Requests for food are met with overwrought gestures of defer-
ence and compliance, signaling the absurdity of powerful outsiders 
extorting food through force: 
"What about papaya, are there any?" 
"Oh ya, there are." 
"Where are the chickens?" 
"They're here, you all eat them!" 
So they just shot all over the place killing chickens. It didn't matter 
that we were there, they shot all over the place. 
Once again, as in the opening episode when Hebala and his partner 
engage the Japanese in conversation with guns trained on them, fear 
and intimidation surround transactions in the village. When the 
Japanese want coconuts, they force people to climb coconut trees to 
take them under threat of being shot: 
"We want coconuts." 
We didn't know how to climb up to get them, but they forced us. 
"Climb up! If you don't climb up we'll shoot." 
They all just climbed up. Even if someone didn't know how to climb 
up, he just went.up. 
When the Buala people work for the Japanese, carrying buckets of 
water to fill up a supply boat, they are once again compensated only 
with cigarettes. In this instance, the medium of exchange is deval-
ued even further as the cigarettes become soggy because people are 
compelled to carry two buckets at a time and are unable to smoke 
properly. 
So then they came ashore in a big boat. "You all, we want you to take 
water [to the boat]." All the people of Buala carried water for the J ap-
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anese. Cecil was the boss of people here for carrying water. They went 
to the stream, taking a bucket, two buckets per man. One Japanese 
followed, he was their boss. Then [he] put a cigarette in our mouths, 
and in Cecil's mouth he put two cigarettes. That's how it went, every 
cigarette got soaked because you couldn't hold it in your hand with 
two buckets. The cigarettes were completely wet in our mouths. 
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Here the Japanese officers' gesture at compensation becomes far-
cical. Their dominance is manifest in a rigid work routine (each per-
son carrying two buckets of water) overseen by a "boss" who 
rewards people by inserting cigarettes into their mouths. The local 
"boss," Cecil, is doubly rewarded, or perhaps doubly demeaned, by 
receiving two cigarettes instead of one. The image of people 
adhering to such a meaningless regimen with only soggy cigarettes 
in return makes for one of the narrative's more amusing passages, 
reminding the audience, in the self-mocking tone characteristic of 
much of the story, of the absurdities that may be encountered in 
dealing with powerful outside forces. The hollowness of compliance 
with the water-carrying regimen is made obvious by the inability of 
the people even to smoke the cigarettes they are given. Not only does 
the compensation become worthless, but the apparent act of cooper-
ation is exposed as a meaningless facade, requiring ungainly behav-
ior without purpose or enduring social significance. 
Deception and Denigration 
The work for soggy cigarettes might seem to epitomize the submis-
sion of the Buala people to the powerful outsiders who appear on the 
scene and extract local resources easily, at will. 9 Yet a series of delib-
erate deceptions enacted by the villagers at various points in the nar-
rative suggests that this is not so, that they, rather than the Japanese, 
understand and manipulate the interaction. Ironically, the posture 
of submission or unthinking cooperation in large measure provides a 
vehicle for their manipulations. 
The theme of deception runs throughout the narrative, especially 
in depictions of conversations between Japanese and villagers. On 
the one hand, the exaggerated offers of food, available for the tak-
ing, are an obvious manipulation, even if motivated by fear and a 
desire to escape from the dangerous intruders. However, the confi-
dence of the Isabel people in their ability to manage their interac-
tions with the Japanese is best expressed in their most direct decep-
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tion: their concealment of two Europeans in the face of persistent 
Japanese questions about the whereabouts of"whitemen." 
The pattern of deliberate deception emerging in the narrative 
crystallizes as the Japanese come ashore and begin asking about the 
presence of Europeans. The Maringe people were in fact hiding two 
Europeans (Emily Sprott, the mission teacher, and a plantation 
manager) at inland locations and ultimately transported them by 
canoe to the resident commissioner's outpost on Malaita. The story 
describes the way the Maringe people, in the person of their best 
English speaker, Father Henry, revealed nothing to the skeptical 
Japanese. Hebala's comment that, "actually we were hiding Miss 
Sprott; and Mr. Martin, we were hiding him at Kubolota" is an 
important statement about the island's ability to resist the intrusion 
of powerful outsiders, as is Hebala's earlier, more comedic descrip-
tion of how he faced Japanese rifles on board their ship. 
In other stories of wartime encounters, strategies of deception 
emerge as a useful means of interacting with the Japanese. For 
example, the success of the Buala headman, Mostyn Kiokilo, in 
gaining access to the Rakata base by befriending the commander is 
well known. His deception began with the pretense that he was an 
uneducated "native," dressed only in a loincloth, who wanted to vis-
it the Japanese to sell them fruits and vegetables. This is a prime ex-
ample of a genre of deception stories, circulating in several of the oc-
cupied islands, where scouts or police acting as "natives" are said to 
have obtained valuable intelligence information about the strength 
of Japanese installations (see Nelson 1982, 199-200 for an example 
from New Guinea and Ngwadili et al. 1988 for Malaita). Kiokilo 
was so skillful that he became a regular visitor among the Japanese, 
who reportedly gave him a nickname and a military cap and allowed 
him extensive access to their base. 10 
In deception st?ries, Islanders engage the Japanese in interaction 
under the guise of "native," thus imposing their own definition of 
the situation. The contrast between pretense and reality is most 
clearly drawn in the case of members of the Solomon Islands 
Defence Force, such as Mostyn Kiokilo and former police, who were 
both educated and clearly working in the service of the Allied forces 
in the Pacific. These men repeatedly assumed the posture of the 
"simple native" in their contacts with the Japanese, as in the exam-
ple of one armed scout working with the coastwatchers who recalled 
how he and others would plan their encounters with Japanese 
groups by first dressing in loincloths or tattered clothes and then 
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moving along in a loud procession pretending they had not noticed 
the Japanese until they were seen and called upon (Zaku et al. 
1988, 34). 
Epic Encounters: The War in Historic Perspective 
War stories continue to be told in a variety of contexts, reflecting the 
broad significance of the war as a focal epoch in cultural construc-
tions of Isabel history. Along with the arrival of Christian mission-
aries, the war is one of two subjects most elaborated in oral historical 
traditions. Within the longer, episodic view of the island's past, 
those two epochs mark major junctures in local historiography. Both 
periods are characterized by radical change induced by the sudden 
intrusion of powerful outsiders. In the case of missionaries, contact 
marked the beginning of deep and enduring transformations, while 
the effects of the war were largely temporary, followed by reimposi-
tion of the British status quo. As others have noted, World War II is 
commonly positioned as one of a series of historiographic signposts 
associated with distinct shifts in relations with outsiders, such as 
periods of colonial transition (Gewertz 1983, 133-148; Scaglion 
1983; chapters 4 and 10). 11 
While the two key periods of history are temporal indices struc-
turing concepts of the past, they are also focal points for the elabora-
tion of social meaning and concepts of self. The retelling of epic 
encounters with Japanese, like mythic accounts of missionary con-
tacts (White n.d. ), fashions images of identity out of scenarios of 
interaction with outsiders. War stories, like conversion narratives, 
are "good stories" (chapter 17) because they are, to use Thune's 
words (chapter 1 0), "temporal cassowaries": representations of 
events that are at once anomalous and laden with cultural signifi-
cance. It is instructive to compare the narrative examined here with 
stories of missionary contact as a way of illuminating its sociocultur-
al significance within the broader perspective of Santa Isabel cul-
tural history. 
In certain respects, war stories and mission stories resemble one 
another as examples of a genre of contact narrative in Isabel oral lit-
erature: both portray heroic encounters between an indigenous pro-
tagonist and one or more outsiders in a life-and-death situation. 
Both represent their subject matter as a scenario of approach, resist-
ance, and resolution. However, the war period is in large measure 
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represented as an inversion of the events and relations depicted in 
conversion narratives. Whereas acceptance of Christianity involved 
movement out of the bush into coastal villages, the war reversed this 
direction: evacuation of villages to return to the bush. This move-
ment also entailed a reversal of certain key social transformations 
associated with conversion to Christianity. Whereas settlement in 
Christian villages involved consolidation of formerly dispersed fami-
lies, the wartime retreat to garden lands once again splintered the 
village polity into smaller units. More importantly, the process of 
pacification associated with the arrival of Christian missionaries was 
obviously reversed in wartime, when the intruders brought not 
peace but violence. In both epochs, the elements of change (coast/ 
bush, unified/dispersed, peace/war) are the same, but the transfor-
mations are mirror images of one another: 
Christianity 
bush- coast 
dispersed - consolidated 
warfare - peace 
World War II 
coast- bush 
consolidated - dispersed 
peace - warfare 
Situating Hebala's narrative of war within this longer ethnohis-
torical context reveals greater significance for the irony of Japanese 
power discussed previously. When juxtaposed with the genre of mis-
sionary stories, the military power of the Japanese is analogous to 
the strength of pagan warriors: intimidating but ultimately ineffec-
tual. In Hebala's story, the indigenous protagonist is Christian; the 
outsider is not. The outsider brings threats of violence rather than 
peace; and the native actor, rather than the missionary outsider, 
overcomes that threat. The significance of Japanese strength is fur-
ther diminished QY its disassociation from Christian notions of spirit-
ual power, or mana, derived in part from religious belief and prac-
tice. Although the Buala people are forced to abandon their village 
church (used by the Japanese to interrogate Father Henry), they 
continue to hold communion ceremonies conducted by a local priest 
in the bush by the light of a kerosene lamp. 12 
The representation of wartime encounters with Japanese depicts 
more of a confirmation than a transformation of social and cultural 
life, which may explain why war narratives have not been incorpo-
rated in ceremony in contemporary society to the same extent as 
conversion narratives. The events of the war are much less the sub-
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ject of ceremonial reconstruction than are the events of Christian 
contact and conversion-celebrated in speeches, songs, and skits 
performed on a variety of occasions (White n.d.). Unlike missionary 
heroes in conversion narratives, the Japanese in Hebala's story 
remain a nameless backdrop to a historical drama portraying a 
range of practices, from humorous deception to the ritual of Holy 
Communion, that mark continuous threads in Isabel selfhood. The 
confirmatory messages of the war narrative may be less salient than 
the depiction of transformation in missionary tales where narrator 
and audience identify with protagonists on both sides of the encoun-
ter: pagan ancestor and Christian hero. These contrasts in depic-
tions of two key historical epochs illustrate differences in the 
sociocultural uses of history, such that events of the past are appro-
priated by historical representation (and self-representation) to the 
extent that they have cultural significance for the persons doing the 
remembering. 
Conclusion 
Although many individuals tell stories about wartime experiences, a 
few events and the narratives that encode them have gained mythic 
proportions by virtue of being repeated over time. I have examined 
one such narrative as a way of asking what it says about social his-
tory and identity and how it continues to stimulate the cultural 
imagination. The recollections of a first encounter with japanese are 
a parable of Isabel selfhood. Portrayal of the encounter as a scenario 
of interaction creates images of identity that have continuing signifi-
cance for contemporary audiences. 
The story discussed may be "read" on several levels. Description 
of events that seem at one level to confirm the vulnerability and sub-
mission of Isabel people to powerful outsiders at another level estab-
lish their ability to impose their own definitions of social reality on 
critical encounters. The narrative's portrayal of Islanders' strategies 
of guile and deception in dealing with the Japanese, including the 
enactment of self-conscious images of the "ignorant native," depicts 
important understandings about the self in dealings with outsiders 
that have been useful throughout colonial history. The tropes of 
humor and irony highlight differences in power and forcefulness 
that, in the local cultural context, are more apparent than real. In 
contrast with portraits of the era of conversion to Christianity, the 
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narrative of wartime encounters confirms an indigenous (Christian) 
way of life and its ability to resist intrusions from seemingly power-
ful outsiders. 
As Lindstrom (chapter 17) has noted for war stories still circulat-
ing on Tanna, the theme of exchange is the major motif of the narra-
tive taken up here. But the absence of reciprocal exchange marks 
transactions with the Japanese and contributes to the essential irony 
of their military power. A further irony is revealed when the narra-
tor observes that the Islanders' largesse was, in the end, recipro-
cated. When the Japanese ships that had anchored in the lagoon 
were attacked outside and three transports went down, much of their 
cargo washed back ashore: 
Later we saw all the stray cargo of the Japanese coming [up on 
shore] .... We were fortunate to get biscuits, rice, all kinds of things 
like that came up on the beach at Kharuo. We just went to pick it up. 
Some gasoline drums, 44-gallon drums, were full of rice, fish, coffee, 
all kinds of things like that of the Japanese. 
Appendix 
Speaker: Nathaniel Hebala 
Place: Buala village, Santa Isabel 
Time (of recording): 2July 1983 
We heard about the war between Japan and America and we were 
really worried. "When will this war reach here?" Because we had 
heard, the government announced, "America will help us." So we 
waited and waited and waited like that. But what happened? Japan 
was already coming. They came and occupied Bougainville. They 
had taken Boug~inville and they had already taken all of the West-
ern Solomons. That's how [they] came. They reached Lungga [on 
Guadalcanal] and just took it over. They had already taken Lungga. 
Everywhere, from Honiara, Lungga, Tenaru, and places like that, 
the Japanese had already taken them. Then we started to wait. 
"When is America [coming]?" "Maybe America is just bluffing," 
we thought. Then all of a sudden eleven Japanese ships came and 
anchored here, in the lagoon here. So, we didn't know about Ameri-
cans andJapanese, but we just heard "Oh! The Americans are com-
ing now! The Japanese and Americans are coming now." "That 
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must be eleven American ships coming now! Let's go [out] to 
them." So one big canoe went out from Buala, from the Buala side. 
Then Belo and I went out in a canoe too, "[Let's] go to the Ameri-
cans," we thought. But what happened? It was the Japanese. Belo 
and I went paddling, paddling out. But the other canoe, with about 
ten men, was also paddling. They recognized the Japanese flag and 
then went all the way to the island [on the other side of the lagoon]. 
"Hey, it's Japanese!" So [they] went to the island. [But] Belo and I 
didn't know. There is a man, Belo, his name is Alan Belo, and he 
lives at Kaori now. So the two of us were paddling along like this 
[makes paddling motion with arms]. Now we look [at one of the 
ships]. It had a Japanese flag, with a round sun. Now we're looking 
at it, "Hey! It's Japanese, man. It's not American. Oh, let's turn 
back!" Now we want to turn back. [But] the Japanese are looking 
our way and holding their guns like they want to shoot us. They say, 
"Come! Come! If you two don't come we'll shoot you now." So, of 
the two of us, one man paddles [forward], and one man is going 
backward. "Hey! man, now we are going to die!" "If that's the 
case, it doesn't matter if we die, whether we go back or whether we 
go on, we're going to die anyway." "Let's just go ahead." So we just 
go on. Go on, with the Japanese still pointing their guns at us. Now 
off we go, "Oh, it doesn't matter if we die now." [We] go on like 
that, go reach the ship at the place where the ladder comes down. 
Two men take two short ropes. As they look we think, "Oh! [that's] 
for tying us up!" "Now we are going to die." It [the boat] comes 
closer bit by bit. I pray a little. "Oh, we are going to die now," we 
think. Now the two Japanese come holding the two ropes. And they 
come and ask us, "Are there any oranges [ashore]?" So I answer 
first, "Ya, ya, ya, [lots of] oranges!" "What about papaya?" they 
ask again. "Oh, plenty of papayas in Buala!" "What about yams, 
chickens?" "Oohhh, really a lot!" That's how the two of us stayed 
alive. "All right, you two go now, go quickly." [They] gave us ciga-
rettes, gave us sugar, gave us tea. With that [they said], "you two go 
quickly, take this food now." We [thought] "Whew, lucky!" So we 
paddled [back]. I don't know when the big canoe that went all the 
way to the island came back. It was nighttime before it returned. 
[We] got back here, and Belo looked all over the place for oranges. I 
just ran away, to the bush. Because every family, everyone in Buala, 
had already gone to stay in the bush. The government order said, 
"Go right away!" It had been one month since the government told 
us "You all go [hide] outside [the village]." All the people here had 
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gone to stay behind a certain hill. Just a few men stayed. So now I 
went all the way [to the bush]. I was frightened because [I thought], 
"Oh, if I go I'm going to die." So then Belo came and started talk-
ing [about what happened] all over the place. Father Henry Vasula 
[priest and head of local school] and others were there. At which 
point [Father Henry said], "Oh, you all send all those things out [to 
the Japanese]." Then they took some canoes, taking oranges, 
because there were lots of oranges in Buala before, and papayas and 
things, and went. Then the Japanese said, "We are going to come to 
Buala, going to come ashore." So then they came ashore. They took 
that food, [but] they simply didn't pay, just gave cigarettes. A full 
canoe and they didn't even pay, just gave cigarettes. When they 
came [they said], "Where is someone who knows how to speak En-
glish?" But at that time, Father Henry was the only one who knew 
how to speak a little English. The rest of us didn't know how. When 
we talked to the Japanese, we just said, "Ya." "What about papaya, 
are there any?" "Oh, ya, there are." "Where are the chickens?" 
"They're [here], you all eat them." So they just shot all over the 
place killing chickens. It didn't matter that we were there, they shot 
all around. So then Father Henry and the Japanese talked in the 
church. "Are there any whitemen here?" "None." "No, there are 
some whitemen somewhere [around here]." But actually, we were 
hiding Miss Sprott [missionary]. And Mr. Martin, Nelson Martin 
[plantation manager], we were hiding him at Kubolota [near 
Buala], above Kubolota village there was a whiteman. All right, we 
were hiding Miss Sprott at Loghadou [inland from Buala]. We were 
hiding them then and wouldn't tell. Some of the Japanese said, 
"Oh, there are some whitemen here." "None." That's how it was. 
So then they came ashore in a big boat. "You all, we want you all to 
take water [to the boat]." All the people of Buala carried ~ater for 
the Japanese. This Cecil [of Buala], Cecil was the boss of people 
here for carrying water. They went to the stream, taking a bucket, 
two buckets per man. One Japanese followed, he was their boss. 
Then [he] put a cigarette in our mouths, and in Cecil's mouth he put 
two cigarettes. That's how it went, every cigarette got soaked 
because you couldn't hold it in your hand with two buckets. The cig-
arettes were completely wet in our mouths. [We] went and tossed the 
water in the boat. Didn't put it in any tank, just put it in the boat. 
[They] came back [and said], "We want coconuts." We didn't know 
how to climb up to get them, but they forced us. "Climb up! If you 
don't climb up, we'll shoot." They all just climbed up. Even if some-
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one didn't know how to climb up, he just went up, afraid of dying. 
That's how it went for one night and one day. Then one night Father 
Eric (Gnhokro] came. Because Father Eric was staying in the bush 
too. "Let's have Holy Communion." "Hey, that's hard, man." 
"Okay, if so, then (we'll have it) at night." He just lit one bottle [of 
kerosene], and he read from the book for Holy Communion, having 
Holy Communion at night. That's how we were for quite a while, 
until five days had passed. (Then] I think the Japanese heard that 
the Americans were coming. I think the Americans had already 
arrived. (They] told us, "Tomorrow we are going out [of the 
lagoon]." "Oh." "We are going out and there might be a big battle 
tomorrow." "What's happening, a big battle where?" "Oh, the 
Americans are coming, have already come .... " "Ya?" Now we 
were really worried too. In the morning we looked, because we were 
on top of a hill. Just all the men were there. We wanted all the 
women to stay outside [in the bush]. So we were looking when 
morning came. Couldn't see any of the eleven ships in the lagoon. 
Then all of a sudden, two Americans, two planes came. We looked 
up and [saw] a star [on the planes]. "Hey! The Americans are com-
ing now, everyone!" But all the ships were just outside, off the coast 
here. Maybe the Japanese knew too, "If we stay in the lagoon, we'll 
all die." So now [they] go and separate. As we watch, the two Amer-
icans go following along the hillside here. We see them [and think], 
"Oh, the Americans are coming now, guys." "This is what we've 
been waiting for." "The Americans are coming now." The two 
planes go as far as Ghojoruru [end of the lagoon] and turn back. As 
we watch, the Japanese begin firing "brr, brr, brr, brr, brr." Now 
they are shooting, shooting first. As they shoot, we look up, because 
the shells exploded twice, once here and once in the sky for shooting 
the planes. We look up and it's completely dark, dark all over. "Oh, 
lots of airplanes!" we thought, but it was just the shells exploding. 
Then, we watch the American planes come down like this [motions 
with hand], go up like this, around like this, and go along, go down, 
drop a bomb and go up, shooting. Then this one large ship blows up 
and starts burning. "Oh! now one's burning." We just watch. It [the 
plane] goes around like this, comes back, and drops another one, 
two of them. Now another one blows up. "Oh, one is dead now." 
They [the Japanese] shoot all over, but the Americans are not high 
up, they're just going like this (motions with hand skimming over 
the floor] all over underneath [the fire]. If it went up like this 
(motions upward with hand], it was going to drop a bomb. So two 
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ships were already dead. It went on like that, and six all totally 
burned in one day. So then we watched for a long time and at sup-
pertime other planes came in their place. I think they [the planes] 
were from beyond Lungga, or were already at Lungga, I don't 
know. Two more came, replaced them between one o'clock and six 
o'clock, two came to bomb. Three more ships died. At night, they 
still went on fighting. Then we watched all the fires; the flames from 
the fires were like a city, burning until daylight. Maybe seven ships 
or something like that. Later we saw all the stray goods [cargo] of the 
Japanese coming [up on shore]. After one week all the loose goods 
came ashore, oil came ashore. We were fortunate to get biscuits, 
rice, all kinds of things like that came up on the beach at Kharuo 
[Maringe Lagoon island]. We just went to pick it up. Some gasoline 
drums, 44-gallon drums, were full of rice, fish, coffee, all kinds of 
things like that of the Japanese. So, a short time later, we heard that 
the Americans had reached Lungga. We heard a big battle, with 
guns blasting one week, we heard it, but all the noise of bombs and 
ships and airplanes really made us frightened and very worried. It 
went on, we heard, "du du du," "du du du du du" like that all the 
way through the night, until daylight, we still heard it, without 
letup. At night we saw those searchlights. We just saw them in the 
distance, like when the moon comes up. All the Americans were 
shooting up at all the planes coming over. Maybe three, four, five 
hundred planes, Japanese planes this time, went down, we didn't 
know. That's how it was, we just saw the Japanese, the first Japa-
nese to come here, in 1942, or something like that. That's when we 
first saw the Japanese. We didn't see the Americans until the Japa-
nese came to Suavana [seaplane base in western Isabel], then we saw 
the Americans that the Japanese at Suavana shot down. Then some 
people here, like Christian [Ko'uti] and Mostyn [Kiokilo], went to 
scout, to go aro~nd there and keep watch. If they saw an American 
crash, they came and reported to us and went to Tataba [district sta-
tion, then location of coastwatcher Geoffrey Kuper]. If a Japanese 
crashed, [they would] take him to Suavana, just the same. We were 
afraid too. Lest they think, "They're on their side." Then the writ-
ten statement of the Japanese circulated among us. In Maringe and 
Isabel it said, "Now we [Japanese] are natives, all of us are natives." 
That's what they said. "If you see the sun still going up like that [in 
the east], Japan is still winning." "If the sun goes up here, America 
is losing." "You all just watch." "When the sun comes up in the 
east, Japan will win completely." "If you see the sun go up in the 
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west, America will win." [Laugh. To GW:] Putting you [Ameri-
cans] down [laugh]. That's how it was. That's all I know about. 
That's how we saw the japanese when they first came. 
Notes 
This chapter has profited from comments and discussion by participants in the 
ASAO symposium and by members of a seminar at Pitzer College, where an earlier 
draft was presented. Comments from Jim Boutilier, Don Brenneis, and Lamont 
Lindstrom have been particularly helpful, as has my collaboration with David 
Akin, David Gegeo, and Karen Watson-Gegeo on related work at the East-West 
Center. 
1. Documentary evidence suggests that the events described in the narrative 
unfolded during the course of several weeks. The oral account, however, describes 
a single visit by eleven ships over the course of five days, beginning with their 
unexpected arrival and ending with a hasty exit when two American dive-
bombers attack and sink several of them. Whatever the case, we know that Japa-
nese ships were present in Maringe Lagoon for about six weeks prior to an attack 
that sank three ships just offshore on 28 August (Marchant, 29 August 1942). J apa-
nese warships and transports were probably present throughout this period-the 
same time that the seaplane base was being established farther up the coast at 
RakataBay. 
Resident Commissioner Marchant kept a diary during the period he took refuge 
in Malaita (1942-1943). The daily entries consist primarily of a running record of 
reports coming in by radio and from scouts about happenings on the various 
islands. The entry for 15 July includes the note, "Report from Ysabel of transport 
aground Maringe Lagoon." And on 5 August, two days before the American inva-
sion, Marchant wrote, "Letters from Ysabel show Maringe Lagoon being exten-
sively used by Jap warships up to 30 July." A bombing incident off the Maringe 
lagoon, most likely the one referred to in the narrative, is referred to in Marchant's 
29 August entry as simply "3 Jap ships sunk offMaringe 28th." 
2. Santa Isabel was one of the most active areas for the return of Allied (mostly 
American) pilots. According to the count compiled by Kuper (1946; and see Lord 
1977, 293), the Isabel scouting network returned twenty-eight pilots, about one-
fourth of the total number picked up in all of the Solomons. The large number of 
pilots to be rescued was due in large measure to the notorious accuracy of the anti-
aircraft gunners at the Japanese base at Rakata Bay. Despite his meritorious ser-
vice, Kuper, born on Makira, was the only one of sixteen coastwatchers manning 
radio posts throughout the Solomons never given an officer's commission. 
3. J. A. Corrigan, succeeded later by A. M. Andresen and then F. A. Rhoades. 
4. The Solomon Islands Defence Force (SIDF), referred to as the "youngest 
combatant unit in the Empire" (Horton 1975, 246), was hastily formed in 1939. A 
small number of Solomon Islanders were trained with Australian assistance prior to 
the war, but most of the force's four hundred or so members were made up of for-
mer members of the British administration and the Solomon Islands Armed Con-
stabulary. Most recruits of the SIDF who saw combat action did so as scouts 
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assigned to Allied units. Although few in number and short on experience, they 
proved to be effective fighters. 
5. The text of the song, recorded on 6 March 1975, is given here in translation: 
The japanese enemy 
has reached Tulagi 
with their strength 
with their guns 
Lungga and Tenaru 
Kukum and Point Cruz 
Maravovo and Hautambu 
The japanese went first 
Tulagi headquarters 
Lever Brothers at Ghavutu 
Girl's school at Bungana 
Io dere (refrain) 
Capital Tokyo 
They came out from 
Seat of the big fight 
That has arrived 
Airforce weapons 
Warships, submarines 
These things, friend 
Surround the Solomons 
Now this is good 
To walk around 
In the Solomon Islands 
Ko hi'e hi riri'eo 
[You] come here to die 
Stay alive until 
Arrives the Honolulu airforce 
Ko hi'e (refrain) 
Airplanes above 
Submarine below 
Come to take back 
The headquarters at Tulagi 
You watch out, my friend 
America is facing you 
They want to drink you 
They want to consume you 
Run for your life 
Whether we die or live 
That's how we are, fathers 
Ko hi' e hi riri' eo (refrain) 
At first you asked for a sign 
From your home Tokyo 
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But left to live or die 
Ko hi' eo (refrain) 
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6. The original story was told in Solomons Pijin. I asked Hebala to speak in Pijin 
so that his narrative would be accessible to a wider audience (see Zaku eta!. 1988). 
Pijin is well suited to recollections of the war era, a period when it was often spoken 
in intercultural contexts. Furthermore, Hebala frequently uses Pijin in conversa-
tions with persons from outside the Maringe area. The Pijin version of the narra-
tive, with interlinear English translation, is available from the author upon request. 
7. Reference to the Japanese presence on the north coast of Guadalcanal 
(Honiara, Lungga, Tenaru) fixes the date of the arrival of Japanese in Maringe 
sometime after mid-June 1942, when the Japanese established themselves on 
Guadalcanal to begin building the airstrip that was to be taken over and renamed 
Henderson Field by the Americans. 
8. As other chapters make clear (e.g., chapters 3, 8, and 12), relations between 
Japanese and island peoples in many areas deteriorated as the war progressed, and 
troops cut off from their supply lines were forced to exact food and labor by coercive 
means. However, the events described in the story occurred at the outset of the Jap-
anese occupation, and the troops at the Rakata Bay base were evacuated before 
severe hardship set in. In fact, as the appendix story reports, they left behind large 
quantities of rice and clothing. 
9. No doubt the story ofBuala villagers cooperating by assisting with the reprovi-
sioning of Japanese ships could be told in many ways, depending on who is speak-
ing, who is listening, and so on (see chapter 7). As the narrator says, the Buala peo-
ple had been told to evacuate their village and avoid contact with the Japanese. Yet 
a certain number, including village leaders such as the Anglican priest Father 
Henry Vasula (Hebala's brother), remained to talk and even work with the Japa-
nese who came ashore. Not long before, the district officer and coastwatcher 
Donald Kennedy (see chapter 14) had reported that he was worried about anti-Brit-
ish sentiments among the Isabel people (M;:trchant, 19 May 1942). 
10. The story of Mostyn Kiokilo and his spying on the Rakata Bay base attained 
enough notoriety to merit mention in written histories of coastwatching in the Solo-
mons. For example, Horton (1975, 147) reported Kiokilo's activities (referring to 
him as Aliki) as follows: 
Aliki looked a complete fool, but he had a very shrewd brain and any amount 
of courage. When the Japanese first established themselves at Rekata Bay he 
walked into their camp with fish and vegetables for sale. He was immediately 
seized and taken before the commandant. ... Eventually the commanding 
officer was satisfied of his innocence and made him a personal friend . . . 
allowing Aliki to move all over the camp and see the gun positions, the bar-
racks and other arrangements. 
In a locally produced collection of mimeographed stories about the war, a man from 
Maringe writing about some of the same incidents described here also gave promi-
nent mention to Kiokilo's exploits (Palmer 1980, 10). Not all accounts ofKiokilo's 
remarkable deception, however, are so clear about just who he was deceiving. The 
last of the three Isabel coastwatchers, F. A. (Snowy) Rhoades, who took over the 
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Isabel post just after the Japanese evacuated Rakata Bay, wrote in his diary, 
"Unfortunately a native from Meringi [sic]lagoon who had been Corrigan's master 
spy ... had apparently been doublecrossing both Corrigan and the Nippon Com-
mander. He had entry into the enemy lines at all times and had a good idea of their 
main bivouac areas. However he never gave us these as a bombing target and most 
of the bombing ofRekata Bay was futile" (1982, 43). 
11. It is certainly the case that the war serves such a function in Isabel maps of 
history. As I took a census and recorded migration histories, I soon realized that 
people repeatedly invoked the war as a before-and-after reference point for their 
own life events. 
12. It should be noted that the priest referred to in the story was not just any 
priest. Father Eric Gnhokro is widely remembered as a man of exceptional mana or 
spiritual power who performed numerous "miraculous" feats during his time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Source of the Force 
in Marshallese Cosmology 
LAURENCE MARSHALL CARUCCI 
For the survivors-on their forty-second raan 
in kamolol 'day of thanksgiving' (March 1986) 
THE Focus of this volume on World War II brings out, perhaps 
more than any other single topic, both similarities and dissimilarities 
in the experiences of Pacific Islanders with outsiders. In many 
societies war experiences had a considerable impact on how Island-
ers came to conceive of interactions between themselves and others 
(see chapters 4, 6, and 10). The effects of those experiences differ 
from one society to another according to the ways events are con-
structed in local interpretations. Yet in spite of these dissimilarities 
some commonalities unite societies in disparate regions of the 
Pacific. Comparable ways of interpreting displays of military might 
are particularly notable in this regard. 
The way in which Islanders lend .supernatural cause to displays of 
power is a theme that ties this paper to several others in the volume 
(see chapters 9 and 15) and cuts across regional boundaries. Enewe-
tak people see this power integrated into their daily lives in ways that 
become manifest in their portrayals of themselves and others (see 
chapter 8). Marshall Islanders construct portraits of "we" and 
"they" much as Northern Apaches portray whites in a series of 
enacted "jokes" that are simultaneously a type of linguistic play and 
deft sociopolitical polemic (Basso 1979). Like those of Apaches, each 
Marshallese sketch is necessarily intersubjective. Who "we" are is 
only defined in relation to who the Japanese and the Americans are. 
Simultaneously, the sketches collapse past and present, creating 
images of the war in relation to a currently understood worldview 
and in accord with conceptualizations of a young, unmarried, male 
ethnographer who, for some, at least at times, was a ribelli 'white 
man' or 'American'. 
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It is difficult to talk with an Enewetak person for long without 
mention of "the war." Even in the minds of children raised on Uje-
lang, separated by thirty years and one hundred thirty miles from 
the battle, the war is very real. Therefore this chapter begins with 
narratives that focus on elementary questions. How do Enewetak 
people conceive of World War II? And, as part of the same query, 
how do members of this group envisage themselves vis-a-vis Japa-
nese and Americans who selected these isolated atolls as a stage for 
conflicts of international consequence? Given the resultant destruc-
tion, it is amazing that Enewetak residents construct positive images 
of Americans when encounters with them have been ambivalent at 
best and often negative. One might be tempted to explain the phe-
nomenon by reference to Polynesian aloha, or its Marshallese equiv-
alent, iokwe, a notion that focuses on love, respect, welcome, empa-
thy, and caring. It is an idea clearly involved in the Enewetak 
worldview, yet is too general to have much explanatory value. For 
one thing, it fails to address the question of why Americans and jap-
anese are typified differently. A more useful approach is to consider 
narratives and indigenous explanations of the war and, through an 
analysis of their content, seek to answer the question. 
Indigenous Understandings of "The War, Number Two" 
The war came to Enewetak late in the 1930s. According to local 
exegesis, the first indications were subtle shifts of treatment and 
demeanor on the part of resident Japanese entrepreneurs. Within a 
short time, Japan began to make Enewetak into a military base.' 
Well before 7 December 1941, Enewetak was preparing for war: 
At first, when the warriors began to arrive, they took a little space, 
there, in from the pier on the lagoon side of Mokoni. It was in that 
spot that they stayed, inside the pen-sleeping houses, cookhouse(s), 
outhouses, gardens-everything was within the fence, that is why we 
called it "inside the corral." Only the wharf and the road [to the pier] 
were outside; but all of us, Marshallese, we lived outside as well, sur-
rounding [on the periphery]. Nonetheless, we worked for the military 
men. All the time there was work [to be done]: cooks, cleaners ... 
some cleaned the sleeping quarters, some cleaned the dining spot, oth-
ers cleaned the cook area, and some the latrines-we (exclusive) had 
to take the feces and urine collected in buckets to the gardens and use 
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it to fertilize plants. Yes, the Japanese were a certain type. In one way 
they were very smart, but in others they were crazy. 
The thing was, we (exclusive) had to work, work all the time; and if 
your work was not suitable-[ they would] beat you. Hit you. Yes, all 
the time they beat you. So then we knew-you could work hard and 
work [harder], and they would thrash you: with hands, with belts, 
with sticks [boards]. A few only, they liked, such as that man Maku. 
He worked in the kitchen, they gave him cigarettes, and other things; 
and they made him whip us .... 
So life then, it was difficult; it wasn't like now with the whitemen 
[in this case, Americans]. You see that, the Japanese, they needed 
assistance. They made us work and treated us like children. They 
struck us to the point of impossibility when our work was bad, but 
they also taught us because we would grow up to be like them, Japa-
nese. The Americans, however, they are very kind and smart. But 
such is their intelligence they do not need Marshallese. We are like 
shit to these foreigners [Americans]. They give us a new way of gov-
erning and take off, because they do not need us. We will never 
become Americans. Now we quarrel like cats and rats because this 
new way of law is unsuited. We need someone to help us and to 
straighten us out because we are not like Americans, we are still uned-
ucated [crazy], like children. 
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The multiple images of this sketch help clarify the highly relativ-
ized context in which Enewetak and Ujelang people have come to 
think of Americans, a theme to which I shall return. First, however, 
it is necessary to place these images in the context of the war as 
viewed from an outer island, for our own assumptions about World 
War II directly contradict the processual picture in the minds of 
Marshallese. The above quotation was generated when my infor-
mant wanted to "tell me a little about the war." 2 It returns to com-
parisons of Americans and japanese (the subject ofmy friend's ear-
lier conversation), and it places a mental boundary around the 
beginning of "the war" -the Japanese military buildup on Enewe-
tak (see Tobin 1967, 28). 3 World War II has two conceptual begin-
nings: one, recounted above, predates 7 December 1941; a second, 
more tightly constrained "war" refers to the battle of Enewetak, a 
time that begins either with obvious preparations for battle in J anu-
ary 1944, with American reconnaissance planes and submarines a 
week or two before the bombings, or with an "in the trenches" 
account on 4 February 1944. None of these images of"the wa.r" cor-
responds to American understandings of World War II, which begin 
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with the war in either Europe or Pearl Harbor and end with the 
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
"The war," in Enewetak eyes, means either a direct existential 
encounter among Japanese, Americans, and Enewetak people on 
Enewetak Atoll, or it refers to processes of Japanese and American 
militarization. According to the latter, commonly expressed view, 
the war that began in 1939 has never ended; it has only moved from 
place to place. This astute interpretation is based on an experiential 
apperception, one in which American military personnel took Ene-
wetak, first from the Japanese and then from the Enewetak people 
themselves, who were moved to a camp on Bijili and Alembil (small 
Enewetak islets), to Kwajalein, back to Bijili and Alembil, to Uje-
lang for "permanent relocation," out to sea to witness nuclear tests 
on Enewetak (and prevent exposure to nuclear fallout on Ujelang), 
and eventually, beginning with short visits in the late 1960s, back to 
Enewetak (map 1). All of these moves were carried out under the 
direction of the United States military. 
The perception of unending war also relies on an ancient 
Marshallese model of warfare in which pojak 'preparedness' or 'pre-
paring for' is a critical phase of war (see Kotzebue 1830; Hager 
Kwajalein Islanders being evacuated by Americans to a camp on Enilapkan 
Island, 1 February 1944. (U.S. Army Signal Corps) 
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1886). Enewetak people consider all of the nuclear tests on Bikini 
and Enewetak as part of a larger project that made the United States 
not only the strongest military power on earth, but kept them pojak 
wot im pojak 'ready still and ready' and 'extraordinarily prepared' for 
all skirmishes. All conflicts (Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Middle East) 
are viewed as a continuation of the war. When a visiting Peace 
Corps member suggested that the United States had lost the war in 
Vietnam, listeners rejected his interpretation in favor of their own 
more pervasive processual perspective that allows Ujelang residents 
to make sense of continued United States interest in Enewetak and 
Kwajalein. One person, for example, explained away the visitor's 
suggestion in the following way: 
Oh, yes, perhaps Americans lost one battle [in Vietnam], but they 
won many others; when the war settles down there, it only appears 
elsewhere. And the warriors are prepared to go in and extinguish it. 
And when no one moves there, in Cuba or another [place], the fight-
ers remain, so when they begin a battle elsewhere, in the Middle East 
and around those parts, they [the soldiers] are still ready to quell the 
fighting. 
Or another says: 
These battles, there are many even today, and the war, it still goes on. 
Like the fighting on Enewetak. It began on Hawaii and then grew. 
They moved to Kiribati and then to 'the Marshalls, then they came to 
Enewetak and ruined it, and then moved onward to Pohnpei and 
Saipan and those places. And after Japan they moved onward to that 
place they call Korea and afterward to Vietnam. You see that, they 
haven't finished fighting [or haven't finished the war], they only move 
around from place to place; ... and all the time they [the warriors] 
have to remain ready. 
The war that came to Enewetak is the same one that continues 
today. It involves a United States preparedness that involved Enewe-
tak for thirty years. Yet, instead of bitterness, Enewetak people feel a 
certain relief. Having conceptualized the future in terms of ancient 
wars with other Islanders and in terms of daily abuse under the J ap-
anese war effort, many view the overall encounter with Americans 
in a positive light: "We were fortunate, they [the American military] 
took Enewetak, but they could have killed everyone." 
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Rearranging Forces: They Could Have Killed Everyone 
The second Sunday of March on Ujelang and Enewetak is called 
Raan in Kamolol-'Day to Be Thankful' (or give thanks). As anyone 
will explain, "it is the day we came out of the holes," and was origi-
nally celebrated on the first anniversary of the end of the battle of 
Enewetak in 1945, a tradition that has continued for forty-five years. 
As a ceremony of commemoration it has become a core symbol for 
Enewetak people that reaffirms their solidarity in the shadow of the 
sacrifice of nearly 15 percent of their number. With subsequent pop-
ulation increases, only about 11 percent of the 1983 population actu-
ally experienced the event, but the yearly recounting of their stories 
reconveys the apocalyptic nature of an occurrence that altered their 
lives. 4 · 
In the course of the ritual, the war is relived. With each narration, 
the battle is given a new symbolic shape that survivors as well as 
their children incorporate as a significant part of what it means to be 
an Enewetak person. The formal part of this celebration takes place 
at church with a tikon 'deacon' or elder of the church who lived 
through the battle briefly recounting the scene. Tears are shed by 
other survivors not only for their dead kin but also for their remem-
bered terror. In the staid tradition inspired by New England mis-
sionaries, hymns reshape sorrow into themes of thanksgiving. On 
Ujelang, the community divides into three groups to present songs. 
Residents who lived through the battle on one of three islets-Ene-
wetak, Meden, or Enjebi-form the core of each chorus. Since their 
repatriation on Enewetak, they have been joined by a fourth group 
whose membership consists of the now-aging group of secondary 
school students who witnessed the war on Pohnpei. 
All four sets of survivors are supported in their singing by rela-
tives born after ~he battle. As with most ritual events, though, each 
resident has relatives from various groups. Since the overall intent is 
to create a sense of continuity and atoll solidarity, it is important that 
everyone participate in the celebration. Those born after the battle 
may affiliate with the group of their choice, but children nearly 
always follow their mothers and fathers while young adults often 
select the group of an aged relative who may not witness another 
Raan in Kamolol. Food is collected, prepared, distributed, and shared 
after the service by members of each of the four groups. 
The remainder of the day is spent visiting, sharing with fellow vil-
lage members scenes of the past, checking on aging relatives and 
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newborns. The day recreates many of the activities of Niu Yia 'New 
Year's Day' a few weeks earlier, though reasons for each celebration 
differ. Both are rites of renewal and intensification. Both conjoin 
representatives of the past and of the future, but Raan in Kamala! has 
a group of survivors to create vocal and visual enactments of the 
event. Their stories concentrate on warfare, helplessness, and death. 
They transport listeners back to a time of terror, when the very exis-
tence of Enewetak was tenuous and community survival was mirac-
ulous. The survivors, those who transmit the tales and shape their 
content, themselves become signifiers of continuity and renewal. 
Their stories construct events as they are recalled from Enjebi (or 
Lujor), Enewetak, and Meden (the three residence islets at the out-
break of the battle). Those who were on Pohnpei as young men and 
women also contribute stories, although the Enewetak tales are most 
significant. Everyone has relatives who witnessed the war on the tiny 
sand spits of their homeland. Their accounts differ in the intensity of 
despair, but all reaffirm the helplessness of Marshallese in the face of 
the awesome grandeur of the event, the incredible display of power 
by its perpetrators, and thankfulness for having survived. 
Each of the following three sets of stories re-presents "the war" in 
its narrowest connotation: that is, they construct events from bata eo 
'the battle'. 5 
We (personal exclusive) who were on Enjebi, perhaps we were the 
most fortunate. Like the others, we knew the vehicles [planes] were 
coming because for three or four days previously they had flown 
toward us to view the atoll [on reconnaissance flights]. They had also 
seen the submarines, the Enewetak residents, but we did not know 
that until later, after the battle, because it was forbidden to sail. So 
damaged [inefficient] were the Japanese that they had to use our 
canoes to chase the subs! They also used them to move troops ... 
yes, Japanese military men; like the one time the man, Lematen, had 
to sail from Meden, pick up a group of warriors on Runnit, and bring 
them to Enjebi. So large were the sailing canoes at that time that he 
brought forty soldiers to Enjebi. But still, to use the canoes to chase 
submarines on the ocean side of Ananij and those parts! So crazy 
[ludicrous] were the Japanese, perhaps they thought they could cap-
ture a sub with sailing canoes! They were really unprepared. They 
knew before. They knew they could not win because of their unpre-
paredness. They needed another half of a year to ready the atoll for 
battle, but the Americans, perhaps they knew [this] and they moved 
toward us still, hurriedly. Yes, when the [American reconnaissance] 
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planes began coming, they were still working on the airfield. It was 
nearly ready and planes were landing, but we still worked on the 
periphery. And then they made us cut coconuts and prop them up like 
big guns and cover them up with brush so the Americans would think 
they were totally prepared. Such was the craziness of the Japanese. 
But the Americans were not deceived. They came anyway and began 
dropping bombs, first off on Enjebi. And planes kept coming, not 
from Kwajalein, but from the north, the island they call Wake, 
because it is lined up with Enjebi and very near the northern islets [of 
this atoll]. 
On that day, nothing moved. It was still the midst of darkness and 
then, the sun had not even appeared and we heard the engines, many, 
and we knew it was the time .... When the bombs began to drop we 
were frightened and we went to ask if we could run-off downwind to 
the islets to the south. And we were fortunate because the "colonel" 
was kind . . . and [he J told us to take the children and women and fly. 
We hurriedly went back and revealed the news, and took only an adze 
and a machete and moved from that place. We were fortunate, and we 
thanked God he was kind. 
We flew in a leeward direction to Mijenkadek, on to Kidenen, on 
then leeward still to Lujor, the islet that is the property of Lijemlok 
[female clan head], and then hid and remained still and watched. 6 We 
stayed there for [some J week( s) until the Americans came. [Shaw, 
Nalty, and Turnbladh (1966, 197) noted that the marines found a 
group of twenty-five natives on "Canna" (Lujor) while setting up 
artillery positions to support the Enjebi offensive.] And we were 
frightened and thought they would kill us, but when they saw we were 
natives (kanaka) they grouped us together and asked about Japanese 
and then took us to the ships. So by that time there were families and 
families of ships on the lagoon side of Enjebi, and they took us there 
and asked us questions, and gave us food. But by then, the war on 
Meden and Enewetak was completed, and we had witnessed it, and so 
great had been the damages we thought no one was still alive. 7 • 
Other versions mention specific details of Enjebi and yet others 
the awesome impression of the bombs, most of which were dropped 
on Enjebi to destroy the airfield and the japanese bunkers: 
[A]nd the vehicles [planes], there was no end to them, they flew 
toward us still and always bombed the islet, not only the north but the 
southern sectors as well. Sometimes it was like night, the sky was so 
dark, and then red and white when the bombs exploded, reflective, so 
bright you would never see properly [be blinded]. You would be 
amazed. In some places a coconut stood, there, and one [way] over 
there; but in others they were all gone. Not even one remained .... 
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As Enjebi people subsequently learned, their relatives in the south 
suffered more severely: 
Perhaps we on Enewetak first knew that the fighters were coming for 
we had the observation tower, and at night we saw the lights over in 
the shallow pass, near Biken, because the Americans had discovered 
that pass and came through it at night, maybe, and into the lagoon to 
picture the atoll. They, those whites were smart, for they knew that the 
Japanese had set charges in the pass. But maybe they also came in 
through the small pass, by Jeptan, there where it is very deep. There 
were also charges [in that pass] but they were not deep so maybe the 
submarines came in below them to tour. But when we told the japa-
nese, "Oh, there are lights in the pass, way over in the leeward part of 
the atoll," they did not believe it. They thought we were seeing 
demons and laughed and struck us and said we were stupid, so we 
shut up; because they could not see the lights and we did not like it 
when they beat us. . . . 
It was on Enewetak that they first landed. We had seen the planes 
picturing, and then even the japanese believed they were coming; and 
my friend, a low person [Japanese soldier] came and said goodbye, 
that we would all die soon, and that he loved us very much. And then, 
on that day, very early at dawn, I went out to the ocean side to defe-
cate, and they appeared. Families and families of ships. One upon the 
other, and combined, so long were they, like an island from here to 
Meden [about five miles], and the landing craft had already started to 
leave the ships. And then I ran back to the holes, over there nearby, on 
the ocean side toward the windward of Lojitak and Elelen [land par-
cels in the central part of Enewetak islet] and revealed the news. And 
the women and children began to cry and said we were all going to 
die. But then the old man Ernej came from the other holes and we all 
prayed together and shared our love. Then we sang a song from the 
hymnal and separated from one another in the various holes. 
By that time the shooting had already begun on the lagoon side, 
and the Americans at first were losing because they stayed there a long 
time, on the lagoon side from Lojitak leeward to about here [Lobet]. 
Perhaps it was difficult because, even though there was no precipice 
like now, they were in the sea and coming ashore, up toward the japa-
nese bunkers. But then the planes came and started to battle, and the 
warriors from the ocean side came ashore. Within minutes they found 
us, and I could see them coming because I kept sticking my head out 
of the hole to watch and smoke . . ._ and the captain [leader] saw me 
and began to raise his gun. So great was my fear, I [indicates rapid 
retreat into bunker with head]. Then, nothing happened, so I stuck 
my head out just a little and [again indicates quick withdrawal into 
hole]. But the captain wanted me to come out. He does this thing 
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[Marshallese wave to come in direction of speaker], so again I stick 
my head out-maybe you say I was crazy, but then I was a young man 
-and he signals that kind of thing again. So, slowly, I come out of the 
hole. But then the fighters raised their rifles and I flew, hurriedly 
returning to my place. In a bit I came back out, a little only, and the 
captain said this sort of thing [signalled the men to keep their guns 
down], and he came toward me slowly. I also went, but when he 
started to raise his gun, I hurriedly retreated. Then he stopped, and 
took his radio and called the ship, and in a moment they answered. 
He asked, "You speak English?" and then I responded, "Some word" 
because we had learned from the missionaries and from that man 
Ernej. And then he said, "Wait" and again called the ship. Then he 
said, "How many you?" and I said 'Many' [single quotes indicate 
Marshallese qua English (code switching), even for captain's utter-
ances] and pointed out the hole to him. So he said, 'Are there other 
holes, kanaka?', and I pointed to the leeward and said 'Another two'. 
And he said, 'Wait' and called again. But you see his gun was still 
ready, not lifted, but this kind of thing [at the hip]. So I was really 
scared, knees trembling and throat [the seat of the emotions] un-
steady. And then he signalled for me to come over, and he took his 
rifle and did this sort of thing [stood it on the butt] and signalled for 
me to come over [Marshallese signals-come closer]. Nonetheless, the 
other soldiers, they had their guns readied, and I was frightened. He 
took out a cigarette and signalled me to take it. So I stayed there, 
about four baar away [15 or 20 feet] and thought, maybe now I will 
disappear [die]. But the others [in that bunker] did not know any En-
glish, so I went ahead then and took the cigarette. He lit it for me, 
because I was so nervous. I could never hold it steady, and said, 'You 
wait'. Because there is going to come a japanese speaker, and then, as 
soon as he arrived, in maybe five minutes, he spoke to me and asked 
about the others in the hole and about the japanese. 
And I told him all the Japanese were there to the downwind, but 
maybe they already knew, for those who had landed on the ocean side 
had met the o.thers there to the windward and come down [leeward] 
and gone past us and were fighting farther downwind. [This was 
probably a Marine reserve battalion that had landed on the lagoon 
side and crossed the island to support the flank of the "pinned down" 
First Battalion (Morison 1951, 297-298).] And he asked about the 
other Marshallese, but when some soldiers went to see, they had 
already been discovered by others and they came in a group to join us. 
They were crying and shaking with happiness to see us, but also sad, 
because the old woman [Lijani] had been killed with a fragment that 
entered the bunker, and the old man had also been damaged, there in 
the leg. 8 And the others came in the hollow, there where it was low, 
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and in a few minutes they took us to the lagoon shore along a 
windward, northward, and lagoon-tending route and then we board-
ed and went to one of the big ships in the lagoon. Again they asked 
about the Japanese, how many, and where were they, but mainly they 
fed us and gave us clothes, and checked the wounds. 9 By that time the 
Japanese were gone [doomed]. Another group of Americans landed 
on the far leeward end of the islet and were making the Japanese 
abandon their trenches [bunkers?]. Windward, they unearthed them, 
toward the others [Japanese troops]. We could hear the fighting, but it 
lessened, and perhaps they [the American troops] met and combined 
in the area of Bakaen or Larej; and maybe the last Japanese stood 
there near the house of the old lady [a mutual grandmother] and 
thence to the ocean side and farther downwind around the place they 
call Lokieb and around there with Leibual, because it was in that area 
that the final sounds were heard .... 10 
But we were lucky. It was the people of Meden who were unfortu-
nate. 
The struggle on Meden, the last and least important islet to be 
taken, has received less attention from military historians than have 
the others. For Enewetak people, however, it remains the most 
important symbol of the war precisely because it captures the sense-
less brutality of battle. A scene of holocaust, Meden presents a case 
of marked destruction. But it also contradicts the treatment others 
received in the hands of the Americans. Marshallese resolve a gener-
alized positive portrait with the harsh handling Meden residents 
received by attributing the latter to a fiendish personality. But the 
misguided acts of the perpetrator have left an indelible stain on an 
otherwise incredible image of high regard in which Americans have 
been held. 11 In the eyes of those who lost close relatives in the battle, 
these acts seem even less forgivable. (Like most of the others, the fol-
lowing account was reconstructed from notes immediately after the 
storytelling session; the rest were transcribed from audio tapes.) 
For those of us on Meden, perhaps it is lucky we are speaking still 
today because, in only another moment, we would have been gone. It 
was that man on Meden [the battalion commander] who was very leJ 
[ferocious and unpredictable], bad and worse yet [than bad]. So great 
was his uncontrolled anger that in a moment he would have killed us 
all. From the beginning, those of us on Meden were unfortunate. To 
begin with there were ships, lagoon and ocean side, and planes help-
ing from above. From all directions the damage was inflicted. If you 
wanted to 'go' [run], you had to dig, for there was no other place open 
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for escape. From dawn to dusk they shot at this islet. At the finish, 
there was not a single coconut standing. Also on Enewetak it was 
almost the same, but the two were not equal [in intensity]. It was on 
Meden that the whitemen, the soldiers, exhausted their total strength. 
All of us were in the holes. Anything not in the holes disappeared. But 
even in the shelters there was damage. That man Lekomta, the reason 
he is damaged today results from the holes; fragments of shells de-
stroyed his vision. So much harm was done, he was fortunate to still 
be alive. And others also died in those holes, some from fragments, 
but almost all after the soldiers landed. You see, there was no bound-
ary to the warring aspect in that man's throat [the commander's 
"heart"; in this respect his attitude is seen as inborn, a core feature of 
wild males, unshaped by culture (see Carucci 1985)]. In the holes it 
was awful. We were hungry and thirsty, but no one could go out. If 
you traveled outside you would disappear. So the hole was also bad 
because we had to pee and shit inside, even desecrate the face of close 
kin. Then in their coming, the warriors were not straight in their 
work. They came to the shelter of ours, guns ready, and looked toward 
us inside. So great was our fear that we were all in a corner, like kit-
tens. And then they yelled and threw in a hand grenade. 
[LMC: Did they really see you? The thing is, they knew you were 
Marshallese?] 
They knew! The soldiers called out to the leaders, "Kanaka; 
kanaka!" and waited until they responded, and then threw in the 
hand grenade. Such was the measure of their damage [mental impair-
ment]. 
Well, at that time we knew we were gone [dead]. 
[Long pause-smokes-reflects] Perhaps it was a bad explosive. 
When it burst, the whole shelter was torn apart. So powerful was the 
thing one could never stand. Earth fragments struck us [pekoti: used 
for those struck with bird droppings], but the others in the other half, 
they died. All the force of the explosion went over there. Iokwe 'love, 
empathy, sad recollection' [Uses endearing kin terms to lisnhose who 
lost their livt;s ]. 
Afterward, we did not move, but stayed there for awhile amidst the 
dirt and sand, and then they returned to check, and they took us out 
and stripped us with the bayonets on the fronts of their guns, like 
some sort of game [entertainment], and then they took all of us to the 
field and lined us up and prepared to shoot us. We trembled, so great 
was our fear, but still they pointed guns at our heads. And then they 
tied cloth around our heads so you could no longer see in front of you 
and readied us to be slaughtered. Perhaps some did not want to shoot 
us and told the colonel that they did not wish to, but he made them 
raise their rifles. They quibbled, and maybe that person [their leader] 
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was mad because they answered [spoke back to him], and he became 
enraged. Then we said, "Okay, perhaps we are gone now," and some 
started to cry like old women at the announcement of a death, and 
others began to pray; but all of us trembled. 
We stayed there a long time. They called the ship. We waited. They 
spoke again to the ship. And so on it went. And afterward, they took 
the blindfolds, and took us to the ship, and gave us fatigues, and food, 
all kinds of food [see note 9]. But for some days we did not see the oth-
ers [from Enewetak and Enjebi], so we could not yet determine who 
was alive and dead. 12 
These three accounts are taken from a series that represents indig-
enous recollections of the battle of Enewetak. They differ from most 
in that they are relatively general accounts that recreate the battle as 
a process. Many other narratives give detailed fragments about spe-
cific aspects of the war, often as an example of how things should or 
should not be accomplished. Another genre consists of accounts by 
those who were not a part of the battle but have come to know it as a 
critical phase of "our era," "the time of Enewetak people." Even 
those who did not experience the war directly still feel they have par-
ticipated in it. It is an existentially real part of the present, separate 
from the ancestral past. 
Each of the accounts details the ominous grandeur of the event 
and the incredible display afforce by the United States military. The 
apparent ability to impose that force not only at will, but also quixot-
ically, forms a core element of discourse. These things are all part of 
seeing Americans as the parallel of traditional conquerers writ large 
-that is, as sacred (and foreign) chiefs like those who ruled the 
Marshalls and many times attempted to take control of Enewetak 
and Ujelang. The mythical template for sacred chiefs derives from 
the tale of Lewoj 'that man, the [original] place', or 'he who accom-
panies' and Lanij 'that man, god', primeval first rulers of earth. 
Several other accounts of battles between Enewetak or Ujelang peo-
ple and invaders from the east reinforce the images of chiefly 
strength. Like Hocart's typification of Fijian ruling chiefs as 
stranger, guest, and heavenly god (1927, 1929, 1970), Marshallese 
high chiefs are both foreign and sacred. This generalized description 
of chieftainship, as Sahlins (1985, 81) reminded us, gains impor-
tance not as "the rationalization of power" but, instead, "as the rep-
resentation of a general scheme of social life." 
The lens that allowed Americans to be construed as sacred chiefs 
took time to focus. It relied not only on gifts offood and offers of care 
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but, additionally, on an image of incredible strength and physical 
distance. The resulting framework of interpretation was, for Island-
ers, simultaneously mythical and pragmatic (see Sahlins 1985, 66). 
The overpowering strength of the Americans, not only in relation to 
the Marshallese but also vis-a-vis Japanese forces on Enewetak, left 
no question as to the supernatural foundation of their force. It took 
years, however, to make sense out of the battle (at least the precise 
sense rendered in the narratives). During that time, impressions 
were worked into an ideology that could explain the force displayed 
in battle in terms that demystified Japanese and Americans in rela-
tion to indigenous Islanders. This process, which has been going on 
for forty years, relies on images of the war as an experienced conti-
nuity, not as a finished event. 
After the Battle of Enewetak 
The war in its narrow sense ended on Meden or, for a few school 
children, on Pohnpei three months later. The 47th and 820th Divi-
sions carried out a strike on Pohnpei on 28 May though reconnais-
sance flights began in early February (see chapter 12). Captured 
Japanese military bases were useful to American troops and Enewe-
tak became one of the most important. From Enewetak, troops were 
shipped out, either southward or westward. For a while naval per-
sonnel even turned eastward-to the Marshalls-to "clean-up" 
atolls that had been leapfrogged in the rapid push toward japan. For 
example, Bikini was occupied on 30 March, more than a month 
after Enewetak had been secured (Bickett 1965; Morison 1951, 
313). During this period, the view of America as a source of sacred 
force was celebrated and enforced. Obedience and enjoyment were 
simultaneous, for under the auspices of the navy, Enewetak people 
were moved fir'st to Enjebi, on 25 February (see HOE n.d.), then 
relocated to concentration settlements on Aoman and Bijili (two 
small islets), where they were fed and "watched over" or cared for. 
Through both physical and social distancing, the image of the Amer-
icans as sacred chiefs developed. 
The "Native Island" settlements created an unusual sort of 
chiefly arrangement. Enewetak and Enjebi people reconstructed 
their communities in small villages that lacked the division into reef-
to-lagoon family land parcels. For the first time, some people lived 
on lands not their own. Capricious high chiefs in the Marshalls were 
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believed to rearrange land holdings at will, and after the recent dis-
plays of military might, "a kanaka would be crazy to question" the 
desires of the United States. More unusual were the types of 
exchange relations set up with the conquerors. At least since the late 
nineteenth century, traditional high chiefs in the Marshalls had 
made occasional rounds of the atolls they controlled to collect tribute 
(Doane 1861). Local Enewetak chiefs imposed no levies but held 
land and asked kajar 'workers' to help them with copra-making 
tasks. In sharp contrast, American military personnel required obe-
dience but exacted no material goods or services. Eventually, a brisk 
trade in handicrafts was established, but the basic prestations, food 
and clothing, moved entirely from "chief" to "commoner." This 
contradicted indigenous sensibilities, but, in the long run, it was 
worked into the emerging explanatory ideology: 
The things that we took over there, coconuts and pig, and chicken, 
and fish, and flour [bread], and rice, all kinds, these things they took 
and revealed their thanks. But later we saw them on the beach, 
damaged, disposed of. All kinds [of things], they [the Americans] 
throw out, for they add nothing. Such is their strength, they do not 
need them. 
This conception of Americans contrasts sharply with images of the 
Japanese, who, as part of their colonial policy, required Islanders to 
be industrious, reprimanded them when they were not, and also 
taught them. By allowing Micronesians to work toward becoming 
citizens, and by offering them the channels to do so, Japanese violat-
ed traditional understandings of the chief-commoner relationship. 
This is evident in numerous statements that categorize Japanese as 
"being like us," "thinking more like us," even "speaking a language 
like Marshallese-it is not difficult to learn, as is English." In con-
trast, Americans are said to be "gods or chiefs [iroi,i ro] of the earth," 
"another kind than [are] we," and "smart, but their intelligence is 
different from our own." 
These different images ofJapanese and Americans point up affini-
ties between Marshallese and Japanese and distinctions between 
Enewetak people and Americans. The ideal, but distant, attributes 
assigned to Americans are based on a lack of contact and a distribu-
tion of wealth with few expectations of return. In contrast, Japanese 
lived with Enewetak residents for nearly fifteen years. The positive 
and negative typifications are tied closely to actions and events that 
88 LAURENCE MARSHALL CARUCCI 
reflect this active association. For some Islanders, resident Japanese 
remained distant and formal, but, with time, others were able to 
establish closer ties. Most of the closest associations were established 
with lower echelon military personnel early in the 1940s. In con-
trast, the Americans isolated Islanders in distant camps and restrict-
ed interactions. Regulations were relaxed after the war, but it was 
only a short time before Enewetak people were placed in an even 
more insular state on Ujelang. 
Along with these divergent experiences, the longer-term effects 
Japanese and Americans have had on local social organization differ 
decidedly. Active political and economic interests in the area created 
the conditions for a new diversified hierarchy under Japanese rule. 
Many point to the effects of democratization and American schools 
as a source of transformation in the Marshalls, but on Enewetak, all 
oftoday's magistrates and community leaders were educated in Jap-
anese schools. Moreover, those Islanders who supported Japanese 
trade stores with large copra crops found an equally significant 
source of power. With the arrival of the military, an increasingly spe-
cialized array of positions was made available, for the Japanese 
attempted to incorporate Marshallese in the war effort. Often, this 
introduced a hierarchy that the community found unacceptable, 
and, with the possible exception of local chiefs, those who lorded it 
over other Islanders were faced with ostracism in subsequent inter-
actions. 
In reconstructing a vision of the war, stories about internal divi-
sions and seeking out favored positions are overwhelmed with 
images of community solidarity. As Tobin (1967, 16) suggested, dis-
tinctions between the Enewetak and Enjebi communities were all-
important. Living in close association on Aoman and Bijili, then for 
many years on Ujelang, undoubtedly created the sense ?f oneness 
that residents now feel. But after the fact, the battle has become the 
unifying, coherent force. The unequal privileges bestowed in the 
Japanese war effort, and the variable punishments, were suddenly 
transformed with the arrival of the Americans. Though there are 
piecemeal reports to the contrary, it is said that when the Americans 
arrived they were welcomed by all. As part of this symbolic attempt 
to separate opposites, no one claims to have done more than was 
required to support the Japanese in the final days of the conflict. 
In contrast, United States forces wanted Islanders out of the way, 
an approach that would become policy in the coming years. By 
island accounts, "only a few days passed" until the Americans built 
a temporary landing field on Enewetak islet, a task that had taken 
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the Japanese a couple of years to accomplish on Enjebi. Within 
weeks, they repaired the Enjebi landing strip and began to use it as 
well. More critically, Americans had no use for local labor, and 
"Native Islets" were as distant from the central activities bases as 
possible. In parts of Melanesia local laborers could be useful to the 
war effort (see chapters 15 and 17). On large islands shrouded with 
vegetation they could also act as scouts, tracing movements of the 
Japanese, and in many places becoming active fighters as well (see 
chapter 14). But on an atoll with a land area of less than 3 square 
miles, cleanup was not a problem. Instead, American forces moved 
the Islanders out of their way. 
On Enewetak, the war era was extended with nuclear tests. Bat-
tles moved elsewhere, but "the war" did not end. Military person-
nel remained. What had been a staging ground for the march 
through the western Pacific toward Japan became a testing ground 
for battles that would likewise "secure the peace and freedom of all 
mankind" (see Carucci 1980; Kiste 1974). The official rhetoric that 
led Marshall Islanders to agree to relocate temporarily also gave 
Ujelang people reason to think of the war as an ongoing project. 
Project Crossroads (a development program in disguise) would 
demonstrate to the world the ferocity of the force that devastated 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The resultant fear would be enough in 
itself to save the human species from the annihilative potential of 
that same force. In theory, only two small groups of Pacific Islanders 
would suffer. 
On a world scale, the nuclear demonstration model failed misera-
bly, leading instead to arms proliferation. However, Enewetak peo-
ple experienced the awe and the fear that others could only witness 
secondhand. During this phase of the war, while they were exiled in 
a permanent settlement on Ujelang, they had further opportunities 
to reconfirm their images of American strength. Eventually, the ties 
between nuclear bombs and sacred force would be elaborately sym-
bolized in the yearly renewal celebration called Kurijmoj where 
pinata-like planes, rockets, and bombs contain wealth displayed for 
God (Carucci 1980; Alexander 1979). While nuclear standoff came 
to be called "the cold war" elsewhere, for Ujelang people this dis-
tant, yet very personal, war had a much more intense emotional 
impact. Nowhere is this more evident than in stories of the first tests 
of hydrogen devices: 
After explaining the tests, he [the district anthropologist] returned, 
went away from us, on a boat belonging to the military people. We 
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took only a few clothes and left everything else behind and closed up 
the houses because they said the trip would be fast. And it was still 
closer to evening when we left and straight away sailed in a southward 
direction for Kosrae and those parts. We spent the entire evening and 
all night at sea and sailed off, way off there to the south, and those 
ships are fast, not like the Marshallese vessels [trade boats], they do 
about fifteen or eighteen knots. And then early in the dawn we 
stopped, and drifted a bit, and floated with the bow of the boat to the 
windward, and then that man [the government representative] and 
the officers took us to the edge of the vessel and pointed off toward the 
north. Perhaps they had prearranged the time, for in just a little while 
we saw it. First like a cloud, white, but enlarging, up, away; then, as 
if they set ablaze the entire earth-colors: red, blue, purple, all colors 
of the rainbow, but stronger. Up higher and wider, until the entire sky 
to the north was filled with colors. 
And then they told us it was Enewetak, one of the bombs, and we 
began to be sad, for we knew it was gone. After some minutes, then 
we heard the sound, like thunder, but louder and it stayed. And we 
again saddened, for the sound revealed the truth: perhaps Enewetak 
was gone. And we did not hear talk of the atoll for many years, until 
now, recently [perhaps the late 1960s], and it only revealed to us our 
own thoughts, that island, the island of ours, was gone. 
This event, in November 1952, was another phase of the war for 
Ujelang residents that was simultaneously close to their hearts 
(throats) and far from their lives. Of the many explosions they had 
witnessed during the war, this one was much greater. It served to 
confirm the images of great power that Enewetak people had built 
up about Americans, an image of untouchable, distant, might rein-
forced by the lengthy exile on Ujelang. Demonstrations of power 
and physical distance only increased the culturally conceived separa-
tion of colonizer and colonized. Micronesia's sole value to the 
United States·was strategic, and interpersonal contact, especially 
with outer islets, was minimized. Whatever interactions there were 
came through a localized administration that operated on a shoe-
string budget. Requests from the district anthropologist had to 
travel from Ujelang to Majuro, then to Saipan, then through the 
Department of Interior. There were no direct government ties (see 
Wolf 1966, 77). 
How do we know that Enewetak people think about relations with 
the United States in these terms? Is not the account a reflection of 
the anthropologist's position and suppositions? I think not, though 
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clearly a Japanese anthropologist would be given representations of 
a different shape (see chapter 7). Enewetak people, like all Marshal-
lese, encode the present using materials from the past. They derive 
current relevance from stories of the past that inform how, in indige-
nous terms, earth comes to be empowered. These accounts deal with 
chiefs and commoners, foreign beings from the sea and sky, and the 
residents who have long inhabited the land. 
One sequence of such stories deals with Etao, the sly one, typically 
considered the "trickster" of the Marshall Islands (see Carucci 
1983; Beidelman 1980). Etao visits numerous atolls of the Marshalls 
and at each' performs different sorts of deeds. Traveling from the 
Carolines, he first visits Ujelang, where he is upset that women will 
not share their arrowroot. He urinates on the arrowroot and makes 
it bitter. Since that time, arrowroot has required intensive labor to 
make it edible, whereas previously it could be eaten like a potato. 
This explanation of women's suffering is based not on sexually unac-
ceptable behavior but on lack of generosity-which on Ujelang is a 
quality controlled by female-headed extended families. On Enewe-
tak, his next stop, Etao teaches the chief how to fish and performs 
other deeds. Not properly reciprocated, he steals the chief's pillow, a 
bag of arrowroot flour, and runs off to Bikini. Various landforms are 
created not only by Etao's footprints but also by the falling arrow-
root. The chief, chasing after Etao, rips the bag. Although Etao 
escapes, some of the arrowroot drops to the sea, creating a renowned 
shoal area between the two atolls, a marker for sailors and reputedly 
a location where a wayward voyager can dive for drinkable brackish 
water. The shoal also divides the Marshalls into patrilineally and 
matrilineally inherited chiefly domains. While Etao deals with other 
chiefs in the Ralik and Ratak chains, none of them pursues him 
beyond the reef and out of sight of his atoll. Their right to rule comes 
through lines of women, localized sources of power contained within 
the perimeter of an atoll. 
Other sorts of primordial empowerment occur at each of Etao's 
stops, the final one in the Marshalls being Mili. There, Etao finds 
the chief's daughters very attractive and, after trying various ploys 
to get them alone (each plot foiled by the old chief), he settles on a 
cooking scheme. He leads the old chief to believe that being buried 
in an earth oven will cure his minor ailments. After Etao magically 
demonstrates the feat, the chief agrees to be buried in the oven only 
to become the cooked complement of the staples that surrounded 
him in the oven! 
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According to the tale, Etao escapes from Mili with the beautiful 
daughters and sails for Kiribati and then on toward Fiji. But several 
versions continue the tale. Etao leaves Fiji for America (or stows 
away aboard an American vessel and is taken to that "island"), 
where he is asked to consult with the government (as he has done, 
quite properly, on nearly all the atolls he visits). Once in the United 
States, however, Etao is captured in a bottle! He is only allowed to 
secure his release if he agrees to help the government with its experi-
ments on planes, rockets, bombs, and spacecraft. In this way, the 
sacred force that is involved in empowering the Marshallese uni-
verse is co-opted by the United States and becomes the source of the 
force wielded by the military in the ongoing war that makes the 
United States, in the worldview of Marshallese, "the strongest 
[country] on earth." At the same time, that empowerment main-
tains a Marshallese heritage. The strength that manifests itself in 
military might does not come directly from the great (missionary) 
God. It is channeled through the trickster Etao, who is constantly 
able to turn the tables on established chiefs. Etao's path from west to 
east retraces the steps of primordial Islanders who first came to the 
Marshalls. He continues his route, eventually being out-tricked by 
the stealthy Americans, far to the windward. At the same time, 
Marshallese become figurative ancestors of the Americans (and cur-
rent Islanders become collateral kin) by weaving part of their sub-
stance into the physiological and geographical path traveled by Etao 
to America. 13 From their Biblical mentors, Marshall Islanders 
learned A ro eta burueir re naJ Jolit ene eo (or Re naJ Jolit lo[) 'the meek 
shall inherit the land' (or 'the earth') (Matt. 5.5). With the high 
chiefs having claimed rights of access to the land, however, by 
Marshallese reckoning, what better way to secure one's inheritance 
than through established claims to a primordial place qn the path 
that leads to the source of the force. 
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1. According to Bickett (1965), 5 September 1941 marked the beginning of japa-
nese military development on Enewetak. Morison claimed that the "Japanese made 
no military use of it [Eniwetok] until November 1942" (1951, 283). Residents, 
using birth histories, place the beginning of the war effort in 1939 or early 1940. 
2. The narrator, Lemijkan, was a male in his teens at the time of these occur-
rences. He attended the japanese school in Pohnpei, where he witnessed the battle. 
A superb storyteller, his rhetorical ability to make the listeners feel they are part of 
an event makes up for the way his stories may bend the truth or come up with "one 
kind of thought, solely his own." In this case, his story corresponded closely with 
others (though Maku contended he was a Japanese favorite, he failed to mention 
that he whipped other Islanders) as well as drawing a comparison between japanese 
and Americans. Others often accused Lemijkan of being out for his own gain. In 
this instance, though, he was saying that the Japanese style of governance, while 
dictatorial, was more suited to Marshallese than the American laissez-faire 
approach, a theme that he reiterated in various forms on several occasions. 
3. "The war," unmodified, conjures up images of World War II since the only 
prior wars anyone can remember are stories of interatoll wars that ended some-
where between 1840 and 1875. Even the oldest residents can only reconstruct these 
battles from narratives they heard when they were children from witnesses of those 
battles. 
4. In 1983, 85 of the original132 survivors were still alive; 21 people were killed 
during the battle, but in intervening years the population has grown to 744. 
5. While indigenous accounts agree with those of military historians in general 
outline, many versions of the battle exist. Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh (1966, 591) 
noted a number of "disagreements of official records with journals and reports," 
and Enewetak accounts are equally varied. In general, Enewetak people construct 
their narratives to show how a series of events supports a common theme. When 
two or three participants are present, it is not unusual to have minor disagreements 
over sequencing. These are dealt with as trivial points hardly worth mentioning. 
For example, a storyteller may respond to an interjection about the sequence of 
events, "Oh, yes, this fellow is correct. It is. all the same, though, because the thing 
that was difficult was ... ";in other words, the reason for including the event was 
to support a larger idea about how tough life was during the war. 
6. "Property" is a poor translation of "land-class object," since ownership is held 
in common by all members of Lijemlok's bilateral extended family and is cared for 
by the current living members. Several possessive classes are selected out of the uni-
verse of possibility by the Marshallese language as being particularly important, 
and land is one of the most critical (see Bender 1969, 18-22). While the extended-
family ownership of a parcel is often mentioned, the narrator Jobaba may well be 
reminding me that this is land to which his family has special rights and is therefore 
a most logical place to flee to. On the other hand, since the rights to this islet are 
critical in current disputes about the division of trust-fund monies, he may also be 
telling me how important this parcel was in the Enjebi past. 
7. This account, by an Enjebi man who was about sixteen at the time of the bat-
tle, connects two tellings of his story of the battle. Older residents claimed that he 
was too small to know much about the war, but, in fact, his accounts are among the 
most complete overviews of what happened to the Enjebi people. His narratives 
cover several aspects of the battle process and contain, in synoptic form, the critical 
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features of many other accounts that focus on particular events. While some of his 
stories stress the sensational in comparison with others of the genre, this one is nota-
bly mundane. 
8. The historian's ability to create events of a certain shape is evident in the fol-
lowing account: "One interesting episode occurred on the nineteenth while the 
infantry were disposing of one underground entrenchment after another. After a 
grenade was dropped in a hole covered by a palm frond, the sounds of a Christian 
hymn emerged. Investigation revealed a native chief with several companions (all 
uninjured). Several others were in a nearby shelter. In a typical GI reaction, pri-
mary attention was temporarily given to a sociable exchange of souvenirs and ciga-
rettes" (United States Navy 1944). All Enewetak accounts disagree with the inju-
ries that resulted from this grenade and with the relative levels of sociability and 
fear in the encounter that followed. 
9. In indigenous terms, feeding and "caring for" were critical to the way in 
which Marshallese accepted Americans as "good people" (something like Marshal-
lese conceptions of themselves). Similar ideas are common in other parts of the 
Pacific (see chapters 6, 8, and 10). On the other hand, being perceived as chiefs 
required, as well, the maintenance of distance and the display of strength, concepts 
of person that developed gradually as "the war," in its broadest Enewetak sense, 
continued. 
10. Some Enewetak people considered the stories of Maku, the narrator, to be 
distorted and egocentric. His critics contended he was two-faced for having main-
tained a close relationship with the Japanese and then rapidly switching loyalties 
when the Americans arrived, all for personal gain. This narrative is told in terms of 
Maku's own contributions, but it also conveys a good sense of how the battle of 
Enewetak transpired. 
11. American hands-off policy has meant a minimum of interaction at the inter-
personal level. This lack of contact is in part responsible for the positive image Ene-
wetak people hold of Americans, an image that has been tarnished to some degree 
by contacts made during Enewetak's resettlement. 
12. I have selected this account, by Lekomta, a respected older man whose wife's 
family has substantial landholdings on Meden, because it contains nearly all of the 
most commonly mentioned features of the Meden offensive. His wife wandered in 
and out during the telling of this version of his story and added occasional sidelights 
or correctives. I originally heard Lekomta give his recollections of the battle during 
Raan in Kamolol, but I asked him to retell the tale for me. 
13. During my first stay, Ujelang residents constructed a parallel pragmatic ploy 
by proposing my ~arriage to a local woman (a member of the Enewetak ruling 
line). A close relative explained, "You see, when you return and become president 
(evidently an easy task in his mind!), you will take her; and then there will be the 
offspring of the two of you; and then there will be our possibility [of ruling], adan 
maron in America." 
(LMC: "Whose possibility?") 
"Ours [inclusive]. The Ujelang people. We [inclusive] will be the chiefs of 
America!" 
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CHAPTER 4 
Echoes of Massacre: 
Recollections of World War II 
on Sapwuahfik (Ngatik Atoll) 
LIN POYER 
UNLIKE most other communities described in this volume, the peo-
ple of Sapwuahfik (formerly Ngatik Atoll) were for most of World 
War II far from the front lines (map 1). 1 Even when war came to the 
central Pacific early in 1944, the eastern Carolines were never 
invaded by Allied troops, and Sapwuahfik itself was not attacked. 
The people of Sapwuahfik suffered little of the trauma and physical 
devastation reported for the Marshall Islands (chapter 3) or the 
southwest Pacific, and they did not experience the mass movements 
of foreign troops and war materiel that had such an impact on the 
people in those areas. But the war nonetheless affected the people of 
Sapwuahfik. Today, they recollect t):leir own experiences and trans-
mit those of their elders in the first stages of the absorption of this 
global event into the ongoing stream of the local understanding of 
history. In this chapter, I indicate how the people's memories of 
World War II reflect continuing cultural and historical concerns of 
the Sapwuahfik community. 
The focus of my field research in 1979-1980 was the recollection 
ofSapwuahfik's nineteenth-century past; I did not intensively collect 
accounts of World War II. Except for a few collected in casual con-
versation, those that I have for the most part result from conversa-
tions in which an informant and I pursued a chronological frame-
work as he or she explained to me the unfolding of the island's past. 
Interviews on specific historical topics generally began with what the 
speaker knew of aboriginal life on Sapwuahfik, then moved through 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century oral history, usually tracing 
some theme important to the speaker, and concluded with discussion 
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of World War II, the transition from Japanese to American control 
in Micronesia, and comments on life in the American era. My inter-
est, in these formal interviews, was explicitly historical. I was speak-
ing with people who, in the context of these conversations, were also 
interested in the process and meaning of history and the significance 
of particular historical events. The resulting dialogue provided me 
with important clues about the nature of Sapwuahfik understanding 
of the past. In the case of World War II narratives, it directed my 
attention to how these stories select and reflect themes common to 
the presentation of other aspects of Sapwuahfik history and identity. 
As I have shown elsewhere (Poyer 1985), what it means to belong to 
Sapwuahfik today has a great deal to do with the Islanders' vision of 
local history. 
In 1837, the entire male population of Sapwuahfik was massacred 
in an attack by a group of European and American sailors aided by 
warriors from the nearby island of Pohnpei (see Riesenberg 1966; 
Poyer 1983, 1985 for details). Following this destruction of its people 
and culture, the atoll was gradually repopulated by deliberate and 
accidental immigrants from Pohnpei, the Gilbert Islands, the Mort-
lock Islands, Europe, and the United States, who joined the surviv-
ing women and children to create a new cultural community. During 
this period, the new population of Sapwuahfik began speaking an 
English pidgin, derived from nineteenth-century Anglophone sail-
ors' speech. Men of the atoll still use this language in certain situa-
tions; their ability to speak English was to be very important during 
World War II, when it gave them privileged access to American mil-
itary personnel. Late in the nineteenth century, the atoll population 
converted to Christianity, closing a period said to have been filled 
with anarchy and violence. In the modern understanding of the 
meaning of Sapwuahfik history, the 1837 massacre is "read" in one 
context as a punishment of the aboriginal people as he~thens. This 
punishment was followed by the voluntary acceptance of Christian-
ity on the part of the reconstructed community, which rejected sor-
cery and other sinful practices and was, in exchange, rewarded by 
special supernatural protection. (I have condensed and simplified 
enormously here; a more complete discussion is in Poyer 1983.) 
On Sapwuahfik, identity is culturally constituted; it is not based 
on a presumption of biological unity or a great depth of tradition. 
The shared history of descendants of this new atoll community 
began in the years immediately following the massacre and contin-
ues into the present. I have argued elsewhere that history is central 
Echoes of Massacre on Sapwuahjik 99 
to the symbolic construction of cultural identity on Sapwuahfik 
(Poyer 1983) and that the 1837 massacre is the key historical event, 
reconstructed in oral traditions that maintain a vision of the massa-
cre for contemporary identity. As Price (1983) described for the 
Saramaka, references to massacre-era events and persons are a 
touchstone for understanding modern life on Sapwuahfik. Yet this 
was not the last traumatic event to affect the atoll. In the Islanders' 
vision of the past, several marked periods and important events fol-
lowed 1837. 2 As with many Micronesians, the historical eras recog-
nized by the people of Sapwuahfik mark the changing of colonial 
regimes, though the specific dates and rubrics do not correspond 
exactly with Western dates for the beginning and ending of each 
colonial power's hold over the islands. 
These locally recognized historical eras are as follows: 
ansou en mehn mahs (mahs, mahs) 'the time of the ancient people 
(long, long ago)' 
ansou en mehn Spain 'the time of the people of Spain' -the Span-
ish era 
ansou en mehn German the German era 
ansou en mehnjapan the japanese era 
ansou en mehn America the American era 
lei rahnwet 'until today' (this is a term of variable meaning; its 
specific time reference depends on the theme pursued by the 
speaker) 
When a person from Sapwuahfik recounts a series of events, or 
compares the form of a social institution over time, these eras consti-
tute the temporal framework in which information is presented. 
Note that the event of the massacre is not explicitly mentioned as a 
watershed in this listing, though its status in marking off mehn mahs 
from the modern era is both implicit and explicit in the entire corpus 
of historical tales told on the atoll. 
In the same way, World War II, though not an era in itself (eras 
are identified by the dominant foreign political power in the region), 
serves to mark off the period of American control from earlier post-
massacre history. That its structural role in dividing "then" and 
"now" matches that of the massacre in dividing the "people oflong 
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ago" from the modern population of Sapwuahfik can be supported 
by several similarities between local historical treatments of the mas-
sacre and of World War II, revealed by a study of oral traditions 
associated with each. Both involve the violence of armed attack; 
each is a case of invasion by foreigners from the outside; each is fol-
lowed by a perceived reward-that is, the massacre by the eventual 
arrival of the much-prized Christian message, and World War II by 
the entrance of the materially wealthy American government onto 
the scene. 
Though I argue that they are structurally similar in terms of 
ethnohistory, World War II and the 1837 massacre differ, of course, 
both in scale and in kind. For the people of Sapwuahfik, the massa-
cre is the key event, the archetypal act of destruction and creation of 
their community. World War II-despite its incalculably greater 
destructive force elsewhere-affected the atoll with only a shadow of 
the massacre's violent impact. Seen in light of the local vision of his-
tory, World War II events echo certain salient attributes of the mas-
sacre. Understanding the meaning of those events depends on 
understanding the people's view of themselves and their history, a 
view predicated on local interpretations of the 183 7 massacre (chap-
ters 2, 1 0). In the rest of this chapter, I present what is preserved of 
World War II events in the personal and community life of Sap-
wuahfik. 
The 1 apanese Era 
The period of1apanese control began in Micronesia in 1914 with the 
1 apanese naval takeover of the area, which was officially sanctioned 
by League of Nations mandate in 1921. Japanese interest in the 
islands was primarily economic and, in later decades, military. In 
the Caroline Islands, the greatest impact of Japanese colonial policy 
was on the high islands. For Sapwuahfik, this meant Pohnpei. Sap-
wuahfik itself experienced the early decades of Japanese control 
mostly in the form of increased visits by traders, augmentation of the 
amount and variety of purchasable goods, the assignment of local 
men as government representatives, regular censusing and an-
nouncement of government regulations, and widespread though 
nonintensive schooling. Pohnpei, by contrast, saw a large influx of 
Japanese nationals, intensive development of agriculture (especially 
the production of rice), construction of roads, government build-
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ings, wharves, and a municipal center at Kolonia that included 
waterworks, an electrical generating plant, and, in the later 1930s, 
military installations. During the height of hostilities in November 
1943, Pohnpei was the site of a japanese airfield and seaplane base, 
as well as a center for supplies, fuel, and the restaging of troops 
(Morison 1951). 
The people who remained on Sapwuahfik knew a few Japanese in 
the context of everyday life as traders or visiting representatives of 
the colonial government. Those who met Japanese through such 
sporadic contact offer little today in the way of recollections or ethnic 
stereotypes of them. In contrast, men and women who lived on 
Pohnpei during this time were usually there either as employees of 
Japanese entrepreneurs or officials or, as the military build-up got 
underway, as conscript laborers. They developed familiar and in 
some cases intimate relations with individual Japanese and readily 
provide anecdotes and summaries of how they felt about them. In 
interviews about the Japanese era, the people of Sapwuahfik usually 
distinguish between the "good times" of the early years of the japa-
nese presence and the "hard times" of the years of military build-
up, climaxed by the war. 
In Japanese times, that's when I was a man, starting at about age 
eighteen [i.e., in the early 1920s]. There was a time, at the beginning, 
that it was very good, because there were friends, there were different 
kinds of work, and money, and things to buy weren't expensive, they 
were cheap. Well, so we worked, and time passed, and it was good. 
Time passed, and then came the t.ime that we call daidowa 'war, dis-
pute' [from the Japanese] when the war of America and Japan was 
going to take place. That was when we began to have difficulty, 
because they would come and take away the young men of Ngatik to 
go and work at their places of war. So, we went along to that place 
[Pohnpei] to make houses, places to stay during the war, over there, 
we went along and did that until the war was done. I stayed until the 
time when American planes flew over, and they started the fighting, 
the war, on Pohnpei. 
This man (born in 1903) also contrasted the Japanese era with the 
period of American occupation (bear in mind that he was talking to 
me, an American): 
We lived under the "law" [using the English word] of the Japanese, 
which is the reason we went along and lived there [on Pohnpei] and 
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could simply die, for we lived under Japan's rule. Until the Americans 
came, and kept coming, and the time came that the Japanese begged 
for mercy; well, apparently [then] we were free. The Americans came 
to Pohnpei, and made it good, everyone was free. Americans came 
and made it so that all were free, and were walking around [at lib-
erty]. If you wanted to work, you worked. If you didn't want to work, 
you didn't work. If you wanted to sell your land, you sold it. If you 
died, then you died. It was up to people [what they wanted to do]. 
The strictness of Japanese law is widely remembered by those who 
lived under it. Particularly recalled today are the prohibitions on 
alcohol production and consumption by Islanders: 
No one could flout [the law] by drinking alcohol. If one obviously had 
been drinking, they would beat him until he suffered, they would 
almost destroy his life. They would whip him with a whip-a rope, or 
some such thing ... kanakas were afraid of the japanese. Their laws 
were very strict. 
Certain stories about life in the Japanese era encode negative feel-
ings about this colonial power succinctly and effectively. One man, 
who had in his youth worked as a house and office "boy" (his word) 
for the Japanese administrator on Pohnpei, told me that the Japa-
nese had given medication (wini, the word means both "magic" and 
"medication") to both men and women so that "they would not 
want to produce children" and that plans were afoot to move the 
people to Tinian and to replace the atoll's population with imported 
Japanese in order to exploit the massive phosphate deposits that this 
man claimed were beneath Sapwuahfik's soil. The commonest sin-
gle-word negative stereotype of Japanese is that they were lemei 
'cruel', expounded on by reference to harsh schoolteachers' punish-
ments and police officers who administered beatings with canes. 
Despite sucq recollections of harsh times under the Japanese, 
individuals from Sapwuahfik and Japanese living on Pohnpei at 
times formed ties of patronage and friendship, some of which endure 
to the present. The most frequent single-word positive stereotype of 
individual Japanese is that they were (and are) kadek 'kind'. Several 
men recalled in detail their relationships with particular employees 
in the earlier, civilian period of Japanese control. They worked as 
house laborers, mostly, living in storage sheds if they were live-in 
help or sleeping in a large house that the young men of Sapwuahfik 
built for themselves. When relations of close friendship tied Japa-
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nese employer and Islander employee, they were expressed in 
prompt, good pay, the chance to learn Japanese, an account at a 
Japanese-owned shop, even an illegal nightly bottle of liquor to be 
drunk alone and in secret. A few young women from Sapwuahfik 
worked as domestics, and more did heavy work in the rice fields. I 
heard mention of Japanese with Sapwuahfik girlfriends. About 
seven alliances of women from Sapwuahfik with Japanese men pro-
duced more than a dozen children born in the 1920s and 1930s, 
another indication of close relations between the two groups. 
People who had good relations with individual Japanese employ-
ers recall the first part of the Japanese era as kaperen 'enjoyable' or 
mwahu 'good'. Some Islander employees, including at least one man 
from Sapwuahfik, were selected for special training to work with 
machinery. Some learned to speak fluent Japanese. Everyone who 
worked with Japanese became more knowledgeable about the use of 
money, industrial technology, the size of the world, and the diversity 
of cultural ways. 
One man's ties with Japanese are so strong that he has visited 
Japan several times. On his most recent trip, in the 1970s, he looked 
up two men he had worked for when they were in the Japanese 
army. The men were happy to see him, and he showed me snapshots 
of the celebratory party they all enjoyed in a fancy hotel. 
The era of Japanese colonial control, then, is generalized in the 
Sapwuahfik vision of history into three distinct periods. The good 
times of plentiful trade goods, wage labor, the learning of new skills, 
and some pleasurable travel; the period of increasing militarization 
of Micronesia and the early years of World War II, when imported 
goods became scarce, Islanders were pressured to provide increas-
ingly scarce food to Japanese, and conscripted labor ate up the time, 
strength, and even lives of Islanders; and the final wartime years 
and the immediate postwar period, when military attacks produced 
danger and death for Islanders, manufactured goods all but disap-
peared, and people lived in destitution and fear. The ease with 
which these "times" are characterized is not accompanied by blan-
ket generalizations about the Japanese themselves, who are consis-
tently distinguished as individuals by the people of Sapwuahfik-
who knew them as such-and are evaluated on the basis of their 
personal relationships with Islanders. 
The Japanese presence in Micronesia today is felt both historically 
and immediately, as Japanese capital and Japanese imports contrib-
ute to the local economy of Pohnpei and all of Micronesia. It would 
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require a separate study to consider how memories of the Japanese 
era influence attitudes toward Japanese entrepreneurs today, but in 
numerous cases Islanders continue to form business and personal 
relationships-as employees, customers, affines, and friends-with 
individual Japanese, and people of Sapwuahfik both admire Japa-
nese as industrious and clever and recognize them as sharply differ-
ent from themselves in enforcing strict discipline on themselves and 
others. 
The War Years 
People of Sapwuahfik who lived through the years of war experi-
enced very different circumstances, depending on whether they 
remained on the home atoll during the critical period ofU.S.-Japa-
nese military encounters or were at that time residing on Pohnpei. 
Those who spent the war years on Pohnpei were affected not only by 
the trauma of wartime pressures-from food shortages to U.S. 
bombing attacks, which they shared with the Japanese and the peo-
ple of Pohnpei-but by the fact that they, like others brought to 
Pohnpei to work for the Japanese, were away from home. This 
meant that they had to deal with peculiar living situations and social 
relations with the Japanese as well as with the people ofPohnpei. 
Most of those who recount stories of the war years on Pohnpei 
went there as laborers conscripted by the Japanese. Although I do 
not have adequate statistical data, interviews suggest that the great 
majority of the men of Sapwuahfik, and many of the adult women, 
spent time as laborers for the Japanese military administration. For 
the men, most of this labor involved constructing airstrips and other 
military installations. Women worked in rice fields, supplying the 
food needed for the wartime population on Pohnpei ( cf. cliapter 12). 
Sapwuahfik wa:; left with old men, some women, and children and 
youth. 
Pohnpei during the War 
By the spring of 1943, Allied resources were sufficient to support a 
second front in the central Pacific, while continuing the southwest 
Pacific offensive. 3 The intent was to open a second "road to Tokyo" 
by a westward sweep through Micronesia. It remained unclear for 
some months which Micronesian islands would be attacked and in 
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what order. The United States had little information about Japanese 
installations in the area, and little experience, at first, in amphibious 
attacks on small islands. Pohnpei was twice scheduled for major 
attacks that were later cancelled. 
The Gilberts were conquered in November 1943, and the estab-
lishment of Allied airfields there meant the beginning of intermittent 
air attacks on Pohnpei and Kosrae in order to neutralize their value 
as Japanese bases. American concern with the base at Pohnpei 
intensified immediately prior to the invasion of Enewetak (chapter 
3). "Between 15 and 26 February Liberators based at Hawkins and 
Mullinnix Fields, Tarawa, made five visits to Ponape, a flight of 
over 900 miles each way, dropping 118 tons of bombs and over 6000 
incendiaries. At the conclusion of these strikes Ponape was out" 
(Morison 1951, 287), though it was operative once again later in 
the war. 
Although the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 24 
August 1943 called for Pohnpei to be invaded after the Marshalls, 
the decision was made to bypass it and aim directly for Truk. Mori-
son wrote that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had agreed to let Po nape be 
by-passed because it had too much rainfall for a major air base and 
in general was not worth the effort" (1951, 315n). Pohnpei had also 
been scheduled for a major attack on the return trip of the first air 
strike on Truk (February 1944 ), coinciding with the invasion of Ene-
wetak, but this also was cancelled in exchange for a sudden thrust at 
the Marianas. 
The second major attack on Truk, at the end of April 1944, 
brought simultaneous naval bombardments of Pohnpei and Sata-
wan, two islands where the Japanese were suspected of building 
alternate air bases. The Pohnpei attack force had seven battleships 
plus destroyers and aircraft carriers. 
Airstrips, town and seaplane base were duly bombarded on the after-
noon of 1 May, the only opposition coming from antiaircraft guns, 
which ceased firing when the big shells began to burst. Admiral Lee, 
after a shoot of 70 minutes, concluded that no worthwhile targets 
remained, and called quits to avoid wasting ammunition. As at Sata-
wan, the main profit in pounding Ponape lay in giving the ships prac-
tice on live targets .... (Morison 1951, 40-41) 
Though not the scene of actual invasion, the "by-passed" Japa-
nese bases in the Marshalls and Carolines were subjected to constant 
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air strikes up to and through the Marianas campaign, with espe-
cially severe attacks coinciding with major invasion activity, such as 
Enewetak in mid-February and the invasion of Saipan on 15 June 
1944. In addition, Pohnpei underwent a single massive bombard-
ment on 1 May. To be "by-passed" for land invasion did not mean 
escaping the war. 
Men who went as laborers from Sapwuahfik to work for the J apa-
nese government on Pohnpei during the military escalation recall it 
as hard, endless physical labor. There were no machines to make 
their work easier, nor did Islanders know how to use construction 
machines. (They learned this later, from Americans, whose use of 
machinery to replace the Japanese system of intensive human labor 
impressed them very much.) One man estimated that more than 
forty men from Sapwuahfik worked for the military. This labor put 
them in close contact with laborers from the Mortlocks, Pingelap, 
Truk, Pohnpei, and Korea also working for the Japanese. As labor-
ers were sent where they were most needed by the military govern-
ment, local men had a chance to travel, willy-nilly; some of them 
spent time working in the Marshalls or on other Japanese posses-
sions, instead of or in addition to Pohnpei. A woman who spent this 
period working for the Japanese in Pohnpei's rice fields tells stories 
of this time that contain hints of espionage and excitement in Kolo-
nia town. She tells of knowing a Japanese man who told his 
girlfriend from Sapwuahfik about his activities spying for the Ameri-
cans, of Pohnpei people hiding an American, and of a Sapwuahfik 
man in radio contact with the Americans. 
When the air attacks began, laboring to construct airstrips and 
other military facilities became dangerous as well as backbreaking. 
One man recalls that Koreans "died, died, died" as bombs fell on 
the place where they worked. Vivid memories of dirt erupting, trees 
being blown up, and workers scattering to run for their lives rise 
readily to people's lips. As supply lines to Japan and other islands 
were cut and food supplies dwindled, the Japanese made additional 
demands on the local population. One man recalls that people on 
Pohnpei were forced to work both during the day, when they pre-
pared food, went fishing, and grew taro, and at night, when they 
worked on the airstrip. 
When the bombing became severe, work was impossible. People 
scattered for shelter, well aware that foxholes were no guarantee of 
safety: 
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People ran, we scattered because we worked with the Japanese. We 
ran and hid when they dropped them [bombs]. They had dug holes, 
before the "evil time," before it arrived, because they knew bad things 
were going to come to Pohnpei. So that's what people would do, run 
and hide in a hole. But if a bomb went straight in, it would destroy 
[everything], no hole is going to make it all right. You would really be 
destroyed .... Many died, in that evil time. 
Men and women who were on Pohnpei during the bombings retain 
vivid memories of their unwilling involvement in a war not 
their own. 
[It was] hard, hard for us, because we are not white people, and we 
were afraid, for we didn't know what we would do. We waited to die. 
That's what we did. Because they brought bombs, and dropped them, 
brought guns, and shot them. Apparently, we were stupid [naive]-
we hid ourselves around in holes, or in rocks, or in trees and suchlike. 
We were all the time trembling. 
As conditions became extremely dangerous, many people stopped 
working and simply left the area under attack. Calling on kin or 
other ties, they sought the relative safety of the rest of Pohnpei 
Island. One man recounts how he and a few companions spent the 
time "until it became somewhat more peaceful" traveling around 
Pohnpei. As he explained it to the people of one Pohnpei household 
that he visited: 
The oldest woman who lived there ~sked me, "Where do you all come 
from?" I said, "Oh, we are resting from work, and we are going 
around Pohnpei visiting, going around, and we stop at places where 
we know people. We rest for two or three days, and then we go on 
again. We've been traveling, and we arrived at this place. We went 
from around the side of Sokehs to the side of Kitti, going up to Mado-
lenihmw" [i.e., three-quarters of the way around the island!] Yes, we 
circled Pohnpei, resting a little here and there, resting from work. 
The pressures of strict Japanese military discipline and wartime 
laws, forced labor, food shortages, and bombings put everyone on 
Pohnpei into unusual social situations. Between enforced meetings 
in work groups, the crowding of Kolonia, and such voluntary visit-
ing as described above, the people from Sapwuahfik considerably 
expanded their range of contact and personal relations with other 
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Islanders, especially people of Pohnpei. They already had ties of kin 
and clan with some Pohnpei families, but the war period created 
novel opportunities to form social relationships with others. Many of 
the ties formed with particular Pohnpei families due to the exigen-
cies of this period continued after the war in marriages, adoptions, 
and business relationships. In the context of describing his first 
encounter with Pohnpei gardening magic, one man described the 
special relationship that developed between several Sapwuahfik peo-
ple (including himself) and an elderly Pohnpei couple: 
I felt sorry for that woman, for she was just an old woman. We 
thought of her as our "mother" [classificatory]. And also that man, an 
old man who could no longer walk. People carried him, his legs were 
paralyzed. He owned that land. We were the ones who were feeding 
them. We Ngatikese would go fishing, and take some to them, we'd 
make food, breadfruit or bananas, and feed them. It was their land, 
but there was no one to take care of them, because it was the time 
when the Americans and the Japanese were fighting. Hard times, 
those. The people who were truly their family threw them aside and 
ran away. So there were only those two, nor were any of their children 
there-their sons were with Kosraeans, working as forced labor for 
the Japanese. Well then, the Ngatikese went and took care of them. 
That's the reason they gave permission to all the Ngatikese to come 
and plant on their land. 
A number of people from Sapwuahfik worked this land and supplied 
the elderly couple with food. "Many Pohnpei people were in diffi-
culty," my informant concluded. "It was hard, very hard, for no one 
wanted to help them. The old woman, the old man-very pitiful." 
Several from Sapwuahfik lost their lives on Pohnpei during these 
years-whether from illness or attack I do not know. Two tnen carry 
marks of the U.S. attacks on Pohnpei to this day. One lost an arm to 
an American bullet. As I was told, "It was Americans who took off 
his arm." Another man's limp is due to bullets from American 
planes strafing Pohnpei. 
By the end of hostilities, local people on Pohnpei were short of 
food. The disruption of trade meant that they were living in rags and 
had reverted to coconut oil lamps and traditional cooking methods. 
These hard times during the war on Pohnpei are remembered in 
sharp contrast to the experiences of the same years on Sapwuahfik 
Atoll. 
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The War on Sapwuahjik 
In contrast to the descriptive historical recollections characteristic of 
people who worked on Pohnpei during the war, the less numerous 
stories of the war years on the atoll seem emblematic in nature. That 
is, rather than conveying descriptions of particular activities, or the 
ambience of the period, these anecdotes selectively report incidents 
and circumstances that represent, for the people of Sapwuahfik, 
something considerably more important than the remembered 
events of that time. Specifically, they are evidence in support of Sap-
wuahfik's particular vision of itself, of the people's interpretation of 
their own past and of the meaning of their identity as a community. 
Extremely important to the people of Sapwuahfik, for both prag-
matic and less obvious cultural reasons, is the fact that their atoll was 
not hit by U.S. bombs. In fact, people repeatedly claimed that it was 
the only island in what is now Pohnpei State not bombed. The 
explanation given by at least two individuals is that certain local peo-
ple, knowing the English pidgin spoken by men on Sapwuahfik, 
wrote messages on the beach. American pilots, seeing these mes-
sages, responded appropriately. In one story, a man wrote in the 
sand, "No Japanese on this island," and the Americans, flying over 
Sapwuahfik on their way from a bombing run on Pohnpei, spared 
the atoll. An elderly woman confirmed this story and added that a 
woman wrote another message, spelling it out in coconut fronds, 
requesting the Americans to "help this island." 
The "help" Sapwuahfik got from Americans went beyond preser-
vation from bombing. In fact, according to numerous eyewitnesses, 
the atoll actually benefited from the presence of American planes in 
the area. In place of bombs, Sapwuahfik was bombarded with pack-
ages of food, clothing, tobacco, and chocolate dropped by navy 
planes into the lagoon, there to be picked up by Islanders. Sap-
wuahfik's good luck is explicitly contrasted in these stories with 
Pohnpei's hardship: where Pohnpei received explosives dropped by 
Americans, Sapwuahfik received gifts; where people of Pohnpei 
were suffering dire want from shortages of food and clothing, Sap-
wuahfik's people were walking around fully clothed and replete with 
tinned corned beef, thanks to the U.S. Navy. Thus, World War II 
reinforced the special ties people of Sapwuahfik feel themselves to 
share with Americans, who, along with other English speakers, had 
been instrumental in attacking and resettling the atoll in the nine-
teenth century. 
no LIN POYER 
Navy planes even landed in Sapwuahfik's lagoon on occasion, 
trading with the people and directly renewing the atoll's ties with 
America-ties that had lapsed during the German and, especially, 
the Japanese eras. Several women recalled times when seven, nine, 
or twelve planes would fly over, and American military men would 
stop at Sapwuahfik to rest, giving away candy and other gifts. The 
fact that the men spoke pidgin made these interactions rewarding 
rather than frustrating for both sides, and the people used these 
opportunities to learn about America. 
Sapwuahfik men who were on Pohnpei when the U.S. military 
Caroline Islander provides information to American and japanese officers 
during the evacuation of the Japanese garrison on Woleai, September 
1945. (U.S. Navy) 
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moved in also found their pidgin useful and a marker distinguishing 
them from Pohnpei people. 
When Americans arrived in Pohnpei, when the Navy captured Pohn-
pei, all the Ngatikese went and conversed with the Americans. [Q. 
But Pohnpei people couldn't?] They couldn't, that's right! They 
would ask, "Who is Ngatikese?" and [then say] "Come here, come 
here!" and the Ngatikese talked with the Americans, they discussed 
all kinds of things. They very much liked it, that the N gatikese knew 
English. That's the reason that, when cigarettes were scarce, all the 
Ngatikese would walk around with their pockets, their trousers full of 
cigarettes. They would give us a carton as a gift. We are the ones who 
gave cigarettes to Pohnpei people, made it easy for them. Truly, they 
[Americans] were nice. But today, with schools, Pohnpei people have 
surpassed Ngatikese, very much surpassed them in knowing English. 
This distinction and implied competition between Pohnpei and 
Sapwuahfik is an important marker of the latter's identity. The 
reversal of the direction of the flow of goods-normally from high 
island to small island-is worth noting. 
An elderly man began a conversation with me by asking which 
U.S. state "fought the most," offering his opinion that it must be 
Texas. He followed this with a World War II recollection of an 
American who flew into Sapwuahfik during the time when Ameri-
cans in planes were giving gifts to the Islanders. The Americans 
were exchanging U.S. goods for seashells when this Sapwuahfik 
man asked one flyer, a Texan, ''Don't you have any soap [to 
trade]?" The Texan replied, "Soap?! I didn't come here to bathe, I 
came to die [in battle]!" (see chapter 6 for a similar comment and 
similar friendships with flyers). Such encounters were important in 
shaping initial impressions of Americans, the next colonial rulers of 
Micronesia. 
Although Sapwuahfik was never bombed, a few of its people did 
suffer as the result of one attack by U.S. military forces. A young 
girl was shot in the leg by a machine gun when a canoe traveling 
between islets was strafed by an American plane. According to one 
account, several people were in a canoe when a plane shot at them. 
The girl didn't even notice at first that she had been shot. The plane 
turned to come back to shoot again, and the people jumped out of 
the canoe and swam to land. They noticed that the water around 
them was full of blood, and then saw that she had been shot. The 
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explanation given by those who were in the canoe is that perhaps 
there had been a box or boxes with Japanese writing in the canoe, 
and that the plane crew had seen this through binoculars and so shot 
at them. Like the two men hurt by American bullets on Pohnpei, 
this woman had the right to file for reparations for her injuries after 
the war, but, unlike the men, she did not do so. 
Conclusions 
These several atoll anecdotes and the story of using pidgin to good 
advantage on Pohnpei during the war years were told to me several 
times. Unlike stories about the prewar period and the time of bomb-
ing attacks on Pohnpei, they were told not as memories of personal 
experience, but as genuine "oral traditions" -events that are widely 
known and recounted by people who were not personally involved 
with them. They were told by the younger generation as well as by 
those old enough to have been eyewitnesses. Why do these war sto-
ries have such historical currency? Of all the personal memories of 
World War II, why are these few told and retold? I think it is because 
the themes expressed in these anecdotes repeat, and their events val-
idate, the people's understanding of Sapwuahfik's history and their 
community's identity. 
Major themes in the history of Sapwuahfik center on the massacre 
of aboriginal males by a group of American and English seamen and 
Pohnpei warriors in 1837. The attack on the atoll and the destruc-
tion of the culture were followed by resettlement and by the decision 
of the reconstituted Sapwuahfik population to discard sorcery and 
accept Christianity (Poyer 1985). In return for this act offaith, Sap-
wuahfik received special divine protection-a Christian continua-
tion, perhaps, of the traditional spirits that had guarded·the island 
long ago (Poyer 1983). In telling me the moral of Sapwuahfik's his-
tory, the people spoke explicitly of the protection of the atoll from the 
horror of bombardment during World War II. One Western-edu-
cated man stated that sometimes he blames the white attackers for 
the 1837 massacre, but then he thinks about World War II and the 
fact that Sapwuahfik was not bombed, and he thinks, "maybe it 
comes out even." 
The people speak of their atoll as sapw paiamwahu 'the fortunate 
land' because of this special protection, as well as because of Sap-
wuahfik's bountiful gardens and lagoon. This theme recurs in war 
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stories, as the island is vividly contrasted with the situation of near-
starvation on Pohnpei in the final years of the Japanese era. Com-
munity identity centers on the locus of Sapwuahfik identity vis-a-vis 
several crucial others. In particular the people of Sapwuahfik see 
themselves as distinct from, though specially tied to, the people of 
Pohnpei and as having a unique relationship with Americans (Poyer 
1988). Both of these critical relationships derive from the Islanders' 
understanding of their past and are reflected in what they consider to 
be the significant events of the World War II period. 
Because of historical circumstances, Sapwuahfik shares with 
Pohnpei partial biological identity, a language, and much of the cul-
tural content of everyday life. Pohnpei warriors assisted in the 1837 
attack on Sapwuahfik, and men and women from Pohnpei were 
among the most numerous of the immigrants who resettled the atoll, 
intermarrying with survivors, Euro-Americans, and immigrants 
from other islands. One of the important and problematic aspects of 
modern Sapwuahfik identity is marking off the atoll's culture from 
that ofPohnpei. 
Two aspects of this distinction are reflected in accounts of World 
War 11-references to pidgin, and social ties established with Pohn-
pei people. English pidgin, unique to Sapwuahfik, continues today 
to be a marker of identity for the atoll's men, who may be teased 
about it when they are in Pohnpei. Personal relations with Pohnpei 
people established during the "hard times" of the war period both 
reinforced the Sapwuahfik sense of culture shared with Pohnpei and 
sharply distinguished the two on the matter of sorcery and magical 
practices. People of Sapwuahfik c<;msider these to be widespread on 
Pohnpei, but nonexistent among themselves (except when they 
obtain magic from people of other islands). 
The Sapwuahfik sense of an identity shared with Americans is 
also based historically on the 1837 massacre: American sailors par-
ticipated in the murderous attack, but a few also remained to 
become ancestors of the present population. Several other Ameri-
cans arrived on Sapwuahfik for brief or lengthy stays during the 
Spanish, German, and Japanese eras. The island is seen as being 
"like America" because of its English pidgin, because Sapwuahfik, 
like the United States, has a plentiful food supply, and because its 
people and Americans share a preference for egalitarian, democratic 
social relations with a minimum of attention to the forms of aristo-
cratic honorifics and etiquette (Poyer 1983). Christianity, intro-
duced by American missionaries in the Carolines, is another shared 
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bond, though it is shared as well with other Micronesians (see chap-
ter 3 for positive Marshallese impressions of Americans). 
In World War II recollections, this special tie with Americans is 
expressed in several ways. Their fluent pidgin gave Sapwuahfik men 
on Pohnpei control over a difficult situation and preferential access 
to American resources that set them apart from Pohnpei people. 
Americans conversed with people from Sapwuahfik-not only in the 
simple words necessary to the situation, but about "all kinds of 
things," and Americans favored these Islanders with gifts of ciga-
rettes. On the atoll, too, Americans displayed special interest in the 
people. They avoided bombing the atoll, dropped gifts to Sap-
wuahfik, and visited, trading and conversing in pidgin. Here again, 
communication-in the form of messages on the beach and the 
men's pidgin-is the entree to this special relationship. 
For Sapwuahfik, then, World War II anecdotes, like stories of the 
1837 massacre, encode a good deal of information about what it 
means to belong to the island. Of relevance to the subject of this vol-
ume are the ways the people distinguish themselves from, identify 
with, and relate to various sorts of foreigners, most notably those of 
Pohnpei and the United States. Also significant is the perception 
that Sapwuahfik is peculiarly protected from outside attack. The 
elaboration of these aspects of the historical understanding of the 
massacre and ofWorld War II, and the perception of the position of 
the Sapwuahfik community in its regional context today, reveal con-
tinuities of structure and of theme in the people's understanding of 
themselves and their history. 
Notes 
My thanks go to Sinio Nahior, who checked my translations of interviews, and to 
the people of Sapwuahfik for their hospitality and assistance. Twe~ty months of 
fieldwork in 1979;-1980 were funded by the National Institute of Mental Health. 
All quotations are from interviews with men and women who personally experi-
enced the war years, recorded on Sapwuahfik and Pohnpei in 1979-1980. 
1. From early European contact until 1985, Sapwuahfik was known as Ngatik 
Atoll. "Ngatik" is retained verbatim in direct quotations. Detailed ethnographic 
information about Ngatik!Sapwuahfik is available in Fischer and Fischer 1957, and 
Poyer 1983. 
2. Other marked events preceded the 1837 massacre, but I will not deal with 
those here. 
3. Information on Allied war plans and the progress of the central Pacific cam-
paign is from Karig, Harris, and Manson 1948 and Morison 1951. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Time of Famine, Time of Transformation: 
Hell in the Pacific, Palau 
KAREN L. NERO 
Poverty and sacrifices in war camps 
People have been starving too long 
Mr. Famine came and put a spell upon us 
So we're eating denges, and belloi. 
If it were up to us to request 
We would ask Mr. War 
To stop all his warfare 
Because, friends, we've suffered a great deal. 
N garchelong song 
THE IMAGE that overwhelms all other Palauan recollections of 
World War II, the "War of japan and America," is one offamine. 1 
In contrast to recollections of Palauan warfare of the previous cen-
tury, which conformed to strict rules and ceased after one or two 
individuals were killed or key community property was destroyed, 
this war of outsiders was an endless one of wanton death and 
destruction. There was no refuge; the Palauans were reduced to liv-
ing like wild people in the forest, foraging for food, sheltering in huts 
and holes. Koror, cosmopolitan capital of the Japanese Pacific 
empire, was bombed to rubble. The islands of Peleliu and Angaur 
were denuded of vegetation and captured by the Americans with a 
loss of thousands of lives. Much of Palau's physical world was de-
stroyed, and the cultural world that gave life meaning was over-
turned. 
The war was also a period of transformation, when the Japanese 
changed from all-powerful colonial overlords and teachers to harsh 
taskmasters and finally to helpless dependents. But, in the process, 
Palauans regained their sense of national worth after years of being 
treated like second-class citizens in their own land. Encoded within 
tales of the starvation, privation, and fear of the war years is an 
important contrast between the people of Palau, who continued to 
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share food, to share their humanity, and the soldiers of Japan, who 
fought and killed to obtain food, thereby "proving" their inhuman-
ity. This transformation of cultural identities arising from the experi-
ences of the war has been a slow process, varying by generation and 
nationality. Palauans, Japanese, and Amedcans draw on their 
images of each other, constructed and transformed during and after 
the war, to guide not only their understandings of it but, more 
importantly, their own continuing relationships. 
Palau an histories and understandings of the war are retained and 
passed on through a rich body of art and oral traditions. Chants and 
dances record early perceptions of the Japanese governors and 
teachers, the war's bombing attacks, and the feelings of the Palauan 
laborers in Palau and Papua New Guinea. The new social relation-
ships created when entire villages were displaced and given refuge 
by others are maintained today through intervillage visits and inter-
familial exchanges. Stories of the war are told within the family and 
shared with outsiders. At times these stories are filtered according to 
the nationality of the outsider, as Zeleneitz and Saito discovered 
among the Kilenge (chapter 5). In other cases, there is evidence that 
the stories are solidifying into historical accounts, maintained and 
passed on through the repetition of key phrases retained despite 
changes in the time, locale, and identity of either the storyteller or 
the audience. At least one such account is a myth in which the details 
contradict independent historical evidence but nevertheless provide 
an explanation for behavior otherwise inexplicable to Palauans. In 
this chapter I examine a sampling of this rich oral tradition, col-
lected by various researchers over a fifty-year period from the 1930s 
to the present, to elucidate changing Palauan perceptions, both of 
themselves and of outsiders, and the catalytic role the war played in 
changing these perceptions. Finally, I consider the ways these trans-
formations are understood and have been incorporated into Palauan 
history. 
The Palauan experience of the Pacific War differs significantly 
from the experiences of other Pacific Islanders presented in th~s vol-
ume. This was not the first major encounter between the Islanders 
and the Japanese. Palau had been capital of Japan's South Seas 
empire for thirty years, and (some) Palauans had been thoroughly 
indoctrinated by the "mother" country despite the differential treat-
ment given them. Prior to the establishment of the Japanese colonial 
administration, Palau had a history of interaction with outsiders 
spanning several centuries. Because of their long association with 
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the Japanese, Palauan families, despite their own difficult circum-
stances, took in the wives and children of Japanese colonists and 
helped them to survive. A number of Japanese children were left 
behind after the war and adopted by Palauan families. Furthermore, 
the war was not a distant echo, as it was in other Pacific regions, but 
a real presence in 1944 and 1945. After the Americans cut off com-
munication and supply lines to Palau in 1944, approximately fifty 
thousand Japanese soldiers were reduced to "self-support" on an 
island where productive capabilities were crippled by daily Ameri-
can strafing attacks designed to prevent anyone from farming or 
fishing. For the Japanese soldiers and civilians, and the five thou-
sand Palauans, the war became a struggle to obtain enough food to 
survive. The Japanese, who suffered the heaviest losses, attempted 
to segregate the Micronesian and Japanese populations and their 
food supplies. All Palauans were severely dislocated and disrupted 
by the war, especially those evacuated from the invasion sites of 
Peleliu and Angaur. Palauans died from the bombing runs as well as 
from starvation and associated diseases. 
Despite the differences, Palauans share with other Pacific Island-
ers many commonalities in their war experiences. As the epigraph 
song demonstrates, an abstract war was personalized; the war was 
experienced in terms of interpersonal relationships between the J ap-
anese and the Palauans, and later between the Americans and the 
Palauans. Japanese and American stereotypes of "the native" 
entered into these relationships, which the Palauans at times used to 
dupe the Japanese in otherwise unequal exchanges. The primary 
Palauan contribution to the Japanese war effort was conscripted 
labor; the removal of men from their communities entailed family 
hardships even though Palauan women had always been the agricul-
turalists. A number of Palauans volunteered to work for the Japa-
nese surveyors in Papua New Guinea supervising work teams of 
other Pacifi~ Islanders. Toward the end of the war, a team of 
Palauans was trained as "suicide commandos," although they never 
saw action. 
The most significant commonality of experience, noted elsewhere 
in this volume, was the wartime perception of Americans as unbe-
lievably powerful, wealthy people who possessed and shared unlim-
ited supplies of food and treated the Palauans as equals. Sharing of 
food, the quintessential Pacific metaphor of social relationships, took 
on added significance after a year of starvation and famine. The 
image Palauans formed of Americans shaped subsequent expecta-
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tions as Americans acquired administrative responsibility for the 
islands after the war as a United Nations trusteeship. Furthermore, 
the lessons of the war and its aftermath inform American-Palauan 
negotiations to bring that trusteeship to an end. 
The History of Outsider-Palauan Interactions 
Palauans have a long history of close interactions with Chad era Nge-
bard 'people of the west' (the direction from which the first Europe-
ans arrived) and well-established ways of incorporating outsiders 
and tapping their greater wealth and expertise. The first written 
record of contact with Europeans followed the shipwreck of the 
Honourable East India Company's trading packet Antelope off Koror 
in 1783 (Keate 1788), when lbedul, paramount chief of Koror, 
befriended the captain. In return for food, water, and assistance in 
rebuilding his ship, Captain Wilson aided lbedul in his local wars 
and, when he departed, left five muskets and his gunner, who pre-
ferred to remain in Palau. During the next century, the Koror chiefs 
managed to contain and benefit from their relationships with Brit-
ish, European, andJ apanese traders. Any trader wishing to settle on 
the island was adopted into the chiefly clans and given a wife accord-
ing to Palauan custom, effectively transferring his wealth to the 
chiefly clans as well as affording him protection. 
Even when (in European perspective) Palau became a colony of 
Spain (1886) and then Germany (1899), Palauan chiefs continued to 
govern and to use the outsiders' wealth and firepower for their own 
purposes. The Spanish colonial presence was limited to rare visits by 
passing Spanish ships and several Catholic missionaries, who did 
not arrive until 1891. After Germany "purchased" the islands in 
1899, little changed. In 1901 the German administration appointed 
James Gibbons, a black British West Indian, as governor. Gibbons 
was one of lbedul's dependents and had been given the seventh-
ranking title in Koror's governing council. Only after his death in 
1904 was a resident German administrator appointed, one Herr 
Winkler, whom the Palauans promptly married to a daughter of a 
chiefly clan. Just ten years later, at the beginning of World War I, 
the Japanese occupied the islands, and Winkler returned to Ger-
many with his Palauan wife. 
In the first century and a quarter of interaction with Westerners 
(among whom Palauans include Japanese), Palauans were for the 
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most part able to incorporate and use the outsiders while retaining 
significant local control and autonomy. The outsider, the other, was 
perceived to possess superior knowledge and technology. But the 
Palauan self retained a high valuation, for the Palauans were capa-
ble of controlling outsider wealth and power for their own purposes. 
Indeed, the chiefs used considerable political skill to manage their 
relationships with outsiders, resorting to subterfuge and manipula-
tion as required (see Nero 1987). 
The Japanese occupation presented an entirely different set of 
problems and over the years resulted in substantial shifts in Palauan 
perceptions of themselves and outsiders. No longer were outsiders 
limited to a few traders or administrators easily incorporated into 
Palauan society and relatively supportive of the continuing power of 
the Palauan chiefs, whom they needed in order to "rule." Instead, 
the Japanese worked to build a productive outpost where they could 
settle their people and produce foodstuffs and minerals for the home-
land. By 1935, the Japanese population outnumbered the Palauan. 
In addition to a large administrative, military, and religious center 
on Koror, there were four Japanese agricultural villages on Babel-
daob, and mining centers in Ngerdmau and on Angaur and Peleliu. 
During the next five years of increased militarization, the Japanese 
population quadrupled. Palau was planned as a rear supply base in 
the Japanese Asian-Pacific economic development zone. The mili-
tary appropriated the island of Ngerkebesang in Koror, and by late 
1944 nearly all Palauans had moved or been evacuated to the big 
island ofBabeldaob. There they were far outnumbered by the Japa-
nese; even after thousands of Japanese casualties from battles, sui-
cide, and starvation, approximately forty-five thousand Japanese 
military personnel surrendered on Palau on 2 September 1945 
(Higuchi 1986a, 98). 2 
The Palauan Self 
Palau an perceptions of the Japanese vis-a-vis themselves underwent 
a series of transformations during the three decades of Japanese 
rule. In Palau, inversion is a well-established principle of social 
change, captured by the proverb a cherechar obelbult 'time overturns'. 
It is expected that one's fortunes may reverse. For example, the 
ranking of the highest chiefs of most village councils has been 
reversed over time in response to particular historical incidents. 
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Palau is a highly stratified society with clearly established internal 
relationships of domination and submission. Whereas in the past 
Palauan chiefs had retained power, the political and economic 
changes introduced by the Japanese now put the chiefs into a posi-
tion of subservience to the Japanese. Originally the Japanese ruled 
through local chiefs, but they soon reduced chiefs to impotent inter-
mediaries who only communicated and carried out Japanese direc-
tives. The Japanese replaced any chief who dared oppose them, 
including the two paramount chiefs of Palau. In the words of one of 
Koror's eldest chiefs, beginning with the Japanese-introduced chiefs 
the traditional system "descended into darkness." Political power 
was transferred to the Japanese, and economic power, once concen-
trated in the hands of the chiefs, was now held by younger Palauan 
men with wage employment. The youth were valued over elders, the 
sons of the chiefs over the true matrilineal heirs. Land was alienated, 
and the concept of individual ownership introduced. Children were 
given three to five years' Japanese education to prepare for jobs as 
laborers and were indoctrinated in Japanese cultural ideals and love 
for "the motherland." Palauan autonomy had been completely 
undermined by 1936 when Iwakichi Muranushi recorded this war 
chant: 
When they traveled from place to place 
There was nothing good about Palau. 
Now that we are under Japan's control 
Palau has improved (because of industriousness). 
When Japan first fought in the war they landed in Russia. 
They landed in Russia and confiscated the flag. 
They confiscated the flag; now they sound their trumpet. 
Now they sound their trumpet and everyone shouts "banzai." 
The second war Japan fought and 
The islands of Micronesia came under its control. 
We became its subjects for good. 
(Tatar 1985, 43) 
There is an expression of finality in the original Palauan closing 
statement, e di merekong 'and there it ended'. Palauans accepted their 
second-class status when faced with such a wealthy, powerful 
country. 3 
The early war years brought two major, somewhat contradictory 
transformations to Palauan perceptions of self and Japanese other. 
The first was an increased pride and identification with the J apa-
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nese. In contrast with the other "natives" now coming under Japa-
nese control, Palauans were considered part of the homeland, and 
there was a Japanese campaign to develop Palauan loyalties to 
Japan. Although perhaps only second-class citizens, the Palauans 
were nevertheless considered and trained as citizens. Speaking J apa-
nese fluently, Palauans could supervise other Asians and Pacific 
Islanders as the Japanese extended their control. Palauans increas-
ingly identified with the Japanese, collected donations for the war 
effort, and enlisted in volunteer work crews. These contributions 
increased their self-esteem, as shown in sample verses from the war 
period. The first is about a Palauan survey team that traveled to 
Papua New Guinea: 
I'm leaving home and going very far, 
We, young Palauans, are on our way to the South 
There are about sixty of us 
We are Palauans, 
But what we do is for Japan. 
I just want to let you and everyone know 
Our work is difficult, it's a matter oflife and death 
The dangers and the snakes are difficult to describe 
We crossed dangerous rivers and plains. 
(Palau Department of Education 1986) 
The second describes the strong young work teams in Palau: 
We are a group of young men from all over Palau 
Our camp is in the middle of savannah 
We are lonely, all of us 
There is nothing to do for fun. 
From morn til night 
Over the clear surrounding area 
Airplanes keep flying over 
With loud sound of their bullets. 
We, Palauans, are 
Young men from all over 
The enemies are flying over us 
But we have to keep working. 
The bullets are falling 
Just like we're in the rain 
But with the war approaching the end 
The sound of airplanes is diminishing. 
(Palau Department of Education 1986) 
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The Japanese Other 
Coupled with increased pride was a diminished respect for the J apa-
nese. Previously, there had been two categories of Japanese in the 
islands-administrators and teachers, highly respected for their 
knowledge and power, and poorer agricultural settlers from Japan's 
outer islands, respected for their hard work and agricultural skills. 
Now Palauans were confronted with relatively uneducated soldiers 
of Japan's poorer classes, who looked down on them. Palauan males 
were conscripted for intensive labor projects. They built the Airai 
airport and placed heavy anti-invasion guns high in the hills over-
looking the major harbors and breaks in the reefs. Palauans worked 
long hard hours under men who were, at times, cruel taskmasters. 
Palauans discarded their earlier stereotype of the Japanese as wise, 
cultured people from whom they could learn. They discovered there 
were also rough, uneducated Japanese who considered themselves 
superior simply because of their race. The final blow to the prestige 
of the Japanese was their inability to counteract the American mili-
tary offensive. The Palauans discovered that the all-powerful J apa-
nese were vulnerable. Indeed, in the search for survival, many Japa-
nese now became dependents of the Palauans. 
On 31 March 1944 the Americans attacked Palau and destroyed 
the airport that the Palauans and Japanese were constructing at 
Airai, effectively neutralizing Japanese air power on Palau. Palau-
ans of that generation remember the confusion of the attack and the 
flight to avoid the bombs. Many Palauans and Japanese civilians 
were still in Koror and fled to the rock islands for shelter, as reported 
in this account I recorded in 1985: 
So it was early in the morning, one day in March, and then there were 
a lot of airplanes all over Palau, and there was a lot of confusion. And 
we were at the time expecting some reinforcements from japan, from 
Saipan, to prepare for the United States attack, so there was a lot of 
confusion as to whether they were enemy planes or Japanese planes. 
And then they started bombing and strafing, and my father didn't 
have time to come back to help us. So my mother and about eight chil-
dren (I was about ten or eleven years of age at that time) we just put 
together some empty drums and then some belongings, some food, 
blankets, stuff like that. And then we just made a platform for our 
food, clothing, and then we drifted. We started to swim across the 
channel, looking for some island, some rock-island hideout. Because 
the bombs were falling all over the place. And my father was not 
there, so it was the oldest son, the male in the family, who was myself. 
KAREN L. NERO 
And so we sculled together under some rock-island overhang, and in 
the water, all night, all day, all night. The following morning we 
didn't know whether my father had been killed at the [Airai] airport. 
And then about three families got together. My family and the other 
families got together and because my father was not there the other 
men in the two families felt sorry for us so they took us in and then we 
became a group of three families and we found a little cave. So we set 
up a little place to stay, and the three families stayed together for about 
three days without my father, and we assumed that he had been 
wounded or had been killed. 
The Americans returned in force in September and captured 
Peleliu and Angaur. Peleliu was one of the Pacific theater's bloodiest 
battles, and war historians to this day question whether the battle 
was necessary. By its end, the dense tropical vegetation was com-
pletely blown away-not a tree, no greenery was left. In only two 
weeks nearly ten thousand Japanese and Americans lay dead 
(Hough 1950)-more than twice the total Palauan population at that 
time. To this day Palauans describe with horror the deep revolving 
wave at the point of Peleliu, which was blood red for days. The few 
Palauans who had remained on these islands as laborers described 
the death and horrible destruction to other Palauans. Before the 
war, European missionaries had tried to describe European-style 
warfare to the Palauans, but Palauans at that time could not even 
conceive of such a war. Now they had witnessed it first-hand. 
The battle for Peleliu began on 15 September and ended on 25 
November (Costello 1982, 497). By early November and December, 
all the Chamorros on Babeldaob and a few Palauans had escaped in 
small canoes to the American ships off the reefs of northern Babel-
daob. They were evacuated to the American headquarters, which 
had been established on Peleliu and Angaur. The Palauans were 
even more amazed by the immediate transformation of these 
islands. Pala.uans had labored for a year to build the Airai airport 
and to put defensive guns in position, yet these defenses had been 
quickly destroyed or neutralized. Then in a matter of weeks the 
Americans themselves built airfields and bases at Peleliu and 
Angaur. An elderly Palauan woman from Angaur recalled that, "It 
was a different island. There were roads all over the island, a new 
cement airstrip, planes, new houses, and buildings everywhere. It 
was a new place." Who were these people who had so easily van-
quished the all-powerful Japanese, who could so rapidly transform 
an island to serve their own needs? They did not even bother to 
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invade the rest of Palau, ignoring the powerful anti-invasion guns 
put in place with such hardship, but simply harassed the Japanese, 
who could do nothing against them. 
The Year of Famine 
Then the most difficult, excruciating war began, the year of famine 
and starvation that affected the Palauans as well as the Japanese. 
Planes flew overhead every day to threaten fishers in their canoes 
and farmers in their fields. Villages were bombed, and the people 
took refuge in the woods, forced to live in rude shelters. The J apa-
nese soldiers sent Palauans to collect food and then took all they were 
able to get. Sometimes they beat a man if he would not give up his 
only pig, which he had saved to feed his children. Two accounts were 
recorded in 1985 from Palau an men, one educated in the Japanese 
school for Palauan children, the other aJapanese-Palauan educated 
in the school for Japanese children. One hid outside Ngaraard, a vil-
lage that accepted refugees from Peleliu and Angaur: 
So Palau spent a whole year of preparation for an invasion by the 
United States forces which didn't materialize. The Americans just 
tried to cut off, to use those two islands [Peleliu and Angaur] and to 
cut off supply lines to Palau and render Palau ineffective as a defense 
post to interfere with the invasion of the Philippines. So it began, a 
long, grueling one year of starvation. The poor people, there were 
many, many soldiers all of a sudden cut off from their regular supply, 
shipping lines, military transportation of Palau. So we had to turn to 
whatever food was left behind and eventually whatever food we found 
and grew on Babeldaob. So we are talking about maybe two hundred 
thousand to three hundred thousand [actually less than one-third that 
number] and then maybe five thousand to six thousand natives. So in 
the first halfofthat year things seemed to be okay, because there were 
still a lot of Japanese supplies. But the last, long part was very, very 
terrible-a terrible period of starvation and sickness. And the Japa-
nese came to find out that they could not rely on the Japanese main-
land to supply them, and they had to make do with what they had at 
the time, which was not very much. And then they came to the natives 
for their food source, and in some places the Japanese took over the 
food gardens, and taro, and food sources from the natives, by force, in 
order to feed the military persons. And some administration people, 
[trying to coordinate the food problems with the Palauans] many 
times came to my father to seek advice what to do. And then my father 
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said of the coconuts that were turned to food supply, that if the people 
just eat coconut with nothing they would get too much oil and get sick. 
So they started squeezing oil out of the coconut and eating the cake, 
cooking it with leaves. And that way it's more compatible with the 
Japanese stomach. Because a lot of people would die of diarrhea 
rather than starvation. And my father came in very handy in advising 
the Japanese what to do. And the secretary of a very high official, a 
secretary of a high man in the Japanese administration who was also 
his girlfriend-the official asked my father to take care of the woman, 
and then the woman came to live with us. And we were all very young 
kids, and she was maybe twenty, twenty-one. And so she came to live 
with us, and we were just told she was another sister, and we lived 
very closely, she became to be regarded as just a member of the family. 
The chiefs of all Palau were called and told that first Peleliu people 
were to be evacuated, and Angaur people to be evacuated, and asked 
the chiefs for accommodation. And then the Ngaraard chief, my chief, 
said that he would take in Peleliu and Angaur, all of them in one 
place. So they came to live in Ngaraard at that time, during the war 
period. We all lived out in the woods. There was sickness, we didn't 
know how to live, we didn't know how to cook, that kind of living. 
The woods were there all the time, but we had not learned how to live 
in those woods. And a lot of people got sick, you know, of exposure to 
the cold. We built very simple huts in the woods, so the dampness, the 
rain and all came in. We took one whole year to get adjusted. It was 
more than hunger and lack of food. The true danger, I think, was the 
environmental sanitation-that was a very crucial factor in our sur-
vival at the time. A lot of people got sick. And some of the people from 
Peleliu and Angaur died while there at Ngaraard, and were buried 
there, and because of that they became common ancestors for both, 
for the two villages. 
The other Palauan hid outside Aimeliik, closer to the japanese civil-
ian and military camps: 
So the war'became more intensive, and therefore we had to move. 
Before we left Koror, there were Japanese teachers with their families, 
and their husbands were taken to the military but the families were 
left, the mother with the kids. And I remember my father said, "Be 
nice to these people, because they are your school principal's family." 
So the man left and the family moved in. Two daughters, fourteen and 
sixteen, and the wife. And my father asked them if they wanted to join 
us. The war was going on, the Japanese were winning, at least they 
thought. ... So they had that pride, I recall, and what pride can do 
to destroy. Knowing that. But the family decided to join with the J apa-
nese. So we moved, the war became very intensive. They [bombers] 
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came every day around eleven o'clock, from Guam. They used to 
come in threes. And it became a daily ritual, kind of. Mmmmmm 
mmmmmmm mmmmmmm. From Kayangel they were coming. 
Spat, spat. Then Airai, pass, Ngerkebesang .... They were coming 
hourly, so we couldn't go fishing, we couldn't farm. If we did, there 
was the plane. So that gave us a hard time. So we farmed at night-
time, in the moonlight. 
So the war became very intensive because of the patrol planes, 
come from Peleliu, by then they took Peleliu. You could see them. 
The black guy, or the white guy. You know they come so, like that, 
and you see them. But they didn't wave. If they waved, then maybe 
we would have been saved. How stupid we are, if I waved, maybe . 
. . . Psychologically brainwashed, that guy is an enemy, maybe a 
machine. They kill you. Like any war, an enemy is an enemy-you 
want to make an enemy as dirty as possible. So those guys were bad. 
And so, that's the patrol planes. 
That side of Babeldaob they didn't have food. Ngaraard and 
Ngchesar, all the way. I don't know that side of it. The other side, they 
didn't have food, but where we lived, we almost starved to death. We 
ate dog, pig, went to places where we thought we could find spoiled 
coconut. We ate practically everything except snake. Japanese ate 
snakes. And so we lived in Aimeliik and watched the bombing of 
Koror, including occasional submarines coming out. The Japanese 
just couldn't do a thing. 
I was in the boonies. Finding food, that was my job. My brothers 
were so small, so weak, they couldn't move. The three of them. One 
was a baby. They couldn't move, too weak. We lived in a dugout, a 
hole, practically. It was a hole. Covered with leaves. Rain came in. 
Small, not a house. It was not a house. Dirt. About this size, this 
deep. If you ask the others, they wouldn't remember. They were just 
lying on the mattress. And I was going out to get coconuts, other food, 
we didn't know. So that was the life, and we were almost starved to 
death. That's what I know. 
So one day after I came from where I was looking for food, I saw 
this lady, the Japanese lady, ragged. She was the wife of the principal 
and then I remembered the whole picture. The Japanese lady, after 
they went to Ngatpang where the Japanese civilians stayed they ran 
out of food, they didn't have food. But of course the military saved 
some, but they ran out of food, and the two girls died. You see the 
pride they had? So I heard that they died. 
Palauans' war experiences differed according to the village in 
which the individual lived during this year, but several themes are 
repeated in these two parallel accounts of the year of famine. First, 
there was recognition that the Japanese were completely helpless to 
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do anything to stop American bombers. The storytellers stated that 
the Japanese were reduced to stealing and violence to obtain food, 
yet both reported that their families reached out to attempt to save 
individual Japanese friends or associates (especially civilians) from 
death. Although Palauans had little food and little knowledge of how 
to survive in the wild, they were still better able to cope with the 
disaster than were the Japanese civilians who lived in camps. Per-
sonal relationships still counted, both with the Japanese and among 
the Palauans. It was also a time when strong new relationships were 
formed, when families became bonded to one another through bury-
ing each other's dead. 
Perhaps the most striking parallel in the two accounts is the 
description oflife in the woods. This was a life of animals, not people 
-a life for which there was no cultural preparation, no experience 
to draw on to help them survive. They were at the mercy of the ele-
ments, ill, weak, starving, living in holes. Yet the Palauans lived not 
as animals but as people. They continued not only to share their 
food among themselves but to reach out to assistJapanese as well, to 
share what little they had. 
The sharing of food, that primary Pacific definition of social rela-
tionships, was the pivot on which the redefinition ofPalauan self and 
Japanese other turned (see chapter 2). Even living like animals in 
holes in the forest, the Palauans continued to share their food. In 
contrast, the previously all-powerful Japanese no longer shared food 
and even stole it from the Palauans. Like animals fighting over food, 
Japanese soldiers beat people and stole their food. 4 
At least one war story tells of "playing the native" to get back at a 
Japanese soldier hated for his violence. When ordered to collect taro 
and other foods by this soldier, a Palauan man was careful to posi-
tion some poisonous wild taro on top of the basket. Without know-
ing that this type of taro requires special cooking, the Japanese man 
was poisone9. He was ill for weeks, his mouth horribly swollen and 
sore. The "native who didn't know any better" escaped Japanese 
wrath because he simply followed orders to bring the soldier taro 
to eat. 5 
The American Other 
Just when the dominant-dependent Japanese-Palauan relationship 
was inverted the Americans arrived. Palauans had had little pre-
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vious communication with Americans, except for two they had 
known as spies-brilliant military strategist Colonel Pete Ellis, who 
died in Palau in 1923 of excessive drinking (and very plausibly J apa-
nese poison), and a Mr. Curtis, who had left the islands before the 
war. Most Palauans received images of Americans second hand. 
European missionaries, who had been in Palau before the war and 
were subsequently executed by the Japanese, had told people that 
the Americans were stronger than the Japanese. The Japanese, on 
the other hand, had told the Palauans that Americans were monsters 
who would kill them and rape their women. They forbade people to 
read the circulars written in Japanese that the Americans dropped 
over Babeldaob to inform Palauans that they could come over to the 
Americans without fear of harm. The Japanese increased security 
measures after Joseph Tellei, who had been the highest Palauan 
police officer prior to the war, escaped to the American ships in 
December 1944. Frightened of both Japanese and Americans, the 
Palauans remained in hiding until the end of the war. For most, the 
end of the war was signalled when American pilots overhead finally 
waved back rather than dropping bombs. 
Palauan accounts of the end of the war frequently mention gen-
baku, a new Japanese loanword referring to the nuclear bomb attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Palauans know that only the demon-
stration of nuclear firepower convinced the proud Japanese to sur-
render. 
After the surrender, the Americans summoned Palauans from 
Angaur and Peleliu to come to Renrak, the dock at the southern end 
of Airai, for transportation back to their islands. As a sign of the 
final break of Palauan-J apanese relationships Palauans reportedly 
refused to share a meager last meal of rice with the Japanese, stating 
that they would eat American food instead. 
On the evacuation ships they were overwhelmed by offerings of 
food. A woman who had been hiding in N garaard with her children 
recounted: 
They told us to come to Renrak, and then we boarded the boat to go 
back to An gaur. And they offered us food, and candy. And we took the 
candy, but didn't eat it. We put it aside in our purses to give to our 
children. And so they gave us more, and again more. Soon we had a 
pile of food in our baskets, and we finally ate some ourselves. All dif-
ferent kinds of food, and food we hadn't had before. Bread, cheese. 
Good food. And then when we got back to Angaur, it was a com-
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pletely different island. There were roads, new roads everywhere. 
And new houses, lined up on both sides of the street. And we were 
shown which house we should have. It was a completely new island. 
And there was so much food. 
The Americans gave an overwhelming abundance of food, un-
aware of the cultural import of this food exchange. Even more 
important, they ate together with Palauans. In local cultural per-
spective, this demonstrated an equality unknown during the Japa-
nese administration. The sharing of food, the physical transforma-
tion of Peleliu and Angaur, and the military might that vanquished 
the Japanese all united to create an image of Americans as all-pow-
erful, magnanimous new benefactors. A Palauan man who was a 
youth during the war recalled, 
After the war, we came out of the woods in Babeldaob and our only 
contact with United States military troops was that every so often, 
American civil affairs officer distributing candy on Peleliu, October 1944. 
(U.S. Marine Corps) 
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maybe every other week, we would get a supply of food, then Nga-
raard would have a share, it would be divided into sixteen shares in 
Koror and Ngaraard would come in a big boat and haul our supply to 
Ngaraard and then divide them and end up with a lot of food. And 
this was from the military, you know. And then we would go back 
home and all of a sudden we would say, "These are very kind people, 
very rich, like Santa Claus." And it was a very awesome thing, you 
know. All the Japanese were telling lies, these people were like angels 
come from heaven, with these candies, food, everythi~g, produce. We 
were no longer frightened of the Americans. We looked at them as an 
easy source of food, of abundance. The rest of the Palauans were very 
fast to reconcile with the Americans, while the Japanese were still on 
the island they were ready to evacuate. So they quickly turned against 
the Japanese for lying to them, causing them all these miseries and so 
forth. And there was some conflict between individuals, betweenJap-
anese and Palauans over all the hardship and mistreatment they had 
with each other during the war period, the hard times. 
The War's Aftermath: Reassessing Images of Self and Other 
Palauans, Japanese, and Americans have taken years to assess and 
learn the lessons of the war, to revise their images of self and other in 
light of this new knowledge, and to incorporate this knowledge into 
their understandings of one another. Many of the lessons of the war 
were only learned in retrospect, by comparing actions of different 
peoples, lessons that were impossible before such comparison was 
possible. Oral histories, chants,, and dances provide a dynamic 
forum for exploring these understandings. When Japanese and 
American tourists visit Palau, they are often shown dances depicting 
the war years, alive with the sounds of the American planes over-
head. 
But immediately after the war there were feelings of helplessness 
and turmoil. The Japanese, teachers for three decades, were con-
quered; the Americans were still an unknown force. These feelings 
are captured in a song written (originally in Japanese) as a farewell 
to the Japanese: 
Our departure was very sudden 
For us Islanders and our mother country. 
We're; sad for such sudden good-bye. 
Japan, our mother country, 
Was destined to be defeated. 
KAREN L. NERO 
We won't forget you goodJapanese people 
Who were our teachers for thirty years. 
My favorite sakura. 
Our relationship with you has ended. 
We don't know which direction to go next. 
(Palau Department of Education 1986) 
For many the farewell was particularly difficult. Japanese families 
who had settled for several generations during the pre-Japanese 
colonial administrations were repatriated to Japan. Palauan wives 
and children of Japanese-Palau an families had to decide whether to 
follow their Japanese husbands and fathers back to Japan, or to 
remain alone in Palau. Many of the Palauan families chose to 
remain behind, and a few Japanese families left their children in 
Palau, reasoning they would have a better chance of survival there. 
These children were adopted and raised by Palauan families. One 
family went to Japan, but after struggling to survive decided to 
return to Palau. The strong-willed Palauan wife forced her way in to 
see General MacArthur personally and succeeded in obtaining 
American passports for herself and her children and clearance to 
return to Palau. They eventually were allowed to bring the father 
back to Palau to work in the Angaur phosphate mines, but when the 
mining ceased he was once again scheduled to be repatriated to 
Japan. At the last moment, the military governor in Guam permit-
ted him to remain. 
The American image gradually tarnished. After the American 
soldiers departed, the civilian personnel segregated themselves from 
the Palauans as their Japanese predecessors had done. They had 
their own clubs, their own rules ("natives" weren't allowed liquor, 
an echo of U.S. policies toward American Indians). The new 
administrators were not sure how to treat the Palauans, and many in 
the Interior Department drew on experience with the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. As a Palauan observed: "You [Americans] didn't 
really know how to be colonists. Your only experience was with 
slaves, with the Indians." Only in the 1960s under President Ken-
nedy, when the American administrative policy toward the islands 
changed, did the barriers between Palauans and Americans relax. 
At that time, hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers arrived to live in 
the villages, and Palauan students went to the United States. 
Education is one of the main issues in terms of which Palauans 
have analyzed and compared Japanese and American others. It is 
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the primary contrast between the japanese time and American time. 
Palau an elders today recognize that the Japanese held them back in 
education, only providing enough for them to learn Japanese and to 
work as laborers. Most received only three years' education, and all 
higher education was restricted to vocational subjects-carpentry 
and agriculture. Palauans' highest praise is reserved for American 
education policies that have provided access to high office in island 
government. Although elder Palauans fault the American education 
system for its lack of discipline (in contrast to the Japanese style of 
education), they appreciate education as a key to equality and em-
powerment. 
The Myth of Morikawa 
One of the most fascinating of all Palau an accounts of the war is the 
story of Morikawa, who many Palauans believe was an American 
spy who saved Palauans from genocide. The story demonstrates the 
importance of stereotypic images and their influence in making 
sense of the war. Morikawa figures prominently in historical songs 
and chants about the war: 
Meringel a Mekemedil Rubak 
(Merciless War of the Rubak) 
by Buikispis 
Reckless was the way Isoroku [Yamamoto] handled the war 
That he irritated Roosevelt that he sent out kidobutai [] apanese mobile 
troops] 
He sent out kidobutai to fill the whole Pacific 
That it filled the whole Pacific and getting its weapons 
turned on 
Wow-these are okabes [planes] flying kusentei [submarine chasers] shoot-
ing the lands 
Wow-kusentei shooting. Hiding in the woods we were unaware 
that 
They [] apanese] were preparing a bokugo [air raid shelter] at N get bang 
In an effort to exterminate us all. 
Were it not for the rescue of Morikawa, spy of Roosevelt 
We should have all perished at Ngatpang. 
(Higuchi 1.986b, 4) 
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The reference to an air raid shelter reflects the Palauan belief that 
they would all be put inside the air raid shelter at Ngatpang and a 
bomb detonated to kill them. Morikawa and other Japanese officers 
denied that any such plan existed, but the belief was common in 
Palau at the end of the war and survives to this day. 
"Spy" is a customary label used by Palauans to characterize out-
siders whose behavior and presence are anomalous to their national 
stereotype. In fact, this use of the term has a historical basis, for 
Colonel Pete Ellis was an American spy in Palau between 1921 and 
1923 while presenting himself as a trader (Ballendorf 1975). Palau-
ans believed the American ornithologist Curtis was also a spy who 
used his birds to send messages to the Americans on Guam. Curtis 
left Palau before the war and was one of the Americans stationed on 
the ships off Babeldaob during the war, when he sent messages to his 
Palauan friends inviting them to join him. Today, Palauans label 
anomalous foreigners as "spies" -it is a favorite designation for 
anthropologists. 
To the Palauans, especially with hindsight after the war, Mori-
kawa was an anomalous Japanese. He was tall, which alone caused 
him to be identified as a Japanese-American nisei from Hawaii. He 
was cultured and well educated, which contrasted markedly with 
many of the other Japanese soldiers the Palauans encountered. And 
he was of the upper classes and a graduate of the Japanese Officers' 
Training School. 
Many accounts of Morikawa have the sound of informal reminis-
cences rather than formal chants or songs. I was therefore surprised 
to discover that the opening phrase in an account of Morikawa (from 
a 1975 interview with a Palauan man from Ngeremlengui) was the 
same as the opening phrase and information given me in an infor-
mal interview I conducted in 1987 with a woman from Ngaraard. 
"Morikawa arrived in Palau without informing anybody.as to which 
airport or commercial port he would arrive" (Higuchi 1986b, 2). 
The phrase itself is an unusual communication, for Palauans would 
not necessarily know or follow the comings and goings of all the J ap-
anese officers, particularly new ones. But this phrase is used to 
emphasize the difference between the other Japanese officers and 
Morikawa. 
Fearful of the radical behavioral change in the Japanese, many 
people were convinced that they planned to kill all Palauans. Some 
elders discounted the fear, but many believe to this day that such a 
plan existed and only the intercession of Morikawa saved their lives. 
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Morikawa was responsible for agricultural production and worked 
directly with Palauan farmers to try to increase production for the 
war years. He also served as intermediary and conciliator in war-
time disputes. After the Japanese image was reversed during the 
war, the only way for Palauans to explain Morikawa's kind behav-
ior, as well as his greater size, was to presume that he must be an 
American. 
Higuchi has recently interviewed Morikawa, and Morikawa paid 
a return visit to Palau in early 1987. He was surprised to learn of the 
Palauan myths about him. He denied being an American spy or 
nisei, pointing out that he was a Japanese military officer trained in 
the Officers School injapan (Higuchi 1986b, 4). 
Palauan Relationships Established by the War 
Palauan oral accounts are structured into history through the repeti-
tion of key phrases by which they are solidified and transmitted. 
One of the public occasions supporting this process is itself related to 
the war experience and has been incorporated into existing cultural 
practices. Prior to the war, related or allied villages cemented and 
maintained their relationship through klechedaol 'intervillage visits' 
up to several weeks in duration. The chiefly councils and men's and 
women's clubs planned the interchange and prepared the dances to 
be performed, and a large delegation from one village then made a 
formal visit to its partner. Throughout the klechedaol, the visitors 
were accommodated in the village. meeting houses (or the houses of 
relatives), and all meals were prepared by the host village. People 
often congregated at the central village square where dances were 
performed, stories told, chants sung. The klechedaol was a means of 
keeping alive ties between two communities, expressing reciprocal 
responsibilities between the villages. The host village would subse-
quently make a return klechedaol to balance the exchange and con-
tinue the obligations. 
The village evacuations and relocations brought about by World 
War II established relationships between villages that had not been 
linked in the past. The sharing of the extreme privations of the war 
forged strong relationships between both clans and communities. 
Where people died during their relocation the new relationship took 
on special significance, because of traditional Palauan burial prac-
tices and the importance of ancestors. Normally an individual is 
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buried by his or her maternal clan on clan lands. Titleholders and 
other important persons of the clan are buried under the stone plat-
form in front of the clan house. These burials are in a real way the 
material records of the clan and its interrelationships and are used to 
verify clan history. People believe that their ancestors continue to 
assist the living, and it is important that the dead are properly bur-
ied because their activities after death are associated with the sites of 
their death and burial. 
The war made it impossible for many clans to return their dead to 
their maternal lands for burial. By burying the dead of another clan, 
a host clan acquired a close relationship to the descendants of the 
deceased. As previously quoted, a Palauan man noted that, "the 
people from Peleliu and Angaur . . . became common ancestors for 
the two villages." 
The new relationships created by the war have been maintained. 
In 1985 the village of Ngaraard made a klechedaol visit to Peleliu that 
expressed the war-established relationship between the villages. Peo-
ple explained that Peleliu hosted Ngaraard to thank it for the hospi-
tality Ngaraard provided during the war. A second klechedaol 
between the villages will keep this relationship alive, linking individ-
ual families and the communities in general. 
The klechedaol is a time of visiting and celebration. New chants are 
composed and performed to remind the people of their shared past 
(see chapter 3). Old dances are performed, and members of the 
older generation sing songs that were popular during their youth. 
The klechedaol is perhaps the most significant occasion for cross-
generational and cross-cultural sharing among Palauans, for older 
people sing the Japanese songs popular when they were young. 
They tell tales of the war and what their lives were like under the 
Japanese administration. Through such performances war remem-
brances are codified and transmitted to members of .the younger 
generation. 
The War in Palauan Historical Perspective 
In many Pacific societies the war was a time of demarcation between 
the ways of the past and the ways of the present. The structuring of 
social relationships was transformed, and a new era was begun. In 
Palau, as well, the war engendered major structural upheavals. Fol-
lowing the social transformations under the Japanese administra-
tion, the war constituted a liminal period of anti-structure. The year 
Hell in the Pacific, Palau 139 
of famine was outside Palauan cultural frames of understanding. 
People could no longer live in villages but retreated to the forest, 
where they lived in rude shelters and foraged for food like animals. 
Immediately after the war there was an effort to reestablish cul-
tural understandings and reevaluate power relationships vis-a-vis 
the new administrators. Under the Japanese a reversal of many 
Palauan social structural principles had occurred: youth were valued 
over elders, the patriline was supported over the matriline, and indi-
vidual land ownership and economic status were supported over 
clan control. However, the war and the subsequent transformation 
from] apanese to American administrations are now coded simply as 
two eras in the larger mytho-political framework of historical knowl-
edge. Taem era Siabal 'Japanese time' and Taem era Merikel 'Ameri-
can time' follow two earlier colonial administrations, Taem era Seban-
giol 'Spanish time' and Taem era Dais 'German time'. The larger 
mytho-historical structure, the world of Milad, founding goddess of 
the existing Palauan political hierarchy, remains intact. 6 
The first mythological world of Palau was the world of Chuah, 
who established the chiefly council system of governing and who 
peopled the land. Seven of Palau's villages descend from the chil-
dren of Chuah, headed by Mengellang, a village in the state of 
Ngarchelong. A flood that inundated Palau marks the demarcation 
between the era of Chuah and the era of Milad (She Who Was 
Dead), who died in the flood but was brought back to life by messen-
gers of the gods. Milad gave birth to the villages of lmeungs 
(Ngaremlengui), Melekeok, Ngerebungs (Aimeliik), and Koror, 
thereby engendering the existing rnytho-political structure of Palau. 
The two paramount chiefs are from the villages of Melekeok and 
Koror, and intervillage relationships are still expressed in sibling 
terms. The existing structure is one of chiefly rule, governed by 
paired male and female councils of chiefs respected for their wisdom. 
As the eldest son of Milad, N garemlengui is considered the wise 
older brother who makes peace between his brash younger brothers, 
Melekeok and Koror. Palau has a stratified political system, with the 
remaining villages ranked in relationship to the four children of 
Milad. 
The islands' political and economic structures during the Japa· 
nese administration remained stratified, although the chiefly system 
was weakened. In principle, the American system should also have 
supported youth, the patriline, and individualism, with the impor-
tant addition of an ethic of equality rather than stratification. 
Oaikawasang Joseph Tellei, son of the paramount chief of Mele-
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keok and the highest Palauan officer under the Japanese administra-
tion, worked to retain the status and position younger men had 
achieved under the Japanese administration. One of his means was 
to reinterpret Palauan history. He tried to interpret the war as a 
major structural break in the mythological worlds of Palau, which 
had shifted Palau out of the world of Milad. He maintained that 
Palau was now in the cycle of Mengellang, one of the children of 
Chuah. The important difference was Tellei's characterization of 
Mengellang's world as one of equality among villages and people 
rather than one of stratification and rank (Vidich 1980, 313-314). 
Through a reinterpretation and recoding of Palauan mythology and 
history, the circle would be complete and Palau would continue to 
draw on the past for its current and future political structure 
throughout this structural transformation. But in practice the equal-
ity the Americans seemed to offer turned out to be an illusion. As the 
Americans took over the administration of the islands they looked to 
the chiefs to reestablish political and social order and to be the agents 
through whom they could govern. Moreover, the Americans did not 
support economic development in Palau, so the wages and presti-
gious employment that had given the younger men the economic 
basis to challenge the structure during the Japanese administration 
were no longer available. 
Perhaps the sedimentation of the present precludes a clear picture 
at this time, but Oaikawasang's attempted reinterpretation of his-
tory has not been accepted in the postwar years. Intervillage rela-
tionships today are for the most part conducted in the cultural idiom 
of the world of Milad and the ranked relationships traditionally 
established. The chiefs of the two sons of Milad, Koror and Mele-
keok, are still recognized as the paramount chiefs of Palau despite 
the disjunctures between the traditional political system and the con-
stitutional government of sixteen equal states governed by the 
elected president of the Republic of Palau. 
Stereotypic Images and War Remembrances Today 
Whatever their degree of accuracy, images of the other formed 
during the war continue to color relationships between Palauans, 
Japanese, and Americans. Such images affect Palauan-American 
interaction in particular. They figure heavily in the stalemated nego-
tiations to establish a Compact of Free Association between the two 
countries that would confirm U.S. military rights in Palau. 
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Hell in the Pacific, an American cinematic attempt to make sense of 
the Pacific War, was filmed in Palau in the mid-1960s. It provides a 
valuable window onto American images of the war and the tropics. 
In one way, it combines Pacific and American sensibilities about the 
war. It takes an island-style approach to the war by reducing the typ-
ical war movie genre of spectacular battle scenes to a confrontation 
between two men. A Japanese, played by To shiro Mifune, and an 
American, played by Lee Marvin, are both shot down near an unin-
habited remote tropical island covered with dense vegetation. They 
must find a way to survive in this unfamiliar environment while 
working out whether to continue on a personal level the deadly war 
in which their respective countries are engaged. 
The discontinuities between the stereotypic images portrayed and 
the war's realities afforded Palauan spectators much amusement 
during filming. Moreover, they highlight the role many Pacific 
Islanders played during the war-that of unrecognized laborers. 
The movie set was located just outside the busy harbor of Koror, 
rather than in an uninhabited remote area. The site had figured 
prominently in the early history of Koror (though most Palauans 
today do not know its Palauan name, calling it "Lee Marvin's 
Beach"). This part of the rock islands was the same area where peo-
ple took shelter during the March 1944 attack on Koror. Similarly 
amusing was the Hollywood stereotype that a dense tropical forest 
must include bamboo. This island has no bamboo, but every day of 
filming Palauans were paid to cut bamboo and "plant" it there so 
that the Hollywood image could b~ "correct." Once again, Palauans 
were behind-the-scenes workers. 
Perhaps the most telling stereotype in the film is the absence of 
any Islanders at all, reflecting the American government's approach 
to Palau. Local inhabitants are largely ignored, too few to be taken 
seriously, for the main significance of the islands is their strategic 
position in global politics. 
The Interplay of Palauan and American Images of Each Other 
In retrospect, one Palauan storyteller now realizes how bad the ini-
tial American generosity was for Palauans, how it raised impossible 
expectations of what the Americans would do for Palau. 
The spoils of war, the United States, that is the worst thing that ever 
happened to the people of Palau. Here in Palau there were the rem-
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nants of war supplies, of food, and there was just an abundance of 
everything, and you think heaven had come to earth. The United 
States has so much that you can just walk into the woods and stumble 
over corned beef, canned corned beef, you know, military supplies. 
We had cheese, the kids were playing with cheese like mud, you know, 
and everything so much, so plenty. And then Palau people coming out 
of starvation and sickness and all of a sudden get hit with this, and it's 
really like heaven come to earth. Then they started to say, "Oh, the 
United States is so rich all you need to do is sleep and eat, for the rest 
of your life." And it began to be "Give me this, and give me this, and 
give me this." And then came the reality. And they said, "Oh, the 
United States is really stingy." See, because of the anguish of being 
left languishing in poverty because the United States has forgotten. 
But that is actually the reality of life-that you have to go out there 
and pick the soil for your own livelihood. 
The image of generous Americans has now been inverted. By 
their neglect they are now perceived as stingy, as having ulterior 
motives. After the initial profusion of food and medical supplies and 
services given freely, the naval administration was replaced with a 
civilian administration under the Department of the Interior that 
operated under a limited budget. Anthropologists were called in to 
assist, to ease the cultural transitions. Although the anthropologists 
were perceived locally to be in positions of power within the Palau an 
administration, their influence in Washington was minimal. Wash-
ington bureaucrats continue to entertain images of the "primitive 
native." Washington failed to recognize that Koror had been an 
urban center with excellent communications, roads and sidewalks, 
electricity, stores, restaurants, theaters, newspapers. Although Pa-
lauans were perhaps second-class citizens of the town, these services 
were available to and used by them. Some had large bank accounts 
that were confiscated during the war and not replaced. Palau's pro-
ductive infrastructure, its roads, electricity, docks, boats, and 
canoes, was destroyed during the war. Its gardens were heavily 
bombed. Housing was in the main destroyed. But the image of the 
Palauan in postwar Washington was of "natives" who should not be 
spoiled by giving them things beyond local means of production. 
What the Palauans feared, as reported by anthropologist John 
Useem, came to pass: 
The character structure of Palau society is basically that of a people in 
the midst of acculturation and eager to complete the transition. 
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Unlike the Yap islanders, the people of Palau are impatient to resume 
the historic process of change so successfully directed by the Japanese, 
and are deeply concerned lest the process be reversed. The predomi-
nant fear is that under American control, Palau may be regarded 
merely as a primitive society and allocated goods and materials 
accordingly. There is anxiety that with the termination of hostilities in 
the Pacific, America may forget its commitment to Palau and aban-
don it, and the island will then revert to conditions which prevailed 
prior to the coming of the foreigner ( 1949, 65). 
The assistance the United States offered to rebuild Europe, 
Japan, even other Pacific islands, was less generous in the U.S. 
Trust Territory, earning it the nickname "Rust Territory." Some 
temporary reconstruction was done in Koror, Angaur, and Peleliu-
mainly quonset huts (some of which are still in use today)-but in 
general there was little reconstruction in Palau. The bombed-out 
Japanese buildings were patched up. Palau languished under a small 
civilian administration, largely forgotten by Washington. The first 
war-claim payments were not received by Palauans until the mid-
1970s. In the words of a Palauan politician, 
After the supply, the war supply and the guns disappeared at Koror, 
we began to take a look, and the Americans were doing very very lit-
tle, even for just war reparations. Just to bring the road back to its 
original condition, that was not taking place. Construction, recon-
struction, that was not taking place. You know the biggest buildings 
up here in Koror to this day are the court house, the Palau Legisla-
ture, the high school. These were all Japanese buildings. High school 
was a hospital, where MOC [Micronesian Occupational College] is. 
The Palau legislature. It is kind of a shame when someone asks "who 
built this?" That was a powerhouse for communication. A Japanese 
international communication system powerhouse. You go to the base-
ment where there are tunnel-type rooms-that was loaded with 
machines for communications. Now it is the highest building. It is the 
Palau Legislature. Our president of the republic sits where there used 
to be a court room for the Palauan administration. 
After twenty years, the twenty-fifth year, the people began to won-
der. "Where is the war reparation, the reconstruction? It's not taking 
place. We are tired of improvising on the remnants of war." And as 
you know, the conditions have not changed very much to this day. 
And we are about forty years now. And so that people began to think 
that maybe after all the United States took this by force, took Palau 
and the rest of Micronesia for other purposes than to liberate the peo-
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ple of Palau, to help them catch up with the rest of the world, civiliza-
tion and development. And this thing has grown deeper and deeper as 
more people go to the United States and get education and come back 
here. 
Palauans realize that their earliest expectations of American largesse 
were unrealistic but continue to expect more reconstruction than the 
Americans have been willing to offer. 
The military considerations alluded to in the quotation above 
now overshadow the relationships and miscommunications between 
Americans and Palauans. Both sides use lessons they learned during 
the war as they try to arrange for future relations, but there are seri-
ous differences in the ways both Palauans and Americans interpret 
these lessons. American military strategists refuse to give up the 
islands that were so dearly won in the battle of Peleliu. Palau is con-
sidered the closest fall-back position if America loses its bases in the 
Philippines. Even though modern military practices and equipment 
may make the establishment of bases in Palau impractical, strate-
gists wish to have options. 
Within Palau there are numerous interpretations of the lessons of 
the war and the economic and political options of an independent 
Palau. Although political considerations and factional disputes 
among government branches and departments in both the United 
States and Palau affect the status negotiations between the two coun-
tries, the focus of discussion continues to be the military situation. 
What is the United States willing to pay for Palau's strategic loca-
tion? What are the Palauans willing to accept and give up in return 
for economic assistance? The answers to these questions turn, in 
part, on the differential lessons and interpretations of the war. Many 
elderly people equate a military presence with their vulnerability to 
other nations' wars and fear the return of a military presence to 
Palau. When one of the early United Nations Visiting Missions vis-
ited a rural village during an inspection tour and asked for villagers' 
comments, an elderly woman seriously requested "the next time you 
have a war, please don't have it here." Islanders know that nuclear 
explosions brought an end to the war in the Pacific, destroyed an 
entire island in Bikini Atoll, and caused cancer among the Marshal-
lese. Many continue to fight to maintain a nuclear-free Palau. On 
the other hand, many Palauans appreciate the complexities of the 
world political scene and the necessity for small Pacific islands to 
maintain alliances with strong geopolitical powers. The negative 
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example of Palau's close neighbor, East Timor, is often cited. Most 
Palauans wish to maintain a close alliance with the United States. It 
is a matter of balancing military, economic, and political consider-
ations, and the balance has not yet been achieved. 
Notes 
1. The final verses of a song about World War II are presented in the epigraph. 
The song was written in 1945 in Ngarchelong and collected by the Palau Depart-
ment of Education in 1985-1986. I would like to thank Masaharu Tmodrang for 
permission to use this and other songs quoted in this chapter. These songs were col-
lected by a research team including Masaharu Tmodrang, Kodep Kloulechad, Jus-
tina Ramarui, Dilmei Olkeriil, Hermana Ramarui, and Demei Otobed. 
The Palauan denges and belloi referred to in the text of the song are the inedible 
fruit of the oriental mangrove (Bruguiera gymnorhiza) and bitter yam (Dioscorea bulbi-
jera), respectively, which were used as famine foods during the war. 
2. I would like especially to thank Wakako Higuchi for sharing and discussing 
her research data on the interactions between Japanese and Palauans prior to and 
during the war and on the history of the Japanese administration. 
3. Wakako Higuchi (personal communication) has pointed out that Palauans 
were more precisely considered "third class." They were called santo kokumin or 
"third class people" ranking after the Japanese and the Koreans and Okinawans 
(Peattie 1988, 111 ). 
4. In the accounts of famine and starvation, and the cultural depictions of the 
Japanese who stole food, the effect of the nationality of the interviewer is most 
apparent. Palauans interviewed by Wakako Higuchi during an oral history project 
on the Japanese administration of Palau (Ballendorf, Shuster, and Higuchi 1986) 
focused on their admiration for their Japanese teachers, Palauan contributions to 
the war effort, their work as members of the survey team, their training as Japanese 
"commandos." They down played the hardships and famine of the war, the trans-
formation of their images of the Japanese, images that are today being redefined 
more favorably in any case as Japanese businesses move into Palau and provide 
employment, and as more Japanese tourists visit Palau. Although Higuchi's 
informants reported that several Palauans died during the war, the starvation and 
Palauan losses are not emphasized. In a 1987 conversation concerning our respec-
tive data on the war, Higuchi was surprised to learn of Palauan deaths due to star-
vation or related diseases during the war. We discovered that the information pro-
vided to each of us in turn, one Japanese, the other American, was colored by our 
nationalities. In many cases, similar or identical material was reported, but at times 
the tone, the emphasis differed. Palauans would share negative images of the Japa-
nese with me which they might hold back from Higuchi, and undoubtedly the con-
verse was also true. 
The format and time frame of interview topics also colored the information pro-
vided. Palauans would discuss in detail their remembrances of working for the Jap-
anese-of the work teams, the construction projects, and the commando team-in 
terms of these experiences. But new understandings of their relationships with the 
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Japanese were only reached later, when Palauans could compare Japanese and 
American approaches. Often, interviews on more contemporary subjects provided 
analytic reflections back to the war, its lessons, and comparisons between the Amer-
icans and the Japanese. Palauan house servants who worked for Japanese families 
before the war did not question that they were not allowed to eat with the families, 
that they only served them. Some established warm relationships that continue to 
this day. Only later, when Palauans were invited to eat with Americans, did they 
reflect unfavorably on Japanese practices. 
5. Another story told with great humor today is of the man who, when surprised 
in the open by American strafing planes, sought to disguise himself as a pandanus 
tree! He took his pose but was shot by the American pilot and bears scars to this 
day. Not every trickster or magical response to the war could be relied on. 
6. An understanding of Palauan conceptualizations of time and history is 
required to grasp the potentiality of major structural transformations. The Palauan 
sense of time and history differs from Western understanding, which is more linear 
in conception (see Parmentier 1987 and Nero 1987 for comprehensive explica-
tions). In Palau, time is conceived of more in circular or incorporative terms. Chere-
char 'forever' is the root word from which both the past, irechar, and the future, mo 
Cherechar (literally "go to forever") derive. The image is also one of sedimentation, 
but this sedimentation is perceived not just in linear geological terms but as an 
active selection of what shall remain. The best of present actions are sedimented 
onto the past to legitimate the future. 
Examination of a key Palau an proverb perhaps helps elucidate the semantic com-
plexities: A Cherechar a lokelii 'The essence of the past becomes the future'. Cherechar 
is used reflexively to indicate the circle that includes both past and present. Lokelii 
evokes two images, and people identify two roots from which the verb may be 
derived (evincing a Palauan predilection for layered, multifaceted communication). 
The first root, melakel 'to render the essence', is used for the act of extracting coco-
nut oil from coconut cream, an image of preserving the best, the purest from the 
whole. The second root, omekang, means "to feed, to provide sustenance"-the best 
from the present is an extracted sediment that forms the sustenance of the future. 
Time is conceived both in terms of the long duration and as continually reincor-
porative. The structure is derived from the mythological past, and at the same time 
the best from the present is reencoded into the past in order to give legitimacy to the 
present structure. But the future is often unclear because of turbidity that has not 
yet settled, and whenever the changes are too great to be incorporated within the 
existing world, a new world is "born." 
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CHAPTER 6 
"Far Away" and "Close Up": 
World War II and Sikaiana Perceptions 
of Their Place in the World 
WILLIAM W. DONNER 
EARLY in my stay on Sikaiana, a small Polynesian community in the 
Solomon Islands (map 2), an elderly woman recounted her interac-
tions with Americans during World War II. Recalling why some 
young women were reluctant to marry American servicemen, she 
said that they were afraid because at that time America was "far 
away." But she added that America now is "close up," meaning that 
the economic and cultural distance between it and Sikaiana is no 
longer very great. This woman's statement about Sikaiana's relative 
economic and cultural distance from industrialized nations reflects 
an important concern with social change and economic development 
that continues in present-day Sikaiana society. World War II was a 
period when Sikaiana had intensive, although brief, contact with 
massive technology and world events. It is therefore an important 
point of reference when the Sikaiana consider their place in the 
world. 
The events taking place during World War II made a profound 
and lasting impression on the Sikaiana people who witnessed them, 
and they frequently recounted these experiences to me. Many of 
these accounts recur in a similar form, and I consider them to have 
become fully incorporated into Sikaiana's oral traditions along with 
legends and stories about the island's original settlement, history 
before colonial administration, and conversion to Christianity (see 
chapter 17). Whether accurate or distorted, I will assume that recur-
ring themes in these accounts reflect Sikaiana perceptions and inter-
pretations of their experiences with the war and Americans. 
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Sikaiana 
Sikaiana is a small atoll about one hundred miles east of Malaita 
Island in the Solomon Islands. Sikaiana, like the other Polynesian 
outliers in the Solomon Islands such as Tikopia, Ontong Java, and 
Rennell and Bellona, is occupied by people whose traditions, lan-
guage, and culture are Polynesian. It was originally settled by Poly-
nesians who migrated to the fringes of Melanesia (see Bayard 1976). 
Today Sikaiana is an administrative council district within Malaita 
Province. The population residing on the atoll fluctuates at about 
two hundred to two hundred fifty people; about four hundred to four 
hundred fifty others have emigrated from Sikaiana to various parts 
of the Solomon Islands. Once a month a boat brings and takes pas-
sengers, unloads supplies, and loads copra, the main cash crop. 
Compared with many other communities in the Solomon Islands, 
Sikaiana has had long and comparatively close relationships with 
Westerners. 1 In the nineteenth century, the atoll was visited by whal-
ers and traders. By the early twentieth century, older Sikaiana peo-
ple remember that tobacco, trade cloth, bush knives, pots, pans, 
steel tools, flint, flour, and even canned beef were available at local 
stores supplied by European traders. 
In 1929, Anglican missionaries in the Solomon Islands sent their 
ship, the Southern Cross, to Sikaiana and left a group of missionaries 
to convert the island's population. The conversion was rapid and, 
within ten years, virtually complete. The missionaries took young 
people away from the island to be educated at missionary schools, 
including Pawa and Maravovo. Many traditional practices and cer-
emonies were discontinued and replaced. At the time World War II 
reached the Solomon Islands, Sikaiana had a long history of casual 
contact with Western culture that had intensified iq the previous 
decade. Sikaiana's inhabitants were mostly Christian. Many young 
men had attended mission schools, others had worked for Europe-
ans, and some spoke Solomons Pijin and even a little English. 
Shortly before the Japanese invaded the Solomon Islands, many 
Sikaiana emigrants, including the children at mission schools, were 
taken back to the atoll. Some, however, did not get back and spent at 
least part of the time in various places, including Santa Isabel and 
Guadalcanal. 
During World War II, the Sikaiana people remember that Ameri-
can seaplanes often visited Sikaiana; some stayed overnight and left 
on the following day. The names of some of these fliers are remem-
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bered, as are the families they stayed with. Several events are 
recounted frequently, including the visit of three fliers who crashed 
near the island, a visit by several warships, an air skirmish over the 
island, and a brief visit by a Japanese submarine. 
The rescue of the three fliers is one of the most vividly recounted 
incidents. The Sikaiana claim that early one morning in late August 
1942 three fliers came ashore at one of the roughest areas of the reef. 
As fate would have it, the sea was calm that morning. They stayed 
on the northeastern side of the main islet (Hale) until they could 
determine whether there were any Japanese on the island. The fliers 
were eventually discovered and escorted to the inhabited area of the 
island. One of the men is reported to have had a "broken" leg, 
which was mended by a Sikaiana person using traditional medical 
techniques. The fliers stayed for several days before being rescued. 
Their names are remembered as "Ben," "Paul," and "Clyde." (See 
appendix.) 
Sikaiana was at the fringes of most of the conflict. There were no 
large troop movements through the area or consistently heavy fight-
ing. However, Sikaiana is located very near the site of two naval bat-
tles fought in 1942, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and the Battle 
of Santa Cruz. The naval engagement of 23-25 August 1942, now 
known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, was originally named 
the Battle of Stewart's Island (Sikaiana). During this engagement 
Sikaiana was directly between the American fleet to the south and 
the Japanese fleet to the north and west. On 24 August, Japanese 
airplanes flew over the atoll on their way to bomb (and disable) the 
aircraft carrier Enterprise, which was located about fifteen miles 
southwest. Records at the U.S. Naval Historical Center in Washing-
ton, DC, report that one plane from Torpedo Squadron Three of the 
aircraft carrier Enterprise was unable to land because the Enterprise 
was under attack. The crew crashed at sea and arrived on Stewart's 
Island, where they were rescued several days later (United States 
Navy 1942). This crew included Ensign Harold L. Bingaman (Ben) 
and Aviation Radiomen Paul W. Knight and Calvin ("Clyde") P. 
Crouch (United States Navy n.d.). 
The Transformation of World Events into Community Events 
After the departure of these three fliers, a series of songs was com-
posed that commemorated their stay. These songs are still remem-
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Marakei Islanders rescuing American from downed seaplane, 6July 1944. 
(U.S. Navy) 
bered and performed on occasion by older Sikaiana women. In tra-
ditional Sikaiana society, men and women periodically divided into 
separate groups and composed humorous songs critical of the oppo-
site sex. After the arrival of Christian missionaries in 1929 and the 
conversion of Sikaiana, the missionaries discouraged these song fes-
tivals. However, they continued in a modified form until after World 
War II. During the school holidays men and women divided into 
separate groups and continued to compose songs, although the mis-
sionaries discouraged explicit sexual references. 
The following songs were composed by the island's women shortly 
after the departure of the three American fliers. 2 The songs describe 
the beauty of the American fliers and the young women's attraction 
to them. The songs, however, were intended not so much as praise 
for the Americans' beauty as a taunt to the island's young men by 
comparing Sikaiana men unfavorably with the Americans. This 
type of taunt is very common in song composition, and indeed in 
daily joking. 
Song 1 
A toku lautama he tuunia na moena o na kehu kaihe sulamai 
A toku lautama he tuunia na moena o na kaniva kaihe sulamai 
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0 toku ohia te kili maania a "Ben" ki moe rna nau 
0 toku ohia te kili maanoni a "Paul" ki moe rna nau 
N oho koe ku kino i a nau 
Noho koe ku kino i a "Clyde" 
Noho koe ku kinokino, hakaoti 
Unmarried young men do not burn the bedding of the 
beautiful whites who just appeared 
Unmarried young men do not burn the bedding of the 
rainbows (beautiful people) who just appeared 
I want the very white skin of Ben to sleep with me 
I want the fragrant skin of Paul to sleep with me 
You are disgusting to me 
You are disgusting to Clyde 
You are simply disgusting 
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Song 1 describes an incident that occurred shortly after the fliers 
left the island. The young women of the island demonstrated their 
romantic interest in the Americans by gathering together to sleep on 
the bedding they had used. The young Sikaiana men burned the 
bedding mats. (This was all done as a form of teasing or joking and 
is consistent with contemporary patterns of male-female teasing and 
joking.) In song 1, the light color of the fliers' skin is mentioned to 
taunt the Sikaiana men for having darker, less attractive, skin color. 
(The Sikaiana prefer lighter complexions, much as some American 
women are said to prefer men who are "tall, dark, and handsome," 
or sometimes it is asserted that "gentlemen prefer blondes.") The 
terms kehu in line 1 and maania in line 3 describe the very white skin 
of the fliers and are meant to be complimentary. In line 2, the word 
kaniva is literally a "rainbow," but in this context it means a beauti-
ful person. Paul is described by reference to a common romantic 
idiom, maanoni 'fragrance'. In the final three lines, the young men of 
Sikaiana are taunted for not being worthy of the attention of the 
young women, especially in comparison with the fliers. 
Song2 
A "Clyde," A "Clyde," noho tani tani 
Tani, tani ko nau ei 
Luuluu ki taaua i Tai Hale 
Luuluu ki taaua ko ka hano 
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"Clyde," "Clyde," (I) remain crying 
Cry, cry, I am crying 
We shake hands at the sea shore 
We shake hands, you are about to go 
On Sikaiana, following European custom, it is common to shake 
hands at departures, especially of foreign visitors. The women com-
posed the song to describe their sadness at the departure of the fliers 
and to taunt the Sikaiana men. Clyde is remembered as the 
youngest of the fliers. 
Song3 
Melika, too vaka ku aleha te ulu henua 
E tahuli ki hano saaua toku manava 
E saele ki kake moku loimata 
Taaua ia heki poloaki 
America your plane circles the island 
When it turns to go, my heart swoons 
When (they) walk to climb (into the plane), I cry 
We have not yet said goodbye 
Song 3 describes the departure of the fliers on the seaplane that res-
cued them. The phrase in line 2, saaua toku manava, literally means 
"the belly is carried," a frequent idiom that is used to describe being 
in love. The young woman is crying because she has not said 
goodbye. 
In 1969 another song festival was held to mark a feat of American 
technology, the landing of Americans on the moon. The island's 
men and women composed songs that used the moon landing to crit-
icize each other. The Sikaiana men performed a skit. imitating the 
launching. One man put on the earphones from the island's short-
wave radio ·and acted the part of mission control. Another soaked a 
rag with kerosene, tied it to the tail of a bird, and lit it in imitation of 
a rocket's launch. The men composed a song claiming that the astro-
nauts met a beautiful woman on the moon, Sina, who was far more 
beautiful than any woman on the earth below (the women of 
Sikaiana). (Sina is a common folktale figure whose image is said to 
be seen weaving a mat on the moon.) After hearing this song, the 
women composed a reply (hakapili) describing Sina's dislike of the 
men of this earth (the men of Sikaiana) because they steal coconuts, 
copra, tobacco, and money. 
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In 194~, and as recently as 1969, Sikaiana people memorialized 
world events in their song compositions, reformulating these events 
in a manner that reinterprets them in terms of community concerns. 
These activities are one of several ways in which the Sikaiana 
attempt to maintain themselves as a separate and distinct commu-
nity in the face of ongoing sociocultural change. 
Social Images of Americans 
In addition to these songs, stories are frequently told about encoun-
ters with Americans. In these stories, several recurrent themes 
present an image of Americans as sharing a manner of beh · ,ving or a 
social character (see chapters 2, 17). This ethnic stereotn ~, wh~ther 
accurate or not, reflects the consolidation of experie1.ces with a 
group of outsiders. These images continue to shape Sikaiana percep-
tions of America and Americans as well as to reflect important pro-
cesses in Sikaiana's experiences with outsiders. 
Overall, the Americans left a favorable impression as being a 
friendly, if also violent, people who shared in Sikaiana life-style and 
social relationships in a manner that was very unusual in light of 
previous Sikaiana encounters with Westerners (see also chapters 15, 
17). 3 The Americans prayed in the local church, played cards with 
the Sikaiana people, and drank fermented coconut toddy. Several 
are reported to have wanted to "marry" Sikaiana women. (There 
are, however, no offspring of Americans.) 
The Americans did not find the Sikaiana life-style to be repulsive 
or disgusting (hakalialia). The term hakalialia is frequently used to 
describe disgust at an inedible or rotten food or the revulsion some 
people feel when caring for a person with a severe physical deform-
ity. The Sikaiana people expect that most Westerners will find their 
living conditions and food to be simple, plain, and even disgusting. 
One woman explained my own adjustment to Sikaiana life in terms 
of her experiences with these Americans: being American, I did not 
experience revulsion at Sikaiana food and life-style. 
In normal Sikaiana social interactions, hostility and anger should 
be controlled. Americans are remembered as being friendly to the 
Sikaiana and not given to anger. One woman recounted that once 
some children were playing on the wings of a seaplane and damaged 
them, rendering it unable to take off. Nevertheless, the pilot did not 
get angry. 
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"Duck" seaplane at Kwai, Malaita, Solomon Islands, June 1943. (U.S. 
Navy) 
Reciprocity is an important basis for social relationships on 
Sikaiana, and Americans are described as becoming involved in 
Sikaiana systems of reciprocity. Some of the young men formed 
friendships (soa) with individual fliers and helped them during their 
stays. 4 In return, the Americans are remembered as giving gifts and 
sometimes parachuting supplies with their friend's name on them. 
The Sikaiana people claim that several days after the American fliers 
were rescued, packages of medicine and other supplies were dropped 
from an airplane. 
Although the Americans were friendly to the Sikaiana people, 
they are also remembered as being brave, fierce, and violent. One 
man who was on Guadalcanal said that the marines had told him 
they had "come to die." America is still thought of as a place where 
there is constant violence and Americans are thought to be a poten-
tially violent people. 
Americans are also remembered for their great material wealth. 
People found large tins full of food and other supplies that drifted 
ashore. Some of the men claimed that they began smoking during 
this time because there were so many free cigarettes . Americans are 
still seen as powerful, an attitude extended to the value placed on 
their technology and manufactured goods. World War II stainless 
steel is highly prized and preferred for making fishing spears. My 
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aspmn and other medical supplies from the United States were 
thought to be more effective than the same generic medicines sold in 
the Solomon Islands. Many people thought that American brands of 
watches such as Timex were better (or at least more prestigious) 
than other brands such as Casio or Seiko. 
Overall, the Sikaiana people have a favorable impression of 
Americans. Generally, they are much kinder in their assessment of 
the character and motivations of Westerners, including Americans, 
than they are in their assessments of one another. Over the course of 
their contacts with outsiders, the Sikaiana people have made a very 
favorable impression on those who have encountered them, includ-
ing myself. The population had acquired a reputation as friendly 
and hospitable by the mid-nineteenth century (Bayliss-Smith 1975, 
298-299; see also Schertzer 1861, 622-623; Woodford 1906, 165; 
Woodford 1916, 41; Lambert 1941, 109-110). During World War II 
the Americans also seem to have formed positive impressions of the 
Sikaiana (see appendix). An article in Time magazine dated June 
1943 described Sikaiana as a "terrestrial paradise ... where the 
South Seas live up to their literary tradition and the native girls 
really look like Dorothy Lamour." Just as the Sikaiana people 
formed an image about American character, this article suggested 
that Sikaiana was seen by Americans as a manifestation of long-
standing images of the romantic South Seas. 
Locals and Cosmopolitans: Sikaiana's Place in the World 
Memories about World War II and social images of Americans are 
part of the broader context of Sikaiana perceptions of economic and 
social change and their place in the world. Many areas of Sikaiana 
life have been altered dramatically over the last fifty years. After 
World War II, the British Solomon Islands Protectorate government 
developed new political institutions on the island. At present, a local 
church, school, court, government council, medical clinic, and 
cooperative store are well established. Younger people are no longer 
familiar with much of the traditional technology, including loom 
weaving, fishing techniques, and canoe making. Many legends and 
indigenous practices are known only to older people, who say that 
they know much less than their elders did. Many other traditional 
activities have been discontinued or replaced, including song feasts, 
tattooing, magic incantations, rites of childbirth and burial, and sev-
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eral ceremonies involving gift exchange. Before the conversion to 
Christianity, marriages were arranged when the couple were young 
children. At present, most marriages are made by the couple's 
choice. Traditional songs have been replaced by compositions for 
the guitar, which in turn are being replaced by commercially pro-
duced music heard on radios and tape recorders. Western-style 
dances between young men and women were introduced on the 
island in the 1970s. Traditional games are being replaced by West-
ern games such as soccer, netball, volleyball, and cricket. The 
Sikaiana language is changing through the simplification of its 
grammar, the loss of Sikaiana lexemes, and borrowing from En-
glish. Some younger adult males consider Solomons Pijin, the lin-
gua franca of the Solomon Islands, to be their first language. Some 
Sikaiana people have attended training courses and universities in 
England, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Fiji. 
Generally, the Sikaiana people have responded readily to opportu-
nities for participation in Western institutions and practices, but 
they have found economic and cultural change to be a mixed bless-
ing. On the one hand, they sometimes recount their traditional ritu-
als with self-mockery. They remember that seances with ancestors in 
the traditional ritual system caused hostility, disease, and deaths. 
They claim that in traditional society there were high rates of adul-
tery, along with the heightened conflict and hostility that resulted. 
On the other hand, they also feel that in previous times social rela-
tionships were more harmonious and people were happier. They 
lament the loss of certain traditional activities and events, including 
dances, song styles, games, and interpersonal etiquette. But they 
also encourage their children to attend schools where they have con-
tacts with other Solomon Islanders and learn different cultural prac-
tices. 
During World War II massive new technologies entered the Solo-
mon Islands, and important world events, at least for a while, cen-
tered there. In the accounts of the events associated with World War 
II, there are the seeds of many issues that continue to concern the 
Sikaiana people and reflect some of their perceptions of their place in 
a complex world. The Sikaiana people had intimate contact with 
Americans and their technology. The war is, therefore, an important 
reference point for their perceptions about economic and cultural 
development and their relations with industrialized nations. They 
view themselves as developing and changing, but they also see a 
wide gap between themselves and industrialized countries. In many 
respects, they still think of themselves as "far away." 
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The Sikaiana people often joke about the small size of their com-
munity in comparison with the large size of industrialized societies. 
A man who completed a secondary education jokingly described a 
bush path on Sikaiana as a "highway"; another man pretended that 
his canoe was a battleship. Several people referred to Sikaiana as the 
"United States of Sikaiana," joking about the island's small popula-
tion in relation to the large size of the United States. Indeed, such 
concepts of size are inherent in Solomons Pijin; the word for indus-
trialized countries is bikples, from the English "big place." 
The Sikaiana continue to be fascinated with the technology of 
warfare. I was frequently asked questions about U.S. military capa-
bilities. People who could read English eagerly passed around my 
Time and Newsweek magazines. During my stay in 1980-1983, there 
were conflicts in both Lebanon and the Falklands. These wars 
stirred interest on Sikaiana, and indeed in the rest of the Solomon 
Islands. For a while, the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation 
had a special radio show devoted to updating events about various 
wars going on around the world. When the bishop of Malaita visited 
Sikaiana, he was asked about the possibility of a nuclear war. A 
Sikaiana man first told me about Reagan's plans for the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, after he heard about it over the national radio. 
This interest in world events and technology corresponds with a 
self-deprecatory humor about Sikaiana's smallness and lack of 
sophistication. In some descriptions of events that took place during 
World War II, there are incidents that expose a lack of sophistica-
tion. For example, one man recounted his adventures trapped 
behind Japanese lines near Henderson Airfield on Guadalcanal. He 
was sent out as a scout to find out whether there were any Japanese 
or Americans nearby. Laughing and shaking his head, he recalled 
that he had never seen people of either nationality and had no way to 
distinguish their racial features. Local traditions are not always 
denigrated in war stories; in the story of the three fliers, people 
always recount that one flier had a broken leg that was set by tradi-
tional medical techniques. 
This concern with lack of sophistication is a frequent theme in 
present-day Sikaiana teasing and joking. A commonly used Pijin 
term, lokolo, ridicules behaviors or people for lacking sophistication. 
Lokolo is derived from the English, "local," in the sense of referring 
to the attributes of a "local" community-that is to say, "provin-
cial" or "hick." Usually, lokolo is used to tease a person for lack of 
familiarity with a sophisticated life-style or Western manufactured 
goods. For example, some people teased me for being lokolo because 
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of my clumsy efforts at using pressure lamps, axes, and other manu-
factured goods. Sikaiana men often joked that many Sikaiana 
women were lokolo because they were not familiar with Western 
housekeeping, cooking, dance styles, and interpersonal etiquette. 
The statement that America is no longer "far away" but is now 
"close up" reflects the culture and economic change that older peo-
ple have witnessed. But it belies a continuing ambivalence about 
Sikaiana's small and relatively isolated place in the larger outside 
world. 
Conclusion 
Sikaiana experiences in World War II were a particularly intensive 
part of a longer process of social and cultural change. For older peo-
ple who witnessed these events, and for younger people who hear 
their stories, World War II is a kind of reference point, when there 
was intimate contact with wealthy and powerful outsiders, and when 
world events were briefly centered on the Solomon Islands. 
The Sikaiana developed images of Americans as friendly, wealthy, 
violent, and willing to participate more intimately in Sikaiana activi-
ties than other Westerners. However, the Islanders became aware of 
not only the similarities, but also some of the dramatic differences in 
power and wealth between themselves and these outsiders (for other 
examples from the Solomons, see chapters 11 and 15). The Sikaiana 
remain fascinated with this power and wealth; they admire it, but 
also distrust and fear it. 
The songs that were composed about the three American fliers, 
and more recently the songs composed following the American land-
ing on the moon, reflect one aspect of Sikaiana's interaction with the 
industrialized world. Global events are. incorporated into the com-
munity's traditions and memorialized in terms of community social 
relationships, in these cases the fundamental Sikaiana distinction 
between men and women. The songs reaffirm the community in 
terms of events of the outside world. 
But often cultural and social change is not incorporated so neatly 
and fully into local community experience. Western institutions 
have had a profound effect on the Sikaiana community, resulting in 
emigration, wage-labor, formal education, new values, and interac-
tions with non-Sikaiana people. Whether or not the Sikaiana will be 
able to maintain their community as a distinctive cultural tradition 
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and social group is not clear. For better and worse, Sikaiana contin-
ues to be strongly influenced by cultural and social change, and 
technologically advanced societies provide frames of reference for 
this change. In this respect, World War II was an especially dra-
matic and intensive stage in a longer process. 
Appendix 
After writing this chapter, I enlisted the help of the Department of 
the Navy to contact Paul Knight, one of the fliers commemorated in 
the songs in this text. His letter follows. 
August 29, 1986 
Dear Sir, 
I enjoyed very much your letter and the verses by the native 
girls on Stewart Island. Although your letter is dated in April, I 
just received it from the Navy Department in St. Louis. I would 
like very much to read the entire paper you are writing about 
the island. 
I'm no doubt the "Paul" referred to. The event took place dur-
ing the Battle of the Eastern So~omons. Late in the afternoon of 
August 24, 1942, we were returning to the carrier Enterprise, 
from a mission in a TBF and were attacked by 3 zeros. The task 
force we had encountered were cruisers and destroyers. When 
we arrived within sight of the "E" she was under attack by J ap 
planes. We received a radio message to stand clear, so we con-
tinued to circle on the horizon. We found ourselves alone when 
the zeros attacked. In later years, in reading about the battle, it 
seems there were two task forces: the one we encountered and 
another with carriers in it. I shot one down, confirmed by 
myself and Ens. Bingaman, the pilot, but they also finished us 
and we went into the drink. We spent several hours in the life 
raft, before landing on the beach of Stewart Island in the wee 
hours of the morning. We remained on the beach until day-
break, when Bingaman and Crouch left to explore the island. I 
couldn't walk, so remained behind. An eternity later three 
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natives appeared. That was a frightful moment. I didn't know 
whether they were "friend or foe." I had a .45 and was getting 
ready to shoot them when one raised his hand and smiled. I 
decided to take the chance that they were friendly, which might 
be the best decision I've ever made in my life. The picture of 
them approaching me is like it is happening now; I was on that 
beach, hurting all over, with a cocked .45 wondering what to 
do. They carried me to their village, and gave the three of us a 
hut to ourselves, which must have meant that a family moved 
out for us. During the days that we remained in their village 
they treated us splendidly. I couldn't walk and had other 
wounds, an especially bad one in the forehead, and two older 
men were constantly with me washing the wounds, etc. 
I especially remember a young lady who daily brought a fresh 
stalk of bananas into the hut. Also from the hut I could see an 
elderly woman who seemed to be the cook; she constantly 
tended a fire and was cooking. They fed us well, and I think 
I've never had more delicious chicken. One evening I remem-
ber well. A group of the men gathered in a circle in our hut with 
some type of alcoholic beverage; it tasted terrible but we drank 
with them to show our gratitude for their kindness. They also 
had a sort of wine in a coconut shell that was real tasty. We had 
given them the whistle from the life raft, and on the evening 
they gathered in the hut one would blow it and they'd all laugh 
like crazy; when the laughter subsided, he would blow the whis-
tle again and the laughter started all over. They really seemed 
to enjoy the evening. 
Some of the men spoke pidgin English, and told us some mis-
sionaries were there some years before, and taught them. I got 
the impression they knew the difference between our planes and 
the japanese. I recall one indicating he had seen a plane with a 
round ball, and not liking it. I couldn't determine if ajap plane 
had crashed there, or just flown over. 
Each day there was the sound of a drum, and I would see the 
entire village going past our hut. Crouch went with them and 
told me they went to worship each day. They also went to the 
water and bathed daily, as well as cleaning the street through 
the village. 
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When you were there, did they still have the rubber life raft we 
left? The rations in the raft consisted of a hard cracker and 
sweet chocolate. They didn't care for the crackers any more 
than we did, but did enjoy the chocolate. 
The day the PBY flew over and saw the flare, and landed in the 
lagoon to pick us up, the entire village accompanied the outrig-
ger canoe we were in out to the plane. The crew of the PBY 
gave them several packages of cigarettes. I was able to shake 
hands with several and wave to the others as we were boarding 
the plane. Even though I wasn't feeling well, and was happy to 
know we were rescued, I still felt sad at leaving these people 
behind. If you do have contact with them, tell them I remember 
them very well. Over the years I have thought of them often, 
and in discussions have often related the story of our stay there. 
They were wonderful people, and I'm certain the two elderly 
men, no doubt now passed on, who tended to me constantly 
saved my life. The wound in my head became infected, even 
with their constant washing, and my head became quite puffy; I 
could push with my fingers at any location and green pus would 
ooze from the wound in my forehead. The PBY that rescued us 
took us to the seaplane tender, USS Curtis in New Hebrides, 
where the Navy doctor told me I would probably have died 
from the infection in a few more days. I might not have had the 
"few more days" if they hadn't kept washing the wound. 
The verses by the young girls were amusing. I remember they 
would stand around outside our hut, looking in and giggling. I 
also remember they wore only a cloth around the lower part of 
their body; nothing from the waist up. 
This was many years ago, but it seems like yesterday. I hope 
this will be of some help in your studies of the people on this 
island. If I can help further, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
Paul W. Knight 
WILLIAM W. DONNER 
Notes 
Fieldwork on Sikaiana was conducted for thirty-three months from October 1980 
until july 1983. Support was provided by the National Science Foundation. I am 
grateful to many different people in preparing this manuscript. Geoff White made 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. Dean Allard and his 
associates at the Naval Historical Center in Washington were very helpful in 
researching navy records about Sikaiana. Paul Knight kindly responded to my let-
ter. His letter is attached as an appendix. Finally, William Davenport, my thesis 
adviser, helped make me sensitive to many issues of cultural change in the Solomon 
Islands. 
1. I use the word Westerner to refer to Caucasians (from both Europe and North 
America). The Sikaiana refer to these people as lama maa 'white people'. 
2. These three songs were collected by myself during 1981 and transcribed and 
translated with the aid of Dr. John Kilatu, among others. 
3. The American servicemen may have appeared friendly because, unlike other 
Westerners, they had no long-range economic and political interests and responsi-
bilities. Moreover, studies of soldiers under high stress suggest that they tend to be 
more egalitarian and interested in primary group relations (see Stouffer 1949; also 
Mauldin 1983). 
4. Soa is the Sikaiana term for "friend." At present, it most often refers to a sex-
ual liaison between an unmarried man and woman. It also describes informal 
friendships between people of the same sex and is often used to describe Sikaiana 
friendships with non-Sikaiana people. Finally, it also refers to several types of for-
mal friendships in which there are expectations of reciprocity, mutual respect, and 
deference. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Kilenge and the War: 
An Observer Effect on Stories from the Past 
MARTY ZELENIETZ 
AND HISAFUMI SAITO 
MANY Kilenge people of northwest New Britain recall the Second 
World War as if it happened yesterday. As they gesture at the sur-
rounding land and seascape, the people of Portne, Ongaia, and 
Kilenge villages provide vivid and detailed accounts of events four 
decades past. But despite the detail, despite the vividness, different 
audiences come away having heard substantively different stories of 
the war, stories impossible to reconcile in their differences. Our 
objectives, then, in this essay are threefold: to document the war 
from the perspective of the Kilenge people; to discover why different 
anthropologists heard different versions of the war stories; and to 
place war stories in the wider context ofKilenge historical narrative. 
The Kilenge see the war as more than just a series of impersonal, 
isolated, inconsequential events .. The war consisted largely of the 
actions of people as groups and as individuals: the Kilenge them-
selves, Japanese, Americans, and Australians. The war marked a 
pivotal point in recent Kilenge history. Even today, people who lived 
through the conflict use it as the major time marker in their lives: 
things happened bipo long wa 'before the war' (Tok Pisin) or bihain 
long wa 'after the war', whether in 1948 or 1973. 
Studying Kilenge perceptions of the war highlights a crucial meth-
odological issue of field research: the influence of the observer on the 
observed, or the listener on the speaker. In the field, the relationship 
between the observer and the observed, the audience and the narra-
tor, the anthropologist and the informant, is always problematic. 
Knowledge of the context and manner in which anthropologists 
gather their data is often as valuable to the reader of the account as 
the data themselves. The researcher's central interest may generate 
discomfort in his or her informants: it may be a topic they wish to 
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avoid at all costs. In such circumstances the research can, at best, 
only proceed obliquely and with great sensitivity. Conversely, a topic 
peripheral to the researcher's original objectives can crop up repeat-
edly, signalling to the anthropologist the importance that people 
attach to the subject. Both conditions occurred in our fieldwork. 
By and large, the information we present does not result from sys-
tematic investigations on the impact of the Second World War in 
Kilenge villages. Zelenietz did not concentrate on war research in 
1977-78 and 1981-82. Rather, people from Ongaia and Portne vil-
lages spontaneously offered information on the war, sometimes in 
the course of relating employment histories and often in other con-
texts. In short, people liked to talk about the war. In contrast, in 
1981-82 Portne villagers did not talk spontaneously with Saito about 
their wartime experiences. They preferred to tell their Japanese 
guest about Japanese citizens they saw in Rabaul before or after the 
war, rather than their experiences during the conflict. Only the 
tenacity and empathy of Machika Saito, a journalist, allowed the 
Saitos to gain access to some of the desired information. 
Anthropologists in pursuit of data inevitably learn something 
about their own relationships with their hosts, how they as outside 
observers fit into the local scheme of things. Who the anthropologist 
is (his or her identity and national origin) may have an important 
impact on the research conducted (for example, see chapter 17). We 
found this to be true with some (but not all) aspects of our research, 
particularly those aspects related to the war. In our case, we found 
that an American and aJapanese anthropologist collecting informa-
tion on the war (occasionally from the same villagers, but at different 
times) received markedly different versions of the same events. Our 
identities as Japanese and American, it seems, had an important 
bearing on the stories Kilenge told us. Thus, we not only address 
here Kilenge actions in and reactions to the war, w~ also analyze 
relationships between Kilenge and outsiders-the storyteller and the 
audience-to learn something of the influence of Kilenge narrative 
style and the effect of the observer on reconstructions of social his-
tory. 
Overview of the War 
The Kilenge people live in what Davenport (chapter 11) has identi-
fied as one of the "hot spots" of the war, which for them began 
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shortly after Pearl Harbor. In the early 1940s, many Kilenge men 
worked or studied at the Roman Catholic mission headquarters near 
Rabaul. When the Japanese invaded the area in late January 1942, 
most of the Rabaul-based Kilenge decided to return home. The 
Kilenge men who remained ~ehind suffered internment with the 
mission staff. Those fleeing the Gazelle Peninsula walked overland 
in small groups, occasionally obtaining canoes to speed their return 
home. Some men completed the trip in one month; others took 
three. When they arrived they found their fellow villagers con-
scripted by the Australians to complete an airstrip 10 kilometers 
from the major cluster of Kilenge villages. Shortly afterward, in 
mid-1942, the Australians withdrew before the Japanese advance. 
Once again, powerful outsiders (this time Japanese troops) con-
scripted villagers to work on the construction of the airstrip. 
The next year and a half of Japanese occupation defies easy sum-
mation. In addition to a major concentration of troops at the air 
base, the Japanese army stationed small units near the villages; vil-
lagers had a firsthand view of these foreigners. In general, we can 
say that Saito heard more favorable comments on the occupation 
than did Zelenietz. Kilenge descriptions of this period to Saito were 
usually, at a minimum, neutral and were often favorable. Zelenietz, 
however, heard many negative comments about the Japanese pres-
ence, especially in contrast to descriptions of the later American 
occupation. The Kilenge told Saito of the cooperative spirit between 
Kilenge and Japanese; Zelenietz heard that the Kilenge fled into the 
bush, not to return to the coast until after the American invasion. To 
Saito the Kilenge told of Japanese 'courtesy and generosity to local 
people; to Zelenietz they told of wanton Japanese destruction oflocal 
people's property. Narrators, quite obviously, tailored their stories 
specifically to their audiences. All accounts agree, though, that as 
time passed and the Allied blockade cut off Japanese troops from 
their source of supplies, relations between occupiers and villagers 
deteriorated. 
The beginning of the end of the Japanese occupation came on 26 
December 1943. As part of MacArthur's overall plan for the South-
west Pacific, Operation Cartwheel (Spector 1985, 226, 232), the 
American First Marine Division invaded Cape Gloucester (for 
another perspective on the Cape Gloucester action, see chapter 8). 
Most villagers indicated that fighting was not too severe. Rather 
than make a stand at Cape Gloucester, the Japanese withdrew east-
ward across New Britain. The Kilenge were not caught in any cross 
Siassi 
• 
MapS 
N.EW BRITAIN 
Bismarck Sea 
UNEA @ 
MUNDUA 
~;·~ ~ GAROVE 
(/ 
~ 
Solomon 
0 25 so 100 150 200 km 
--------------1------------------6~ 
Sea 4' 
------------------~----------~ 0 10 25 so 75 100 125 mi 
Not for repr
oduction wi
thout permis
sion
The Kilenge and the War 171 
fire. The only casualties ascribed to the fighting as such came just 
before the invasion, when the smoke of cooking fires attracted aerial 
bombing and strafing. After securing the area, the Americans gath-
ered the Kilenge at a temporary settlement near the airstrip, site of 
the main American base. At this settlement near the village site of 
Masele, 1 Americans and Australians conscripted young adult Ki-
lenge men to serve as carriers and soldiers. Some conscripts headed 
east to the fighting on Bougainville, while others went to join the 
leapfrog campaign on the north coast of New Guinea. The rest of the 
Kilenge returned to their coastal village sites to rebuild. Unlike the 
Kaliai (chapter 8), who had only fleeting contact with American 
troops, the Kilenge felt American influence for the duration of the 
American sojourn at the Cape Gloucester air base. Except for those 
conscripted, the fighting was over for the Kilenge. Later, after the 
American pullout, all that remained of the war was a large quantity 
of abandoned material and ANGAU (Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit) officers. 
People's reactions to these events, not surprisingly, reflect their 
previous experience with the world outside Kilenge, what they saw 
during the conflict, and how they saw it. In the next sections, we will 
deal with the events of the war on a personal level, in the eyes of 
Kilenge villagers. 
The japanese 
The Kilenge told both authors of cordial and favorable relations with 
the japanese in the prewar period (see chapters 3, 4, and 12 for simi-
lar descriptions). Before the war, Kilenge worked for Japanese in 
Rabaul and on the seas, diving for shells. Saito heard many nostal-
gic stories about the Japanese in prewar Rabaul. Indeed, relations 
were so cordial that some Kilenge permanently adopted nicknames 
bestowed on them by their Japanese employers and use those names 
to this day. 2 The people of Ongaia and Portne also consistently 
stressed, to both Saito and Zelenietz, friendly postwar relations 
between themselves andJapanese. 
In contrast to their unanimity of opinion on the pre- and postwar 
periods, the Kilenge did not give Saito and Zelenietz a uniform 
impression of the invading Japanese during the occupation of New 
Britain. When talking with Saito, people never missed the opportu-
nity to stress their ties with the Japanese and to emphasize the gener-
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osity of Japanese soldiers (see Read 1947, 105). Although some 
informants said that women and children fled to the bush during the 
occupation, leaving only men in the villages, men and women alike 
mentioned Japanese generosity with food and the similarity of the 
Japanese diet to their own (see chapter 10). Japanese punishment for 
various crimes of theft was just, informants said, even though they 
saw non-Kilenge New Guineans beheaded for the theft of a pig. 
When the Kilenge interned in Rabaul talked about seeing a military 
policeman beat a New Guinean servant for no apparent reason, they 
hastily added that a Japanese officer severely reprimanded the MP. 
Even the internees, when speaking to Saito, emphasized the positive 
aspects of internment: the warm and human relationships they 
formed with individualJapanese soldiers and civilians. The theme of 
cooperation and mutual respect between villager and Japanese runs 
parallel to a theme of generosity in Kilenge narratives. Of the eleven 
people the Saitos interviewed in depth about the war, only one favor-
ably mentioned the Americans, and even he took great pains not to 
criticize the Japanese in comparison. · 
Zelenietz and Grant received a totally different view of Japanese 
occupation forces. Their informants generally agreed that villagers 
hid in the bush from the occupiers, avoiding them at all costs. Of the 
thirty or so people who talked with the North Americans about the 
People visiting Japanese military camp on Panaeati, Louisiade Archipel-
ago. (Mainichi Shimbun) 
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war, only one boasted of remaining in the village and cooperating 
with the Japanese while everyone else fled. Most people condemned 
the Japanese for their lack of generosity and their wanton theft from 
Kilenge gardens. "There was so little left, no taro, no yams, that we 
grubbed in the bushes like wild pigs, looking for famine foods." 
Rather than stress dietary similarities, Ongaians decried the way in 
which the Japanese wasted coconut palms, cutting them down just to 
eat the shoots or the hearts of the trees. They talked about Japanese 
repression, excessive punishment for minor theft, and the callous 
way in which the Japanese destroyed personal property, houses, and 
sacred masks. They commented with curiosity on the Japanese cus-
tom of cremation of the dead. 
In sum, when speaking to the Japanese about Japanese during the 
war, Kilenge provided a picture of tolerance and cooperation, stress-
ing friendly individual contacts between the two groups. When 
speaking to North Americans about the Japanese, the Kilenge 
painted a desolate scenario of harsh, unfeeling overlords with 
strange and unfathomable customs. 
The Americans 
In war recollections gathered by the Saitos, the Americans generally 
assumed an impersonal status of walk-on characters in a play, as an 
element of the story mentioned and then, for the most part, dis-
carded. "The American planes bombed us [in Rabaul] and left." 
"The Americans evicted the Japanese and we returned to the vil-
lages." Only one informant favorably compared the Americans to 
the Japanese for the Saitos. 
In sharp contrast to this neutral attitude, Zelenietz and Grant 
constantly and consistently heard stories praising the Americans. 
"We stopped living in the bush like animals, and came back down to 
the beach. They took care of us-gave us food, clothes, housing." 
This is the dominant narrative theme: American wealth and gener-
osity (see chapters 9, 10, and 17). The Kilenge had never experi-
enced or dreamed of wealth on the scale brought by the Americans. 
Even villagers with work experience in Rabaul, who had tasted of 
Australian wealth and technology, remember with awe the vast 
quantity and kinds of American material goods. 
Kilenge related their amazement when the Americans unloaded 
their ships and barges and then distributed a portion of the goods to 
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villagers (the stuff, in other parts of Melanesia, of which cargo 
beliefs are made). "The inside of every house was like a store-full 
up to the rafters with all kinds of goods." "Those Americans, every-
thing they had came in tins. They gave every household tinned beef, 
tinned lamb, tinned tongue, even their bread and sweets came in 
tins. Those were the good times." American soldiers stationed at the 
Gloucester air base would come to the villages bringing wealth, and 
all they asked for in return were "eat's eyes," the polished opercula 
of various gastropods. For Kilenge narrating their experiences to a 
North American audience, American wealth, generosity, and tech-
nology stood in sharp contrast to Japanese relative paucity of mate-
rial goods. The well-supplied Americans had all wants catered to by 
tinned goods, all work done by technological products of their indus-
trial culture. Machines, not indigenous people, built American air-
strips (see chapter 4). And the machines came in an endless stream, 
discarded with as little thought as an Ongaian would cast aside a 
coconut husk. How the Kilenge wondered when the Americans 
lined up dozens of amphibious armored vehicles in a swamp near the 
airstrip, drained the oil from the engines, turned on the ignitions, 
and walked away. What kind of people were these, what kind of 
wealth did they possess to so casually dispose of valuable, powerful 
machines, sure in the knowledge that more machines would await 
them at their next stop? Not the same kind of people as the Japa-
nese, who seemed impoverished, with more limited food and tech-
nological resources. 
American technology and wealth and its seemingly endless avail-
ability made such a deep and lasting impression on the Kilenge that 
even a young man born several years after the war recited a very 
detailed "eyewitness" account to Zelenietz. For this villager, the 
event might have happened yesterday, rather than before he came 
into the world. Older villagers, fondly remembering A{nerican gen-
erosity, asked Zelenietz to approach the president of the United 
States to request that Papua New Guinea (or at least New Britain) 
become part of America. 
Another aspect of the American occupation that deeply impressed 
the Kilenge (as evidenced by their constant reference to the topic) 
developed from the apparent equality between black and white ser-
vicemen in the American armed forces (see also chapters 8 and 15). 
The sight of black, as well as white, American soldiers, wearing the 
same uniforms, using the same equipment, and eating the same 
food, amazed the Kilenge. It contradicted most of their previous 
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First Catholic mass after Japanese withdrawal from Cape Gloucester, New 
Britain, 12 March 1944. (U.S. Marine Corps) 
experience of black-white encounters under Australian colonial 
domination. The Kilenge put their experience under Australians 
into a new focus when they saw apparent equality between black and 
white American servicemen and participated in a new form of black-
white interaction. Villagers now "speak of their relationships with 
Americans in profound contrast to their relationships with Austra-
lians. Kilenge impressions of equality received a boost when one of 
their own leaders, "Tave" (a pseudonym), achieved the status of 
paramount luluai (chief village headman). They still describe with 
wonder and delight how Tave stood on a platform, flanked by Amer-
icans and Australians, while a brass band played in his honor. 
Regardless of the true state of integration or segregation in the 
American forces, the Kilenge interpretation of the situation un-
doubtedly influenced their postwar perceptions of, and relations 
with, the Australians. Villagers had a new, different model for 
black-white relations, a new way to define their relationships with 
whites. 
The war provided employment opportunities for young Kilenge 
men, opportunities that continued an existing pattern of labor 
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migration (Grant and Zelenietz 1980), rather than offering a novel 
chance to leave the village for work, as occurred in some other 
Melanesian communities during the war (e.g., see chapter 17). 
American and Australian conscription of Kilenge as soldiers and 
carriers provided two distinct ranges of opinion from the Kilenge. 
To Saito, the Kilenge related the experience in neutral or negative 
terms. "The American Army took our young men to the battlefield 
and their parents and wives cried missing them. Some villagers died 
in battle" (cf. Robinson 1981). Zelenietz, however, listened to many 
stories of the experiences men had in distant parts of New Guinea, 
how the Kilenge willingly cooperated with the Americans to defeat 
the Japanese on New Britain, Bougainville, and the New Guinea 
coast. Once, during a hunt, some Ongaian men began to explain to 
Zelenietz their pig-hunting techniques and sorcery. Talk quickly 
jumped from the hunting of pigs to the hunting of Japanese soldiers 
during the war. "We had guns and hand grenades, and we hunted 
the Japanese." "It was sometimes uncomfortable, but no one from 
Ongaia died of wounds, because we knew the sorcery [for how to 
hide from the prey] and couldn't get shot. A couple of men from the 
villages did die, but from diseases, not wounds." Today, aging men 
complain bitterly that the Papua New Guinea government does not 
provide them with a pension or compensation for their enforced par-
ticipation In the war. They hear of some participants receiving pen-
sions, provided they have medals to show for their service. But they 
contend that when they were demobilized at Talasea, they had their 
medals and papers confiscated. Still, they remember the service 
experience itself in a positive light. 
In summary, when speaking with the Japanese ethnographers, the 
Kilenge quickly dismiss the American presence and role in their 
area. When talking with Americans, they recall with evident fond-
ness instance after instance of American generosity and equality. 
The Australians 
The Saitos heard remarkably little about the Australian role in the 
war. Although the colonial power, Australians received surprisingly 
minimal attention in Kilenge reminiscences to the Japanese. The 
Australians infrequently visited the villages before the war, drafted 
people to work on the airstrip in 1942, left when the Japanese came, 
and came back when the Americans arrived. 
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Australians have a slightly higher profile in information gathered 
by Grant and Zelenietz. One old man, a long-standing luluai who 
got on well with the administration, proudly remembered how he 
fed and sheltered two downed Australian airmen until they made 
good their escape from New Britain. Most people, though, remem-
ber with bitterness the Australians' actions during and after the war, 
particularly in comparison with American behavior. As soon as the 
Americans departed, the Kilenge saw Australians reimpose the pre-
war situation of sharp distinctions between colonial rulers and colo-
nized subjects. Gone was the apparent black-white equality fostered 
by the Americans, replaced by apparent Australian discrimination 
and segregation (see chapters 8 and 10 for similar local perceptions). 
Above all, the actions of ANGAU infuriated and alienated the vil-
lagers. The Americans, as they left, gave the Kilenge all manner of 
goods: housing materials, clothing, food. 3 Shortly after, in a pattern 
repeated all across Papua and New Guinea, ANGAU agents arrived 
and confiscated materials left by the Americans. People still bitterly 
recall how members of ANGAU punctured tins of food and threw 
them into the ocean, how they took away and destroyed clothing. 
From the Kilenge perspective, their Australian colonial masters 
vengefully displaced the friendly, egalitarian Americans, reimposing 
colonial stratification. 
The Aftermath 
Without question, the Kilenge see the war as a watershed event in 
their recent history. The war exposed them to new technologies, new 
scales of wealth, new role models, and a new social order. The old 
isolation of coastal villagers broke down before the onslaught and 
intrusion of global conflict. The Kilenge reshaped their images of 
themselves, and of the world, as they tried to comprehend the events 
thrust upon them and to instill those experiences with meaning. 
The onset of the war disrupted their lives of subsistence horticul-
ture, taking them away from their gardens, their ceremonies (Zele-
nietz and Grant 1980), and their trade with neighboring groups (see 
Harding 1967). First conscripted by the Australians and then by the 
Japanese to work on the Cape Gloucester airstrip, the Kilenge later 
spent months hiding in the mountain bush, fearful of the Japanese 
and of roving American planes. Villagers remember this period as a 
bitter time, full of discomfort. Unable to work their gardens, they 
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had to subsist on famine foods. Unable to light fires (for fear of being 
bombed), they ate food raw and had no relief from the damp misery 
of mountain dwelling. Life, in short, became uncertain. 
The appearance of the generous and egalitarian-seeming Ameri-
cans generated new role models, new images of self and wealth. The 
subsequent ANGAU actions of confiscating the fruits of that gener-
osity and destroying those images by restoring prewar social differ-
entiation undoubtedly exacerbated Kilenge uncertainty and hostil-
ity. Out of this uncertainty and confusion emerged a man who gave 
stability and focus to Kilenge life, who provided the potential to 
recapture the wealth, technology, and newfound self-image of the 
American era. Tave traded on the prestige of being appointed para-
mount luluai by the Americans and Australians and called upon his 
considerable abilities to set the course of Kilenge development for 
the next quarter century. Tave first outlawed sorcery and then rein-
stituted it as a means of consolidating political control (Zelenietz 
1981). He relayed administration orders to begin coconut planting 
and later set the pattern for business development and activities in 
the villages (Zelenietz 1980; Grant, Saito, and Zelenietz 1986). 
From the confusion of the Second World War, he created an orderly, 
stable, and yet greatly transformed life for Kilenge villagers. With-
out the war, Tave would probably not have had the chance to be the 
leader he became. Without Tave, the Kilenge might not have 
become the people they are today. True, the outside world has and 
does impose changes on the Kilenge, but what they make of those 
changes, and how they respond to and manipulate them, is largely 
predicated on their postwar experience under Tave's tutelage. 
One common change in postwar Melanesian communities was 
the rise of cargo ideologies. The people of Vanatinai (chapter 9) 
developed a nonviolent ideology to account for American wealth and 
technology and to place themselves in a clear relationship to the 
Americans; while on Tanna (chapter 1 7) the war served to fuel an 
existing ideological construct. The Kilenge never responded to the 
material wealth of the war with a ritualistic cargo ideology. They had 
beliifin cargo, cargo to be attained through commercial, rather than 
ritual, activities (see McSwain 1977). We suspect that Tave chan-
neled people's aspirations for material wealth. A ritualistic cargo 
ideology did not suit his ends in the immediate postwar period. By 
the time Tave abandoned commercialism and opted for ritualism, 
he and his policies no longer had the credibility needed to get a cult 
accepted (Zelenietz 1981, 113). 
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The Kilenge speak with one voice on the war itself, whether talk-
ing to Japanese or North Americans. Villagers agree that the war 
showed them new things, opened up new vistas, and introduced 
them to people who treated them, in their eyes, in a better fashion 
than did the Australians. The war brought them new wealth (short-
lived as it was), new horizons and aspirations, and change. But they 
decry the war itself, the fighting and killing, the bombings and dis-
comfort, the dislocation and destruction. These are things, the 
Kilenge say, they can live without. 
Looking Back 
Kilenge accounts of the war would drive a military historian to dis-
traction. General themes emerge, only to lose definition and clarity 
in apparently contradictory statements. In these circumstances, the 
question "What really happened?" becomes impossible to answer 
and subservient to other inquiries, inquiries designed to discover the 
meaning of events for narrators and listeners and the relationship 
between those parties. Who said what to whom becomes as impor-
tant as what was said. The overall Kilenge story of the war becomes, 
in part, a product of the anthropologists who record it and also, in 
part, a product of the way the Kilenge relate events. In order to 
understand the story, therefore, we have to know the backgrounds of 
the field-workers and their attitudes toward the subject matter, and 
try to fathom the attitude of the Kilenge toward the anthropologists. 
Not surprisingly, the war as a historical and personal family event 
carries different meanings for Zelenietz and for Saito. Both born 
after the war, the authors developed different attitudes toward the 
conflict. Zelenietz, raised during the postwar boom on American 
ideals, and seeing those ideals shatter with American involvement in 
Vietnam, saw World War II as the last "good war." He reacted 
favorably to stories about the war, and Ongaian men pressed him for 
details of his father's role as an army engineer in the struggle for 
Okinawa and for stories of his father's elder brother's combat 
exploits in Europe. Zelenietz felt that both he and the Ongaians used 
such stories as a way to create a common past, to bridge the vast dis-
tances of culture, time, and geography: the Kilenge and the anthro-
pologist's kin had fought on the same side in a global conflict. They 
were, after a fashion, comrades-in-arms. 
The war had a different meaning for Saito and his family. Saito's 
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father served the Japanese army as an architect in Korea and China 
and often told his son of the hardships he, his wife, and Saito's eldest 
brother endured on the long road home following the defeat of the 
Japanese empire. The knowledge and understanding that he was an 
invader did not mitigate Saito's father's loathing of Koreans and his 
treatment at their hands following the Japanese defeat. Saito sympa-
thized with his father, dragged into Japanese imperialism, but 
rejected his father's biased view of Koreans. Saito saw Japanese vet-
erans of World War II as victims of imperialism, with the right to 
indulge in vivid reminiscences of the war. He felt, however, that 
they have generally ignored the victims of Japanese imperialism in 
other countries. Saito's aim in collecting war stories in Portne, then, 
was to discover the extent of disruption Japanese troops caused the 
villagers. Saito did not conceal his ill feelings about the conflict and 
about Japanese militarism and always tried to encourage the 
Kilenge to ignore his origins and speak from the heart, to give an 
unbiased account of their feelings about the Japanese and the war. 
He felt that, in terms of his war research, he suffered because the 
people ofPortne never failed to show him courtesy and compassion. 
We feel that our different origins, our expressed attitudes, and 
Kilenge perceptions of what they thought we wanted to hear 
strongly influenced much of the information we collected. Perhaps, 
had Saito expressed support of Japanese participation in the war, he 
might have heard even more positive narratives from the Kilenge. 
Zelenietz, with his positive response and feedback to war stories, 
was showered with favorable accounts of American doings. Much as 
they tried to elicit negative comments, the Saitos failed to evoke 
them from the Kilenge. Portne villagers would not, despite the 
explicit invitation, provide images that might possibly offend their 
guests. Why? 
For years, the people of Portne had wanted an anthropologist. 
Several Englillh-speaking anthropologists had lived and worked in 
Ongaia over the years, while Dutch anthropologists studied Kilenge 
proper. In 1977, in response to a request from some Portne men, 
Zelenietz promised to try to provide them with an anthropologist of 
their own. In 1981 , he made good on the promise and arranged for 
the Saitos to visit Portne. Given their desire for an anthropologist, 
and their obligations as host, we doubt that the people of Portne 
would have endangered their relationships with the anthropologists 
by telling derogatory tales about the "kin" of one of the field-
workers. 
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Why did the people of Portne want an anthropologist? Why, 
indeed, did Zelenietz, in 1977, receive delegations from other New 
Britain communities asking for anthropologists of their own? For 
one thing, the people of West New Britain recognize the rapid 
change around them. They want to record their past, and have that 
record preserved and disseminated. They see this as the work of 
anthropologists, people from the outside world who appear to have 
empathy and sympathy for the local situation and who also seem to 
have access to resources unavailable in the villages. 
But the people of West New Britain, who have had long and ami-
cable contacts with anthropologists, perceive these slightly strange 
outsiders as more than stenographers of the past. Anthropologists 
have additional roles in the village scheme of things, and the war sto-
ries collected by Saito and Zelenietz illustrate one such role. The sto-
ries told to the anthropologists have the recurring theme of the gen-
erosity of the field-workers' wantoks, their fellow countrymen. Both 
anthropologists saw the war stories as parables, as lessons in social 
behavior: Generosity was the hallmark of your wantoks; so too should 
generosity be the mark of your behavior. We need not expound on 
the well-documented importance of generosity in Melanesian cul-
tures to make our point. Suffice it to say that the anthropologists, 
with their comparative wealth from the world outside the village, 
should replicate the appropriate social behavior (generous redistri-
bution) of their cultural ancestors. Although we knew the impor-
tance of generosity before entering the field, the message was not lost 
on us. 
The issue of generosity, the stories told to the North Americans 
and the Japanese, and the way in which the Kilenge told them all 
illustrate aspects of Kilenge narrative style. Kilenge narrative does 
not merely recite dry facts, places, names, and events. 4 Narrative, 
especially when dealing with recent events and the known past, 
reflects a dialectical process between the storyteller and the listener. 
The teller can try to provide the listener with what the listener wants 
to hear, or at least what the teller thinks the listener wants to hear. 
The narrator sizes up his audience and then delivers an appropriate 
recital, secure in knowing that no other Kilenge will openly contra-
dict the account. Public disagreements over stories provoke needless 
disputes. Storytelling is a leisure activity, meant to entertain, and 
"facts" are much less important than the sense of conveying a "good 
story" ( cf. chapter 2). Bystanders who want to amend or correct the 
story can do so later, after the teller departs. No one is openly 
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insulted. No one publicly takes offense. Only when the stakes are 
high, only when "facts" count (as in ownership of an important 
resource) is public disputation and the resultant social tension 
deemed worth the cost. 
The distinction between public and private narrative correction 
dovetails with another aspect of Kilenge narratives of the known 
past. In most cases, the narrator is the protagonist in the story. The 
narrator could have been 50 kilometers away, or perhaps not yet 
born at the time the events occurred, but by talking about them he 
or she can become the central figure in the drama, affirming a bond 
with the community and its past. This first-person narrative style is 
not unique to the Kilenge; Counts (personal communication) 
reports the same for the Kaliai. 
The Kilenge imbue the war with numerous meanings. Stories of 
the war become means to ends, rather than ends in and of them-
selves. The kind of audience present, as well as selective memory 
(see chapter 8), may determine the kind of story told. Narrators can 
tailor their stories to fit specific audiences and convey specific mes-
sages. The narrator is an entertainer and a historian, making the 
events of yesterday or yesteryear come alive for the listeners. The 
narrator is also the good host, indirectly praising the guest by 
directly praising the actions of the guest's fellow citizens. The narra-
tor can also be an educator, teaching the guest proper behavior by 
using parables. For both the Kilenge storyteller and the foreign 
observer, Kilenge narration parallels the injunction laid out for the 
Jews in the Haggadah, the recitation to celebrate Pesach (Passover) 
and the exodus from Egypt. Each person must be made to feel per-
sonally a part of the exodus from Egypt, to have participated in the 
past. So too can Kilenge narration evoke a sense of continuity, or 
personal participation, with the past. The Second World War ended 
a generation ago, and villagers directly affected by it grow fewer in 
numbers each year. For those who will listen, though, the war might 
have ended yesterday. Its impact continues to unfold. 
Notes 
Much of the material in this chapter originally appeared as Zelenietz and Saito 
1986. We would like to thank the participants in the symposium, and above all Jill 
Grant, for suggestions and comments. The research on which this chapter is based 
was conducted by Jill Grant and Marty Zelenietz in Ongaia village in 1977-78 and 
The Kilenge and the War 
1981-82 and by Machiko and Hisafumi Saito in Portne village in 1981-82. We all 
owe thanks to the people of those villages for their wholehearted cooperation with 
the research effort and for their warmth and generosity as hosts. The research was 
funded in part by the University of Papua New Guinea, McMaster University, and 
the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design. We thank these institutions for 
their aid. 
1. Masele was the only Kilenge "hard luck" village. Separated from the main 
cluster ofKilenge villages by 10 km of swampy coast, it was destroyed by a tsunami 
in the 1880s. Rebuilt by the survivors, it was leveled for strategic reasons (proxim-
ity to airstrip) during the war and never resettled. 
2. For the significance of names in Kilenge, see Grant and Zelenietz 1983. 
3. They may have abandoned the material, and the Kilenge simply perceived 
that the material was there for their use. The important feature is that the Kilenge 
see the material as gifts given by the Americans. 
4. Although this is not the place to explore it in detail, we must note that Kilenge 
perceptions of the past, history and legend, are organized on a geographical, not 
chronological, basis. Where things happened is emphasized far more than when. 
Kilenge history seems to be written in the landscape, rather than in a time 
sequence. 
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PART III 
The Local Scene: 
Disruptions and Transformations 
CHAPTER 8 
Shadows of War: 
Changing Remembrance through 
Twenty Years in New Britain 
DAVID COUNTS 
WoRLD WAR II ended more than forty years ago. It came to New 
Britain in the early days of the fighting when Japanese forces struck 
at Rabaul, on the eastern tip of the island, on 6January 1942 (Mori-
son 1962, 259; map 5). From Rabaul, capital of the League of 
Nations mandated Territory of New Guinea controlled by Australia, 
the invading Japanese forces moved swiftly westward, establishing 
small garrisons at various points along the north coast of New 
Britain. 
Although the Japanese remained in Rabaul until the end of the 
war, their occupation of the western half of the island was brief but 
intense. It was followed, a little less than two years later, by an 
invading counterforce composed primarily of the U.S. Marine First 
Division. The marines landed in the early morning hours of 26 
December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on the western end of the island 
and in the next three months reclaimed the whole of the western por-
tion of the island as far east as Cape Hoskins. The marines were 
relieved and replaced by the Australian New Guinea Administrative 
Unit (ANGAU) on 5 April 1944. Meanwhile, continuous aerial 
bombing had rendered the massive Japanese forces based at Rabaul 
completely impotent. With their ships and aircraft totally destroyed 
and no roads to permit land forces to move into action, the garrison 
of nearly one hundred thousand men in Rabaul was simply left until 
the end of the war. 
The fighting from Gloucester to Talasea/Hoskins has received 
only brief treatment by military historians. Most have judged the 
invasion of Gloucester to have been oflittle strategic significance. Its 
claim to note arises from the fact that the Gloucester campaign was 
the last of the fighting that took place in tropical jungle conditions 
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and, by some accounts (Morison 1968), the most difficult. The diffi-
culty of the New Britain campaign was caused by the weather more 
than by the enemy forces: the landing took place just as the north-
west monsoon hit with full force, and the maps marked "damp flats" 
should have read "waist-deep swamp." To be sure, some of the 
fighting was fierce as the Japanese forces, nearly ten thousand 
strong, fell back from Borgen Bay eastward toward Rabaul, but 
most of the accounts stress the difficulty of keeping dry in the "green 
hell," as the marines dubbed northwest New Britain. 
In this chapter, I am concerned only with the interplay of the 
opponents in the fighting as they affected the indigenous people of 
the northwest coast of New Britain, now part of the West New Brit-
ain Province of Papua New Guinea. My research in the Kaliai area 
of West New Britain has extended over a period of twenty years. 
During that time local perceptions and recollections of World War II 
have shifted and dimmed as the people who were adults, and whose 
lives were most directly affected by the fighting, have grown old and 
witnessed more recent changes of equal significance for them. 
The Japanese invasion and the American counterthrust were but 
an interlude in the colonial control of New Britain by Australia. 
Although the Australians left New Britain briefly, when they 
returned they reestablished, as best they could, the prewar status 
quo. This chapter discusses war experiences that affected their abil-
ity to accomplish that task. 
A second concern in this chapter is to assess the ways in which dif-
ferent kinds of persons remember the war. I start from the assump-
tion that a person's view of the war takes on a distinctive cast, 
whether he or she was actively engaged in the fighting in a formal 
capacity; indirectly engaged by being employed by one or both of 
the fighting forces; or a village dweller whose normal. life was dis-
rupted by th~ events going on around him or her (see chapter 15). It 
is important to note, also, that a person's recollections are further 
skewed by experiences in the intervening decades, especially by the 
amount and intensity of contact with outsiders, whether Austra-
lians, migratory anthropologists, or officials of the new state of 
Papua New Guinea. 
The War's Legacy 
In this chapter I deal with recollections of the war among the Kaliai 
or, more properly, the Lusi-Kaliai, consisting of about a thousand 
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Lusi-speaking coastal people dwelling in five villages located roughly 
halfway between Cape Gloucester at the western end of the island 
and Talasea on the Willaumez Peninsula to the east. Their language 
is one of a number of related languages found along the north coast 
of New Britain and is distantly related to the Kilenge language 
(chapter 7). 
When we arrived in Kaliai for our first fieldwork in 1966, 
Dorothy Counts and I were, to the best of my knowledge, the first 
Americans to be seen in Kaliai villages since the departure of the 
marines during the war. I remember writing a letter to friends not 
long after our arrival and noting that one of the great disappoint-
ments of our arrival (as far as the villagers were concerned) was that 
we had brought no supply of hand grenades. We would be reduced 
to fishing with hook and line instead of concussion. Some Ameri-
cans! 
In 1966, Kaliai memories of the war were not only fresher than 
they now are, the war remained palpably present in their physical 
environment. Landing in a DC-3 at Gloucester airstrip (started by 
Australians, finished by Japanese, and improved by Americans), 
one could see the skeletal remains of warplanes scattered around the 
periphery. Looming out of the bush on the road between the strip 
and the government station at Gloucester were abandoned Ameri-
can armored personnel carriers, and at Gloucester station itself, site 
of the invasion in December 1943, the bones of landing craft lined 
the beach-slowly decaying reminders of all the wealth used and left 
behind in the effort to dislodge Japanese forces from islands that 
most Allied servicemen had never even heard of before the war. 
In the villages, too, the war was still present and providing useful 
implements and income, if not the excitement, that had attended the 
war itself. In Kilenge villages near the airstrip, for example, many 
houses were fenced with metal strips of marsden matting that had 
paved the runways. Farther to the east, in Kaliai, the heavy wire 
mesh that had strengthened the spotter plane strip at Iboki planta-
tion made useful grills for people cooking beneath their houses. And 
a brisk trade in nonferrous metals was being carried on by the plan-
tation's manager. Everything from brass propellers from Japanese 
barges to live cannon shells was brought in copra sacks by people 
from the Kaliai villages. Based on reports from other parts of New 
Britain, the Lusi-Kaliai were also aware of the continued presence of 
some of the war's dangers. During that year, Radio Rabaul reported 
the death of two children who had been attempting to open a 
beached sea mine with screwdrivers. 
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The overwhelming import of the wartime reminiscences for which 
I have notes from 1966 was the excellence, generosity, friendliness, 
and care of American troops who came through Kaliai, mopping up 
after the expulsion of the Japanese from Cape Gloucester. Zelenietz 
and Saito (chapter 7) raise pertinent questions about the meaning of 
such sentiment. They suggest that storytellers who stress the gener-
osity of American troops during the war are giving to later Ameri-
cans (including anthropologists) a message about New Guineans' 
continuing expectations after the war. Clearly, the same possibilities 
apply to my materials, as well, since Zelenietz and Saito and I are 
reporting on closely related events with the same troops as referents. 
But, while noting this, I would also point out that I have never found 
the "America = good :Japan = bad" contrast to be as sharp among 
the Kaliai as Zelenietz has reported from Kilenge. 
The tales stressing American generosity were usually told (and 
many still are) by actual participants in the described events. Many 
have the kind of background detail and richness that one expects 
from recollections of experience. Yet there is an element of mythic 
content in a number of them that, not surprisingly, calls to mind 
cargo myths. The main theme or scenario of these tales goes some-
thing like: "If only 1/we/someone had done the one more thing 
required, then some desired outcome would have taken place." 
A couple of these stories, briefly summarized, serve to illustrate 
the point. 
The Chance to Live in America 
The Americans were occupying the Kaliai area, and people had 
come back down from the interior, where they had hidden away 
after the coast became the target of American strafing_ and bombing. 
A group of children went swimming on the beach and afterward, 
finding an ·unexploded shell on the sand, passed the time throwing 
stones at it. The oldest of the group said that it was time to go back 
to the village. My informant, then a ten-year-old boy, picked up one 
last stone to throw and, of course, the shell exploded. 
Several of the boys were slightly injured, but the thrower, my 
friend, suffered a compound fracture of the upper arm just at the 
mid-point of the bicep. The arm was nearly severed. He was carried 
to the aid post at the small installation at Iboki plantation. The Aus-
tralian medic on duty there said that the arm would have to be 
amputated, but the American Marine who had brought the boy in 
Changing Remembrance in New Britain 
insisted that the loss of his arm would ruin his life. He put him on a 
patrol boat and accompanied him to the field hospital at Cape 
Gloucester, 60 miles to the west. There the American doctor saved 
his arm, though it remains scarred still. The marine who saw that 
his arm was saved stayed with him through his convalescence and 
toward the end proposed that he take the boy home with him to live 
in America. One of the local elders at Gloucester forbade it, how-
ever. So, my friend says, he is still a New Guinea villager and not an 
American. 
The Chance for Wealth 
A young married man, after working for the Japanese for a while, 
fled to the interior to escape the bombing and strafing on the coast. 
Months later, when the bombardment of the beach seemed to have 
ended, he and his wife decided to creep quietly down to the beach 
early one morning to collect saltwater in a bamboo container. As 
they approached the beach, they heard someone call, "Hey boy, 
where you goin'?" The man took his wife's hand and tried to run 
back into the trees, but the marine called again, "No, no, you come 
-I give you this ... ," while holding out a tin of meat from his 
rations. 
My informant, Jake, now in his sixties, told me that then and 
there he decided that these Americans were all right. Over the next 
few months, he developed a friendship with this American, whose 
name he remembers as Connor. Connor, stationed at the Iboki 
camp, used his rifle to hunt some of the cattle that had strayed from 
the plantation so that the villagers could feast, and Jake showed 
Connor the reefs and helped him to collect shells. The night before 
Connor's unit was to be relieved, he came to Jake and told him that 
they were leaving. He said that he had some things he wanted to 
give Jake, and that he should come to the camp very early the next 
morning-preferably before 4 AM. But Jake failed to wake until just 
after six o'clock, as the sun rose. He ran to the camp as fast as he 
could but found Connor just getting onto the ship that would take 
him away. "I'm sorry," he said, "but we had to bury all the things I 
was going to give you in a hole on the beach this morning." 
No one ever found the place where all the wealth was buried, 
though as late as 197 5 a group of men went to the plantation man-
ager to try to get him to dig up the beach with a bulldozer. 
Such events and beliefs as those described above did not, in 
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Kaliai, lead to any cargo movement featuring the Americans, and 
many of the stories are told with a sadness about what might have 
been. The story of the buried wealth left by the Americans, however, 
often is told with an entirely different slant. In these cases, while it 
still serves to highlight the generosity of the Americans, it does so by 
contrasting that trait with the stinginess of the Australians who are 
said to have forced the Americans to undertake the burial in order to 
deny the wealth to the villagers. I have never heard the Americans' 
fabled generosity contrasted with any niggardliness of the Japanese 
forces. The Japanese show up in the stories, rather, as objects of ridi-
cule for their poor command of Tok Pisin or as objects of pity for the 
enormous difficulties they faced in trying to escape after their defeat 
at Cape Gloucester. 
Kaliai War Experiences 
The people of Kandoka village in Kaliai, where the bulk of my 
research has been carried out, experienced the war in a number of 
ways. Two men were members of the police who were serving on the 
New Guinea mainland near Wewak when the war broke out. One of 
them was taken by the japanese and subsequently executed, accord-
ing to his son, who was a witness. The son survived the family's 
imprisonment and now lives in the village. The other policeman, 
whom I will call Sergeant, accompanied Australian officials in their 
flight from Angoram up the Sepik River, across the Highlands, and 
down into Port Moresby. He later served as part of a forward 
observer group locating Japanese encampments for Allied bombing 
runs along the Markham River in the Lae area. 
Sergeant died in early 1986, but if the length and de.tail of his war 
memories are any guide to significance, then one event that took 
place before fighting with the Japanese began claimed greatest 
importance. As he recounted it, when word came to Angoram, 
where he was stationed, of the invasion of Rabaul by Japanese forces 
and of their impending arrival on the north coast of New Guinea, all 
of the kiaps 'administrative officials' and whites living in the area 
gathered at the government station to decide what to do. The police 
detachment was called together to get instructions as well. Briefly, 
the police were told that those who were from the mainland should 
try to make their way home; that married police from the islands 
(principally Manus, New Britain, and New Ireland) would be evac-
uated with their families, if possible, as would the married whites 
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and their dependents; but the islands' policemen who were single 
were to stay with the administrative officers in order to harass the 
Japanese, even though they were poorly armed and supplied and did 
not have the means to make war. 
The officer in charge of the station (Sergeant refers to him as Kiap 
Ellis, or Masta Ellis) did not agree with the others and (according to 
Sergeant) argued that the action proposed would not harm the japa-
nese but would only lead to the needless loss of life among the 
Angoram party. He suggested that they simply wait and surrender to 
the Japanese as noncombatant personnel and hope that they would 
be repatriated to Australia. The others shouted him down and 
informed him that he was relieved of his responsibility and should go 
to his house and remain there. 
Once at his house, Ellis called the police sergeant-major and had 
him assemble all the policemen. He then instructed a detachment to 
bring all the station's weapons and ammunition to him-in short, he 
fomented a police revolt. Sergeant's account goes on at length, but 
the final outcome of this revolt was a brief skirmish between the po-
licemen and the expatriate community in which one of the white 
officers was wounded. The wounding of a colonial official so upset 
the native policemen that they dispersed into the bush, leaving Ellis 
alone. According to Sergeant, Ellis, realizing that he had not only 
lost but had also put the men under him in great danger of imprison-
ment, then wrote a note accepting full responsibility for the actions 
of the police and asking that they be granted amnesty. He then killed 
himself in his house. Sergeant says that when the other Europeans 
found Ellis dead, they honored his wishes with respect to amnesty, 
but cremated his body then and there and suppressed the incident. 
According to accounts given by J. K. McCarthy (1963, 215-217) 
and Gewertz (1983, 133-137), the sequence of the events took place 
pretty much as described to me by Sergeant, except in one major 
respect: the positions of the major protagonists are reversed. Ellis, 
then assistant district officer at Angoram, led the police revolt 
because he wanted to stay and fight the Japanese, while the others 
had decided to evacuate up the Sepik to safety. The fighting did end 
with the wounding of a white officer, whereupon Ellis's opponents 
withdrew down the river to get reinforcements. The police did dis-
perse into the bush, and Ellis did commit suicide. Unlike Sergeant, 
though, some of the police, joined by a small number oflocal people, 
went on a rampage of murder and rape until they were finally sub-
dued by the Australian officers (Gewertz 1983, 134). 
Sergeant, in his account, not only made no mention of the violent 
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incidents that followed Ellis's suicide, but attributed to Ellis only 
care and concern for the lives of the police-an interesting reversal 
of the other documented accounts. Nevertheless, and however much 
his interpretations are at odds with other historical facts, Sergeant 
recalled that he was deeply shaken at the time and that he stayed hid-
den by local villagers for some weeks until convinced by a priest that 
there was an amnesty in effect and that he could safely return and 
take up his duties. Subsequently, he served with considerable dis-
tinction, was decorated after the war, and continued as a policeman 
until his retirement in the early 1960s. As he put it to me, before that 
incident he and other policemen and, indeed, New Guineans in gen-
eral had always heard white people speak with one voice ( Ol i gat 
wanpela lo tasol: ol i tok long wanpela maus 'They have only one law: 
they speak with one voice'). In this incident, whites not only showed 
to the New Guineans the certainty of at least initial defeat at the 
hands of the Japanese, but were in such disarray that there was open 
strife and killing among them. 
Sergeant, who was in his seventies when he died, was for as long 
as I knew him impervious to any hint of cargo belief-to such an 
extent that he reported and caused the arrest of a man preaching 
such beliefs while wearing a police uniform. His long experience 
with white people and his observation of their disarray at the begin-
ning of the war seems to have convinced him that whites had no spe-
cial relations with spirits. 
Another retired policeman, Paul, provided a different perspec-
tive. At the outbreak of the war he was stationed in Rabaul, the first 
point of contact with Japanese forces. Given warning of the 
approach of the invasion force in the early days of January 1942, 
most expatriates and administration officials along with the police 
battalion managed to escape Rabaul before the Japanese arrived. 
Many people made their way to Iboki plantation, three miles to the 
east of Kaqdoka (Paul's home village) and camped there for a few 
days before regrouping and being withdrawn to Port Moresby. Paul, 
along with other New Britain policemen, was told that he should 
remain when the Australian forces left, should remove his uniform 
and all other evidence of having been a policeman, and should try to 
live as inconspicuously as possible until the administration returned 
and he could resume his duties. 
Paul followed his instructions to the letter, but when an old man 
(responding to Japanese questions about who knew how to use fire-
arms and could do some hunting for them) identified Paul as such a 
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person because he was a policemen, Japanese officers immediately 
arrested and imprisoned him as a spy, using a copra shed as a tempo-
rary prison at their Iboki plantation headquarters. 
Whatever their intentions toward him may have been, Paul was 
then (and remains still) convinced that he was being kept there only 
until his captors could arrange for his execution. When his guard fell 
asleep during the heat of the day, Paul took the opportunity to escape 
and fled into the interior, where he spent the rest of the period of the 
Japanese occupation. 
Japanese 
For the villagers of Kaliai who were not police, but were bystanders 
caught in the ebb and flow of war, the Japanese occupation of the 
north coast of New Britain was (at least until Allied air attacks 
began) a time of some excitement, of some amusement, and perhaps 
of bewilderment, but it was not a particularly difficult time. All of 
the people with whom I discussed this matter agreed that the villag-
ers suffered no atrocities at the hands of the Japanese. There are no 
reported rapes. There are no half-Japanese children left from that 
time. No one was killed or mutilated, and gardens and pigs were 
usually safe from confiscation. People were frightened. Rumors of 
Japanese cruelty filtered out from Rabaul, and the escaping Austra-
lians had warned villagers about the cruelty and inhumanity of the 
Japanese. I have not heard Kaliai mention the leaflets dropped by 
Japanese in some areas urging New Guineans to cooperate in over-
throwing the white colonial government and promising a high stan-
dard of living and a surfeit of manufactured goods (Gewertz 1983, 
13). Given what they did know of the combatants, the villagers were 
understandably wary. One informant recounted that when a Japa-
nese officer came into the village and expressed a wish to buy a large 
pig, its owner (his father) refused because the pig was already dedi-
cated to a future ceremony. The officer became insistent, though, 
and my informant advised his father to sell lest he lose more than 
just a pig. He did. 
Village men were required to work for the Japanese occupation 
forces, but they did not describe this as forced labor. As they put it, 
they were required to work on the same terms and in the same way 
as they liad previously under the Australian administration. Each 
village along the coast was required to send men to one or another 
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Japanese camp for a week at a time to act as carriers, to build sheds, 
and to load and unload cargo from barges. The men were paid no 
money, but they were provided with food and given tents in their 
own encampment. This arrangement was in effect from the time the 
Japanese came until shortly after bombing and strafing of the coastal 
installations began. The Japanese who supervised the laborers were 
solicitous of their welfare. One man who reported to work despite a 
severe boil on his leg recounted that the kempitai 'Japanese supervi-
sor' (from kempeitai 'military police') immediately instructed him not 
to work that day and sent him off for medical treatment at the aid 
post. 
When the bombing of Japanese installations began, labor supervi-
sors were careful to protect their workers. They would shout Skoki 
Amerika! 'American planes!' at the first sign of approach and send 
the villagers off to hide in ditches and foxholes. As the coastal raids 
increased in severity with the buildup to the invasion of Cape 
Gloucester fifty miles to the west, the Japanese instructed village 
laborers to build a new camp for themselves farther away from the 
work site. Most workers think that this saved their lives. Shortly 
after the move the Japanese camp and ammunition dump were de-
stroyed in a night incendiary raid that caused severe loss of life 
among the soldiers. 
The intensity of this particular raid frightened the local people 
and, coupled with leaflets dropped by Allied planes warning villag-
ers to hide in the interior, led people finally to flee the coast. The 
Kaliai people spent the rest of the period of Japanese occupation liv-
ing in temporary shelters in the interior, cooking only at night and 
eating mostly famine foods. This was the most difficult time of the 
war for them, sitting through the cold and damp of a monsoon sea-
son without even the simple friendliness of a fire for fear this would 
attract the marauding planes. When the people melted" away into the 
bush, their Japanese employers made no effort to recall them. 
After the invasion at Cape Gloucester by the U.S. Marines, and 
as the Japanese forces fell back to the east through Kaliai, relations 
changed. Although there continued to be little direct contact 
between the Japanese forces and villagers, most claimed that the 
defeated troops from Gloucester, often hungry and ill, were no 
longer respectful of villagers' pigs, gardens, or other possessions. 
People recounted the tendency of retreating troops to take food from 
gardens and to shoot pigs anytime they could find them. They said 
that houses in the villages that had survived the air attacks were also 
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destroyed. Any possessions left behind were scattered about and 
broken, and entire coconut palms were cut down so that the palm 
heart at the top could be eaten. When villagers encountered retreat-
ing Japanese troops, they were often asked to help guide the Japa-
nese across the island to what they hoped would be a secure installa-
tion on the south coast at Gasmata. In return for the villagers' help, 
or sometimes just to lighten their loads, soldiers often gave away 
weapons and other possessions. 
Americans 
Whereas interaction between villagers and Japanese was character-
ized by wariness and their relations are remembered as mostly neu-
tral, the recollections of those who worked with Americans are strik-
ingly different. The Americans seem to have been universally held 
in high regard by my informants, and their widely renowned gener-
osity is only one of their remembered characteristics. Other elements 
-apart from generosity-are also mentioned again and again. 
First, the presence of black troops among the American contin-
gent was of enormous import to the people of New Britain who came 
into contact with them (see chapter 7). The local people identified 
strongly with black servicemen on the basis of skin color and hair 
form and were apparently unaware of the segregation ofblack troops 
by unit in the American armed forces in 1944. What they did see 
astounded them: black-skinned Americans housed, clothed, and fed 
in the same way as white Americans (see chapters 9, 15, and 17). 
To understand the significance of this to New Britainers, it is nec-
essary to note that the separation preferred by Australians and other 
expatriate colonial planters, administrators, and even missionaries 
was most strongly symbolized by a denial of commensality and by 
distinctions in dress and housing. In Kaliai experience, not only had 
Islanders been excluded from eating with white people, but when 
their employers provided them with food, it was (they believed) food 
that whites themselves would not eat, such as rice and tinned beef. 
Similarly, when clothing was provided by employers it was clothing 
appropriate for "natives" to wear and never the kind of clothing 
worn by whites themselves. Those who had worked on plantations 
knew too that even the lowest-ranking white could and did com-
mand a much higher standard of housing than did any native 
worker. The war generated a confusion of these symbols of separa-
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tion; the physical segregation of black troops was less significant 
than their similarity of condition. 
Two personal anecdotes serve to illustrate how strong and perva-
sive these rules regarding commensality remained even in 1975 at 
the time of Papua New Guinea's independence, more than thirty 
years after the war. The first occurred when an Australian patrol 
officer whom we had invited to lunch while he was in the village 
holding elections for local government councillor seats declined the 
invitation when he found that we had only "native" food (rice, 
tinned beef, and local vegetables) to offer. The second incident indi-
cates how strong the rules remained in force for New Guineans. 
Returning to the village from Rabaul, I booked passage on a cargo 
barge that left port at dusk. Not until the next day, near noon, did 
one of the crew come and ask if I would be willing to eat kaikai bilong 
Kanaka 'native food', by which he meant rice and tinned fish. In 
both cases the foods offered were regarded as "native" despite the 
fact that they were store-purchased items. Their low status and 
resulting inappropriateness as consumption items for whites result 
from their having been fare for plantation workers and colonial ser-
vants. 
When New Britain men were called upon to act as carriers for the 
American forces (all my informants tell me that they were not paid 
by the Americans any more than by the Japanese, so I do not 
describe them as having been employed) they say that they, too, 
were treated like the troops they were assisting. My informants vary 
as to whether they were issued fatigue uniforms-some apparently 
were, while others were simply given cast-offs by those for whom 
they worked-but all agreed and emphasized that they ate the same 
food and were housed in the same sort of quarters as the soldiers. 
Given the conditions of war and the monsoon season that was in 
full swing during the months of the American presence, neither the 
food nor tht! shelter could have been described as luxurious, but they 
are nonetheless remembered as such, surely a rare description of C-
and K-rations, quonset huts, and pup tents. Still, the significance of 
these items lay not in what they were, but in that they were the same 
for everyone. 
Another common theme running through informants' memories 
of the war is amazement at the scale on which Americans did things. 
Americans brought, used, and abandoned things in enormous quan-
tities, a fact that has lent itself to the "cargo" interpretations of the 
war and provides the sharpest contrast between the American forces 
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and those of Japan. The Japanese (at least in the early days of the 
war) had sufficient food and other materials for themselves, but this 
food was regarded by New Britainers as similar to their own (see 
chapter 1 0) and the Japanese did not display it in quantities so great 
as to stagger the imagination. While the Japanese were not stingy 
and provided well for those who worked for them (see also Read 
1947), they are not portrayed as constant gift givers in the way that 
Americans are. 
Australians 
When Americans are described in contrast to Australians, on the 
other hand, especially ANGAU members who accompanied the 
American forces and resumed administrative control of the area 
when the Americans departed, the dimension of contrast is generos-
ity versus niggardliness. The problem, as informants recounted it, 
was not merely that Australians had and gave less, but that they 
actively discouraged or forbade the generosity of the Americans. As 
Two children at ANGAU refugee camp, Sipilangan, New Britain, 27 July 
1945. Six hundred refugees from the northern coast of the Gazelle Penin-
sula were housed in this camp. (Australian War Memorial) 
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ANGAU refugee camp staff, Sipilangan, New Britain, 27 July 1945. (Aus-
tralian War Memorial) 
informant after informant put it: "If an American was going to give 
something to me, he had to look around and make sure that none of 
the ANGAU were present. If an ANGAU saw an American give one 
of us something, then he would come and take it away." 
The same theme emerges in story after story of the departure of 
the American forces. The Americans are remembered by many-
indeed most-as having taken almost nothing with them. Jeeps, 
armored personnel carriers, tanks, food, shelters-nearly every-
thing was left behind. Some of this is demonstrably true. The tanks 
and personnel carriers still lining the road near the Gloucester air-
strip give mute testimony to the claim. Even weaponry was some-
times abandoned, as attested to by the discovery in 1971 of case after 
case of live American hand grenades near the old camp at Iboki 
plantation. The theme of generosity versus stinginess appears when 
informants assert that it was the intent of the Americans that these 
weapons, food, vehicles, quonsets, and the like were to be left for the 
villagers. Stories vary from informant to informant as to whether 
ANGAU officers forced the Americans to bury all the good things 
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and leave only the broken ones, or whether the Americans simply 
left the things and ANGAU came along behind confiscating every-
thing and burying it in great pits. 
When informants discuss the war, Americans come off as good, 
while Australians are said to have actively undone the things that the 
Americans tried to accomplish through generosity and brotherhood 
(a story that parallels Solomon Islanders' talk about American sol-
diers and British colonial officers-see chapter 15). The Japanese, 
except in the memories of those few who were actively involved in 
conflict with them, emerge as more to be pitied than censured. 
Poorly equipped and supplied, resident for but a brief time, they 
retreated from the Americans sick and in disarray, sometimes de-
stroying things in their way, but also giving away their goods and 
weapons. The impact of the Japanese on the consciousness of the 
Kaliai people was slight. The worst things that are said about them 
are stories of barbarous practice in Rabaul filtered through many 
tellings but witnessed by none of my informants. 
Conclusion: The Present 
If focus on the war and its immediate aftermath shows Australian 
administrators in such poor light, what happens if the focus is shifted 
to the present when, like the Americans at the end of the New Brit-
ain campaign, the Australians have departed, yielding up their 
power to a different regime? This time, of course, the new adminis-
trators are New Guineans. 
I have been startled to hear the same people who bitterly recalled 
Australians robbing villagers of Americans' largesse shake their 
heads at the venality and incompetence of officials of the current 
government and contrast New Guineans' inefficiency and lack of 
care with the good government and well-ordered society they had 
under Australian rule. I do not propose to examine the truth or fal-
sity of the allegations made against current officialdom. The experi-
ence that I have had in dealing with officials of Papua New Guinea 
since its independence in 1975 suggests that most are, like govern-
ment officials everywhere, quite variable in skill, competence, and 
devotion to work. That is not at issue here. What is significant in my 
view is the rehabilitation of former Australian administrators in the 
minds of those who criticized them so strongly when they were in 
power. 
A number of interpretations could be read from these stories. 
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Zelenietz and Saito (chapter 7) called our attention to the fact that 
the identity of the person to whom a story is told affects the story's 
shape and content. The material in this chapter lends itself to 
another interpretation. While this might result from my lack of 
opportunity to compare Kaliai stories told to me with stories told to 
a Japanese ethnographer, I do not think that is all that is at issue. A 
final anecdote will make the point. 
One of my informants in the early years of my research told me a 
story of a debate held by the senior men of Kandoka. When the first 
marine patrol reached Kandoka in the wake of the retreating Japa-
nese garrison from Borgen Bay, one of the first questions asked was 
whether there were any Japanese in the area. The men of the village 
knew that there was a small group of Japanese hiding in the bush a 
mile or two in from the beach, because they had been giving them 
food. But they also knew that the Japanese were sick, hungry, and 
without weapons and that they wanted only to make their way across 
the island to Gasmata. After a short debate among themselves, the 
men decided that the Japanese were harmless and that to expose 
them would lead to their needless death. So they denied any knowl-
edge of Japanese in the area and sent a youth to warn the Japanese 
that Americans had come. The next day the Japanese were gone. I 
do not think that I would have been told this story if all that was at 
issue was my identity as an American. 
It may be that the material in this chapter indicates only that 
whatever government is in power makes mistakes and has to make 
difficult decisions and that, therefore, former authorities, whose 
mistakes, inefficiencies, and unpopular actions have faded into the 
past, are seen in a softer, more favorable light. Thus, the Australian 
administration is now lauded by its former critics for the very behav-
iors that were formerly resented bitterly: the fact that patrol officers 
patrolled, that they paid regular visits to villages, that they enforced 
health regulations, that they maintained order in the towns, that 
they forbade easy access to alcohol. Back then, it is said, there were 
no "rascals" making the roads unsafe, and money bought more 
than it now does (though there was less of it). In particular, the Aus-
tralian administrators are remembered for having demanded and 
deserved the respect of those whom they governed. But the "re-
spect" that was demanded by patrol officers and other Australians 
took precisely the form of maintenance of social distance. Social dis-
tance was enforced and villagers were continuously reminded of it 
by the ubiquitous symbols of separation. Australians dressed, ate, 
and lived differently from the villagers and made clear to the people 
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that the way they ate, dressed, and lived was not only different but 
better than what was available to or permitted the local people. 
In stories of the American occupation, it is precisely the absence of 
these symbols that is remembered and stressed in images of the 
Americans as ideal persons. Yet a New Guinean official who dis-
penses with the trappings of social distance becomes the object of 
contempt. When a member of Parliament, coming ashore in a canoe 
on a visit to one of the villages in his constituency, removed his shoes 
and socks, rolled up his trouser legs, and waded ashore rather than 
waiting to be carried (as would a "proper" patrol officer in similar 
circumstances), the local people on the beach were heard to mutter, 
bus kanaka, tasol 'Just ajungle savage'! 
It would be interesting to know how the Americans were regarded 
while they were in Kaliai. There seems to me no doubt that they 
were generous without intention because the things they gave had 
little value for them. I have no doubt, either, that Americans violat-
ed Australian symbols of separation more in ignorance than intent 
(although there is evidence elsewhere that American troops deliber-
ately derided British colonial pretensions). But the greatest Ameri-
can advantage was the brevity of their stay and their lack of political 
responsibility over Islanders. The influence that the American inter-
lude has had on Kaliai perceptions is, it seems to me, ironically 
related to the fact that they were there for so brief a time. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Soldiers and Spirits: 
The Impact of World War II 
on a Coral Sea Island 
MARIA LEPOWSKY 
BEFORE the Japanese invasion of New Guinea in 1942, Sudest 
Island in the Louisiade Archipelago, known as Vanatinai to its 
inhabitants, was one of the most remote outposts of the Australian 
Territory of Papua. With the advent of the war, the people ofVanati-
nai and their neighbors were swept up in events that deeply affected 
the entire region. But these events produced differing responses 
among two neighboring groups of Islanders. Both responses ex-
plained the current social upheavals and the presence of new politi-
cal forces in terms of relations with ancestor spirits, but differed in 
other respects. A violent anticolonial and antiwhite cargo cult found 
adherents among Saisai and Misima peoples to the northwest of 
Vanatinai, but was rejected by Vanatinai Islanders, who saw them-
selves as allied with the absent whites against their Saisai traditional 
enemies. In this chapter, I explore the social, cultural, and historical 
bases for these different responses to the extraordinary events of 
World War II. 
In May 1942, the island and the adjacent Coral and Solomon seas 
suddenly became the arena of a massive air and naval battle between 
the Allies and the Japanese. This Battle of the Coral Sea stemmed 
the southward advance of the Japanese in the Pacific and forestalled 
the invasion of Port Moresby and northeast Australia. In the 
Louisiade Archipelago, a panicky withdrawal of almost all whites 
and colonial government officers led to outbreaks of raiding among 
traditional enemy groups as well as the cargo cult with protonation-
alist overtones. 
Forcible conscription of young men to labor for the Allies at Milne 
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Bay on the mainland of Papua offered an unprecedented opportu-
nity for Vanatinai people to learn about the outside world and 
encounter a variety of "Europeans," particularly Americans, whose 
perceived behavior contrasted strikingly with that of prewar Austra-
lian resident planters, traders, and government officers. Using tra-
ditional mythology to explain their new and unprecedented experi-
ences, Islanders concluded that the spirits of their own dead turn 
white and go to America. During this time, military administrators 
established tight control over island affairs, moving settlements, 
ordering changes in subsistence, and dispensing justice on the spot. 
These wartime government edicts were never rescinded, and island 
life has been permanently altered ever since. The postwar years 
brought continuing interventions into island life by colonial and 
later national government officers. 
Vanatinai and Its Neighbors 
Vanatinai, labeled Sudest or Tagula on maps and charts, is the larg-
est island of the Louisiade Archipelago, the chain of islands that sep-
arates the Solomon Sea from the Coral Sea. It is 50 miles long and 8 
to 15 miles wide. A central mountain range rises to 2645 feet at Mt. 
Rio, said to be the home of the creator spirit, Rod yo, and the spirits 
of the dead. Vanatinai and adjacent islands are encircled by one of 
the world's largest lagoons. Numerous uncharted coral patches and 
shallow waters make the region dangerous for shipping, contribut-
ing to the island's lack of integration into the world economy. 
The Islanders, however, participate in elaborate systems of 
interisland exchange offoodstuffs, local goods, and ceremonial valu-
ables such as shell-disc necklaces and greenstone axe-blades. These 
goods are taken by sailing canoe throughout the Louisiade Archipel-
ago and as far as Ware Island, 175 miles to the northwest. The 
Louisiade exchange networks are linked with those of the kula 
exchange network to the north and west and with trading systems of 
the south Papuan coast (see Lepowsky 1983). 
The small, drought-prone, infertile islands of the east Calvados 
Chain begin just a few miles to the northwest of Vanatinai. Known 
locally as Saisai, they are inhabited by about twelve hundred people 
who are ethnically and linguistically distinct from the people of 
Vanatinai. Just as the larger island ofVanatinai in precolonial times 
comprised numerous districts whose relations with one another 
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shifted from enmity to uneasy alliance, the Saisai area was not politi-
cally unified. While the people of Wanim (Grass Island) were tradi-
tionally allied with the southwestern portion ofVanatinai, the people 
of Sahara Island often raided Vanatinai, carrying off yams, pigs, 
and people. 
Farther to the northwest, in the west Calvados Islands, is the 
beginning of the Misima language area, which also includes the 
islands of Panaeati Lagoon, Kimuta, and Misima itself. The west 
Calvados Islands, like the east Calvados, are marginal for cultiva-
tion. Their inhabitants rely on trading smoked fish and shellfish, 
clay cooking pots, and outrigger sailing canoes to the more fertile 
and larger islands of Misima and Vanatinai. Some of these people, 
particularly those of the pottery-exporting island ofUtian (Brooker), 
were famous on Vanatinai, not only as traders who sought sago 
starch and yams in exchange for their clay pots, but as persistent 
raiders and headhunters who plundered Vanatinai when fragile 
trade alliances broke down. It was primarily the inhabitants of the 
east and west Calvados Islands who joined the wartime insurrection 
against colonial authorities described in this chapter. 1 
On Vanatinai, as well as the neighboring islands of the Louisiade 
Archipelago, ancestor spirits are believed to be the source of all good 
fortune and prosperity, and their descendants maintain relationships 
with them through an elaborate series of mortuary rituals. Good 
health, fruitful gardens, and success in trade (and formerly warfare) 
are only obtained through their blessings, secured by the appropri-
ate ritual or magic and through observance of relevant taboos. 
These traditional beliefs in ancestral power were extended to explain 
and organize responses to new sorts of people and new situations 
encountered during World War II. 
Relations with Europeans 
The first recorded Western contact on Vanatinai was with the visit in 
1849 of HMS Rattlesnake during its voyage to survey the approaches 
of the Torres Strait (Macgillivray 1852; Huxley 1935). The charts 
produced on this occasion were used by the Allies during World War 
II. Secretive traders and whalers probably bartered with Louisiade 
peoples in the early 1830s or before (see jacobs 1844, 250-251 for an 
account of contact in 1834 with Louisiade peoples, probably in the 
Calvados Chain). A brief gold rush on the island in 1888 triggered 
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the formal annexation of all of British New Guinea, but no 
motherlode was discovered. Many miners moved onto Misima 
Island, soon to be a government and mission center for the region, 
where they operated gold mines with contract labor until World War 
II. A few miners remained on Vanatinai to open trade stores or work 
small coconut plantations. The Islanders brought gold dust, copal 
gum, and pearlshell to exchange for small quantities of tobacco, rice, 
cotton cloth, and steel tools. 
There were no missions on the island until 194 7, in contrast to the 
Misima-Panaeati region, where the Australian Methodist Mission-
ary Society had British and Tongan workers from 1891. Neverthe-
less, rephrased and reinterpreted versions of Christian prophecies of 
the second coming and the resurrection of the dead must have trav-
eled through the Louisiade Archipelago, carried by trading partners 
along with ceremonial valuables, sailing canoes, clay pots, dance 
styles, and other myths that are identified by Islanders as recent 
imports from the northwest. As elsewhere in Melanesia, Christian 
teaching about the imminent return of spirits of the dead was con-
gruent with traditional beliefs about the power of ancestor spirits 
and the efficacy of spirits in daily and ceremonial life. The social 
changes resulting from the new political dominance of the colonial 
government and the economic power of the archipelago's handful of 
white residents may have lent credence to predictions of the arrival 
of spirits of the dead. 
Government officers rarely visited Vanatinai. After 1906, when 
the region became the Australian Territory of Papua, government 
patrols visited Vanatinai in 1911, 1912, 1925, and 1934. Prewar 
colonial officers collected the hated head tax, held court, and sen-
tenced men guilty of sorcery, adultery, and nonpayment of taxes to 
imprisonment and hard labor on Misima Island (Territory of Papua 
1911, 1912, 1925, 1934). Military officers of the Australian New 
Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU) took over from the civilian 
colonial government in February 1942, following the japanese inva-
sion of Rabaul, but Vanatinai was not visited until February 1943. 
The British and Australian colonial authorities were under the 
impression that the Louisiade Archipelago had been pacified in 
1888. However, while the frequency of raids by warriors of small 
and infertile Utian, Sahara (Sabarl), and the Engineer Group near 
the Papuan mainland had lessened, attacks on the food-rich island of 
Vanatinai had not ceased. Until about 1910, the people of Kwa-
raiwa, near Tubetube in the Engineer Group, sailed to Vanatinai 
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every year after the yam harvest to trade in some hamlets and to raid 
others, making off with yams, pigs, women, and children. Vanatinai 
people say the last raid (by Sahara people) took place in the 1920s. 
Nevertheless, the decades before World War II are remembered as a 
relatively peaceful time when elaborate interisland trading expedi-
tions and lavish months-long mortuary feasts took place without 
government interference. 
Even today very few people leave the island to work on coastal 
vessels, plantations, or in towns or to go to school. Even fewer left 
the region in the prewar years, in contrast to people of the D'Entre-
casteaux Archipelago (Young 1983a; chapter 10). Prewar contact 
with whites was limited to interactions with the few resident plant-
ers, traders, or the rare government officer. 
World War Comes to the Louisiade Archipelago 
Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the 
Japanese advanced rapidly in southeast Asia and the southwest 
Pacific. The British colony of Malaya fell at the end of January, and 
Singapore was captured on 15 February 1942 (Bateson 1968, 111-
115). On 21 January 1942, an invasion force, which had steamed 
south from Truk in the central Caroline Islands, overwhelmed the 
small Australian garrison at Rabaul. The Australians, who until just 
prior to the war had been selling their scrap metal to the Japanese, 
were stunned, furious, and frightened of an imminent invasion of 
their own east coast. It seemed likely that Port Moresby would fall 
next to the Japanese and then be used as a springboard for the 
bombing and invasion of Australia itself (Milner 195 7; Johnston 
1943). 
By February, all white civilians, including govern"ment officers, 
were ordered to evacuate the territories (at the same time as white 
residents were evacuating the Solomons; see chapter 14). The rule of 
law broke down in Port Moresby itself, where undisciplined Austra-
lian troops looted stores and homes. Other notorious examples of the 
collapse of civil order occurred at Misima Island and at Samarai, 
burned to the ground in a "premature scorched earth policy" (Inglis 
1969, 511-512). 
A 1945 patrol report reconstructed the Misima situation: 
During January 1942 a mysterious radio was received at this station 
[Misima] to evacuate everyone because attack was imminent. [The 
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source of this message was never traced, and it may well have been 
sent from Rabaul by the Japanese]. The Europeans naturally obeyed 
orders including the representatives of law and order but left behind 
three white men of poor repute and over a thousand foreign natives 
who had been indentured [mostly Northern District and D'Entrecas-
teaux Islanders who were on contract as laborers in the gold mines]. 
The general uproar that followed may well be imagined. The Whites 
on one side, the foreign natives on the other engendered the usual spe-
cies of Vailala Madness amongst the locals. Money in safes as well as 
gold and other loot provided incentives. I hesitate to criticise many of 
the subsequent actions of the white man as I am not in full possession 
of the facts. Certain it is that for a lengthy period of time there was as 
much Justice extant as was promulgated by a medieval Grand Duke 
of Russia. (Territory of Papua 1945-1946) 
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There was no civilian or military colonial administration in the 
Louisiade Archipelago for a further ten months. The disorderly 
retreat of almost all the whites from Misima combined with the 
accompanying looting and violence to leave an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty about the future. Just after the white retreat there arose a mil-
lenarian prophecy that ancestor spirits would return if all whites and 
mixed-race people were killed. In compliance with this prophecy, 
Australian Lieutenant Mader and a party of police were murdered 
soon after arriving in the islands in November 1942 to establish a 
military colonial administration. 
The postwar patrol report continued, 
One of the Europeans got out and went to live on Motorina [site of 
Mader's murder], here also his actions did not endear him to the indi-
gene. It was not until November '42 that an Officer was sent to take 
over the Station area. As the natives of these islands have been 
schooled in treachery by the Caucasian for the past couple of years his 
fate was sealed when he was selected to come to Misima, just as would 
anyone else's fate after such a period of incompetence and lawlessness. 
(Territory of Papua 1945-1946) 
Immediately after the hasty departure of all but three whites from 
Misima two days after the fall of Rabaul, a man named Buriga 
(sometimes spelled Buliga or Bulega) from Siagara village on the 
northeast coast of Misima, adjacent to the principal gold-mining 
area, proclaimed that he had received a message from the ancestor 
spirits. He prophesied that if the Islanders killed all white and 
mixed-race people, the spirits would return to the islands with a ship 
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full of the European cargo that whites had diverted from Islanders 
by trickery. 2 Buriga found few adherents at Misima and later moved 
to the west Calvados island ofMotorina. 
The patrol officer's comparison of the situation at Misima with 
the "Vailala Madness" of the Gulf District of Papua in 1919 was 
apt. This earlier, famous outbreak of cargo-cult beliefs predicted the 
coming of a European ship with the ancestor spirits on board as well 
as an abundance of European "cargo," or material possessions such 
as rifles, flour, rice, and tobacco (Williams 1923; Worsley 1968). 
Many of the Vailala movement's most enthusiastic adherents were 
men who had worked in the Lakekamu goldfields (Worsley 1968). It 
is possible that some of the "foreign natives" who worked at Misima 
brought cargo beliefs with them. 3 Another Vailala theme that was to 
reappear in the Misima District was, as Williams said, "vague ideas 
of Papua for the Papuans" (1923, 15). The departure of government 
officers, mission personnel, and traders from Misima showed clearly 
the limits and impermanence of white rule. 
In early May the Japanese established a forward seaplane base in 
Panaeati Lagoon (Deboyne Lagoon), thirty miles to the west of Mi-
sima. Their military strategy was to advance from Rabaul south, 
passing west ofMisima and Vanatinai to head for Jomard Passage, a 
rare break in the barrier reef to the southwest of Vanatinai. Turning 
to the west, they could move along the Papuan coast and invade Port 
Moresby. Both Japanese and Americans sent reconnaissance planes 
over the Louisiade Archipelago. 4 
The Islanders were afraid of the mysterious patrolling planes and 
boats, which they referred to as "spirit boats" and "spirit planes" 
(as they today label unidentified and unexplained high-flying planes 
or boats spotted on the horizon in the hazy distance outside the bar-
rier reef). Spirit boats and spirit planes are also described as the 
vehicles of the region's notorious flying witches (waaawada). These 
witches WQuld traditionally use a crocodile as a kind of supernatural 
amphibious attack vehicle. Similar flying witch beliefs are found in 
the Trobriand and D'Entrecasteaux islands (Malinowski 1922; For-
tune 1963). 
Between 4 and 8 May 1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea was fought 
in the Louisiade Archipelago's skies and waters. It has been 
described as "the first naval battle in history in which the opposing 
ships never came within sight of one another" (Bateson 1968, 163). 
The people ofVanatinai and Rossel apparently had no direct contact 
with the two belligerent forces but witnessed their awesome firepow-
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er. Aircraft from American carriers bombed and sank the Japanese 
carrier Shoho as it lay with its support vessels between Misima and 
Panaeati, an attack that was spectacularly and frighteningly visible 
from both islands. The following day, Japanese planes bombed and 
sank the American carrier Lexington to the south ofVanatinai. Attack 
planes in both cases would have flown directly over the island. One 
unidentified wrecked fighter plane lies inland from the hamlet of 
Buyawe on the southeast coast of Vanatinai. Similarly, a Japanese 
submarine is still eerily visible on the reef near the northeastern tip 
of Rossel Island. 
ANGAU 
The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit was organized in 
April 1942 to take over the functions of the colonial government and 
to organize "native" labor and the production of strategic tropical 
commodities (Ryan 1969). One ANGAU officer, hastily promoted 
from clerical work at Port Moresby to sole representative of the mili-
tary government in the Trobriand Islands, recalled that he was "to 
keep crude law and order ... sen[ d] back reports of any move-
ments of troops or natives . . . and encourage the natives that the 
Allies had not abandoned Papua" (Saville 1974, 20). 
In the Misima District (which included the entire Louisiade 
Archipelago), the first ANGAU officer, Lieutenant Mader, accom-
panied by Papuan police, arrived at the government station at Bwa-
gaoia in November 1942. Hearing about the cultist prophecies of 
Buriga, Lieutenant Mader and his party traveled by boat to arrest 
him at Motorina Island in the western Calvados. Just as the govern-
ment boat was anchoring in the shallows off Motorina, Lieutenant 
Mader was stabbed in the back. George Burfitt, a plantation owner 
who was the son of an English gold miner and a Vanatinai woman, 
was also murdered, as were six Papuan members of the ANGAU 
party, including two policemen. 5 
ANGAU Lieutenant Sidney Smith, sent to investigate the murder 
of Lieutenant Mader and his party, reported that "a man named 
Kaiwata of Mamanila [a village of Panawina Island in the eastern 
Calvados, quite close to George Burfitt's plantation on the same 
island] is known to have assisted in the murder of Lt. Mader and his 
party on Motorina. I heard that when he returned to his village he 
boasted of his deeds and hoisted a flag made out of scraps of calico, 
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saying that the Government had now been killed and they would fly 
their own flag" (ANGAU 1943a). The uprising inspired by Buriga 
had a clear anticolonial theme: from now on the oppressive white 
government is no more, and the Islanders are in charge of their own 
affairs. The nationalistic tone of many Melanesian movements was 
pointed out almost forty years ago by Guiart ( 1951). 6 
Lieutenant Mader and his entourage were murdered with tradi-
tional blackpalm spears and war clubs by a group of men from as far 
away as Misima and the Misima-speaking islands of Motorina and 
Bagaman and the Saisai-speaking islands of Sahara, Kuanak, Pana-
wina, and Nigaho in the eastern Calvados. All of these islands are 
small and infertile, with food supplies insufficient for their popula-
tions, a situation traditionally remedied through interisland trading 
and raiding. These Islanders collectively had in earlier times 
attacked Vanatinai regularly. The people of the Calvados Chain had 
had fewer opportunities to obtain Western goods than the people of 
either Vanatinai or Misima, where gold could be worked and copal 
gum collected and bartered to the resident white traders. 7 
Shortly after the Motorina murders, an old, mixed-race Filipino 
trader and his Vanatinai crewman were murdered off Panawina, in 
accordance with Buriga's decree that mixed-race individuals, who 
tended to be traders or planters on a small scale, must be killed too. 
Another Vanatinai man was killed at Wanim while attending a feast, 
and his body was thrown into the deep sea. Eyewitnesses to this 
murder told me that the man was accused of killing an erstwhile 
trading partner with sorcery because he felt he was owed a debt of 
ceremonial valuables. 
As ANGAU Lieutenant Sidney Smith wrote in April1943: 
After these latest murders it seems quite definite that every native in 
the Calvados Chain, from Motorina Island in the west to Nimoa in 
the east., had decided that Governme~t control had more or less ceased 
to exist and they could return to their old fashions and kill with impu-
nity .... It is hard to say how far the influence of Buriga the "false 
prophet" extended. It had even reached Sudest by one of his disciples 
but had gained no hold there and this may be the reason why the 
Nigahau, Sabari, Panawina andjoannet people had decided to attack 
Sudest. The Sudest natives certainly believed they were going to be 
attacked for they deserted their villages and had been living in the 
bush for two or three months before I visited the island. (ANGAU 
1943a) 
Soldiers and Spirits on Vanatinai 
The people ofVanatinai recall the period following the withdrawal 
of whites from the region and the various murders in the Calvados 
Chain as a time of terror and flight from their homes to the high, 
defensible ridges of the central mountain range. They used to build 
their hamlets there in precolonial times for protection from raids on 
their coast. They refer to the period following the murders as a time 
of gaizi 'fighting' or 'warfare'. They were not concerned with the 
Allied-Japanese war, which no one had bothered to explain to them, 
but with the resumption of traditional forms of interethnic raiding 
and enmity among the peoples of the Louisiades. Davenport (chap-
ter 11) has described similar concerns in Santa Cruz in the Solomon 
Islands. Another murder that took place during this period also had 
"revolutionary" or anticolonial overtones. ANGAU put out orders 
for young men to "volunteer" to labor for the Allies at the new base 
at Milne Bay. The first person to convey this message was a police-
man from the village of Hebwaun (Bwailahine) on the island of 
Panatinani (Joannet), just northwest of Vanatinai. Eyewitnesses 
told me that when he returned to his home village to deliver this 
message, some men said, "Why should we go and die for the lumo-
lumo [Europeans]?" The police officer was speared and fell dead on 
the beach. The motive for this murder was apparently never dis-
cerned by ANGAU authorities, who were at the time chasing the 
scores of men implicated in the Motorina murders from island to 
island in the Calvados Chain. 
Eventually, 151 men were arrested for the various murders, 
including Buriga himself. Nine ringleaders were sentenced to death 
by public hanging, which all available residents of Misima Island, 
from old people to small children, were forced to witness. Buriga 
hanged himself in his cell the night before (or possibly was hanged 
by his cell-mates; see Macintyre 1987, 9). Eight other men were exe-
cuted in front of a horrified populace, most of whom had rejected 
Buriga's prophecy from the beginning. One man, who had been a 
small child at the time, told me of how he too had been forced to 
watch and how his nightmares about this episode have continued for 
decades. The first civilian patrol officer to return to Misima after the 
war criticized ANGAU officers for their arbitrary dispensations of 
justice and for forcing "hundreds of natives" to witness this "multi-
ple execution" (Territory of Papua 1945-1946). A large percentage 
of the adult men of the Calvados Islands spent time in jail for their 
involvement in the murders or for other cult activity. 
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Because their loyalty was suspect or they were already in jail, 
Calvados men were not subject to the same forcible recruitment by 
ANGAU officers to labor for the Allies at Milne Bay. By March 1943 
a visiting ANGAU officer on the north coast of Vanatinai observed: 
"I did not see many young men. Apparently the island ofSudest has 
been recruited pretty thoroughly" (ANGAU 1943b, 21 March). 
About seven hundred men from the islands of Vanatinai and Misi-
ma were sent to Milne Bay. 
ANGAU officers in 1943 administered the islands as they believed 
appropriate. "Native court" was convened on the spot when neces-
sary. On the same visit, the ANGAU officer noted that he sentenced 
one sorcerer to six months of hard labor at Misima: "This native 
said he did not give two pins for the Government and that he would 
kill anyone by sorcery if he so wished. Apparently thought he had 
seen the last of the Government in this district" (ANGAU 1943b). 
It is likely that Islanders on Vanatinai were also contemptuous of 
colonial power in an area that had last been "patrolled" by govern-
ment officers in 1934. Yet despite the presence of resentment against 
whites and a lack of respect for the power of government, the people 
of Vanatinai did not join Buriga's antiwhite uprising. Its main 
adherents included many of their traditional enemies from the east-
ern Calvados, who had threatened to attack them and had already 
murdered a Vanatinai man at an east Calvados feast. Furthermore, 
Vanatinai people saw whites as trading partners from whom they 
could obtain European goods in exchange for gold dust and as politi-
cal allies whose presence in prewar days forestalled the possibility of 
attack on their settlements and gardens by raiders from the eastern 
Calvados. 
To regain control over a truculent population, ANGAU officers 
issued new orders commanding that people build new, nucleated vil-
lages at designated sites along the coast, where they could be more 
easily su.bjected to government control. This order has never been 
rescinded, and the present coastal villages of Vanatinai remain as its 
result. 8 
A white government officer took up residence on Vanatinai for 
some months in 1943 to organize the production and transportation 
of copal gum, taken from trees in the forest for use as varnish on 
naval vessels. In july 1943, Lieutenant Sidney Smith reported that 
he had secured 15 tons of gum in two weeks. He traded with the 
Islanders at the rate of one stick of trade tobacco for six pounds of 
gum. He noted that women and children did most of the collecting 
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and that the older men (the young ones were in Milne Bay) collected 
the tobacco. He recorded the "propaganda" he gave to the Island-
ers: the gum was "used to make paint for Battleships and the Battle-
ships are used to fight the japanese, therefore no gum, no paint, and 
no Battleship" (ANGAU 1943c). 
Another ANGAU officer concluded that the Islanders were insuf-
ficiently involved in gardening and relied too heavily on a diet of 
sago and fish. He attributed part of their reluctance to garden to the 
precolonial period of interisland hostilities and fear of raids: the 
smoke from clearing gardens could have been seen by enemies. The 
officer therefore ordered Vanatinai people to increase the area of 
their gardens, in which they grew yams, sweet potatoes, and bana-
nas. He referred to "much fertile land ... now being put under 
cultivation." He was quite pleased with their larger harvest and 
wrote of how people of different areas presented him with a total of 
three pigs in gratitude for his gardening "advice" (ANGAU 1944). 
ANGAU orders to grow more food in gardens have permanently 
changed local subsistence and dietary patterns. 9 This dietary shift 
may have had a deleterious effect on the nutritional status of island 
children and adults (see Lepowsky 1985). 
The absence for several years of hundreds of young and able-bod-
ied men from Vanatinai who were conscripted by ANGAU and sent 
to labor for the Allied war effort on the mainland increased the 
workload of island women. Along with elderly men, they were now 
responsible for gardening, collecting wild vegetable foods, making 
sago, fishing and collecting shellfish, hunting small game, and col-
lecting the copal gum demanded for the war effort by ANGAU. 
Male absence strengthened the position of island women in decision-
making and community affairs (see chapter 12). Women's eco-
nomic, political, and ritual authority was also traditionally high in 
prewar island culture (see Lepowsky n.d.a). 10 
Milne Bay and the Americans 
The young men who were sent to Milne Bay, a strategic tropical 
fjord at the southeastern tip of mainland Papua where the Allies con-
structed a major naval and air base, recall their initial fear of dying 
in someone else's war. They arrived after the July 1942 Battle of 
Milne Bay, at which a Japanese naval advance on the Allied airstrip 
was repulsed (Milner 1957). Their jobs were to construct a new 
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wharf at the old Lever Brothers coconut plantation at Giligili, to 
improve the airstrip, and to unload ships. The Australians and the 
Americans continued to use Milne Bay as a staging area from which 
to launch attacks on the Japanese strongholds at Bun a and Gona. A 
huge number of Allied troops passed through Milne Bay, along with 
enormous quantities of war materiel. 
The men from Vanatinai and nearby islands who traveled to 
Milne Bay to labor for the Allies returned after the war with amaz-
ing stories to tell their kin. They reported that American soldiers 
contrasted sharply with Australians in being friendly and regularly 
giving them gifts of food, clothing, tobacco, and money. They were 
amazed to find black Americans who dressed like and worked with 
whites. And they were deeply impressed to see that the black and the 
white American soldiers sat down and ate together. Sharing food is a 
potent symbol of friendship and trust on Vanatinai (as it is in many 
Pacific cultures; see chapter 15). Most prewar Australian residents 
never ate with Papuans (see Nelson 1982). Segregation was still offi-
cial policy in the U.S. Army until1953, but I have heard similar sto-
ries of blacks and whites eating together from other sources (see 
chapter 8). 
People of Vanatinai concluded, and continue to believe, that the 
spirits of their own dead not only travel to Mt. Rio, the highest 
mountain on the island and the traditional home of the dead, but 
turn white and go to America. The color white is traditionally asso-
ciated with corpses and spirits. The corollary of this belief resembles 
Buriga's prophecy without the homicidal theme, as well as many 
other Melanesian cargo beliefs: one day the spirits of the dead will 
sail home from America bringing with them the material possessions 
that Americans possess in such great abundance to give to their 
descendants on Vanatinai. The generosity and wealth of American 
soldiers led Islanders to believe that these white, and black, people 
must be .their kin, because their behavior was in marked contrast to 
that of prewar Australian residents and ANGAU personnel. 
Myths that explain the origins of European material possessions 
are told in many parts of New Guinea from Dobu to Biak (Fortune 
1932, 136; Worsley 1968, 126-130). The Biak story includes what 
Michael Young (1983a, 1983c), using material from Goodenough 
and adjacent islands, called "the theme of the resentful hero." This 
motif features a mythological being who is treated badly and leaves a 
locale, taking with him valuable goods. A similar myth on Vanatinai 
tells of a female snake spirit who produces the first shell currency 
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from her excrement but is chased away to Rosse! Island by foolish 
young men (Lepowsky 1983). 
More relevant to the belief that the spirits of the dead turn white 
and go to America is the Vanatinai myth of Alagh (sometimes called 
Ghalagh), a supernatural being who lived at the summit ofMt. Rio, 
home of the ancestor spirits, with his two wives. Alagh was a carpen-
ter who disturbed the sleep ofRodyo, "owner" of the mountain and 
of the dead, with his constant hammering and sawing. Rodyo sent 
Alagh away. Alagh took with him one of his wives, Egogona, and his 
assistant, Kilimboa, and sailed away on his European-style boat, 
Buliliti, headed for the "land of Europeans" (sometimes identified as 
Sydney or England). He also took with him all the noisy implements 
that had offended Rodyo, including engines, hammers, nails, saws, 
chickens, cattle, and gold (formerly mined with machinery on 
Vanatinai). This is the local explanation for Europeans being 
wealthy and Papuans having only shell valuables. It seems likely, fol-
lowing the wartime contact with Americans, that Islanders con-
cluded that Alagh and the other ancestor spirits had headed for 
America, clearly the home of the most abundant and valuable cargo 
ever seen in Papua. 11 
The Vanatinai myth of the banishing of Alagh and his noisy Euro-
pean cargo, with its corollary hope that one day he will come sailing 
back to the island with all the European goods that rightfully and 
originally belonged on Vanatinai, shares key elements with the 
mythological "charter" of Buriga, the Misima cult prophet, as 
recounted by Macintyre (1987, 5-7). In the Misima version, a pow-
erful leader leaves Misima for Mt. Rio, where he becomes known as 
Kimbauwa, recognizably the same figure as Alagh's "assistant" 
Kilimboa in the Vanatinai myth. Kimbauwa creates Papuan wealth, 
then leaves for the land of whites, where he becomes known as 
Jehova and creates European wealth. Someday he will return home 
with this wealth, and cultists attempt to lure him back by their prac-
tices, as Macintyre has detailed. 
It is likely that parts of Buriga's prophetic myth were grafted onto 
preexisting Vanatinai mythological sequences, so that Kilimboa 
becomes the subordinate of Alagh, a traditional supernatural figure 
(see Lepowsky 1981, 42-43). It is not clear whether the Vanatinai 
mythological motif of Alagh's departure with European goods pre-
dated the period of Buriga's prophecies in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, and perhaps even inspired them, or whether it arose concur-
rently with or after the Misima cargo myth. In any case, the story 
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remains one of the most frequently told myths on Vanatinai today. 
The Islanders make no overt efforts to attract Alagh and his cargo 
back home. But the myth, with its cargoistic explanatory theme, val-
idates the theory that the spirits of the dead turn white and go to 
America and explains the behavior of American soldiers encoun-
tered during World War II as well as that of the resident American 
anthropologist (see below). 
Some officially reported versions of Buriga's prophecies state that 
he proclaimed that the Islanders would turn white (cf. Nelson 1976, 
46-48; Macintyre 1987, 6). Buriga's movement took place before 
any direct contact with Americans, although the huge ships of both 
Americans and Japanese were observed from the Louisiade Archi-
pelago. The "Americanist" theme of many postwar Melanesian 
cargo cults has often been noted (Guiart 1951, 1952; Worsley 1968; 
chapter 17). Other contributors to this volume have recorded discus-
sions about the relative virtue, friendliness, and generosity of the 
Americans versus prewar colonialists and, particularly, the Austra-
lian ANGAU officers (e.g., chapters 8 and 15). 
Many ANGAU officers were concerned with maintaining proper 
hierarchical relations and social distance between colonials and 
"natives" and with limiting pay scales so as not to inflate postwar 
expectations. Nonfraternization rules were promulgated to keep 
indigenous laborers away from Allied troops (Ryan 1969)_12 Read 
(1947) noted that in the Markham Valley the local people distin-
guished between the colonial authorities and the friendlier Austra-
lian and American soldiers (cf. Worsley 1968, 125-126). An Austra-
lian veteran of the Papuan campaign recalled that at base camps the 
Australian troops invited Papuan conscripted laborers to "share our 
food. This was, quite frankly, frowned upon by the local popula-
tion .... They were quite disgusted, and I believe they made pro-
tests" (Nelson 1982, 172-173). These accounts suggest that both 
Australiap and American soldiers behaved in a strikingly different 
way toward Papuans and New Guineans from prewar Australian 
colonials. The wartime memories of the "generous," "friendly," and 
egalitarian Americans reported by the people of Vanatinai and else-
where are therefore not being contrasted to Australian soldiers but to 
prewar Australian colonials and to the wartime ANGAU authorities 
-people who had power over the Islanders and a vested interest in 
maintaining it over the long term. 
The ANGAU image remains today. Villagers who shout com-
mands at their family or neighbors are still sarcastically addressed as 
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"Angau." In comparison, Mead (1956, 185) reported that on 
Manus Island, " 'Angau' is the nickname for a man who takes 
things away from other people by excessive winnings at cards, or 
overuse of his privilege of begging from his relatives." Manus peo-
ple, like many others discussed in this volume (see also Robinson 
1981), recalled that AN G AU officers confiscated the goods Ameri-
can soldiers had given them. 
After the War 
World War II permanently changed life on Vanatinai in several 
ways. The tighter government control, imposed on the region fol-
lowing the uprising and murders of 1942-1943, has remained in 
force. Yearly patrols were instituted by the civilian government in 
1946. Greater government control led both the Roman Catholic 
Mission of the Sacred Heart and the Methodists (formerly the Aus-
tralian Methodist Missionary Society, now the United Church) to 
establish mission stations in the region in 194 7. 
Vanatinai settlement patterns and subsistence practices conform, 
on the surface, to the orders given during the war by ANGAU offi-
cers. Most people either live or claim to live in nucleated coastal vil-
lages located on sites designated by ANGAU. Houses throughout 
the Louisiade Archipelago are now built with a pitched roof rather 
than the curved, "turtle-back" roof that was traditional in the region 
until the mid-1940s. The new roof style emulates the design of Euro-
pean-style buildings observed by laborers at Milne Bay and Sama-
rai. The increased emphasis on cultivation of starchy tubers, such as 
easy-to-grow sweet potato and manioc, as opposed to the extensive 
collection of wild foods, has persisted since the well-meaning initia-
tive of the ANGAU lieutenant in 1943.'3 
Dress styles changed rapidly after the war. Men returning from 
Milne Bay very rarely wore the traditional male dress of etched pan-
danus leaf drawn between the legs and belted around the hips with 
locally made bush twine. They preferred to wear Western-style 
shorts or trousers or a rami 'lap-lap' of two yards of brightly colored 
trade cloth wound around the hips. Most women continued to wear 
the traditional dress of several knee-length skirts of shredded coco-
nut leaf. As a final note on appearance, adults and children alike 
enjoy tossing off a snappy military salute when posing for pictures 
today. 
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Ancestors 
Vanatinai people retain an intense interest in America. I was fre-
quently asked, "In what direction is America? How many days sail 
is it from here? How is the American Negro doing?" When I first 
came to live on Vanatinai in early 1978, I asked about climbing to 
the summit ofMt. Rio, home of the spirits of the dead. I was told the 
story of how some Americans had visited the island in the 1950s and 
climbed the sacred mountain, although their island guides were said 
to have been too frightened to accompany them to the top, where 
they spent the night. I was told it was so cold they froze together in a 
block of ice and did not thaw out until the next morning. (I later 
learned that an expedition from the American Museum of Natural 
History had in fact climbed Mt. Rio in the mid-1950s, collecting 
botanical and zoological specimens.) 
The man who told me this story asked me, "Why do you Ameri-
cans always want to climb Rio vwatai 'Rio's summit'?" The signifi-
cance of his question did not become apparent to me until some 
weeks later when a middle-aged man came to the house where I 
lived with a local family. He too asked me a question: "Where do we 
go when we die?" Taken aback, I began a discussion of comparative 
theology. He suddenly confessed that he had heard that the spirits of 
the dead turn white and go to America. A woman present immedi-
ately told him to be quiet, saying such things would land him in jail. 
He moaned, "0, why did I say this foolish thing?" I tried to reas-
sure him, but he and the others present were afraid to say anything 
more. I later learned that this belief was held by virtually all of the 
Islanders born before World War II. The younger people, even if 
they had never been to school (and most had not in the late 1970s), 
had another explanation for Americans: they are lumolumo 'Europe-
ans' of a slightly different kind from Australians. 
I learned further that I was believed to be the spirit of Taineghu-
bwa 'upright forest tree', an important woman who had died a few 
years previously and who was buried not far from where I lived on 
her clan property. It was said that I had returned from America, the 
land of the dead, to "help" the people. This was why I was said to be 
generous with gifts of food, tobacco, and trade goods. 14 A minority 
theory held that I was the returned spirit of the mother of the 
orphaned teenaged boy who lived in the same house as I did. 
From the beginning I denied strenuously that I was an ancestor 
spirit, but I was apparently not believed. Why else was I living, 
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seemingly permanently, in that spot? I was treated with friendliness 
by people who had announced to others that I was a returned spirit, 
but I was attributed with great power, both beneficial and destruc-
tive. For example, I was warned that I should hide the strands of my 
hair which fell out in my brush, for they could be used not only for 
powerful forms of love magic and garden magic (to make yam vines 
grow long) but as aids to murder by sorcerers. Ancestral relics such 
as a tooth, bone, or lock of hair are traditionally used as essential 
paraphernalia for performing acts of magic and sorcery (see Lepow-
sky n.d.b). One important man in his sixties, whom I had known 
well for many months and with whom I had sailed to a mortuary 
feast on the other end ofVanatinai, sat up late talking with me by the 
fire as our hosts slept on their mats nearby. "Tell me, Maria," he 
said, "Will you really die as we will?" Stunned, I replied with an 
adaptation of Shylock's speech in The Merchant of Venice, "Yes, I am 
just like you. If you cut me I will bleed. I will die the same as you 
will." He looked unconvinced. 
I left the island in 1979. When I returned for a visit in 1981, I 
found that the fact that I had not stayed on the island had convinced 
most of the elders that I was just a "European" after all. I had been 
different in that I had lived in a local village, eaten their foods, and 
learned their language, but, like all other Europeans, I had only 
stayed for a while and gone back to my place (see chapter 10). But 
when I returned to Vanatinai again in 198 7, I was still referred to as 
kaka 'ancestor spirit' by one old man who had labored for the Ameri-
cans during World War II. When no one else was nearby, another 
older man asked me in a whisper if it was "truth or lie" that I was an 
ancestor spirit and an immortal. Again I had to argue for my own 
mortal human status. 
Conclusion 
The apocalyptic, "cargo cult" beliefs held by some of the Islanders 
of the Louisiade Archipelago during and after World War II are 
responses to unprecedented social upheavals and new experiences. 
The seemingly omnipotent white colonial, mission, and commercial 
figures left the islands suddenly and in panic. Their departure trig-
gered outbreaks of looting and violence in the government station 
area at Misima. The collapse of the colonial apparatus of patrol offi-
cers, armed police, and "native courts" encouraged various individ-
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uals to settle personal vendettas and exacerbated interethnic hostility 
among the Islanders. The awesome spectacle of aerial and naval 
warfare during the Battle of the Coral Sea contributed to the general 
sense that powerful new forces had arrived in the region and that 
major changes were about to occur. Buriga's prophecy of the return 
of the dead on board ships full of European cargo-if only the 
remaining whites and mixed-race people were killed-appealed to 
hundreds of Islanders as an explanation for wartime events and as a 
strategy for action. 
The Calvados Islanders, who had received little material benefit 
from whites, were the most enthusiastic adherents of Buriga. At this 
point the Vanatinai Islanders probably believed that the dead would 
sail home on cargo ships, but they did not subscribe to the plan of 
killing whites. They regarded the traders, miners, and planters who 
lived on the island before the war as allies against attack by their old 
enemies from the Calvados Chain. Having heard of the murders of 
several men from their own island by people from the Calvados 
Chain, Vanatinai people interpreted the plans of Buriga's followers 
as a plan for a general attack on themselves as well as whites. 
The experiences of young men from Vanatinai at Milne Bay, spe-
cifically the contact with a new kind of "European" who possessed 
seemingly unlimited wealth and who treated Islanders with friendli-
ness and generosity, gave rise to a different "cargo" belief when they 
returned to the island. Americans were identified as returned ances-
tor spirits sailing back with cargo from the land of the dead, in con-
gruence with part of Buriga's prophecy. This belief differed in 
emphasizing that Americans were kin, allies, and supernatural 
exchange partners, as opposed to enemies to be killed in order to 
usher in the Golden Age. Preexisting exchange relations with whites 
on the island and the preexisting myth of a group of supernatural 
beings from Mt. Rio who had sailed off to the "land of Europeans" 
contribut~d to this newer explanation of the identity and significance 
of the Americans observed at Milne Bay. 
Buriga's prophecy and Vanatinai beliefs that Americans were 
returned ancestor spirits synthesized traditional and mission-intro-
duced beliefs. They amalgamated ideas about the power of ancestor 
spirits in the daily lives of their descendants with preachings about 
the imminent end of the world and the return of the dead to earth. 
The collapse of white political and economic power in the region, the 
threat of resumption of interisland raiding, and the arrival of new 
and powerful beings-the Americans-generated two distinct, syn-
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cretic responses that offered ideological bases for the transformation 
of the Islanders' social world. 
Notes 
The research on which this chapter is based was conducted from November 1977 to 
March 1979. For the bulk of the research period I resided in the village ofjelewaga 
on the south coast of Sudest Island, or Vanatinai. I wish to thank the people of 
Vanatinai and their neighbors for their friendship, assistance, and moral support 
during my residence with them. Financial support for this research was provided by 
the National Science Foundation and the Chancellor's Patent Fund and the Depart-
ment of Anthropology of the University of California, Berkeley. This support is 
gratefully acknowledged. I would like to thank participants and audience members 
for their comments at the 1985 and 1986 meetings of the Association for Social 
Anthropology in Oceania, where I presented earlier drafts of this chapter. I owe 
special thanks to Geoff White for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. The fourth distinct linguistic and cultural group in the Louisiade Archipelago 
lives on Yela, or Rosse! Island. Yela is encircled by its own lagoon and separated 
from the rest of the archipelago by a treacherous deep-water channel, which was 
rarely crossed in precolonial times for either trading or raiding purposes (see Liep 
1983; Lepowsky 1983). The Islanders speak a non-Austronesian language, unlike 
any of their neighbors for hundreds of miles to the east or west, and their culture 
differs markedly from others of the archipelago (see Armstrong 1928). They did not 
participate in the anticolonial uprising described in this chapter. Their young men 
were conscripted as wartime laborers, and it is possible that they shared with 
Vanatinai people the same belief that whites are returned ancestor spirits. 
2. Macintyre (1987, 5-9), based on work on Misima Island, located the origin of 
the cargo cult in the late 1930s, noting that it gained momentum with Buriga's 
prophecy of the millennium in 1942 during the upheavals of the japanese advance 
and the white civilian withdrawal. But she said that the cult did not advocate vio-
lence, even though Buriga and his followers murdered an ANGAU lieutenant and 
his party (1987, 9). I was told, not only by Vanatinai and Saisai people but by older 
Misima Islanders, that according to Buriga's prophecy the return of the dead with 
European cargo could only occur after all the whites and mixed-race people in the 
region had been killed. These same Misima Islanders told me in 1978 and 1979 of 
continuing cargo cult activity (without any homicidal theme) based at Siagara vil-
lage on the north coast of Misima, Buriga's natal village (Lepowsky 1981, 378-
379). Battaglia, who conducted research on Sahara Island in the east Calvados 
Chain, recorded that during the 1940s "in the wake of cargo-cult violence many of 
the able-bodied men in the [Calvados] Chain suddenly disappeared into mainland 
jails" for an average of five years (1983, 451). An Australian patrol officer, who in 
1946 investigated a further cult outbreak on Iwa Island, where it was predicted that 
ancestor spirits would come to life and return with foods and other goods (and in 
anticipation of which some gardens and coconut trees were destroyed), reported, 
"It is said that this 'prophecy' had something to do with the preachings of 
BURIGA (the man who caused all the trouble here at Misima which culminated in 
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the murder of Lieutenant Mader, George Burfitt and the others in 1942/43). He 
said that after all the Europeans were killed the world would turn over and then any 
white people remaining would change into natives and natives would be changed 
into whitemen" (Territory of Papua 1945-1946). 
3. Similarly, Keesing (1978, 247) suggested in his discussion of the Maasina Rule 
"politico-religious movement" on Malaita in the Solomon Islands that "specific 
elements of Malaita cultism may derive from diffusion on plantations." Goldfields 
and European-owned plantations were both locations in which Melanesian men 
from many different cultural groups met, communicated with each other, and for-
mulated responses to their contacts with Europeans. 
4. William Davenport (personal communication 1981) was on a small U.S. Navy 
patrol boat that traveled at night without running lights in the waters near the stra-
tegicjomard Passage looking for evidence of Japanese movements. Although their 
orders forbade them to land, he recalled being close enough to see the silhouette of 
Sudest Island against the night sky. 
5. As an act of violent resistance to white colonial rule, this ambush has several 
parallels with the murder of District Officer Bell and his "native police" on Malaita 
in the Solomon Islands in 1927 (see Keesing and Carris 1980). 
6. Both this anticolonial theme and the idea that the spirits of the dead would 
return in a European-style boat (the latter prominent not only in Buriga's cult 
prophecies but in a Vanatinai myth discussed in this chapter) first appear during the 
Milne Bay Prophet Movement of 1893, the earliest recorded New Guinea cargoistic 
movement (see Worsley 1968, 52). The Milne Bay region is culturally related to the 
Louisiade Archipelago and is linked to it through traditional exchange systems. 
7. In the period since World War II, although Misima Islanders continue to have 
the greatest amount of contact with white traders, government officers, miners, 
missionaries, and other visitors, the Calvados Chain peoples have had somewhat 
more contact with whites than have the people of Vanatinai. There were no white 
residents on Vanatinai by the early 1970s. The Catholic Mission of the Sacred 
Heart established a mission on Nimowa Island in the East Calvados in 194 7, staffed 
by Australian priests and nuns. Virtually all the east Calvados peoples consider 
themselves Catholics and send their children to the mission primary schools, and 
many sell copra to the mission. 
8. Until about 1888, the traditional settlement pattern was for people to live in 
dispersed hamlets along the ridgetops for purposes of defense; thereafter people 
resided in dispersed hamlets situated near water sources and garden lands. People 
still believe that they will be taken to court if it is known that they do not really 
inhabit the coastal villages, so many come down from the uplands once a year just 
before the government census patrol. Although ANGAU officers thought they were 
picking out healthy settlement sites away from swamps, the traditional pattern of 
living at altitudes of above 800-1000 feet affords people greater protection against 
the island's three species of Anopheles mosquitoes, which carry both Plasmodium 
vivax and the sometimes fatal P.falciparum malaria (see Lepowsky 1985). 
9. Individuals with whom I discussed island diet and subsistence in 1978-1979 
explained that forty years earlier, when many of them were children or young peo-
ple, the local diet was far more heavily dependent on the collection of wild tubers, 
nuts, legumes, fruits, and leaves, the production of sago, and fishing and hunting 
than the present intensive cultivation of starchy tubers. A mixed economy of food-
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collecting and yam and banana growing was traditional. This earlier, more varied 
diet contained a greater quantity and range of vitamins and minerals (Lepowsky 
1985). 
10. By contrast, the sexual division oflabor in the Keakalo region of the Papuan 
coast was permanently changed by the absence of men conscripted by ANGAU 
during World War II. Women assumed the responsibility of caring for betel nut 
palms and yams in gardens and groves, which were traditionally maintained exclu-
sively by men and taboo to women. When people observed that these crops 
flourished under female care, the old sexual division of labor in gardening was 
abandoned in the postwar years (Wari Iamo, personal communication 1985). 
11. Similarly, Davenport reported (chapter 11) that in the Santa Cruz Islands, 
"traditional myths were reformulated to explain the technological superiority and 
enormous wealth of the Americans." When a deity is not obeyed in the mythical 
past when European trade goods were available without money, he is offended and 
leaves for America, which "is why Americans are so rich now" (see chapters 3 and 
17 for comparable themes). 
12. American soldiers at Milne Bay, and at the base established in 1943 in the 
Trobriand Islands, were enthusiastic purchasers of carvings made by island labor-
ers and villagers (see Saville 1974; chapter 13). The collections of the University of 
California Lowie Museum of Anthropology contain a number of artifacts pur-
chased in the Trobriand Islands during World War II, including a large drum with 
a monitor-lizard-skin head and an ebony letter-opener in the shape of a lime spatula 
with the words, "made in New Guinea 1943" carved on it. One San Francisco 
man, who had been in the merchant marine, donated to the museum a large 
anthropomorphic carving which he had obtained on Kiriwina during the war in 
exchange for a bedsheet. 
Allied soldiers were supposed to keep out oflocal villages as part of the antifrater-
nization orders, but people recall frequent visits from American soldiers. One quiet 
morning on Vanatinai, I was astonished when my woman friend, who grew up in a 
Milne Bay village, suddenly began to teach her three-year-old daughter to sing and 
dance the "Hokey-Pokey" ("You put your right foot in, you put your right foot 
out ... "). She explained that "American Negro soldiers" had taught it to her 
mother and other young village women, who had later taught their own children. 
13. The only tangible evidence of the Japanese wartime presence, besides the 
submarine on the reef at Rosse! Island and perhaps the wrecked fighter plane 
inland from Buyawe hamlet, is a large, sweet yellow banana variety known locally 
as "Japan." These bananas are said to have been introduced by the Japanese at 
.Panaeati Lagoon (perhaps from Rabaul?), from where they were taken to Ebara at 
the western tip of Misima Island and spread to other settlements of the Louisiade 
Archipelago. 
14. Michael Young (1971, 42, 56), who wrote about separate cargo cult move-
ments on culturally similar Goodenough Island, three hundred miles northwest of 
Vanatinai, was believed by some people to be "a spy for the ancestors" who had 
been sent "to assess their worth and readiness for the millennium." 
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CHAPTER 10 
The Making of History: 
The Representation of World War II 
on Normanby Island, Papua New Guinea 
CARL E. THUNE 
The wartime was a source of happiness and 
a source of sadness and also a source of death 
but also of happiness because there was a big 
group of Australians and a group of Ameri-
cans. There was a crowd of Chinese. The 
Negroes' behavior was very good. And the 
Americans and Negroes came with their 
mothers [women]. 
- Bobi of Loeliya hamlet, Laboda village 
MY INTRODUCTION to recollections of World War II, and, indirectly, 
to what might be called ethnohistoriography, occurred during my 
first afternoon of fieldwork on Normanby Island in the Milne Bay 
Province of Papua New Guinea (map 6). After I mentioned that I 
was interested in history, several older men as well as a group of 
younger people gathered to talk about the past. To my surprise, the 
past they described contained only two clearly visible segments, the 
first associated with the arrival of the Reverend W. E. Bromilow, 
the first missionary, on Dobu Island in 1891, the second with World 
War II. 1 Why these two events were thought worth repeating to an 
obviously naive foreigner only became clear during subsequent 
months of fieldwork on Normanby Island. 
However, one clue was given a few months later following an eve-
ning news broadcast of Radio Milne Bay that contained a story 
about ajapanese soldier rumored to be still hiding in the mountains 
at the eastern tip of Papua New Guinea. The group sitting around 
the radio began to talk about this soldier and then to reminisce about 
the war years. Talk quickly returned to the soldier himself, to what 
he must have looked like after having not cut his hair or beard for 
thirty years, to what he ate, and to how and where he had lived. Peo-
ple spoke with an almost morbid fascination about his radical and all 
but inconceivable social isolation. 2 
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This vision of an isolated, socially abandoned individual embod-
ies one moment of a more general rhetorical structure underlying 
most recollections of the war years by the people of N ormanby 
Island. As a recollected literary subject, the war is more about the 
structures and possibilities of social relations than about the violence 
of wartime events. In this chapter I explore and am primarily con-
cerned with the structure of the Laboda villagers' recollections of a 
number of war-related events. The events themselves are of second-
ary interest. 
This chapter is based on a number of "autobiographical" stories 
told by residents of Laboda village about their personal experiences 
during the war years. Although the stories were told specifically for 
my benefit, they were all more or less known in a standardized form 
by friends and relatives of the raconteurs. 3 Like all literature-both 
oral and written, recited or composed spontaneously-these stories 
are cultural artifacts that must be understood within the larger liter-
ary universe that supports their construction, recitation, and recep-
tion. Recollections of World War II are structured using the same 
rhetorical devices that structure the literary representation of any 
other event, whether "true," "fictive," or "mythical." 
Matrilineality, External Relations, and Loboda Village Rhetoric 
Laboda village is located at the northeastern tip of Normanby 
Island, which is one of the D'Entrecasteaux Islands. It is similar in 
culture and social structure to the other villages of the southeastern 
D'Entrecasteaux Islands-Dobu, Sanaroa, east Fergusson, and 
Normanby (cf. Thune 1980, 1983; Fortune 1963; Schlesier 1970; 
Roheim 1950). Like these other villages, Laboda is divided into 
small, self-contained matrilineages (susu), each of which "owns" at 
least one hamlet (kasa) withwhich the matrilineage and its members' 
identity are deeply bound. 4 Internal (matrilineal) relations are a per-
son's only "natural" links to other people and as such, should never 
be compromised by external affiliations with people of other matri-
lineages. 
Although matrilineality provides the essential component of a per-
son's identity, it can only be maintained through the creation of a 
variety of external affiliations with spouses, trade partners, friends, 
and employers. If the immediate problem of social life centers on the 
maintenance of matrilineal identity in a day-to-day world containing 
forces threatening to undercut it, a complementary but equally real 
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problem centers on the creation of external relations that both sup-
port matrilineality and, by their very existence, are threatened by it. 
Precisely because matrilineality renders external relations neces-
sary but unnatural, external relations have an extraordinary but 
always threatening visibility in literature as in daily life. "Normal" 
internal, matrilineal social relations are so natural and, hence, unin-
teresting that they remain largely invisible within Loboda literature. 
Indeed, internal relations only become visible in literature when 
they are shattered by unnatural division within a matrilineage. Con-
versely, external relations are invisible as long as they are anony-
mous and do not threaten the matrilineal order or are sufficiently 
domesticated that they support rather than threaten the matrilineal 
world. 
All Loboda literature, whether myth, folktale, history, or autobi-
ography, is a literature of the tension between simultaneously visible 
internal and external social relations. Frequently the conflict is dis-
placed from a strictly matrilineally defined universe to a universe 
that is defined by species, village, geographical, or what might be 
vaguely termed "racial" differences. For example, many folktales 
are built around a theme of a leading character's inherently unstable 
marriage to, friendship with, or adoption by a "human-like" fish or 
plant. Similarly, many "historical" accounts portray abortive and 
destructive attempts at constructing social relations between those of 
different villages or islands ( cf. Thune 1980). On a broader scale, 
the conventionalized account of the arrival of the Reverend W. E. 
Bromilow on Dobu Island is built around the exploration of the 
problems and implications of external relations between Dobuan 
people and Europeans (Thune n.d.b). 
The underlying message of these stories is that external relations, 
whether based on marriage, adoption, or friendship are fundamen-
tally unnatural. However, as the Bromilow story shows, external 
relations carry the potential for dramatic social expansion if they can 
be made to serve the internal social order rather than undercut it. 
World War II and Northeast Normanby Island: 
The War as a Literary Domain 
In Loboda, as elsewhere in the Pacific, events associated with World 
War II are among the most dramatic and visible features of the rec-
ollected past. However, unlike nearby areas, 5. Loboda did not expe-
rience actual violence. A practice amphibious landing was held some 
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five miles from the village and warships were briefly anchored in 
Sewa Bay, but no serious fighting occurred in northeast Normanby 
Island. A temporary Japanese and subsequent Allied presence in the 
area, though initially feared, is not described as really threatening. 
Even the bombing and strafing seen by northeast Normanby Island-
ers then living on Dobu, east Fergusson, and Goodenough islands 
are not recollected as seriously dangerous. 
Yet, if northeast Normanby was on the periphery of the war, it 
was on a very close periphery. The battle of Milne Bay occurred less 
than fifty miles away and occasioned a massive buildup of men and 
material. A sizable air base was established in the Trobriand 
Islands. A temporary Japanese occupation of portions of Goode-
nough Island was followed by larger Allied bases. And the ocean 
around northeast Normanby was the site of a major shipping route 
between the Japanese center in Rabaul and the Milne Bay-Coral 
Sea area. More important, as the war approached, Normanby 
became one of the prime recruiting grounds for laborers, especially 
in the Milne Bay area. Almost every young man of the time spent at 
least a year away in support of the Allied war effort. 
Loboda villagers use the phrase sahaya kana tuta to refer generically 
to the World War II period and also occasionally to refer to the 
period of intervillage raids before colonially imposed "pacification." 
Sahaya is a generic term that can variously be translated as "war," 
"raid," "battle," "struggle," "fight," "quarrel," "debate," "con-
test," or today even "school examination." It is inherently vague. 
Kana tuta can be translated as "its time" or "the time of." However, 
it, too, is vague and does not point to a sharply demarcated calen-
dar-defined time span. It can more accurately be translated as a 
"period or phase within which an unusual (but not defining) event 
or phenomenon occurred.'' 
When Loboda villagers use the phrase sahaya kana tuta, they are 
referring to a general period of the past that can most easily be 
referenced by mention of the war, sahaya, though it is by no means 
defined by the existence of warfare and violence. If anything, sahaya 
kana tuta, when used to point to both World War II and the precon-
tact period, refers to a kind of epical moment in which the essence of 
social life is visible, challenged, and actively explored. 
Five major episodes can be seen in Loboda villagers' recollections 
of the World War II period. They center on stories of the initial dis-
ruption of the colonial world beyond the village; the temporary pres-
ence of a group of shipwrecked Japanese sailors in northeast Nor-
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manby Island; the presence of a small Australian military base near 
the village; the massive recruitment of young men to support the 
Allied effort; and the end of the Allied military presence and the 
return of the colonial regime. These five episodes roughly followed 
one another. However, recollections of each center on the portrayal 
of a different outcome of attempts at constructing external relations. 
The Advance of the Front and the Collapse of Social Relations 
We didn't have any way to go home because 
the japanese blocked all the paths. At Samarai 
we came to see Mr. Smith [the government 
officer]. He told us, "What? Are you afraid?" 
We said, "No." He said, "You remember 
God and don't you think about dying." ... 
All the [European J women and small children 
were taken away by a plane. It carried them 
away. But we didn't have any way to go. 
- Dagela of Loeliya hamlet, Loboda 
They said to that sergeant, my father, "You 
can't come [to send your contract laborers 
home]. A different leader will come and take 
them and look after them." He was very sad. 
He cried. He said, "I didn't send them off." 
My father cried and cried. He said, "Later, if 
I go to Esa' ala or perhaps Sehulea [patrol 
post], I will go down to your village and stay 
there for good." 
-Manuweli ofKebelukwa hamlet, Loboda 
Loboda villagers' earliest recollections of the war years are of the 
disruption in the colonial world that suddenly confronted young 
men engaged in contract labor in the Milne Bay area and elsewhere 
in Papua. Men of their generation recollecting contract labor por-
tray it as an adventure providing a dramatic introduction to the 
world beyond the village. However, rather than emphasizing novel 
and exciting events, their stories usually focus on deep involvement 
with individual Europeans. These one-to-one relations are critical to 
the stories' overall rhetorical coherence. While many stories men-
tion disdain and brutality from a relatively anonymous European 
community, each describes how the narrator established an espe-
cially warm relation with a single European on whom he was depen-
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dent for friendship, food and shelter, and protection from other 
Europeans and Papua New Guineans, as well as a more generalized 
sentimental concern. It is the creation of these relations, rather than 
the wealth or technological virtuosity of the colonial world, that 
returning laborers recall as particularly impressive about their expe-
nence. 
Occasionally these counterparts in the colonial world are de-
scribed using the word tasi- 'brother' (literally 'sibling of the same 
sex'). However, more commonly they are described using the word 
lama- 'father' (or more generally, 'father or father's brother' or 
'mother's or mother's sister's husband'). Unlike other external rela-
tions (e.g., with spouses or formal trade partners), the "paternal" 
relation involves an asymmetrical indebtedness between the two 
parties, as a "father" provides goods and services, including the 
sharing of knowledge, skill, and experience, that his "child" can 
never hope to repay. 6 Indeed, "paternity" is the one multidimen-
sional relation in which dependency and asymmetrical indebted-
ness to a person of another matrilineage are not only acceptable 
but expected. Even more important, the paternal relation perma-
nently links a person not just to his or her "father" but to his or her 
matrilineage and that of the father. In other words, acquiring a 
relation to a "father" not only ensures concern, support, and pro-
tection but generates a dramatic expansion of an individual's social 
horizons. 
The "paternal" relation provides a model for portraying the mul-
tidimensional associations with the closest associates of the external 
world on whom contract laborers were dependent. These relations 
were in sharp contrast to the rigid and distant, unidimensional rela-
tions with colonial representatives encountered in the village world. 
They were unique even in the traditional world in which such multi-
dimensional relations were rarely established with people from other 
geographic.al areas unless legitimized by a prior genealogical tie. 
Later recollections suggest that contract labor offered a dramatic 
social expansion that could incorporate a portion of the wider world 
into the village experience. 
In general, since relations between two individuals (and conse-
quently their respective matrilineages) cannot be severed as long as 
any unbalanced indebtedness exists between them, the paternal rela-
tion, because it is characterized by permanent indebtedness, should 
be the one unbreakable external relation in a Laboda villager's life. 
Manuweli's statement illustrates that wartime recollections portray 
the unexpected breaking of the tie of contract laborer to employer as 
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traumatic for all parties involved. In prewar years, many contract 
laborers experienced a break with their employers at the expiration 
of their contracts, at which time they were expected to return home 
to assume local responsibilities. Others involved in longer-term 
work relations experienced a similar break as a result of the death or 
return to Australia of their employers. Still others had to break their 
ties to their employers after being called back to their village to 
assume local responsibilities, usually following the sickness or death 
of their senior matrilineage mates. All of these reasons for the ending 
of relations with the European world make sense because they 
involved the demands of internal relations which quite properly took 
precedence. 
By contrast, the sudden end of their contract labor immediately 
before the war is not interpreted as the result of either the laborer or 
his European "father" being reclaimed by their respective worlds of 
internal relations. Rather, the approaching war brought about the 
collapse of an entire social universe. The returning contract laborers 
describe the haste and disorganization within what had previously 
seemed to be a solid and orderly, if rather peculiar and incompre-
hensible, European social world. Some point to the sudden evacua-
tion of the European women and children, who had made Samarai 
into a functioning social universe rather than a collection of isolated 
individuals, as typical of the European world's disorder. 7 
These recollections are structurally reminiscent of many folktales 
describing the collapse of relations between isolated individuals such 
as orphans and persons of an alien world to whom they created a 
temporary quasi-adoptive relation. The underlying message is that 
matrilineally isolated people cannot establish permanent relations 
with an alien world because their acceptance of such relations 
implies that world's fragmentary quality. In other words, the matri-
lineally isolated are only accepted by those of an alien world when 
that world, too, is in a state of imminent collapse. 
The Other Foreigners: The japanese on Normanby Island 
The Australians came and they turned over 
empty meat tins and empty coconut shells and 
husks of coconuts and they looked for the 
Japanese in the bush. They looked all over for 
them. Perhaps the japanese were hiding [by 
using magic to make themselves very small]. 
-Auwepo ofKegebwai hamlet, Loboda 
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The Japanese knew sorcery [ barahu ]. When 
they came they had packets of poison [ bara-
husa] that they carried with them. Deuku car-
ried his poison in his pocket. He wouldn't let 
me see it. The japanese only used sorcery 
against the Australians. They didn't use it 
against the Duau people because we were 
their friends. 
-Eidan ofSawawanubwa hamlet, Loboda 
Collective recollections of the war period begin with the arrival of 
a group of Japanese sailors from a ship that was sunk apparently as a 
part of the Battle of the Coral Sea. They arrived in two lifeboats, 
exhausted by their ordeal, without weapons, and having little in the 
way of resources to support themselves or to effect their return to 
Japanese territory. Although seen to be an alien form of humanity 
having no structured relation to northeast Normanby Islanders, 
they are never described as a real threat. Loboda villagers speak of 
them alternately with tones of pity for those who were alone and suf-
fering, of amusement at the ignorance and foolishness of those who 
did not know how to live in Normanby society, and of comradeship 
with those who were, in some ways, less threatening than represen-
tatives of the colonial world. 
The sailors were essentially abandoned for a time by the Japa-
nese, who were unable to rescue them, and by the Allies, who were 
not sufficiently concerned about their presence to make a concerted 
attempt to capture them. Eventually, Loboda villagers say, the Aus-
tralians landed a force near Dawada village that was able to capture 
the wounded and sick among them. 8 The remainder were able to 
reach a Japanese ship that is said to have taken them to Rabaul. 
Japanese (meJapan) are members of the higher-level category of 
human beings (dimudimu 'foreigners') that rather vaguely includes 
any non-~elanesian. Most typically it includes Australians, New 
Zealanders, English, and Americans, but also Asians such as Indi-
ans, Chinese, andJapanese. 
Like other categories of people, "foreigners" are subdivided at 
lower taxonomic levels into successively narrower categories. 9 Each 
category of human being, whether a broad grouping such as "for-
eigner" or "Papuan" or a low-level category such as a single matri-
lineage, is characterized by common bubuna, a word that can 
variously be translated as "custom," "behavior," "habit," or "per-
sonality." A people's "custom" reflects and embodies their ances-
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tors' historical experience and residence, being matrilineally inher-
ited but also partly derived from the land on which they live. At all 
levels, "custom" always has an authentic and inherent, essentially 
unchanging, quality. External relations, by definition, are with those 
having different "customs." 
The Japanese were an anomalous presence, not exactly a part of 
the colonial world but also not a part of the world of Normanby 
Islanders. Certainly the Japanese were "foreigners," but their "cus-
tom" contrasted them with an unnamed category of people contain-
ing Americans, Australians, New Zealanders, and English. Within 
the category offoreigners, the Japanese are the marked subcategory. 
If Australians and other Europeans were aliens, the Japanese, 
because they did not clearly fit into the category of "foreigner," were 
an even more conceptually difficult category. 
For example, unlike European "foreigners," the Japanese pos-
sessed a variety of forms of knowledge-such as barahu 'sorcery', 
koba 'magic', and welabana 'witchcraft'-with which Laboda villag-
ers are familiar. The quotations from Eidan and Auwepo indicate 
that the villagers believe this knowledge assisted them in avoiding 
the Allied forces. Again unlike most Europeans, the Japanese at 
least vaguely understood traditional Normanby Island food such as 
taro. 
On the other hand, at least in the villagers' recollections, the J ap-
anese made fewer attempts to fit in with traditional society than did 
the representatives of the Allied forces later encountered by Laboda 
villagers. People stress that the Japanese used signs to indicate their 
wishes rather than learning the local language, that they did not 
chew betel, and that they survived by raiding gardens and killing 
pigs. They are described as gomwasoula 'fierce', 'angry', or 'difficult 
to get along with'. Women were initially afraid of them because they 
were sexually aggressive. In addition, the Japanese possessed tech-
nology similar to that of Europeans. 
One dimension of the anomalous status of the Japanese sailors in 
Laboda village stories is their problematic position relative to other 
major categories of people. However, a second, equally anomalous 
dimension is their relatively asocial, uncontrolled behavior. They 
are frequently described as if they had lost their relation to, or posi-
tion within, their own group and wider Japanese society. Even 
though Laboda villagers remember Amanaka and Deuku as kapitani 
'leaders' of the Japanese sailors, the entire party is never portrayed 
as a coherent, internally organized group. 
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Nevertheless, many of the young men of the time formed close ties 
with individual Japanese, and many actually learned some Japanese 
they remember with pride today. A number of young men today 
have the Japanese names of their fathers' close friends. These rela-
tions are always described as one-to-one relations between individ-
ual northeast Normanby young men and individual Japanese. Yet, 
unlike relations between representatives of alien worlds in tradi-
tional society, neither party approached the other as a representative 
of his own group. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier relations 
between contract laborers and Europeans, relations between north-
east Normanby Islanders and the Japanese are described as rela-
tively egalitarian. If anything, the Normanby Islanders were in a 
slightly ascendant position, being able to provide food and housing 
to the sailors, who were unable to support themselves. 
These relations are usually described using the word gosia-
'friend'. In many ways "friendship" is an even more distant associa-
tion than "paternity." The "paternal" relation suggests the exis-
tence of a structured and formalized, if conceptually difficult, exter-
nal relationship between two people, each embedded within their 
own internal relations. "Friendship," by contrast, implies an egali-
tarian external association of two people having no deeper obliga-
tions linking them. It is a relation between discrete individuals 
rather than between people who are representatives and embodi-
ments oflarger groups. 
Because there is no formalized exchange and consequent account-
ed indebtedness, "friendship" does not have the expectation of 
permanence that characterizes the "paternal" relation. Indeed, 
"friendship" is a relation of recognized and marked distance rather 
than intimacy between two people. Frequently two people who ini-
tially form a relationship they describe as between "friends" will 
quickly transform it into a more intimate, metaphorically "inter-
nal," relation they describe using the word tasi- 'brother' or 'sibling 
of the same sex'. While referring to another person as "brother" is 
metaphorical, it suggests that each will act as though he had an 
internal relation not only to the other but also to relatives and other 
associates of the other. 
One of the clearest markers of this formal distance between the 
villagers and the Japanese is that they are consistently described as 
obtaining food inappropriately. When people wish to point to their 
asocial quality, they stress that the Japanese pilfered from gardens, 
killed pigs without regard to their ownership, and ate raw taro. 
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When people wish to stress their dependent and pitiful condition 
(and by implication the concern that they themselves felt for them), 
they describe the trips that groups of Japanese made from hamlet to 
hamlet each morning to obtain gifts of food that were not recipro-
cated. And, when they wish to point to their more socially appropri-
ate relations, they describe how the Japanese engaged in grimane 
'barter' of their limited possessions (such as a compass, one of the 
lifeboats, and clothing) for food and assistance. Theft, unreciprocat-
ed receiving of gifts and consequent dependency, and barter are pro-
gressively more socialized techniques of marking distance and the 
absence of an ongoing external relation. Nevertheless, each reflects a 
considerable social distance between the two parties. 
By contrast, the ideal transactional structure underlying external 
relations in traditional village life is the balanced movement of goods 
and services between the two sides in such a way that mutual and 
approximately equivalent indebtedness is never removed ( cf. Thune 
1983). It is significant that Laboda villagers choose to use the move-
ment of food to mark the ultimate distance between themselves and 
the Japanese because food is traditionally used to mark and define 
external relations between matrilineages. 
In some ways, the Japanese occupied the same structural position 
vis-a-vis the northeast Normanby Island people that the contract la-
borers occupied vis-a-vis the wider colonial world. Like the contract 
laborers, they were socially isolated, relatively helpless individuals 
facing an organized social universe as dependents. In recollection, 
however, contract laborers accepted this dependency by using the 
word "father" to describe the relation that they created, whereas 
Laboda villagers indicate that they were unwilling to accept or una-
ble to create a "paternal" relation to the Japanese sailors, defining 
them as natu 'children'. This status was inappropriate given the 
manifest Japanese possession of knowledge and technology (even 
though temporarily disrupted) and their generally aggressive 
manner. 
From the perspective of Normanby Islanders interested in con-
structing expansive external relations, development of a "paternal" 
relation to a "child," especially if the "child" is isolated or an 
orphan, carries less expansive potential than the development by a 
"child" of a "paternal" relation to a father. For this reason, as well, 
it made better structural sense for the Japanese to be recollected as 
"friends," with the distance, the relative egalitarianism, and the rel-
ative isolation that term implies. 
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Ultimately this relation with the Japanese ended. One reason for 
the inevitability of its failure is structural: it involved relations 
between isolated individuals. The message here, as well as in tradi-
tional literature, is that external relations only survive when they are 
between persons who are socially embedded representatives of their 
respective social worlds. External relations are only meaningful and 
only likely to survive if they lead to a social expansion in which each 
principal party can represent his or her social universe to the mem-
bers of the other's universe. External relations only survive as the 
principals' individuality disappears beneath their roles as mediators 
between two wider social collectivities. 
The structure of the stories that I am describing has a problematic 
relation to what "actually happened." It can be plausibly argued 
that Loboda villagers, on seeing the collapse of their ties to the J apa-
nese, subsequently erected a story explaining why the collapse was 
inevitable. What is critical is that they choose a typically Loboda 
rhetorical approach to describing their relations to the J apanese. 10 
Allies and Villagers: The Base at Koyagaba and 
Dancing in the Village 
I was staying in Laboda and then the Austra-
lian soldiers came to Koyagaba. The Air Force 
and the Army came. We were working for 
them. We washed their clothes and they gave us 
rice and meat. They dynamited fish and I grew 
up to be a young man. 
-Bobi ofLoeliya hamlet, Laboda 
The soldiers stayed for a long time. Its end was 
1945. The war was over. All my friends were. 
staying. I came and I was thinking about what I 
would do next. So I was thinking. I said, "Oh, 
perhaps, I will look for a school," because the 
place I was staying was not good. 
-Alipi Gibson ofKasayahai hamlet, Laboda 
Shortly after the Japanese sailors had escaped or were captured, 
the Australian Army and Air Force established a small base at Koya-
gaba, a narrow point of land between Loboda and Kwanaula vil-
lages. This installation was apparently primarily a radio and coast-
watching installation manned by a small number of American and 
Australian military personnel. 
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The base at Koyagaba was a source of endless fascination, inter-
est, wealth, and knowledge. Young people and children went there 
in the morning to receive leftover food that they took to the bush and 
ate. In the evenings, villagers went there to watch movies with the 
soldiers. A number of Loboda women are said to have had soldiers 
as lovers. Soldiers visited the village to participate in traditional 
dances. Those who were children at the time fondly recall spending 
time with the soldiers, eating mess food, learning about Allied mili-
tary hardware, and talking about the future much as they would at 
village households with which they had a direct or indirect associa-
tion. 
Whereas the relations people created with the abandoned Japa-
nese were egalitarian links to those who were detached and isolated 
from their worlds, those formed with the military personnel at Koya-
gaba were with people who carried a sizable piece of their cultural 
ancestry with them in the form of an impressive social structure and 
a massive amount of material goods. Whereas the Japanese were 
dependent on Normanby Islanders for food and shelter, the soldiers 
at Koyagaba were independent and well supplied. Finally, whereas 
the Japanese were seemingly cut off from their compatriots, the sol-
diers at Koyagaba were visibly representatives of and supported by 
the Allied forces. 
Recollections of relations with the soldiers at Koyagaba stress that 
both sides met as embedded members of their respective social 
worlds with neither dependent upon the other. Indeed, these are the 
only recollections from the war period in which villagers embedded 
in the village social scene were able to meet, live, and work with 
Europeans who were themselves equally embedded in a functioning 
social world. More concretely, in contrast to the contract labor sto-
ries in which villagers are portrayed as visitors in a European world 
or the stories of the Japanese sailors in which the sailors appear as 
visitors in the village world, these are the only war stories in which 
both Loboda villagers and the "foreigners" each had their respective 
visible "place" embodying their "custom" and historical experi-
ence. 
This is the condition of fully developed multidimensional relation-
ships with the external world and, as such, it offers the possibility of 
a real social expansion. If stories of the prewar contract labor experi-
ence and those of the experience with the visiting Japanese are built 
on alternative models of relations between individuals and an alien 
social universe, stories of the war period are built on a model show-
ing multifaceted relations with a much closer alien that situates all 
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members of each group with respect to all members of the other. 
Rather than a "paternal" or "friendship" model of social relations, 
the images in these stories come closer to a model in which an 
expanded social world is created precisely because residing in, or at 
least visiting, each other's places is possible. 11 
As people recall this period, they describe a social excitement and 
expansion that is found at no other time in the village past. In recol-
lection, at least, the period of the base at Koyagaba was the high 
point of the war period. People describe a dramatic transformation 
in day-to-day village life precipitated by a sudden widening of social 
horizons. 
One woman, for example, while describing the excitement that 
became a part of daily village life, vividly described the sudden 
awakening of the village each morning to the sound of hand gre-
nades being used to "dynamite" fish. Everyone would rush from 
their houses to the beach to collect the fish that had been killed, and 
the fish were gathered without regard to genealogical connection to 
the person who originally threw the grenade. Her recollection 
stresses that, with hand grenades, fish became so plentiful that their 
restricted distribution through normal channels became irrelevant. 
Similar stories are told about the unrestricted distribution of meat 
and other tinned food acquired from the base at Koyagaba during 
this period. 
In recollection, the village suddenly appears as an indivisible 
social unit. What this woman and others describe is a temporary 
communitas in which matrilineally based social relations became 
irrelevant. 12 Recollection using the vocabulary of communitas to 
unite those of the village and the Allied base was possible precisely 
because members of both parties were firmly embedded in their 
respective, fully visible social worlds. Unlike recollections of other 
wartime episodes, descriptions of the Koyagaba base show villagers 
transcending social structure precisely because this structure is so 
fully visible and present. 
Irony is the primary trope used to describe village life during the 
period of the Koyagaba base. Endless stories abound, such as that of 
the old man who boiled a tin of meat, ate its label, and threw the 
"bone" away, complaining that there was no meat on the Europe-
ans' food. His children retrieved the tin, opened it, and had a feast 
at his expense. Many were offended by the strong odors of foods 
such as onions and cabbage in the tins they received, again provid-
ing a feast for younger people. And some threw away pieces of 
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cheese in disgust on discovering that the "soap" would not raise a 
lather. Many older people refused to eat rice, thinking it was boiled 
maggots. These stories are told with wry humor at the ignorance of 
the older people who were not involved in daily social relations that 
brought knowledge of the European world. 
Irony is used to comment on villagers' internal, village-wide rela-
tions that became visible with the arrival of visiting soldiers. In rec-
ollection, food is the predominant marker of the new external rela-
tions that people created. The ironic humor with which the period is 
recalled is especially appropriate given that older people were unable 
to eat "foreign" food. 
Stories told in the ironic mode describe only events within the vil-
lage. Similar events must have happened to people working beyond 
the village, but they, being purely idiosyncratic, never became a part 
of the collective village historic lore. More important, while events 
beyond the village might be used to comment on the socially insig-
nificant relation of individual villagers to individual Europeans, use 
of the ironic mode in this context allows people to speak indirectly to 
the relation of the village as a coherent social world to an equally 
coherent European social world. With irony, one can point to 
socially irrelevant, and therefore humorous, differences and thereby 
underscore the true unity that is described as emerging. 
Within Loboda oral literature, irony-a trope used to display 
internal differences in individual experiences, knowledge, and skill 
-is apparently only appropriate where boundaries based on the dif-
ferences between internal and external relations become temporarily 
invisible. Irony then is a literary counterpart of social communitas. 13 
Although I am describing the representation of the relations 
between Loboda villagers and the soldiers at Koyagaba, the reality 
was more problematic-for example, disputes did occur as a result 
of alleged involvement oflocal women with soldiers. But the literary 
structure chosen to represent this period disguises these difficulties 
and ambiguities, whereas that used to represent the activity of the 
Japanese sailors highlights it. 
An Overabundance of Sharing: External Social Relations 
and the Construction of Boundaries within the Alien World 
So we went to them and we became friends. 
They gave us our shirts and our trousers and 
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our boots and socks and all kinds of European 
goods. They gave us bayonets, our weapons, 
but we didn't encounter any fighting. They 
gave us our dress and we walked around care-
lessly [unabashedly] proud. There was so 
much meat it was like rubbish. 
- Bobi of Loeliya hamlet, Loboda 
They [the returning wartime laborers] said, 
"If you go to Giligili to the Americans' place 
you will see many women have come." They 
said, "If you go to the Americans, they will 
call to you." They said, "Their behavior is 
good. During the war we went to the Ameri-
cans' place inside their fence [compound]. 
They boiled their tea and they set a table with 
European food. They would call, they said, 
'Hey, boys, you come and let's eat.' We 
thought about it and we went up and ate with 
the American soldiers. But we were afraid of 
the ANGAU soldiers. We said, 'If we go up 
and eat with the Americans, they [the 
ANGAU soldiers] will see us and they will 
scold us.' " 
-Auwepo ofKegebwai hamlet, Loboda 
About the same time that the base at Koyagaba existed, most of 
the young men of Loboda were recruited to work for the war effort at 
bases associated with the battle of Milne Bay. In contrast to the small 
base at Koyagaba, these bases were overwhelming in size. The sto-
ries of these bases, with their stress on the enormous number of sol-
diers, the massive quantities of cargo, the size of ships and airplanes, 
and the scale of violence, are similar to the stories told by other 
Pacific people who served in similar capacities at other large military 
installation.s (see chapter 15). 
Recollections of this wartime work for the Allies are superficially 
similar to other recollections of prewar contact. Whereas stories of 
relations with the soldiers at Koyagaba describe collective village-
wide experiences, those who left home to work for the war effort had 
experiences that were relatively individual and idiosyncratic. 14 
The soldiers at Giligili and other major Allied installations 
brought a functioning social system with them that is portrayed as 
the wider universe of the "foreigner" writ small. In the stories for-
mer wartime laborers tell, the colonial social world was much more 
Making History on Normanby Island 247 
visible than that described in stories by prewar or postwar contract 
laborers. Auwepo's mention of the presence of "foreign" women at 
the Milne Bay bases is one indication of the complexity and com-
pleteness of this "foreign" world. Even more important in the recol-
lections of this episode are ethnic differences among the European 
"foreigners." From this period persistent stereotypes of various sub-
categories of European "foreigner" are derived: Americans drink 
coffee, Australians drink tea; Americans speak English using open 
vowels, English and Australians clip their words; and so forth. 
As these contrasts suggest, these stories are attempts to portray an 
underlying structure in relations between these different kinds of 
"foreigner." For example, one man suggested that Americans 
wanted to marry Australians so they could drink tea and Australians 
wanted to marry Americans so they could drink coffee. He specifi-
cally compared this pattern to a D'Entrecasteaux stereotype in 
which Fergusson Islanders marry Normanby Islanders so the former 
can eat Normanby Island yams and the latter, Fergusson Island 
taro. 
Stories of life in the Milne Bay area include images of violence 
defining the relations between groups of "foreigners." However, 
this is not war-related violence-the few men who actually saw parts 
of the Battle of Milne Bay find it so incoherent as to be literally inde-
scribable; the violence of the battle was not grounded in any rela-
tions of which they were a part. No wartime stories explore the war-
time opposition of the Allies and the japanese. For Laboda villagers, 
both sides were more or less "good" people with whom they could 
attempt to form external relations. Rather, stories of violence focus 
on tensions among the Allies that, unlike the war between the Allies 
and the Japanese, were meaningful and relevant to their daily con-
cerns. 
The Americans and the Negroes would protect us from the Austra-
lians so they weren't angry. If they were angry we went and reported 
them and the Americans and Negroes were angry. They said, "If they 
~re angry at you, you come and take a gun and go and shoot them." 
- Bobi of Loeliya hamlet, Loboda 
Stories of fights and quarrels between Australians and Americans 
are common and well developed. Much of the affection northeast 
Normanby Islanders express for American servicemen stems from 
their feeling that they and the Americans were allied against the 
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Australian and ANGAU servicemen. Even when no actual violence 
is mentioned, the stress on the generosity of Americans is invariably 
contrasted with the lack of generosity on the part of other "for-
eigners." 
A second theme of recollections of men who went away to work is 
the amount and variety of goods that moved between the Allied 
forces and the contract laborers. To stories of the well-known gener-
osity of the Allies, Loboda villagers add recollections of an equally 
prominent movement of goods in the opposite direction. They made 
toy canoes, grass skirts, carvings, and other artifacts and collected 
shells, coconuts, and other traditional food to trade with the Allied 
soldiers. Several describe clever ways developed with their trading 
friends to outwit attempts by officers to reduce this traffic. 
For Loboda villagers this two-directional movement of goods 
implied an equality between the two parties that they are anxious to 
preserve. Unreciprocated and uncontrolled generosity is impressive 
in the recollections of many villagers. However, such generosity is 
always described as originating from anonymous soldiers or groups 
of soldiers. When Loboda villagers speak of their own special friends 
among the Allies, they stress reciprocity rather than uncontrolled 
generosity. 
Their behavior was good. We came to them and we received all kinds 
of things from them. We went and we washed their clothing. They 
gave us money and they gave us food. We carved their toy canoes and 
made their grass skirts and armbands [to give to them]. All sorts of 
things. We went to them and we traded. We collected louwahu shells 
and we went to them and we traded them. 
-Lasara of Silitaho hamlet, Loboda 
Uncontrolled generosity might be the ideal of a "paternal" relation-
ship, but, precisely because it implies an asymmetrical indebted-
ness, it und~rcuts the egalitarianism required for a long-term rela-
tionship between "friends." 
This self-conscious focus on building "friendship" relationships 
based on egalitarian reciprocity is at the heart of the interest in and 
consciousness of ethnic differences among the "foreigners." Men 
wanted to be sure they were giving gifts or trading with those of the 
proper group with which they had established their formal trading 
relationship. For example, several men noted that when black 
American soldiers asked for coconuts, the men would explain that 
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they were saving the coconuts to trade with the white American sol-
diers who were their special friends. 
In contrast to descriptions of the "friendship" created with the 
Japanese on Normanby Island, these are descriptions of truly bal-
anced relationships. And in contrast to the stories of Koyagaba, sto-
ries about labor in the Milne Bay area reflect the discovery of inter-
nal divisions among "foreigners." 
Violence and generosity divide the world of the "foreigner" into 
units that can be embedded within a larger oppositional structure. 
Loboda villagers rarely act or speak using a vocabulary based on a 
model of complementary oppositions. Rarely would anyone contrast 
"foreigners" and nonforeigners (for which there is no generic term) 
just because the two parties involved in an association happen to 
derive from these respective domains. Indeed, one rhetorical re-
quirement for visible external relations is the ability to segment the 
world of aliens as complexly and finely as possible. Just as in over-
seas kula exchange, relations are always expressed as being between 
specific hamlets of Loboda and another village rather than between 
villages or islands, so the wartime laborers speak of their relation to 
a person from New York, California, or, at least, America, rather 
than a person who is only a "foreigner." 15 
It is no accident that villagers who recollect the most intense one-
to-one relations with soldiers in the Milne Bay area underscore that 
intensity by discussing the fine geographical and "customary" sub-
divisions of the "foreigners' " world from which their "friend" or 
"brother" came. Likewise the failure of relations with the Japanese 
is reflected by a relative lack of interest in exploring subdivisions 
within the Japanese community. 
The End of Social Expansion and the Reaffirmation 
of Boundaries 
When I came [home to Loboda 1 I was arguing 
a bit with a patrol officer . . . about the land 
and war damage claims. That man got angry. 
When they sent me a telegram telling me to go 
[to a course for government employees 1 in 
Rabaul, he didn't tell me about it. We were 
supposed to start school in March, but March 
was over and it wasn't until some time in 
April that he told me .... I said, "Oh, you 
CARL E. THUNE 
save room for me next year." But the next 
year he didn't tell me again. 
-Ali pi ofKasayahai hamlet, Loboda 
Stories of the final episode of the war experience describe the with-
drawal of the military presence and the reestablishment of civilian 
colonial government. Loboda villagers recall this as a drawn-out, 
bitter experience. For example, a variety of disputes developed over 
expected compensation for war-related property damage that was 
delayed or never paid. 
More important in recollections of this episode are descriptions of 
the returning authorities' seizure or destruction of clothing, weap-
ons, and other memorabilia that the "foreigners" had given to vil-
lage people (cf. chapters 8 and 15). For villagers, this amounted to 
the loss of a substantial amount of wealth that they had no prospect 
of replacing. More significant, the goods were markers of relations 
they had established with the world of "foreigners" beyond the colo-
nial establishment. 
Villagers are unclear about why these goods were taken or de-
stroyed. Some say, dubiously, that the colonial authorities claimed 
that the "foreigner" clothing would make them sick. Others suggest 
that the colonial authorities simply did not want villagers to become 
too wealthy. Most, however, interpret the returning colonial govern-
ment's activities as designed to break the relations villagers had 
formed with "foreigners" outside the colonial power system. 
These stories bring recollections of the war years to a close in a 
way that is structurally similar to the end of many traditional folk-
tales and myths. Internal relations, that is, ties of identity uniting 
villages, are dramatically foregrounded, leaving fragmented exter-
nal relations visible only as a broader, partly historical, context. 
External relations at the close of the war are explicitly problematic 
and contest~ble. On the one hand, ties to the Allied soldiers and the 
Japanese sailors had been broken by another group of "foreigners." 
On the other hand, for the first time, external relations with some 
"foreigners" were defined in terms of opposition rather than alli-
ance. Earlier opposition existed, for example, between Australian 
soldiers and Loboda villagers, but had been used primarily to high-
light a more important alliance of villagers and other soldiers. In the 
final episode of the war, the opposition of colonial authorities is par-
amount, serving to underscore the impossibility of other external 
relations. Whereas previously external relations of alliance were 
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built on a union of a fragment of the Loboda village world with a 
fragment of the "foreign" world, usually a single individual in each 
case, now there is an opposition of all Loboda villagers to all of the 
colonial authorities. Even more than the prewar colonial world, the 
postwar colonial world is described as a unified, undivided universe 
containing anonymous individuals with whom no real relations are 
possible. 
By contrast, stories about earlier episodes of World War II are 
built around a foregrounding of external relations as internal rela-
tions are only visible to provide their underlying context. During 
those earlier episodes, internal rather than external relations are 
absent, problematic, or ambiguous. The contrast of the unified vil-
lage in postwar stories to the individual, socially isolated prewar 
contract laborers, the wartime Japanese sailors beset with anomie, 
and the largely individualistic wartime laborers is unmistakable. 
Conclusion: The Meaning of World War II and 
the Limits of Ambiguity 
It is easy to recall the past as a time that somehow led to or generated 
the present. Loboda villagers, especially those who consciously 
reflect on village change, are inclined to view both the arrival of the 
first missionary and a variety of events surrounding World War II in 
such terms. Several men and women say contact with Allied soldiers 
led them to seek an education, precipitating a radical transformation 
of their lives and of those of their fellow villagers. 
It is easy to see recollections of the past as depicting either a lost 
"golden age" or an age of darkness and misery. Loboda villagers 
occasionally speak in such terms. For example, when I was conduct-
ing my fieldwork in 1976, many villagers feared they were entering a 
socially contractive world as "foreigners" left Papua New Guinea 
following independence. For them, World War II was a period of 
optimism precisely because it was a time of social construction and 
expansion of external relations. 
However, more generally, Loboda villagers recollect World War 
II as a period in which they see alternative solutions (however unsat-
isfactory) to the problems of external relationships in a world where 
only internal relations naturally exist. Levi-Strauss has observed 
that animals that are "good to think" have an inordinate position 
within many a cultural universe (Levi-Strauss 1966; Bulmer 1957). 
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The same might be said of certain episodes within a people's past. 
Yet, as Bulmer has shown, animals that are "good to think" are fre-
quently those that are somehow strange, peculiar, odd, or unnatu-
ral. Both the time of the arrival of the first missionary and the period 
surrounding World War II are, as it were, temporal "cassowaries" 
that, in their very unnaturalness, allow the past to speak to the 
present. 
Like cassowaries and pangolins, the episodes of World War II that 
are visible in Loboda village literature are those that are tensely 
ambiguous and structurally incoherent in culturally critical ways. At 
the least, they represent the coming into contact of people and cus-
toms that should have no point of contact. But, more than this, 
unlike normal external associations, such as paternity, marriage, 
and formal exchange (e.g., kula), this contact was not only unnatural 
but never clearly structured. While retrospectively created stories 
may represent an attempt to discover coherence or pattern, the epi-
sodes remain visible precisely because such attempts are necessary. 
Loboda village recollections of World War II are frequently about 
essentially individual experiences. Even the majority of recollections 
of events that took place in Normanby Island derive from one-to-one 
relations between individual villagers and Japanese sailors or Allied 
soldiers. 
World War II stories do not appear likely to be woven eventually 
into a single, commonly accepted story. In contrast, during the 
ninety years since the Reverend Bromilow's arrival on Dobu, the 
events surrounding the early years of the mission have been con-
densed and compressed until they are situated around Bromilow 
himself. In the commonly accepted Bromilow story, he condenses 
within his person an entire literary domain comparable to the World 
War II period. Similarly, most matrilineages have a mumugwa 'myth' 
describing key points in their past by representing them as the result 
of the action~ of a single individual. 
Unlike these clearly recalled events, there are no "heroic" figures 
who embody the World War II experience. Precisely because war-
derived experiences were so individual and were not permanently 
productive of ongoing external relations, they cannot be embedded 
in the collective past of a district, village, or matrilineage. They can-
not easily be perpetuated as collective representations using tradi-
tional Loboda village principles of rhetoric. 
Ambiguity and incoherence are characteristics required to make 
the past visible, even if it is temporarily anchored in the experiences 
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of a single individual. But the ambiguity in and incoherence of 
external relations does not itself ensure the long-term survival of sto-
ries describing them. What I have described here, then, is a body of 
eminently forgettable stories. 16 In the process, however, I have tried 
to underline the reasons why, despite their being forgettable, these 
stories will, in the immediate future, continue to be remembered at 
least as long as their central Laboda village participants are alive. In 
a very real way, the social relations Loboda villagers founded are 
much more alive in memory than they probably ever were in reality 
because they gain their life from the contrast of these memories with 
present reality. 
Notes 
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted from October 1975 to May 1977 pri-
marily in Loboda village, which is located at the northeastern tip of Normanby 
Island in the Milne Bay Province of Papua New Guinea. This period is the "ethno-
graphic present" of this chapter. Research was supported by NIMH grant no. 1 
F31 MOH5340. 
I gratefully acknowledge the support and assistance of the people of Loboda dur-
ing the period of my life and work in their village. In particular, Manuweli, Lasaro, 
Dagela, Taukwaelo, and Alipi Gibson, each of whom had his life significantly 
affected by the events surrounding World War II, played critical roles in helping me 
understand the stories and events described here. 
1. This conversation took place in Sisiana village during the first day of my 
fieldwork on Normanby Island. The Sisiana villagers and I spoke a mixture of very 
ragged Dobuan on my part and equally ragged English on their part. Clearly, their 
recollections of the past were severely edited to cope with our respective linguistic 
limitations. However, these two episodes retained an unparalleled prominence in 
the stories I collected from other villages on Normanby Island. And they continued 
to be prominent even after I began to work intensively in Loboda village, located at 
the opposite end of the island, and after I had gained a fair proficiency in the 
Loboda language. While the specific details recollected regarding the founding of 
the mission and the World War II period varied from village to village, a common 
historiographical structure underlay the recollections of the past I heard. Editing 
during the literary reconstruction of historical episodes, even to meet the linguistic 
deficiencies of an alien anthropologist, certainly required the exclusion of some sup-
porting details but did not involve a modification of the underlying literary struc-
ture and presuppositions. 
2. Loboda villagers say a number of Japanese sailors lived in the Amphlette 
Islands for some years after the war and were hidden by the Islanders from the 
infrequent visits of colonial representatives. In contrast to the soldier described in 
the broadcast, these soldiers are always described as embedded within Amphlette 
Island society, which protected them from the alien colonial representatives. This is 
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the reason Loboda villagers show little interest and excitement when discussing 
them. 
3. One measure of the structuring and stability of these "autobiographical" sto-
ries is that when I collected several accounts of the same events in an individual's 
life, the later versions closely paralleled the earlier versions in terms of both con-
crete events and underlying structure. 
4. I have dealt with Loboda village social organization in more detail elsewhere 
(Thune 1980, 1983, n.d.c). 
5. For example, Dobu and Fergusson islands were bombed, a major base was 
established in the Trobriand Islands, and the japanese were temporarily established 
on Goodenough Island. 
6. Because marriage within a matrilineage is theoretically proscribed, a person's 
relation to his or her father is by definition an external relation. 
7. Lepowsky (chapter 9) has made it clear that this disorder within the Milne Bay 
European community was much more than just Laboda villagers' perceptions or 
recollections. However, the villagers choose to emphasize it within their recollec-
tions because it provides a powerful rhetorical device for presenting the problems of 
external relations with the European world. 
8. Loboda village accounts of this landing are fuzzy. As elsewhere, local people 
were not really clear about what was intended as large numbers of Allied forces 
arrived on their island. This landing may have been part of the more general test of 
Allied ability to land a large number of men that took place in the Dawada-Bwala-
wada area. 
9. As might be expected, the complexity and detail of the taxonomy that individ-
uals use depend heavily on their experience and sophistication, much of which was 
gained during the war. Some men, for example, recognize clear differences between 
Californians and New Yorkers by pointing to behavior characteristics that ring true 
even today. 
10. Zelenietz and Saito (chapter 7) have shown that recollections of the japanese 
in New Britain are powerfully conditioned by the fieldwork context in which they 
are told. While this is certainly the case in Normanby Island as well, I suspect the 
omnipotent recollection of intimate one-to·one relations between narrators and 
individual Japanese sailors means memory is relatively more important than the 
context of story telling. 
11. "Alternating residence" (cf. Thune n.d.c) and kula (Thune 1983) are two 
expressions of the idea that external relations should be grounded in their partici-
pants' respective positions within the geographical world. 
12. After Turner ( 1969, 96) I use the Latin term communitas to refer to a relatively 
unstructured state in which normative lines of social distinctions are minimized and 
a heightened sense of undifferentiated community may emerge. The one occasion 
within traditional village life when such communitas appears (seeming similarly to 
erase matrilineally derived boundaries) is the final sagali funeral feast. There, too, 
the distance between representatives of remote villages and even islands disappears 
in the face of such quantities of food that identity and difference, normally marked 
by exchange of food, become irrelevant. Food, consumed and exchanged without 
regard to the normal rules of genealogically based distribution, becomes a marker 
of the fact that matrilineality has been temporarily transcended (cf. Thune n.d.a). 
13. White (chapter 2) has also described the use of irony and humor in narrative 
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wartime recollections. However, in Santa Isabel narratives it is used to subtly 
underline the differences between what appeared to be one kind of relation with the 
Japanese and what were actually relations of quite a different kind. Whereas 
White's narrators use irony to point to differences and sophisticated cleverness, 
Loboda villagers use it to speak of village unity while pointing to what are actually 
irrelevant and, hence, humorous differences. 
14. However, these experiences were not completely idiosyncratic. Work groups 
were frequently composed of young men from a single village and headed by the 
oldest of the group. The wartime camaraderie that emerged among the members of 
these groups is still visible today. 
15. Kula is a traditional exchange system linking communities and islands 
throughout the Massim region of Papua New Guinea. 
16. See Lindstrom (chapter 17) for an example of how wartime recollections are 
eminently unforgettable because they are used to derive the present directly from 
the past. By contrast, Loboda village recollections speak to the present, but only 
indirectly, by showing structural transformations or alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 11 
Taemfaet: Experiences and Reactions 
of Santa Cruz Islanders during 
the Battle for Guadalcanal 
WILLIAM H. DAVENPORT 
SANTA CRuz Islanders refer to the Pacific War years as taemfaet, a 
loanword from Pidgin English ("time-fight"). Their own words 
having to do with precolonial war and feuding are not considered 
appropriate for the unprecedented events of World War II. While 
the Santa Cruz Islands were spared the massive disruption, not to 
mention destruction, that some Solomon Island societies suffered, 
the events that did touch them, plus the experiences that some men 
had while working at the American bases on Guadalcanal after the 
fighting was over had a profound effect on Santa Cruz perceptions 
about their own culture, the world around them, and their place 
within it. 
As japanese forces advanced on the Solomon Islands during April 
1942, the people of the Santa Cruz Islands were not aware that a war 
was approaching and that the government at Tulagi, Nggela, had 
already been evacuated (see chapter 14). Nor were they aware that 
the United Kingdom was already fully engaged in a war in Europe. 
As far as they were concerned, the British were firmly and forever 
established in the Solomons, two hundred miles to the west, and 
they were under the authority of a district officer stationed at Vani-
koro, the southernmost of the Santa Cruz Islands (Macquarrie 
1948). Most of the people of the Santa Cruz group, however, lived 
in the northern islands and rarely had any direct contact with the 
district officer. Their regular contacts with the outside world at that 
time were with missionaries of the Melanesian Mission (Anglican), 
who came and went several times a year on their ship, the Southern 
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Cross; with Captain Fred Louis Jones, who traded in his small ship 
throughout the islands; and an occasional visit from other recruiters 
seeking labor for plantations in the Solomons. Even though the 
Santa Cruz people recognized the district officer and his squad of 
police as the embodiment of authority and the enforcers of some-
thing called "law," they assumed that all other Europeans with 
whom they were familiar were either directly associated with or in 
some way agents of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate gov-
ernment. 
At Vanikoro, too, there was an Australian logging company, also 
thought to be associated with the government in some way because it 
and the district office had come to the island at the same time, about 
fifteen years before. The timber company had a few Europeans in 
supervisory positions and employed twenty to twenty-five local men, 
who were recruited from all over the Santa Cruz Islands. Captain 
Jones, in addition to being the sole trader in the area, had a contract 
with the company to recruit and repatriate its local labor. A steam-
ship called at Vanikoro two or three times a year, as necessary, to 
take away the logs. 
The district office at Vanikoro consisted of only the district officer 
and a squad of police from the Solomon Islands, but the most signifi-
cant aspect of it from the local point of view was the jail, where a few 
Santa Cruz men were always incarcerated for minor offenses. Seri-
ous offenders were sent to Tulagi to serve out their sentences. The 
district office maintained radio contact with Tulagi and with Fiji, 
where the British high commissioner for the Western Pacific resided. 
Rarely did the district officer at Vanikoro have a small ship at his 
disposal, so he was unable to tour his district regularly. If he had 
orders or information to send to his local representatives, called 
headmen, he usually did so via the mission ship Southern Cross or 
through Captain Jones. Despite these handicaps, the district office 
on Vanikoro had managed to impose and maintain the pax Britannica 
in this outpost of empire, although even in 1942 it was a fragile and 
uneasy peace. With some justification, the peoples of the Santa Cruz 
Islands had earned a reputation for violence against Europeans, 
especially missionaries, before the British arrived, and their pacifica-
tion by British authority had been both brutal and bloody. As a 
result, the people had learned to fear, if not respect, the district offi-
cer, and they were painfully aware that they had to obey official 
orders or risk becoming involved with the police and jail sentences at 
either Vanikoro or Tulagi. 
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The Europeans Withdraw 
The first news about the Japanese invasion of the Solomon Islands 
was not passed on to the Santa Cruz Islanders until late April or 
early May 1942. All the laborers then at Vanikoro were called in 
from the timber-cutting areas, informed that an enemy had invaded 
the Solomons, and told that they would be repatriated to their 
respective islands as soon as possible. While they were waiting for 
Captain Jones to arrive in his small ship, a U.S. Navy vessel, possi-
bly a destroyer, arrived outside the harbor at Peu, site of the district 
office and the timber company headquarters. Shortly after arriving, 
it was attacked from the air. Bombs were dropped, but no direct hits 
were scored. The ship fired back as it steamed out to sea, apparently 
unharmed. This engagement took place in full view of everyone on 
shore; no one even took cover. The unexpected magnitude of the 
bomb explosions in the sea and the noise of the ship's antiaircraft 
guns stunned the Islanders, who, though familiar with steamships, 
rifles, and small charges of dynamite, had not seen a warship before 
and knew nothing about bombs and cannon. This action probably 
occurred on 4 or 5 May as U.S. andJapanese task forces fought the 
Battle of the Coral Sea. 
In due course, Captain Jones repatriated the laborers to their 
home islands north ofVanikoro and returned to Vanikoro to evacu-
ate the Europeans employed at the timber company and the Solo-
mon Islander police to Port Vila, New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), 
about four hundred miles to the south. The district officer stayed on 
for several months more, but from then on Vanikoro came under the 
direct military jurisdiction of the U.S. command in the New 
Hebrides. Also left behind was another British government employ-
ee, Guso Piko, an assistant medical officer from one of the Solomon 
Islands, who would play a significant role later. 
At the same time the U.S. Navy vessel was attacked offVanikoro, 
a single aircraft, presumably Japanese, flew low over the villages 
surrounding Graciosa Bay, Santa Cruz Island (Nidu). This created 
great consternation. One woman, Inane of Nepna village, who was 
a spirit medium, went from settlement to settlement explaining that 
the aircraft was Kio, a deity, one of whose manifestations was a great 
bird. Others claimed it was Lu, a phoenix-like creature that dwelled 
in the fiery peak of Temami (Tinakula), an active volcano located 
ten miles north of, and visible from, the Graciosa Bay villages. How-
ever, two men who lived in the Graciosa Bay area had seen a sea-
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plane a few years earlier while they were at Tulagi serving jail sen-
tences, and they tried to explain what an airplane was. They 
assumed that the plane belonged to the British. 
The Santa Cruz laborers who had been evacuated from Vanikoro 
learned something of the larger situation during their repatriation 
voyage. Captain Jones, unlike most district officers, spoke fluent 
Pidgin English and had a good, long-standing relationship with the 
local people. He made it very clear to the repatriates that the British 
government was leaving, not just Vanikoro, but also Tulagi; that the 
Melanesian Mission yacht Southern Cross probably would not call at 
the islands for a long time; and that he, as well as another occasional 
recruiter who came to the Santa Cruz Islands, would also not be 
returning for some time, maybe never. 
The Santa Cruz Islands were now cut off from all contacts with 
the outside. Fortunately, only two men from Nidu, who were 
employed as crew on a government ship, were stranded outside. 
Within the group three persons belonged elsewhere: a deacon at 
Graciosa Bay, a catechist in the Dufflslands, and the assistant medi-
cal officer, mentioned before, at Vanikoro. All three men were from 
Santa Isabel in the Solomons. None of the Santa Cruz Islanders 
really knew who the Japanese were, although a renegade Japanese 
by the name of Ito had traded in the group some years earlier and 
Japanese shell poachers had often made fleeting visits to-and made 
a nuisance of themselves at-some of the islands. The eyewitness 
reports of the aerial attack on the American warship at Vanikoro 
caused fear everywhere. No one understood who the Americans 
were, what they were doing in the area, or why they should be fight-
ing the Japanese. But the greatest puzzlement of all was caused by 
knowledge that the government was gone. There would be no more 
district officer, hostile police, or jail sentences for poorly understood 
crimes. That part was welcomed, but neither would there be visits 
by the Southern Cross; no more Captain Jones and opportunities to 
work at Vanikoro. All their means of access to work, money, and 
trade goods were closed off, and that was a severe blow. 
The Forces of War Arrive 
During the first few weeks after the evacuation ofVanikoro, the peo-
ples around Graciosa Bay, Nidu, were frequently frightened by the 
appearance at night of a large and completely darkened ship cruising 
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inside the bay. Often, the ship probed the shoreline with a search-
light, and many people assumed that if the searchlight picked out a 
house or person, the ship would shoot it. Unbeknown to them, this 
was a Japanese destroyer that was patrolling the area, looking for 
evidence of an American presence. 
Suddenly one day a large cargo ship entered Graciosa Bay, 
steamed to the head of it, and dropped anchor. No cargo ship of this 
size had ever entered the bay before. For several days the ship dis-
charged hundreds of drums of gasoline, which were stashed in an 
uninhabited swampy area, called Lekapi, the same site that Alvaro 
Mendaiia and his company had briefly occupied in 1595, an event of 
which no memory was retained in the Santa Cruz Islands (Allen 
1976; Green 1976, 31-32). Some information was exchanged 
between the ship's crew and a few local men who viewed the activi-
ties from a cautious distance. They learned that the ship was Ameri-
can, and they were warned to stay away from the petrol-an order 
they respectfully observed. 
Several weeks went by, then a large U.S. Navy ship arrived and 
anchored in Graciosa Bay. It was the USS Curtiss, a naval aircraft 
tender, and it was soon joined by several Catalina (PBY) flying 
boats. Immediately, the aircraft commenced making patrols, taking 
off early in the morning and returning just before dark. The gasoline 
that had been unloaded some weeks before was aviation fuel for the 
aircraft. None of the ship's crew came ashore just to visit and look 
around, but often late in the afternoon an armed squad would land 
and march in close order through several villages. At first the villag-
ers thought this might be a repeat of an earlier experience when a 
squad of protectorate police marched through the villages of Gra-
ciosa Bay and burned all the sacred houses. 
The excitement caused by the U.S. Navy activities soon took an 
ominous turn. One day a PBY returned trailing smoke: After land-
ing safely, it taxied straight to the shore, where it was beached near a 
village. Just as the crew had safely abandoned it, the aircraft 
exploded. On another day, another returning aircraft sank in shal-
low water before it could be beached. Despite language problems 
between the Americans and the local people, communication was 
good enough for the local people to learn that the aircraft had been 
observing Japanese warships not far away, and several had been hit 
by enemy gunfire. The two aircraft that were now out of action were 
among those that had been hit, and because their hulls had been 
holed, their crews had tried to beach the planes before they sank in 
Graciosa Bay. 
Experiences of Santa Cruz Islanders 
One day orders came from the ship that all the people in the bay 
area should leave their villages immediately and go inland because a 
Japanese attack was expected. Within hours all villages along the 
inner shores of Graciosa Bay, an area called Nabakaenga, were va-
cated. This involved about one thousand people, more than half the 
population of Nidu. They took refuge in their gardens, which were 
located on a limestone plateau above the narrow coastal strip along 
which the villages were situated. Most households maintained shel-
ters in their gardens, so there was some rude housing to move into. 
Evacuating the villages and taking refuge in the gardens was not an 
unfamiliar action, because, before peace was established under Brit-
ish rule, such actions were often taken during feuds and periods of 
warfare. However, it would be eight or nine months before the 
Nabakaenga people could move back to their villages, and that was a 
much longer period than any evacuation had lasted before. 
Life in the gardens was very upsetting. It was not only physically 
uncomfortable, but all community life was disrupted because garden 
sites and shelters were scattered (cf. chapter 15). Except for rainwa-
ter, which had to be collected from tree trunks, there is no fresh 
water in most of the garden lands. There could be no bathing or 
washing of clothes in the sea at dusk, a custom that was a pleasant 
daily event in village life. In rotation, a few people would return to 
their villages each day to fetch fresh water from the wells and springs 
located there and to wash themselves and their clothes in the sea. A 
few brave souls, however, tarried in their villages, and children pad-
dled out to the ship on rafts and boards to beg from the crew. The 
Americans \vere always friendly and often threw down scraps of food 
and cloth (bed sheets, probably). The Americans were seen as cor-
dial and very generous, because no persons aboard the Southern Cross 
or the steamers at Vanikoro had ever given anything away in this 
manner. 
The anticipated japanese attack finally came. At the time, the air-
craft were away on patrol, so the attack was directed toward the 
ship. Bombs were dropped, there was some strafing, but no direct 
hits were scored. The ship fired back, and witnesses believe that the 
attack was beaten off. There was apparently only one casualty: a 
local boy about five or six years old, who had been paddling about 
the ship, was struck in the face by a bomb fragment. He made it 
back to shore and recovered from his injuries, but he lost one eye. 
Shortly after the attack, the ship weighed anchor and left Graciosa 
Bay not to return._ The remains of the two damaged PBYs that were 
hit by enemy fire are still visible, one on the beach and one in shal-
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low water. Both have been stripped clean of every fragment that 
could be hammered and cut away, but they are testaments to that 
memorable war action in Graciosa Bay. 
These events took place in June and July 1942. During this period 
the Japanese were consolidating their hold on the Solomon Islands, 
and the Americans were expanding their supply bases in the New 
Hebrides ( cf. chapter 17). Naturally, the people of Nidu knew next 
to nothing about what was going on around them. As far as they 
were concerned, they were the center of a war between two peoples 
about whom they knew very little. However, from the frightening 
events at Vanikoro and Graciosa Bay they had learned that, for bet-
ter or worse, they were allied with the Americans against the Japa-
nese, who were a fearful enemy. 
An American Outpost 
In June 1942, just before the USS Curtiss had taken up its station in 
Graciosa Bay, a team of five U.S. Army enlisted men was surrepti-
tiously put ashore with large quantities of stores and equipment on 
the islet called Temotu, which lies on the western side of the entrance 
to the bay. It was immediately noticed by some people of Malo vil-
lage, a fully Christian community that had had more contact with 
both the Melanesian Mission and government officials than any 
other Nidu village. Its mission was to establish a hidden lookout sta-
tion and maintain radio contact with U.S. Army Intelligence in the 
New Hebrides. A smaller unit was put ashore on Vanikoro at the 
same time. Although these observation units were copies of the 
famous coastwatchers of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, they 
are not to be confused with them. The coastwatchers were a special 
force of civilians, under the command of the Australian navy, that 
manned obst;rvation posts inside Japanese-held areas (see chapter 
14; Feldt 1946; Lord 1977; Michener 1947, 52-72). 
A good relationship was immediately established between the 
Malo people and the U.S. Army coastwatchers. The unit decided to 
set up its lookout station, not on Temotu islet, but at a concealed and 
isolated location above the eastern shore of Graciosa Bay, several 
miles from the closest village. Several young men from Malo volun-
teered to help transport all the gear and set up the station. The infor-
mal leader of the Malo group was Mepuke, who later became a 
dresser (i.e., medical aide), a distinguished community leader, and a 
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staunch advocate of modernization on Nidu. The American team 
asked the Malo men who were helping them to beg their fellow vil-
lagers not to talk with people of other villages about their mission. 
For the most part, these instructions were obeyed, and very few 
other Nidu people learned about the U.S. Army presence on the 
island. 
Just as the lookout station became operational, the USS Curtiss 
arrived, rendering it, for the moment at least, more or less superflu-
ous. The station was to be supplied from time to time by the small 
motorized sailing ship, the USS Echo, a trading vessel that had been 
commandeered by the U.S. Navy in the New Hebrides. 
By the time the USS Curtiss left Graciosa Bay, all the men in the 
coastwatching unit had become seriously ill, their radio did not 
always work, and their supplies had run out, because the supply ship 
had failed to call as promised. Mepuke and his crew supplied local 
food, but often the Americans were too ill to eat, and there was fear 
in Malo villages that the Americans would die. When the USS Echo 
finally did arrive with supplies and discovered the desperate plight of 
the observation unit, it called for a special air rescue mission from 
the New Hebrides to evacuate one man. Illness continued to plague 
the team until it was finally removed (Garrison 1983, 42-54, 124). 
The "New Law" 
During the time that the USS Curtiss was on station in Graciosa Bay, 
Assistant Medical Officer Guso Piko arrived at Nidu. He had pad-
dled alone from Vanikoro, ninety-five miles away, in a small canoe. 
There were no medicines at Nidu, so he could give little medical 
attention to the people, but he made it known that he had been 
instructed by the district officer, who by then was spending most of 
his time in the New Hebrides, to maintain some sort of official gov-
ernment presence in the northern islands. 
Guso Piko quickly discovered a tense social situation that seemed 
to require his services, not as a medical practitioner, but as a repre-
sentative of the protectorate government. In a village on the south 
coast of Nidu a bitter dispute had broken out, having to do with the 
traditional authority of senior men over women. At issue were such 
hallowed customs as the arrangement of marriages, the receipt of 
bride wealth, and the acceptance of damage payments by men for 
sexual offenses against women over whom they had authority. Guso 
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Pika stepped in to adjudicate the dispute. The policy position that he 
adopted was one that had been advocated, but not enforced, by both 
the protectorate government and the Melanesian Mission: women 
should be able to choose their husbands if they so wished; the pay-
ment of bride wealth should be a voluntary matter; and senior male 
relatives should not collect damages for sex offenses against their 
female kin, because this appeared to be very much like pimping. As 
a result of Guso Pika's attempt to introduce these "progressive" 
ideas, the situation became worse. Before long, the senior men of 
several villages declared that the traditional authority held by men-
chiefly fathers-over unmarried women was no longer to be recog-
nized. Moreover, men and unmarried women could have sex rela-
tions according to any private arrangements that were agreeable to 
the parties and without incurring any legal liabilities whatsoever. 
What followed was an open competition among the adult males 
for the sexual favors of unmarried women. The consenting women, 
however, demanded to be compensated with gifts. In addition, some 
lascivious communal games were invented. The men who became 
the most successful in the competition for girls were obviously those 
who had, or could lay hands on, the most trade goods, because the 
women involved would accept only calico, tobacco, tea, and sugar as 
gifts. Two economic factors are relevant to this excessive reaction to 
the customs that regulated sexual relations. First, the south coast vil-
lages had always been poorer, in every way, than the north coast vil-
lages, which had been the center for interisland trade and the 
favored. place for the recruitment of wage labor. Second, since the 
flow of trade goods into Nidu had been cut off by the war, the south 
coast communities were doubly short. The knowledge that the 
imposed authorities of both the protectorate government and the 
Melanesian Mission were no longer present was probably another 
crucial factor. 
This reaction against tradition by the men of two villages soon 
spread and grew into a social movement, called the "New Law." 
Because Guso Pika had been involved, it was also called "Guso's 
Law." However, Guso Pika denied any connection whatsoever with 
the movement, and he ultimately got in his canoe again and paddled 
off to the Reeflslands in the north (Davenport 1970). 
The New Law spread through most of the villages of the south and 
west coasts, which accounted for slightly less than half the total pop-
ulation of Nidu. Around Graciosa Bay, however, the New Law was 
rejected, in large part because of vigorous opposition by the deacon. 
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He was a devoted clergyman who had been placed there before the 
outbreak of the war by the Melanesian Mission in order to support 
the wavering Christian minority who lived in Nabakaenga and to 
continue proselytizing. The social movement would continue to 
flourish until the war was over and officials of both the government 
and the mission returned to denounce it. 
Mysterious Doings in a Rear Area 
The American campaign to recapture the Solomons from the Japa-
nese commenced on 7 August 1942 with simultaneous landings by 
marines on Guadalcanal Island and in the Florida Islands (Nggela) 
at Tulagi, the old protectorate capital. The bitter battle for control of 
the Solomon Islands would rage for six months before the Japanese 
were forced to withdraw, and the vanguard of the Japanese thrust 
into the Southwest Pacific was turned back. The original battle plans 
of the U.S. forces included a third landing on Nidu, known to be 
unoccupied by the Japanese, and would be carried out by the force 
that had invaded Nggela as soon as Tulagi was secured. However, 
the situation on Guadalcanal became so difficult that no troops could 
be spared, even for an unopposed occupation of the Santa Cruz 
Islands (Griffith 1980, 30, 32-38, 168-169, 193). Of course, the 
people of Nidu knew absolutely nothing about either a possible inva-
sion of their island or the fierce fighting that was going on in the 
Solomons. The U.S. Army coastwatching group was still at its post 
overlooking the eastern shore of Graciosa Bay, but, as before, they 
had become desperately ill, their radio had ceased to function, and 
they did not communicate much about the war situation with the 
Malo men who were helping them. In due course, a PBY came to 
evacuate all but one of the coastwatchers. Not long after, word came 
via the radio that two of those evacuated had died of their illnesses. 
Sometime in early October a landing craft suddenly came into 
Graciosa Bay and landed a party of U.S. Navy Seabees on the beach 
of a small cove of Temotu islet, again close to the village of Malo. 
Supplies were landed, and a temporary camp was set up. While not 
hostile to the Malo people who watched their every move, the Sea-
bees made little attempt to communicate or explain their presence, 
and without asking for guides, most of the party set out for the for-
ested center of Temotu, which was only about an hour's walk from 
the shore. There they cut small clearings and pegged strips of white 
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cloth to the ground. With this task completed, they returned to their 
camp, and in a day or two departed, leaving behind most of the sup-
plies they had brought. During this brief and unexplained visit, the 
last coastwatcher was removed and the station was shut down. The 
local people never did fully understand the purpose of the activities 
involving the clearings and the cloth. Months went by before they 
scavenged the cloth, tents, tinned rations, and other useful items 
that had been left behind. The disregard that the Americans had for 
all these valuable goods was a puzzle. 
When the coast watching station at Graciosa Bay was closed down, 
a substitute was established in the Reef Islands to the north. The 
position selected for it had a commanding view of Mohawk Bay, the 
only harbor of significance, but it was in a completely exposed posi-
tion. However, disease was not a problem there as it had been at 
Graciosa Bay, and the men enjoyed close and friendly relations with 
the two nearest villages. 
At this time, the situation on Guadalcanal had become desperate 
for the U.S. Marines. Some of the strategists had revived the plan to 
occupy Nidu as a rear-area base and a place to fall back to, should 
U.S. forces be compelled to abandon Guadalcanal. The party of 
Seabees that had come ashore at Temotu was an airfield construction 
unit from the New Hebrides sent to select and mark a suitable site 
for a landing strip on the flat, interior plateau of the islet. Unnoticed 
by the local people, a high-flying photo reconnaissance aircraft from 
a mapping unit in the New Hebrides had made several passes over 
all of Nidu immediately after the cloth markers had been laid out on 
the ground. However, the U.S. military situation improved on 
Guadalcanal, so the contingency plans to occupy Nidu were aban-
doned, and the maps that were to be made from the aerial photo-
graphs were never completed. To this day probably no Santa Cruz 
Islander is aware of the fact that twice their islands narrowly missed 
being occupied and transformed into· a rear-area base similar to 
those that had been constructed in the New Hebrides and had 
proved so important in the battle for the Solomon Islands. 
About two weeks after the Seabees came ashore on Temotu, on 25 
October to be exact, airplanes began to fly low over Nidu and the 
Reef Islands. The peoples of Graciosa Bay, who were still living in 
their gardens, were terrified because they recognized Japanese insig-
nia on some of the planes. They had learned to recognize the mark-
ings ofboth U.S. andjapanese aircraft while the USS Curtis was sta-
tioned and attacked in Graciosa Bay. At Mohawk Bay in the Reef 
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Islands a Japanese submarine appeared and immediately was 
attacked by a U.S. aircraft. The submarine escaped from the shal-
low waters of Mohawk Bay and, in full view of the people of N enubo 
village, submerged as bombs burst all around it. Reef Islanders 
believe that it was sunk. This was probably the Japanese submarine 
I -21, but it is not listed as having been lost in that engagement. 
On the same day that the Japanese submarine appeared and was 
attacked, the army coastwatching station was bombed and strafed by 
Japanese aircraft. None of the coastwatchers was injured, but the 
station was put out of action, and the team went to the village of 
Nenubo to live. Reeflslanders still point to shrapnel scars from the 
bombing on some coconut trees growing on the site of the lookout 
station. Some weeks later the army coastwatchers were removed 
from the Reef Islands, and some months later a baby girl was born 
to one of the young women of Nenubo. The father was one of the 
army coastwatchers, but he never contacted the mother after he left 
the Reeflslands. 
The intense air activity over all the northern Santa Cruz Islands 
lasted only two days. Afterward, the islands slipped back into quiet 
isolation. Later, great quantities of flotsam, some of it useful, 
washed up along the sparsely populated northern shore of Nidu and 
onto some of the beaches in the Reeflslands. This was another nota-
ble, but unexplained, event that was not directly associated with the 
last appearance of aircraft. 
These events were fringe actions of one of the great naval confron-
tations in the Pacific War, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. The 
main engag~ment took place north of the islands, far beyond the 
limits of sight and hearing of the northern peoples of the Santa Cruz 
group. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands was very significant 
because it forced the main body of the Japanese navy to withdraw 
from the entire Solomons area. 
Isolation and Cultural Revival 
By this time the northern Santa Cruz Islands (Nidu, the Reef 
Islands, and the Duff Islands) had responded to their isolation and 
the growing scarcity of trade goods with a rejuvenation of traditional 
craft specializations and an intensification of trade among the 
islands. More and more overseas trading canoes were built, men's 
house associations began to flourish again as commercial groups, 
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local leaders reasserted their traditional authority, red-feather mon-
ey again became the standard medium of exchange, and new 
wealthy persons began to emerge. However, there was one signifi-
cant difference between this revival of the traditional economic and 
political systems and the situation that prevailed before protectorate 
"law and order" had been imposed: feuding and warfare did not 
return. There seems to have been a residual fear that violence 
among themselves might still provoke some kind of retaliation from 
the outside, if not from the British, perhaps from the Americans or 
the Japanese, either of whom could drop bombs on the people. 
Then, too, the people may have come to regard peace as a desirable 
state of affairs. 
For six or seven months after those two days during which aircraft 
were continually flying over their islands (that is, the Battle of Santa 
Cruz) there was no more war-related activity in the Santa Cruz 
Islands. However, a tragedy of another kind occurred in the Reef 
Islands. A trading canoe on a voyage between the islands was found 
to be months overdue at its destination, and its crew was presumed 
to have perished at sea. Over a year later two survivors of this ill-
fated voyage were returned by a government ship to their home 
islands. They had drifted all the way to Sudest Island, Papua New 
Guinea, where they were nursed back to health by U.S. Army med-
ics and then sent back to the Solomon Islands, although the Ameri-
cans could not figure out where they had come from (Davenport 
1964, 140-141). 
Labour Corps Work and Contact with Americans 
One day the isolation was broken by the appearance of an American 
ship that called at both Graciosa Bay and Mohawk Bay. Aboard 
were recruitt;rs seeking labor to work at the U.S. military base on 
Guadalcanal. The people of Graciosa Bay were also advised that it 
would be safe to move out of their gardens and back into their vil-
lages. About a dozen men each from Nidu and the Reef Islands 
agreed to recruit. They thought they were going off to fight in the 
war on the side of the Americans, although by that time the fighting 
was over on Guadalcanal. 
For nearly a year these recruits worked as laborers at the main 
U.S. base on Guadalcanal, in the environs of what is now Honiara, 
the national capital of the Solomon Islands. The sheer scale of the 
Experiences of Santa Cruz Islanders 2JI 
Solomon Islands Labour Corps officer C. V. Widdy recruiting workers on 
San Cristobal, June 1943. (U.S. Navy) 
operation there overwhelmed them (cf. chapter 15). Never had they 
imagined there were so many Europeans, virtually none of whom 
were British, or that such vast quantities of materiel could exist. 
Their perception of the world, all of which together was called "The 
Big Place," and their relationship to it was totally shattered. Sud-
denly, they
1 
realized how few, how poor, and how powerless they 
were in comparison with the Americans. Obviously, too, their esti-
mation of the British diminished, for they still knew nothing of the 
European war theater, nor did they understand that the Pacific War 
was still raging farther to the west in New Guinea and elsewhere in 
the Pacific. 
Their contacts with white Americans were only minimal, but the 
impressions they did get were that they were a totally different kind 
of person from the English and Australian traders, missionaries, and 
government officials to whom they were accustomed. The Ameri-
cans were different, too, from the French and German bosses under 
whom, many years before, some of their fathers had worked when 
they recruited to work on plantations in the New Hebrides. The 
troops they did work with closely were black, and their relationships 
with these Americans were not the best. The black Americans were 
distant, gruff, and authoritarian; at best patronizing. On the other 
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hand, the black Americans never asked them to do things they 
would not do themselves, were always concerned about whether 
they had enough food, were adequately dressed, and were comfort-
able in their quarters. They saw, too, that the black troops were seg-
regated from and inferior in rank and authority to the white soldiers. 
In this hierarchy they and other Solomon Islanders were also segre-
gated, and they were at the bottom. 
Wages were only a few shillings a week, the same rate that they 
had earned at Vanikoro and on the plantations before the war. Their 
accommodations were inferior to the labor lines at plantations, but 
about the same as they had contended with in the forests of Vani-
koro. Food was much better, however, and there was no limit to it. 
There was also beer, which, under protectorate law, had been for-
bidden to them. The work was about the same, but not nearly so 
routine and boring. However, the excitement of it all put this 
recruiting experience in a class by itself. Work went on day and 
night, there were movies every night, and there were virtually no 
restrictions on salvaging things from the massive rubbish dumps. 
American soldiers, both black and white, were always giving them 
shoes, clothing, knives, candy, and cigarettes. When the time for 
repatriation came, they were allowed to take with them all the 
salvaged materiel, but no explosives, that they could carry aboard 
the ship. Not all the Solomon Islanders who worked at the Guadal-
canal bases were allowed to take home their booties of salvage, and 
as a result they bore grudges against the British officials who 
deprived them of their spoils (Davenport and Qoker 1967, 125; 
Keesing 1978, 48). For the Santa Cruz Island men the value of this 
booty they had accumulated constituted compensation that far 
exceeded anything they had ever expected to receive. There can be 
little doubt that this was a significant factor in the way that Santa 
Cruz Islanders later accepted the reinstitution of British rule as well 
as their lack ?f interest in and rejection· of an antigovernment social 
movement ( cf. chapter 15). 
The repatriates from Guadalcanal were welcomed back as return-
ing heroes. The amount of "cargo" they brought back was unprece-
dented, and their stories were listened to with awe. In earlier times, 
the few men who had gone to Australia and returned were all called 
liars when they tried to explain the wonders of Sydney. This time, 
however, the new insights and perspectives that the recruits had 
gained were believed and shared by all. All the notable experiences 
of their prewar lives grew pale in light of the extraordinary events 
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and experiences of the war. On Nidu, at least, all of the so-called big 
men (kaetu) and all of the so-called rich men (bonia) began to see 
themselves in a new and greatly diminished way. They were merely 
"rubbish" compared with the white Americans who were in com-
mand on Guadalcanal. 
Subsequently, too, many well-known myths appear to have been 
reformulated in recognition of the technological superiority and 
enormous wealth of the Americans. For example, there is a saga 
about the deity Lata, a culture hero who, among other things, 
invented the specialized overseas cargo canoe (tepuki) for which the 
northern Santa Cruz Islands are well known. In one version, Lata 
invents steamships, then abandons the Santa Cruz Islands, taking 
his wondrous invention to America (compare this with the Marshal-
lese mythic "trickster" Etao, chapter 3, and the Vanatinai myth of 
Alagh, chapter 9). In other myths an earlier historical period is 
described in which Santa Cruz Islanders did not have to work to 
produce their food, but this paradise was lost because someone failed 
to obey the commands of a deity. One version of this theme describes 
the former time of plenty as one in which not only was there no hard 
work but European trade goods also came without money. When the 
deity who was responsible for this free abundance was offended, he 
went off to America, and that is why the Americans are so rich now. 
Many other stories in this genre extol the technological and material 
superiority of the Americans but at the same time establish a direct 
connection between them and the people of the Santa Cruz Islands. 
Reestablishing Colonial Authority 
The direct authority of the protectorate government and the influ-
ence of the Melanesian Mission were slow to be reestablished in the 
Santa Cruz Islands after the fighting was over in the Solomons. 
What few ships, government personnel, and European missionaries 
were available had to be used to serve the larger populations of the 
protectorate located in the central and western districts. The U.S. 
military command stayed completely out of all protectorate affairs, 
except where military matters were directly concerned, so no Ameri-
cans appeared again (until I arrived in 1958) in the Santa Cruz 
Islands. It was several years before the timber company recom-
menced operations on Vanikoro, and Jones, the trader, did not 
return until the timber company was again operating. The Santa 
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Cruz Islands remained cut off and more or less isolated for many 
months after the war was over and even after the protectorate gov-
ernment assumed full administrative control again. 
As the protectorate government began to reassert its administra-
tive authority, it faced a new major crisis. The peoples of the central 
and eastern Solomon Islands, constituting well over one-half of the 
total population of the protectorate, had coalesced into a visionary, 
antigovernment social movement called Maasina Rule, or March-
ing Rule (Allan 1951; Keesing 1978, 46-53; Laracy 1976, 121-143; 
Worsley 1957, 170-183). For several years, nearly all the resources 
of the protectorate as well as the efforts of all the missions were 
directed at containing this social movement, which was perceived as 
an insurrection against the protectorate government. Thousands of 
Maasina Rule militants were rounded up and placed behind barbed 
wire at the capital on Guadalcanal. All government plans for the 
reconstruction of the economy and the institution of administrative 
reforms were frustrated because so much government effort was 
going into dealing with Maasina Rule. Consequently, small popula-
tions that were not caught up in the social movement were just left to 
shift for themselves, and the Santa Cruz Island peoples fell into this 
category. The people of Nidu were exposed to Maasina Rule ideas, 
but they rejected them outright. 
The first act of the protectorate government to reestablish its 
authority in the Santa Cruz Islands was the appointment of new and 
additional government headmen. It was also decided not to reopen 
the district office of Vanikoro but to administer the Santa Cruz 
Islands from Kira Kira, San Cristobal, two hundred miles to the 
west. At that time a government-appointed headman was an official 
representative of the district office, but he had no power of arrest, 
and, needless to say, had neither arms nor police to enforce protec-
torate law. In reality, a headman was merely a spokesman and a 
source of information for the district officer. One of the newly 
appointed headmen on Nidu was a man who had gone to Guadal-
canal to work for the Americans, and there he had become a convert 
to the ideas that were to crystallize as the Maasina Rule movement. 
As a headman on Nidu, he lost no time in trying to organize the 
island around the manifesto of Maasina Rule, as he perceived it. 
One of the Maasina Rule objectives was the, creation of a more cen-
tralized political system under "chiefs" instead of the traditional sys-
tem of big men (kaetu), but these innovations fell on deaf ears. Subse-
quently, his actions were reported to the district commissioner, who 
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not only discharged him as headman, but charged and tried him for 
insurrection. He was acquitted, however. 
On the first visit of the bishop of Melanesia to Nidu aboard the 
mission yacht Southern Cross, he was, of course, apprised of the New 
Law movement that was still going on but with reduced enthusiasm. 
The heart of the movement was in some villages that were difficult 
for the mission to reach because they were near neither an anchor-
age nor a safe landing place. The bishop remained on Nidu for sev-
eral days longer than planned and went overland to these villages, 
which no European missionary had ever visited before. Nor had a 
bishop ever strayed that far from the safety of his ship. Even though 
there were no active Christians in these villages at that time, the 
bishop had no difficulty in persuading the leaders of the New Law 
that they were in error. Not many months later the bishop brought 
to Nidu, for a second time, a contingent of Solomon Islander prose-
lytizers called Tasiu (Brotherhood) in an effort to bring Nidu more 
fully into Christendom. This time the Tasiu were very successful 
(Fox 1958, 268-272; Whiteman 1983, 194-198). 
The rejection of Maasina Rule and the rapid acceptance of the 
Anglican church after many decades of unsuccessful missionizing 
reveal something about the postwar state of mind, so to speak, of the 
Nidu people. The war had cut them off, and the economic conse-
quences of that were painful. New knowledge about Europeans had 
diminished their high estimation of themselves and their cultural 
heritage, which up to this time they had vigorously defended against 
all efforts by government and mission to change. Furthermore, the 
great powefs that their deities possessed seemed puny in comparison 
with the apparent miracles that had been revealed by the war. Euro-
peans, and especially the Americans, while mortals like themselves, 
displayed talents and powers that were even greater than those of 
their own deities. Even as late as 1958, comparisons of the feats of 
their deities and those of Europeans were favorite topics of conversa-
tion. Needless to say, the question, "How did Europeans acquire 
their superior knowledge and powers?" was a constant perplexity. 
The smallness of the entire Santa Cruz population was also a 
depressing fact in the postwar reappraisal of themselves because they 
saw that even if they all worked together, as the Americans had done 
on Guadalcanal, they would not constitute much of a work force. 
Missionaries, and even some devout government officials, were 
quick to take advantage of this reappraisal of traditional beliefs 
and the quandary about perceived European superstitions. They 
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preached that God was the source of all the miraculous European 
achievements. This "good news" was partly accepted by the Nidu 
people, but at the same time they were not convinced that Got (God) 
would ever favor them as he favored Europeans. There was no rea-
son to reject their own deities for the one called Got. On the other 
hand, if Europeans received their powers from Got, that great deity 
certainly deserved their respect too. So, in the years immediately fol-
lowing the end of World War II in the Pacific, most of the population 
of Nidu calmly and passively accepted Christianity. 
Conclusion 
While taemfaet was a period of excitement, fear, and even depriva-
tion, in sum it was a humbling experience. Even though the extraor-
dinary experience of the war had an apocalyptic effect on the way 
the people of Santa Cruz perceived themselves, their culture, and 
their relative place in the world, it did not elicit a reformulation of 
their culture. No prophet arose with a plan for restructuring Santa 
Cruz culture and society. The reformulation that occurred as a result 
of the people's war experiences was a recognition that the world 
about them was not only quite different from what they had thought 
before, but it was also dominated by a massive group of people 
called the Lematangi 'Europeans', and among them the Lemelika 
'Americans' were dominant. In comparison, the Islanders were 
small, poor, and powerless. The Americans were awesome; they had 
qualities similar to the people's own deities, but they were more 
powerful than those supernaturals. Still, there was also a great 
enigma about these people who were so rich, so powerful, so 
approachable, yet so removed: why had they come to replace the 
British and fight a terrible war with the Japanese? Why, also, after 
sacrificing s~ many men and so much extraordinary "cargo," did 
they disappear just as suddenly as they had come? 
Note 
Field research in the Santa Cruz Islands was done from 1958 through 1960 and sup-
ported by the Tri-institutional Pacific Program (Yale University, University of 
Hawaii, and the Bernice P. Bishop Museum) from a grant by the Carnegie Corpo-
ration. 
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CHAPTER 12 
From Passive Pawns to Political Strategists: 
Wartime Lessons for the People of Pohnpei 
SUZANNE FALGOUT 
PoHNPEI is a high, volcanic island in the Eastern Carolines of 
Micronesia. It is one of the largest, wettest, and most fertile islands 
in all Micronesia, with lofty mountain peaks covered with lush tropi-
cal rainforest vegetation. A coral reef stretches around the island and 
creates a wide, calm lagoon area with plentiful marine resources. In 
traditional Pohnpei, an estimated twenty thousand indigenous 
inhabitants lived on dispersed farmsteads located on the relatively 
flat coastal strip, where an abundance of coconuts, bananas, bread-
fruit, taro, kava, and yams grew with little need of attention. These 
favorable geographic characteristics gave Pohnpei the reputation of 
a tropical island paradise in the early days of contact. This positive 
first impre~sion was to earn Pohnpei a special place in Western his-
tory, one not entirely of its people's own design. 
In the one hundred fifty years since contact, the role of Pohnpei 
within the world context has been shaped largely by various foreign 
interests in the island and its people. Noted for its good location, fine 
harbors, bountiful resources, and "hospitable natives," Pohnpei 
became a favored port of call for whalers and traders in the early 
1800s. Later the island was selected as headquarters for Catholic and 
Protestant missions and for Spanish, German, and then Japanese 
colonial activities in eastern Micronesia (Fischer and Fischer 1957, 
12-68). These outsiders regarded the people of Pohnpei as passive 
pawns, to be used according to their own desires. Where Pohnpei 
wills clashed with theirs, colonial governments used military force to 
ensure outward compliance. 1 While pockets of resistance continued 
to exist, Pohnpei gradually yielded to the foreign presence (Ehrlich 
1975). 
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Pohnpei's involvement in World War II was likewise largely 
shaped by outsiders . The island was literally caught in the middle of 
a bitter struggle for control of the South Pacific . The fate of Pohnpei 
and its people rested in the hands of Japanese and Allied forces and 
varied with their changing strategic plans. Because the island was 
located in the eastern region of the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese colonists initially envisioned Pohn-
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pei as a staging base that could be used as a springboard for further 
expansion. As the tide of the war changed, the Japanese used the 
area to form a defensive buffer for the home islands. Efforts were 
directed toward fortification of the islands in case of Allied attack. 
Early Allied strategic plans called for seizure of the island, which lay 
in the path of their central Pacific thrust toward Japan. Later, it was 
decided to neutralize and bypass the island. Japanese headquarters 
on Pohnpei and other military-related sites were razed in early 1944, 
and the island was left behind as Allied forces concentrated their 
efforts on islands closer to Japan. 
A general lack of consideration for the wishes of the people of 
Pohnpei is revealed in written sources of the period. Mostly, these 
sources are drawn from Allied military documents, which are lim-
ited to strategic plans, dates and targets of attack, plus some intelli-
gence data on Japanese activities ( cf. Crowl 1960, 1-19; Morison 
1975, 38-41; Richard 1957, 10-17; Sherrod 1952). The limited 
nature of this information, combined with the use of such seemingly 
innocuous labels as "neutralized" and "bypassed," tends to play 
down wartime activities on the island. Furthermore, a reader is left 
to wonder if there were any indigenous inhabitants on the island or 
how they were involved. 
Although it was not their fight, the people of Pohnpei did play a 
significant role in the war. Miraculously few of the people of Pohn-
pei died in the cross fire between Allied and Japanese forces. How-
ever, they did not escape the horrors of war. For the duration of the 
war, they were subjected to forced labor, relocation, and confisca-
tion of far'm goods by the Japanese, as well as the threat of air and 
naval attacks by the Allies. 
Today, the people of Pohnpei consider World War II to be an 
important part of their own history, which is vividly recounted in 
songs, anecdotes, and personal narratives. These accounts provide 
detailed descriptions of the variety of wartime activities in which the 
people participated. They also reveal how they themselves under-
stood, felt about, and coped with those experiences. Initially, war-
time events were interpreted in light of their own cultural traditions. 
Many embraced the Japanese goals and voluntarily joined the fight. 
As time went on, and the vastly different nature and scale of this for-
eign war were realized, Pohnpei people were forced to reevaluate 
their customs: the wisdom and strength of some were reaffirmed; 
others were found wanting. Pohnpei people were also forced to 
reevaluate their interactions with foreigners and to consider the 
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nature and significance of their role in the larger world context. 
World War II serves as the most extreme example of the price offor-
eign dependency. It is a price that they are unwilling to pay again. 
In the Service of the Emperor 
Pohnpei at the time of first Western contact was a traditional chiefly 
society. The island was divided into several petty chiefdoms, each 
led by a dual line of chiefly titles. 2 Everyday life within the chiefdom 
was guided by an elaborate system of formal etiquette and by per-
sonal industry, both offered in respect to the chiefs. 
The key to the good life in traditional Pohnpei was attainment of 
title within the chiefdom, bringing with it status, respect, and 
wealth. Membership in a ruling matriclan was an important consid-
eration in promotion to title for both men and women. However, a 
man could also attain high title by virtue of his personal achieve-
ments, regardless of his birth. 3 The most important forms of 
achievement for Pohnpei men were called "little work" and "big 
work." Military prowess, the most highly valued form of achieve-
ment, was considered "little work." 4 Pohnpei people explained.this 
form of service as little because it was of relatively short duration, 
especially if a man was killed early in battle. Presentations of agri-
cultural products and other community services were considered 
"big work" because this form of service continued throughout a 
man's lifetime. 
When Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941 Pohnpei 
had been under Japanese colonial rule for twenty-seven years. At 
the beginning, the people of Pohnpei considered their wartime 
efforts as traditional forms of service to the highest chief in their 
realm at that time-the emperor of japan. They could not anticipate 
the nature or scale of the hardships they would be forced to endure 
in this foreign war. 
Big Work at Home 
The physical characteristics of Pohnpei played an important role in 
the Japanese use of the island, even before the war. At the time of 
their original takeover of the German colony in Micronesia, the jap-
anese found Pohnpei unsuited to their naval needs. Territorial head-
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quarters were moved to Palau, and a branch office was established 
in Kolonia, Pohnpei's port town in the north (Hanlon 1981, 83-
114). When the war broke out, the island's treacherous almost-bar-
rier reef, mangrove swamps, and rugged terrain were recognized as 
a natural defense system. Construction of barriers and mining oper-
ations helped secure open areas in the reef system. Land communi-
cation and radar installations, several defensive gun emplacements, 
blockhouses, shelters, a seaplane base, and two small airstrips were 
constructed to bolster the island's defenses (Ashby 1983, 48-49; 
Denfield 1979, 17-29). 
The island ofPohnpei had been well suited to japan's initial goals 
of resettlement of its burgeoning population and of economic pro-
duction for the homeland (Fischer and Fischer 1957, 59-64). Planta-
tions were established around the island to grow tapioca, rice, sugar, 
and a variety of other foodstuffs as well as tobacco. A sugar mill and 
an alcohol processing plant were among the various types of manu-
facturing operations conducted on the island. Copra, bonito and 
other fish, hibiscus bast, coconut-leaf fiber, ivory nuts, cassava, 
alcohol, kava, lumber, mangrove bark, trepang, black pearl, and 
shells were included in the list of Pohnpei's exports. Paper, tobacco, 
cigarettes, cotton cloth, charcoal, buttons, salt, molasses, liquor, 
coconut oil, kava, coffee, rice, and fresh vegetables were produced 
for local consumption (Bascom 1965). With the goal of furnishing 
supplies for war efforts on other islands, economic production was 
increased during the early war years. 
Events in 1944 changed Pohnpei's role once again. In early Feb-
ruary 1944, Pohnpei people remember seeing several Allied planes 
flying reconnaissance missions over the island. 5 A few days later the 
bombing began. According to Allied reports, forty-two B-24 Libera-
tor bombers of the Seventh Air Force based on Tarawa struck Pohn-
pei. Their goal was to neutralize Pohnpei before proceeding with the 
attack on Enewetak. Within two weeks, five raids dropped a total of 
118 tons of high explosives and more than six thousand incendiary 
bombs. On 1 May, six U.S. battleships shelled the northern portion 
of the island. 6 The attack was halted after 70 minutes when it was 
determined that no worthwhile targets remained. Indeed, all air 
bases had been destroyed and of the 940 buildings in Kolonia, an 
estimated 75 percent were leveled (Denfield 1979, 30-35; Hanlon 
1981, 107-109). Furthermore, shipping was effectively blockaded. 
The new goal of the Japanese in Pohnpei necessarily became one of 
self-sufficiency. 
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Pohnpei men and women were among those hired to work on var-
ious wartime projects. At first their participation was on a voluntary, 
wage-labor basis. Officially, Pohnpei civilian workers were to be 
paid one-and-a-half yen per day for skilled labor, one yen for 
unskilled labor, and three-fourths yen for women. As the war in this 
part of the Pacific intensified, the Japanese instituted forced labor, 
and the level and harshness of their demands increased. All able-
bodied Pohnpei people were taken from their homes and relocated to 
various projects around the island or even abroad. Husbands were 
often separated from wives. Mothers were forced to leave their 
young children in the care of the aged or infirm. Those left behind 
had to fend for themselves. Farmsteads were neglected, and con-
sumption of produce was carefully monitored by Japanese soldiers. 
Permission was needed to slaughter livestock, and restrictions were 
placed on kava drinking and traditional feasts. 
Work crews put in long hours, from sunrise to sunset. Days off 
were reduced to alternate Sundays, then completely cancelled. Some 
workers were locked in compounds; others were forced to sleep in 
bunkers too tiny to sit upright in. A war song, originally composed 
by a Pohnpei woman supervisor who worked in the tapioca fields of 
Sokehs chiefdom and sung by women in her bunker, tells: 
Our dwelling makes us really lonely 
It is worse than being in prison 
because we have assumed the appearance of frogs, 
crawling around and looking straight ahead. 
-Lena Dehpit Rikardo 
The extreme efforts in food production on the part of the Japanese 
and the Pohnpei people were apparently effective. Although there 
was a severe shortage of cloth and a few other imported goods, 
Pohnpei people do not recall any serious lack of food during the war 
years. 
Allied forces repeatedly bombed th~ island in order to prevent the 
rebuilding efforts of the Japanese. An estimated two hundred fifty 
air strikes were mounted by the Allied forces between February 1944 
and August 1945 (Denfield 1979, 35). Some Pohnpei people recall 
being able to set their watches by the arrival of the airplanes. One 
woman who worked in the Palikir rice. fields of Sokehs chiefdom 
remembered beginning work at 5 AM. When the planes arrived at 8 
AM, workers hid in bunkers and ate their breakfast. When the alarm 
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Japanese supervisors oversee Chamorros planting new nee on Guam, 
1942. (Kyuya Takenaka) 
sounded again, they went back to work. But sometimes the planes 
arrived unexpectedly. Informants vividly recall shaking with fear as 
they vainly attempted to hide themselves in open fields or in fishing 
boats in the lagoon. One Madolenihmw fisherman's war song 
laments: 
. .. there is no place we can hide. 
Those who work making salt and farming are lucky 
because on land there are places to hide. 
I 
- Pretrik Ringland 
Little Work Abroad 
No major battle was actually fought on Pohnpei soil. However, some 
Pohnpei men were drafted into the Japanese military and were 
transported to other islands to join in the fighting. In May 1942, the 
Japanese drafted twenty Pohnpei men, five from each of the then 
four chiefdoms, to fight in Rabaul (Higuchi 1984). The Japanese 
motive for this decision was unknown to the people of Pohnpei, but 
it was generally believed to be a test of their courage and loyalty. 
One Kitti man who witnessed the draft proudly recalled, "A Japa-
nese officer came and did the picking. He strongly stated Pohnpei 
men were clever and could indeed do the fighting." When they 
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reached Rabaul in July, these men were assigned to different units. 
Seventeen would die in battle against the Australians in the fight for 
Buna, Papua New Guinea. The remaining three later returned to 
Pohnpei with the remains of their comrades (Watakabe 1972). 
The Japanese decided to draft an additional two hundred Pohnpei 
men in July 1943. These men were from Kitti chiefdom and repre-
sented nearly all the remaining able-bodied men from this area. 
Located on the opposite side of the island from administrative head-
quarters in Kolonia, Kitti was the most remote and traditional part 
of the island. Some believe the reputation ofKitti men as hard work-
ers made them the obvious choice. Kitti men were renowned for 
their "stupid work": they regularly completed contracts in less time 
than was expected by the Japanese. Others felt their selection was 
punishment for this behavior, which some Japanese considered to be 
mischievous. One Friday, the story goes, aJapanese administrative 
officer came to inspect the work at the Sapwalap rice field in Mado-
lenihmw chiefdom. He was angered that Kitti men relocated there 
had completed the assigned work and left early for home. He report-
edly stated, "It would be better for Kitti men to be put in a washba-
sin and driven off the island." 
Another Pohnpei man's Japanese brother-in-law had told him 
that the initial plan was to take fifty men from each of the four chief-
doms, until he (the brother-in-law) had warned them that rivalrous 
fighting would surely break out. The plan was then changed to 
drafting all needed men from one state. Only Kitti could provide 
this many men. Kitti men vividly recall being drafted. One of the 
draftees explained, 
Someone from the administration and a military officer came to Kitti. 
They had a register listing the names of men and women of each 
municipality, and they checked off the names without knowing if they 
were father~, brothers, etc. They had no thought for checking whether 
people were related. They called out the names of people and assem-
bled them at Rohnkitti. Those involved in work at the airstrip or 
working Japanese military jobs were not i~cluded. 
The criteria used by the Japanese in drafting Kitti men were age 
and physical ability. They made no exceptions for those who had 
personal disabilities or who were of royal status. However, Pohnpei 
men were themselves able secretly to make a number of such substi-
tutions. In the end, 179 men left from Kitti. 
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The Japanese plans for the Kitti draftees were a closely guarded 
secret. However, most Pohnpei people believed the plan was to send 
them to join the fighting in New Guinea. Their send-off from Pohn-
pei was a highly emotional one, breaking the traditional Pohnpei 
code of stoicism in the face of adversity (Falgout 1984, 103-133; Fal-
gout 1985). One woman approaching hysteria reportedly screamed 
after them, "Go and don't ever come back." Another cried to her 
relative, "Please jump off the boat. I love you and don't want you to 
die." Emotions also ran high among the Kitti men themselves, and 
many sobbed openly. Only when they reached the open sea aboard 
the Sun Sang Maru on 12 August 1943 were the draftees informed that 
their destination was Kosrae. Their feelings were captured in the 
opening lines of the "Memorial Song of Kosrae," written by one of 
the Pohnpei supervisors: 
Running there, we suddenly see Kosrae, 
with mountains like those ofKitti chiefdom. 
I begin to recall our happy chiefdom 
that we were forced far away from. 
At one o'clock we reached the open sea of selfishness 7 
all of us prepared and going forth. 
Myself, I believe there is no authority 
for throwing my life away ... 8 
-Linter Hebel 
Once on Kosrae, the Pohnpei men encountered others who had 
been reloc~ted there to serve as laborers on various military projects: 
people from Kosrae and Kiribati, plus Okinawans, Koreans, and 
Japanese soldiers. The Pohnpei men were initially assigned to build 
a seaplane airstrip at Lele. The project was half complete when, in 
November 1943, the Japanese realized it would never be needed and 
the project was abandoned. On 8 February 1944, four American 
planes arrived. The Sun Sang Maru was sunk, and the Japanese ware-
house, the airstrip, and other military buildings were destroyed. 
No Pohnpei men and only a few Japanese were killed in the attack 
on Kosrae. However, this event marked the beginning of real hard-
ship on that island. After this incident, three large ships carrying 
numerous Japanese reinforcements from Truk were dispatched to 
Kosrae. Allied bombing ofTruk shortly afterward disrupted further 
transportation and effectively stranded these soldiers and cut off 
needed goods. Food was in very short supply, and an emphasis was 
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now placed on establishing agricultural plantations. But the num-
bers of people on the island were too great; strict rationing was 
begun, but starvation soon set in. Other defensive military construc-
tion projects were initiated, with work continuing night and day 
with little rest. No one remained idle. Even the sick and dying were 
assigned tasks according to their remaining abilities. 
The Japanese assigned different foodstuffs to each of the different 
cultural groups on Kosrae according to a hierarchical ranking. The 
best foods, including all large fish and most other sources of protein, 
went to the Japanese themselves. Those from Kiribati, former Brit-
ish subjects, were considered to be POWs by the Japanese and as 
such, were given least preference in foods. Pohnpei fell in between. 
At first, Pohnpei people were given breadfruit and coconuts to 
eat, both important items in their traditional diet. People of Kiribati 
were given only less desirable swamp taro. As times got tougher, 
Pohnpei people were given the Kiribati foods. Kiribati workers then 
subsisted on the few tiny potatoes that grew and, finally, on just 
potato leaves. Reportedly, many died of malnutrition. Japanese sol-
diers, unaccustomed to the island foods and environment, did not 
fare well either. The sight of Japanese soldiers who had degenerated 
into "stick men" is one that many Kitti men cannot forget. 
Maybe We Were Dreaming 
Pohnpei understandings of the war and attitudes toward Japanese 
and Americans shifted during the course of the war. Initially, many 
men were eager to join the Japanese in their war effort. They were 
overwhelmed by the spirit of camaraderie and this opportunity to 
display traditional Pohnpei manly virtues of hard work, bravery, 
and cleverness and thereby rise in status. One man whb served as a 
construction ~orker recalled: 
We heard Daidowa [the japanese name for World War II] had started. 
But it was so far away, and we did nbt think much about it. We were 
not afraid. We were a bit excited. This was the "custom of men," and 
we talked about who would become a soldier. At the time Japan hit 
Pearl Harbor and I heard the news, I was working at the airstrip at 
Nanpohnmal. I was not afraid. I was excited to prepare for war. 
Few questioned whether Japan would win the war. In contrast to 
previous Spanish and German colonial administrations, Japan ruled 
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its Micronesian possessions with a firm hand and was clearly in con-
trol. Most of the Pohnpei population truly believed the emperor was 
the "Heavenly Prince" and was therefore invincible. Furthermore, 
the Japanese had led them to believe that the Allies, particularly the 
bumbling Americans, would never be able to mount an effective 
military campaign, much less actually fight in Pohnpei. The Ameri-
cans' inability to use their sophisticated wartime technology effec-
tively was the butt ofPohnpeijokes. Indeed, when American planes 
finally reached the island, their gunfire was usually wide of the pre-
sumed target, often landing in the jungle or the ocean. 
The shock Pohnpei people felt when the serious bombing began, 
however, is indelibly etched in their memories. For the first time, 
they began to realize that the war could be fought on their own soil. 
They also began to sense the potentially enormous scale of a war 
fought with such advanced technology. A man who worked as an 
assistant and interpreter for the Japanese talked about the bombing 
ofKolonia: 
It was only then that I realized Americans would actually fight in 
Pohnpei. The Japanese had given us instructions on how to protect 
ourselves if we were bombed. They told us to put our thumbs in our 
ears and fingers over our eyes. Before this [the bombing of Pohnpei], 
we used to joke about it. We used it to tease our friends. Now, we real-
ized what could happen-we could lose our eyes, even our lives. 
Kitti ~en who served on Kosrae reported experiencing acute 
loneliness,' fear, and nervousness after the bombing began. Some 
were diagnosed as having a dread Pohnpei disease, "sickness of 
unhappiness," a debilitating disease affecting both body and mind 
(Ward 1979, 78-80). Several reportedly died from it. Some Pohnpei 
women, traditionally unaccustomed to heavy work and the scene of 
combat, reported severe hemorrhaging toward the end of the war. 
They blamed their subsequent infertility on the wartime hardships 
they endured. 
For the first time, Pohnpei people began to recognize the possibil-
ity that Japan could lose the war, and they feared reprisals for their 
role in such a failure. Some Japanese soldiers, sympathetic to the 
plight of the Pohnpei people, warned them that the Japanese would 
not allow them to be taken as prisoners. Should invasion occur, 
rumor had it, the japanese planned to annihilate the people ofPohn-
pei as they huddled in their bomb shelters. While they continued to 
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build bomb shelters according to Japanese specification, the people 
secretly made their own plans to escape both sides. These plans were 
codified in song and transmitted through the gossip network. 
Close encounters with advanced technology changed the Pohnpei 
view of Americans. American "incompetence" was reinterpreted as 
"restrained fierceness," a posture designed to trick the Japanese into 
letting down their defenses. 9 Misplaced shots were suddenly rein-
terpreted as messages for the people of Pohnpei to stay clear of J apa-
nese soldiers. Stories of American pilots who waved to Islanders 
engaged in traditional activities away from military targets began to 
surface. Americans came to be seen as extremely powerful, clever, 
and benevolent types-qualities Pohnpei people expect in their tra-
ditional chiefs. 
In the end, the Japanese surrender of the island to the Allies was 
accomplished without incident. Lieutenant General Masao Wata-
nabe surrendered to Commander Ben H. Wyatt, United States 
Navy, aboard the USS Hyman on 11 September 1945. Captain 
Albert Momm, division commander of the Hyman, became the new 
military governor ofPohnpei the following day (Momm 1945). John 
Fischer, who served as naval administrator of the island from 1950 
to 1953, reported that the people of Pohnpei regarded Americans as 
the latest in a series of conquerors, rather than as philanthropists. 
He wrote, "Moreover, some of our behavior (e.g. treatment of gov-
ernment land, caste and social barriers between Americans and 
natives) appears to the Ponapeans to confirm this view. We are con-
sidered as better conquerors than the Japanese mainly because we 
order people around less, do not slap them, and leave them to pur-
sue their own ambitions" (1949-1954, 550-649). 
Returning from Kosrae, the Kitti men sang: 
We no longer believe 
[we are] awaiting death. 
[There is] shocking news; 
maybe we were dreaming. 
-Linter Hebel 
Wartime Lessons 
"War is the greatest hardship" is a phrase that Pohnpei men and 
women use to sum up their experiences in World War II. Conditions 
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on Pohnpei were not as bad as in some other locations in the Pacific 
theater. Nevertheless, the nature and scale of the hardships Pohnpei 
people suffered greatly exceeded anything previously known to 
them. 
The profound impact of World War II on the people ofPohnpei is 
attested to by the large number of wartime accounts still recalled and 
by the variety of traditional genres in which they occur. Anecdotes of 
amusing wartime incidents remain popular on the island today. 
And, as already noted, many events were codified in song. Anum-
ber of these are simple verses that were sung primarily by one indi-
vidual. Some songs composed by Pohnpei leaders served to unite 
their people in their protest against the poor conditions they were 
forced to endure; others served as memory aids for secret plans to 
escape the Japanese and Allied forces. Occasionally, more elaborate 
memorial songs were composed to commemorate significant people 
and events. Certain events have achieved legendary status on the 
island. These are cast in the traditional episodic form and preserve 
important details about the significant people, places, and dates 
associated with these events. 
A measure of the original vitality of these World War II experi-
ences remains today. Accounts are often told or performed at infor-
mal evening kava gatherings of family, friends, and neighbors. The 
more famous ones have been recorded and are occasionally broad-
cast over the local radio station. Significantly, the more detailed 
memorial songs and legends are now being treated in the secret-
sacred manner of traditional historical lore. 10 Whatever the genre, 
these World'War II accounts are remarkably revealing of Pohnpei 
people's innermost thoughts and feelings. Wartime experiences were 
poignantly recalled in personal accounts collected in this study. 
Some informants stated that they still found it difficult to discuss this 
period in their lives. At times, an informant would shudder at the 
memory of an event, ask for a break, or even halt the interview. 
Common themes running throughout these World War II ac-
counts are the bad conditions, the poor treatment by Japanese and 
Allies alike, and the question of why Pohnpei had been caught in the 
middle of this foreign war. The extreme circumstances of the war led 
Pohnpei people to reevaluate themselves-to assess their cultural 
limitations and their cultural strengths. 
In some areas Pohnpei traditions were found lacking, and some of 
them have been modified. For example, as a result of the people's 
wartime experiences, gender distinctions became blurred and rede-
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fined. Pohnpei men, proud of their traditional roles as hard workers 
and fierce warriors, came to sense their impotence in a foreign war 
fought with advanced technology. Women, not traditionally expect-
ed to engage in strenuous work, realized they could overcome cul-
turally imposed limitations on their activities. This was particularly 
true of Kitti women who were left behind to care for their families, 
farmsteads, and communities. This generation of Kitti women is 
renowned for overstepping traditional gender boundaries both in 
work and in politics. They opened the way for further changes in 
women's roles brought by the subsequent American rule of the 
island. 
In other areas, the people ofPohnpei believe their wartime success 
was unequalled. One source of inspiration is the remarkable survival 
of Kitti men who returned from Kosrae-only 6 of the original 179 
died. The success of these men is largely attributed to the wisdom 
and strength of some Pohnpei traditions. 
Traditionally, long-distance voyaging is a major life event for 
Pohnpei individuals and is marked by important rituals designed to 
ensure a safe trip and to give protection from sorcery whilst among 
strangers. Such a ritual feast was held for the Kitti draftees before 
their departure. As a Pohnpei proverb asserts, "Out on the open 
sea, each man looks after his own life." However, ideally, concern 
will also be extended to other members of one's matriclan. At this 
feast the draftees were given a single cup from which they all drank 
Japanese liquor. Later, one of their high chiefs gave a speech in 
which he enjoined them to follow another ancient Pohnpei voyaging 
custom; he told them to "become as one," as though they had a sin-
gle mother and were therefore all clansmates. Furthermore, he 
directed them to act as good Pohnpei people-not to act haughty or 
as know-it-ails and not to be disobedient. Instead, they were to coop-
erate with each other and work hard. Such important words from a 
respected leaqer were to be taken seriously. 
Once on Kosrae, the reputation of Pohnpei people as hard work-
ers made them quick favorites of the japanese. They were also quick 
to establish real or fictive kinship links with some of the Kosraeans. 
Both of these ties gave the Pohnpei men increased access to supplies 
and other forms of assistance. 
Pohnpei people credit their unusual cleverness as a major factor in 
their survival. Anecdotes in which they outwitted the Japanese sol-
diers-doing less work and receiving more food than they were enti-
tled to-have become legend throughout the island ( cf. Santa Isabel 
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stories of wartime deception, chapter 2). Careful monitoring oflabor 
activities by the Japanese was met by Pohnpei trickery. By present-
ing the same items over and over again, they were easily able to 
inflate statistics on worker productivity. Under the pretense of hunt-
ing game for Japanese officials, extra rations could be taken. These 
stories emphasize the Pohnpei ability to beat the Japanese at their 
own game. 
World War II experiences also led Pohnpei people to reassess their 
relations with outsiders and their position in the world context. Until 
then, the history of contact in Pohnpei had followed a pattern of var-
ious foreigners seeking fulfillment of their own goals in the island 
and its people. At first, the people of Pohnpei had bent these foreign 
interests to serve their own traditional ends-to acquire new forms 
of material wealth, to gain powerful allies with superior weapon sys-
tems, and, by these means, to enhance their prestige within the 
chiefdom. However, later colonial regimes were able to impose their 
rule through threat of military force. Pohnpei people became more 
passive in their response to foreign domination and more dependent 
upon them for goods and services. Gradually, they were becoming 
marginal figures in their own land (Petersen 1984a, 1984b). 
Although Pohnpei people became increasingly compliant to for-
eign demands over the period of contact, they have always resented 
foreign rule. Fundamental differences between traditional Pohnpei 
and Western-based concepts of power and authority have been a 
continual source of strife throughout the colonial era. In contrast to 
a rigid, autocratic model of government in our Western intellectual 
tradition, P~tersen (1984a, 121-122) wrote, 
[I]t may well be that Ponapean chiefs never had especially centralized 
control of their communities despite their enormous ritual status . 
. . . What all this means is that the true locus of authority in Pona-
pean communities is the community itself. An able chief is respected 
and listened to, but he founds his authority on his ability to listen. If 
pronouncements are made, they are liable to fall upon deaf ears or 
meet considerable disagreement. 
The people of Pohnpei consider good government to be flexible, 
responsive to current conditions, guided by a measure of consensus. 
Good government provides leadership while assuring a measure of 
personal autonomy: 
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A system of law, and of government, that asserts timeless principles is 
understood, but one that expects them to be lived by is not. Because 
authority is not alien, separate, or distinct but lies within the fabric of 
community life itself, Ponapeans at some level perceive themselves as 
being in control of their own lives. (Petersen 1984a, 127) 
Today, some forty years after the war, the people of Pohnpei have 
been given the chance to decide the course of their future. Now they 
must reconcile their economic dependencies on the United States 
with their strong desire for political self-determination. Their desire 
to regain control over their own lives is not limited to local affairs, 
however. In the June 1983 referendum on the Compact of Free 
Association with the United States-an agreement that assured con-
tinued American funding and local self-government-Pohnpei alone 
within the Federated States of Micronesia voted in favor of indepen-
dence. The compact gained the simple majority needed to pass by 
overwhelming majorities in Yap, Truk, and Kosrae. However, the 
Pohnpei vote sent a strong message that the people ultimately wish 
to gain control of their external affairs (Petersen 1985). 
Clearly, Pohnpei people are no longer willing to place their fate in 
the hands of others. The hardships they were forced to endure in 
World War II serve as the extreme example of the consequences of 
foreign dependency. But wartime experiences also suggest a solution 
to the Pohnpei dilemma. The involvement in World War II height-
ened awareness of the strategic geographic position Pohnpei holds in 
the world context. Some Pohnpei leaders now see this strategic posi-
tion as a significant bargaining chip to be used in charting Pohnpei's 
future. They regard their position as an important export commod-
ity that can be exchanged for the Western goods and services they 
desire. Today, Pohnpei people place additional emphasis on formal 
schooling to enhance their political astuteness. As one Pohnpei gov-
ernment leader explained to me, "I don't care if my sons receive 
advanced education and then just come back to work on the land. 
They need to know what is going on in the world." Pohnpei people, 
he explained, are educating themselves so that they can never be 
"tricked" by outsiders again. 
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Notes 
This paper is based on archival and field research primarily done in the summer of 
1985. I gratefully acknowledge the support ofldaho State University through Fac-
ulty Research Grant Number 551. 
1. For a discussion of the Pohnpei concept of person, particularly the distinction 
between proper outer form and true inner feelings, see Falgout (1984, 103-133). 
2. During subsequent colonial administrations of Pohnpei, the number of chief-
doms increased from three to five. Today, these are the chiefdoms of Kitti, Mado-
lenihmw, Uh, Net, and Sokehs. 
3. A woman's status and title were largely ascribed. As an unmarried girl, her 
father's high status could lead to the receipt of a title of her own. Once married, a 
woman generally took the feminine counterpart of her husband's title. In excep-
tional cases, a woman's personal achievements could win her high title; however, 
this usually occurred in an indirect manner. For example, a woman's achievements 
could result in an auspicious liaison, which could bring her personal reward or a 
favorable marriage, which in turn could lead to high title (Falgout 1984, 28-29). 
4. Ideals of bravery, fierceness, stoicism, cleverness, reserve, humility, respect, 
special knowledge, and skills are qualities Pohnpei men and women seek in men. 
The ideal characteristics sought in women are somewhat different, however. A 
desired woman, literally a "good woman," is a combination of beauty, kindness, 
and strength. She is pretty, pleasant, witty, and fun-loving; nurturant, giving of 
food, goods, and help to her family and to others. She works hard at home and 
knows how to take excellent care of her charges. Finally, she has an inner emotional 
strength to bear her and her family through difficult times. A "good woman" Pohn-
pei people say, is like an outrigger; she steadies her husband on his voyage (Falgout 
1984, 115-119). 
5. Exact dates vary in both written reports and in oral accounts (Denfield 1979, 
30). 
6. USS Iowa, USS Massachusetts, USS New jersey, USS Alabama, USS North Caro-
lina, and USS South Carolina (Ashby 1983, 50). 
7. In "little work" performed in service to the high chief, Pohnpei men are 
expected to be bold, courageous, and stoic. A man should not give any thought to 
losing his life. Rather, he should be willing to throw his life away with no more 
regard than he would give to throwing away a clamshell. But, as one Pohnpei prov-
erb states, "Out on the open sea, each man looks after his own life." 
8. Perhaps the author of this song was expressing some doubt over Pohnpei's 
involvement in this foreign war. 
9. See Falgout (1985) for a discussion of "restrained fierceness" as part of the 
Pohnpei personality. 
10. See Falgout (1984, 133-173) for a discussion of the management of Pohnpei 
traditional historical lore. 
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CHAPTER 13 
Islanders, Soldiers, and Tourists: 
The War and the Shaping of Tourism 
in Melanesia 
CHARLES DE BURLO 
THE HUGE volume of outsiders and material goods passing through 
western Pacific Islands with today's tourism has not been seen there 
since World War II. 1 Wartime history, relics, and memorials them-
selves are main tourist attractions of Melanesia and other Pacific 
Island areas (Boutilier 1979, 7-8; Parr 1975, 62). The encounters of 
Islanders with military personnel during the war have become the 
basis for contemporary evaluations of a new kind of outsider: tour-
ists. Many tourist visitors are Pacific War veterans, and this makes 
the intercultural relations formed during the war even more signifi-
cant for Islanders' definitions of local and national identity within 
the contemporary context of changing international economic and 
cultural relations. 
In the small port town ofVila, Vanuatu, tourists now have impor-
tant effects on the local economy and on local residents. Not only do 
they put money into the town's economy by shopping at stores and 
restaurants, but ni-Vanuatu from Vila and surrounding villages 
often encounter tourists in a variety of settings, including such 
activities as taxi driving, tour guiding, and selling crafts and 
produce at marketplaces on the wharf and in town. 
Wartime construction of military bases put in place primary facil-
ities of airports, roads, communication systems, and buildings (Gar-
rison 1983, 16, 71-73) on which modern tourism infrastructure and 
superstructure are based (de Burlo 1984, 171). At the same time, the 
events of the war and its immediate aftermath created significant 
places and visible reminders of the conflict that have become tourist 
sites (Boutilier 1979, 8; MacCannell1976, 110-111; Oliver 1961, 
391; Parr 1975, 62). 
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The War and Tourism in Melanesia 
Travel and leisure have become key elements in modern life-styles 
in japan, Australia, and the United States, and travel is available to 
a wide spectrum of the populations of these societies (Moeran 1983, 
94-95; Stringer 1984, 158-160; Van Doren and Lollar 1985, 484). 
As travel has increased along with income, air fare discounts, and 
interest in unusual places and activities, the travel industry has 
increasingly segmented its market in order to promote new destina-
tions to both older and younger customers (Moeran 1983, 95-96; 
Van Doren and Lollar 1985, 480). A recent factor in this market are 
thousands of retired veterans from the United States and japan who 
travel to the South Pacific to revisit the places where they fought 
during World War II. Veterans of the war in the Pacific travel both 
as individuals and on group tours to such places as Guadalcanal and 
Vanuatu, as well as New Zealand and Australia, to visit battle sites 
and see war relics (Robert Reynolds, pers. comm., Feb. 1986; 
Boutilier 1979, 8). One U.S. Marine veteran of the Guadalcanal 
campaign began operating tours to Australia and the Solomon 
Islands in 1972. Now that the fortieth anniversary of the end of the 
war in the Pacific has recently passed, many retail travel agencies, 
tour operators or wholesalers, and cruise ship lines are also organiz-
ing tours of "remembrance" and tours for special events (such as the 
General MacArthur Thrust dedication scheduled for 1988) (Travel 
Marketing Magazine 1985, 130-131). 
This chapter examines two themes that are central to the impact 
of World War II on Islanders and recent socioeconomic change in 
island Melanesia. The first is the appearance of two sorts of outsid-
ers-soldiers and tourists-and how Melanesian conceptions of the 
former have come to influence their perceptions of the latter, espe-
cially in the case of Americans. Tourism is part of the post-1970 
modernization in these islands. Differences in perception of tourists 
between a younger generation of Islanders and older people who 
experienced the war reflect that modernization. A second theme is 
the effect of the war on recent economic changes in the islands, 
including the development of an infrastructure basic to tourism and 
the stimulation oflocal tourist arts. 
War in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
Between March 1942 and December 1944, the southwest Pacific was 
the scene of major troop movements, battles, and the construction of 
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large military bases. The Solomon Islands became the focal point of 
an intense struggle between Allied and Japanese forces from August 
1942 to August 1943 (Editors of Navy Times 1968, 11-12; Tregaskis 
1943, 14). Approximately "half a million allied and Japanese ser-
vicemen served in the Solomons" during that time (Boutilier 1979, 
8). The place-names of land battles-Tenaru River, Matanikau, 
"Edson's Ridge" on Guadalcanal, and Tulagi on Nggela-and 
naval battles of Santa Cruz, Vella Gulf, Kula Gulf, Cape Esperance, 
and Tassafarango live on in the memories of veterans of the Japa-
nese and American (and other Allied) forces, as well as in those of 
the Melanesians who witnessed these encounters. 
Vanuatu was not the scene of any major battle. It was, however, 
strategically located and served as a critical staging point and com-
munication center for Joint Command operations in the South 
Pacific theater and for the Solomon Islands campaign in particular 
(Garrison 1983, 20, 33). The U.S. military established Island Com-
mand bases III and IV at Port Vila, Efate, and Luganville, Espiritu 
Santo, in Vanuatu. (See chapter 17 for further discussion of these 
bases.) 
An advance base-with a naval base, inshore patrol squadron, 
and a large naval hospital-code-named Roses was set up at Port 
Vila by Task Force 9156. This task force arrived on 4 May 1942 
with "6,400 troops (Army and Navy officers and men), and 59,850 
ship tons of cargo." It eventually consisted of about twenty thousand 
persons (Garrison 1983, 9-10, 27). The Third Island Command 
Base on Efate comprised headquarters in Vila, a camp at Malapoa 
Point, and hospital and construction units also in the Vila area. 
There was also a major installation at Havannah Harbor, northwest 
Efate, to which the naval base headquarters later moved because of a 
deep-water anchorage there. The main airfield-Bauer Field-was 
constructed just outside Port Vila. One month before the landing on 
Guadalcanal,. Luganville (on Espiritu Santo) was designated as an 
airstrip site to support the invasion. This base eventually became 
one of the largest and costliest built by the navy (Garrison 1983, 69, 
87-92). 
Wartime Changes in the Islands 
The war was, of course, destructive of the islands as well as the lives 
oflslanders (Oliver 1961, 376-378). It also brought positive changes 
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in the form of facilities and economic infrastructure and new work 
opportunities for Islanders. For Solomon Islanders and ni-Vanuatu, 
these noncombatant working relations with U.S. forces provided 
new perspectives on foreigners and on relations with colonial admin-
istrations (Belshaw 1950; chapters 11 and 17). The wartime creation 
of an economic infrastructure and attendant new social relations 
between Islanders and servicemen led the way for subsequent social 
and economic changes, including tourism, in the region (Bedford 
1973, 43; Bellam 1970, 70-71; Philibert 1976, 85). 
Building airfields, roads, wharf facilities, communication sys-
tems, hospitals, and housing were major activities undertaken to 
support combat and military administration in the southwest Pacif-
ic. Developed infrastructures did not exist before the war on many 
Islands (Bellam 1970, 70; Garrison 1983, 65). Vila-the commercial 
and administrative center of Vanuatu (then the Anglo-French Con-
dominium of the New Hebrides)-consisted of a few Asian shops, 
the stores of two main trading firms (Societe Franc;:aise des Nou-
velles-Hebrides and Burns Philp), and a small hotel (Wallin, quoted 
in Garrison 1983, 16). It had a population of about fifteen hundred 
residents (Brookfield, Glick, and Hart 1969, iv). Santo (or Lugan-
ville), situated along the Segond Channel on Espiritu Santo, was 
even smaller (Bennet 195 7, 119, 126). The present capital of the 
British Solomon Islands, Honiara, came into being after World War 
II, when the British administration moved from Tulagi (on Nggela 
Island) to Guadalcanal. Before the war, the area of the town site was 
only sparsely settled (Bellam 1970, 72). 
The establishment of military bases created such basic infrastruc-
ture as all-weather roads, wharves, water systems, and airfields 
important for future economic development in the islands (Bedford 
1973, 43; chapter 8). Honiara was built on the site of the former 
Fifth Island Command base because this infrastrur:ture was present 
(Bellam 1970, 70). Henderson Field, located near Honiara, was 
begun during the war by Japanese forces (including Korean labor-
ers) and completed by American forces after their landing on 
Guadalcanal. Its capacity made it the country's international air-
port. Bauer Field, built by the American Third Island Command 
just northwest of Port Vila, is likewise the primary international air-
port for Vanuatu. These airfields, key goals of military construction 
efforts during World War II, were critical for the growth of commer-
cial aviation in the islands as well as subsequent mass tourism 
(Spoehr 1960, 588). 
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Construction of military base facilities and other infrastructure 
required the assistance of local labor and afforded Islanders direct 
contact with military visitors. The colonial administrations of the 
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu assisted the U.S. military in the 
recruitment of laborers. In Vanuatu, about thirteen hundred adult 
men were recruited for three- to five-month "contracts" (Bedford 
1973, 38) from both northern and southern islands to work on 
Espiritu Santo and Efate. Word of the generous supplies offood, cig-
arettes, and clothing spread widely and quickly from laborers who 
returned to their home villages. As a result, others were eager to sign 
on (Bedford 1973, 38-39). People of the villages around Vila were 
also in close contact with thousands of American military personnel 
on Efate. Men of nearby villages such as Erakor were involved in 
work for the French or British administrations (in the police force, 
for example), as well as for the American military. Women, appar-
ently, had less contact but did wash clothes for some military person-
nel. 2 What is remarkable about this cross-cultural interaction is its 
large scale. Ni-Vanuatu came from outlying islands to town in 
unusually large numbers, and they thought positively about "Amer-
ica" in spite of long hours of hard work for limited wages (chapters 
15 and 17). 
Encounters with Americans as Soldiers and Tourists 
Melanesian impressions of the war, expressed in oral narrative, 
focus on motifs of American generosity and the plenitude of availa-
ble materials, food, and money. For the generation of Solomon 
Islanders and ni-Vanuatu who experienced the war, perceptions of 
Americans established then have since influenced evaluations of 
tourists as more recent sorts of outsiders. Although most visitors are 
received with hospitality, those construed to be Americans often 
excite a special interest and may be received in an especially positive 
light due to recollections of Americans encountered during the war 
(Lindstrom 1981, 304; Worsley 1968, 186). 
Senior men of Erakor village often regaled me with war stories 
about American generosity. Robert Kallon, for example, speaking 
of currently hard times, moved into a wartime recollection: 
When America was here, no problems with food, cigarettes, and 
money. There were a lot of them all the time ... You did not have to 
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pay anything. Things were given freely-lolly, crackers-when you 
went to [the camp at] Ekasik. You did not ask for these things, they 
wanted to give them to you. 
"Grandmother" Pama recalled a similar image of those times: 
There was a big camp at this place (Ekasik]. They stayed there. We-
all the children and adults-wanted such things as crackers or what-
ever. We bought them at Ekasik. 
[Q: You paid for them?] 
Yes, we bought them from them. But they gave us gifts too ... Of 
crackers, all kinds of food. 
On Tanna one hears stories of working for individual labor super-
visors such as the legendary "Tom Navy," whose first name and ser-
vice group label (e.g., Navy, Army) are combined into a name. 
There are many stories of how the soldiers swore, drank, messed in 
groups, and joked with the Tannese and how "America" helped the 
Tannese against the condominium government. A man of Isini 
echoed the stories of many others: 
When the war came the government said it would not pay and feed 
the Tannese men taken by the Americans to Vila to work. But 
America wanted to pay and to feed us Tannese. The condominium 
government gave four shillings each day with no pay for work at 
night. At the airfield, the Tannese worked clearing land. This land 
belonged to a French woman and she was to feed us but the food was 
gone. Ballande's food was also gone, and so Tannese and the govern-
ment went to the Burns Philp store; only a half-bag of rice was there. 
Morinda was to bring food from Australia, but where was Morinda? 
America called all the big-men of America and said "the problem of 
the people of Tanna is this." The big-men of America went to the tri-
bunal to talk to the condominium. America-Tom Navy-said that 
they would feed the Tannese and gave us a lot of food. This was a dif-
ferent way. We did not ask for money. America gave us money for 
work. We started to throw away the food because we could not finish it 
all. Some of us went back to Tanna [before they had their money]. 
America was trying to give us the money, but married men wanted to 
go home. But before they left America-Tom Navy-promised that 
we would someday get the payment. But the condominium govern-
ment still blocks it. 
Other men of Tanna who worked on Efate remember the work, 
how it was organized, and how long they worked each day. "Man 
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Tanna and America worked at night when all the others slept," is a 
typical recollection. John Frum, the mythical personage at the core 
of the ideology of the John Frum "cargo cult," 3 is alleged to have 
visited Tanna and spoken to some Tannese before the war and the 
arrival of the U.S. military. Thereafter, as John Frum had prophe-
sied, "America" helped the Tannese. A man oflonanhan village on 
Tanna asserted: 
Men talked with John on Tanna were sent to Vila to jail and were put 
to work. They got a message from John to watch for a sign. Then one 
night they saw a light at Pan go Point [Efate J, and next day they saw a 
long, long line of ships-battleships, mailboats, more battleships, and 
more mailboats-came into sight ... All the people of the Efate vil-
lages were frightened when the soldiers came ashore and they ran 
away and hid in the bush. The police could do nothing. Then the 
cargo came ashore. The cargo was just like refuse on the beach . 
The government would not let America pay us. 
Men of Tanna often tell an American visitor that the people of 
Efate did nothing and were even afraid of "America," and that the 
Tannese and "America" built all the roads and airfields on Efate 
themselves. Such versions of the past, and the special relation 
between "John" and "America" developed in them, suggest a spe-
cial kind of exchange relation in which the Tannese are joined to a 
powerful entity-as evidenced by the goods in large quantities, the 
organization of work, and productive capabilities. Tannese valued 
the organizational aspects of wartime work and have tried to fit that 
organization to their own social systems (chapter 17). Tannese stat-
ed that they did not at that time ask for payment from "America" 
for their work but that "America" was generous and gave it will-
ingly, despite difficulties with the condominium government. 
This wartime relationship was a turning point at which the Tan-
nese discovered more about the outside world and from which they 
developed ideas and strategies to use in local political processes 
(Guiart 1951; Lindstrom 1981). A local leader in south Pentecost 
who worked on Espiritu Santo for the American military likewise 
explained his rise to leadership in a "custom" group as due partly to 
his wartime experiences that gave him knowledge of the outside 
world and partly to the rifle given him by "America" that made the 
condominium government "angry" with him and local Christian 
villagers afraid of him ( cf. Jolly 1982). 
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Efate villagers did not run and hide in the bush when the U.S. 
military command arrived in Vila. They had been for many years 
involved with urban activities, the cash economy (e.g., copra pro-
duction from their own groves), and holding government posts 
(e.g., on the French and British police forces). They had less reason 
to recruit for wartime labor than did the rural Tannese (Philibert 
1981, 321). Urban villagers also enjoyed friendships and the gener-
osity of the Americans, as well as opportunities to trade with "sol-
diers." (Some women of Erakor village, however, said they were 
frightened of black American "soldiers" stationed on Efate.) 
The Emergence of Tourist Arts 
The presence of military personnel at Allied bases enabled Melane-
sians to use their skills in producing cultural artifacts to use in gift 
exchange and trade with servicemen. These skills would later be sig-
nificant in the tourist trade (Boutilier 1979, 17-18, 24; Philibert 
1976, 85; Weiner 1982, 66-67). Objects such as "grass skirts," shells 
made shiny, and replicas of "traditional" artifacts were made for 
exchange with, or sale to, servicemen. Weiner (1982) has shown that 
in the Trobriand Islands, wood carving for European and American 
visitors has been a stable means of entry into the cash economy in 
that carving fits well into indigenous production and exchange sys-
tems. 
In Vanuatu, the sale of garden produce and marine foods to Euro-
pean residents of Vila had been practiced for many years, but trade 
with soldiers differed in its scale and regularity. Wartime trade con-
tributed to the development of regular marketing patterns and a 
marketplace in Port Vila. The tourist trade generated a regular craft 
market at the deep-water wharf where cruise ships dock ( cf. Boutilier 
1979, 17-18). Women whose parents initiated the marketing of 
pr:oduce to Europeans in Vila later collected shells and made neck-
laces to sell to American servicemen-long olgeta soJa. An old woman 
of Erakor village whom I asked about selling shells at the market-
place in the past explained: 
No, we did not sell these at the market. We sold them to them at the 
place here. Small shells. 
[Q: Who bought them?] 
They did. All the soldiers. 
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Artifact market, New Georgia, 2 December 1943. (U.S. Navy) 
She went on to relate how servicemen had come to the islet (on 
which the village was then located) in the lagoon to set up a post, and 
she recited various camps around Vila-Eluk (Marines); Bellevue 
(Navy); Ekasik (Army)-and how she could buy things at the post 
exchange store and also received sweets (e.g., cookies, "Jollies") 
freely from servicemen. 
Curios made for the "soldiers" were often produced on direct 
request and given to a specific serviceman in exchange for some 
other items. Others were presented as gifts to servicemen who had 
become friends . Craft skills were refined during the war; twenty-five 
years later wartime styles continue to set styles for the tourist trade. 
Robert Ka)lon of Erakor clearly defined the difference between 
today's tourist craft trade and the wartime trade: 
Before, the women did not make necklaces because there were no 
tourists yet. All the tourists came in peacetime. But, if a big-man-a 
general-came to the village, then the men and the chief gave him 
a nalnal [i.e., a "custom" club] .. . When the soldiers were here, 
when we worked with them, they wanted these things. It was not 
given for a price, but it had its own idea-they gave something back 
to you. 
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Artifact market, Apia, Western Samoa, 11 January 1944. (U.S. Anny Signal 
Corps) 
The current trade in handicrafts manufactured specifically for sale 
to tourists is viewed by many ni-Vanuatu as distinctly different from 
the earlier trade in curios with military personnel during the war. 
The crafts made for the soldiers, were , however, a direct precursor 
to tourist craft production; servicemen asked for specific curios such 
as "grass skirts" that were not made or used by Christian ni-
Vanuatu ofEfate and had to be reinvented. 
American servicemen and ni-Vanuatu encountered each other in 
a variety of situations ranging from formal work contexts to informal 
exchange relations involving direct reciprocity or trade in goods. 
The procedures and regulations of the U.S. Island Command and 
the colonial government, however, were designed to keep these 
encounters structured and limited to certain areas and situations . 
Information from veterans of the Solomon Islands campaign and 
from duty on Efate indicates that Islanders and servicemen did not 
have wide contact. 
Many Melanesians were impressed by the organization and over-
all "power" of American military groups. The Melanesians often 
adopted superficial aspects of military insignia and routines into 
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their own local groups and into their interpretations of local identity 
vis-a-vis that of others such as colonial European residents and 
administrators and invading American and Japanese forces (Lind-
strom 1981, 303-305; Worsley 1968, 174). The Americans, for their 
part, were fighting, working, and waiting for the war to move along 
to other islands (Michener 1947, 9). 
Melanesians' wartime experience of U.S. servicemen resulted in 
conceptions of Americans as powerful yet freehanded, friendly, and 
egalitarian people who differed from other outsiders. This categori-
zation of Americans as a people culturally distinct from Australian, 
British, or French administrators and Asians (both resident and 
invading military) left a persistent impression that has carried over 
into Melanesian perceptions of the newest "other" passing through 
the islands-tourists. Tourists are categorized by Solomon Islanders 
and ni-Vanuatu, for example, according to their nationality (e.g., 
man America, or man Australia, or man japan; see Cochrane 1969), not 
simply as "tourist." This may be due in part to the low volume of 
tourist arrivals in these islands compared to major Pacific destina-
tions (Pi-Sunyer 1977, 154). Americans, however, evoke special 
interest for Islanders because of relations established during the war. 
Australians, who form the largest percentage of tourist arrivals, in 
contrast to Americans, are seen as less generous (chapter 8) and less 
affable. Ni-Vanuatu, for example, often state that they prefer Amer-
ican tourists, rather than tourists from other places, because Ameri-
cans are "friends" and would be "helpful" to them. Ni-Vanuatu 
also often seek to contact American tourists in order to establish 
exchange relations connecting themselves to "America," the reput-
ed place of special power (chapters 3, 8, and 17). Impressions of 
Americans as notably different from other foreigners remain among 
Islanders, especially those of the older generation (chapter 9), and 
carry over into current attitudes toward tourists. The relics of war 
and the battle sites continue to bring ni-Vanuatu and Americans 
together. 
Island Tourism and Veteran Tours 
Tourism is one of the two or three largest sectors of international 
trade in the southwest Pacific. The developing countries of Asia and 
the Pacific have one of the highest growth rates of tourism (ASTA 
Travel News 1985, 6). Japan Airlines, the leading carrier in interna-
tional revenues, is now a Pacific regional airline with hub service 
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into the Pacific Islands from Tokyo, Nadi (Fiji), and Auckland (New 
Zealand) (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985c). Major Japanese corpora-
tions-such as Tokyu Corporation, which owns a wide range of 
businesses including Pan Pacific Hotels-are currently focusing 
their interests on the Pacific Basin (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985a, 33). 
Significant growth of mass tourism in the South Pacific began in 
the mid-1960s when large-capacity jet aircraft operating on trunk 
routes and packaged tours made the area more accessible to wider 
markets. Fiji became a regional hub and tourist destination, al-
though countries such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Papua 
New Guinea had only nascent or no tourism, being off the main air 
service routes. In 1968, for example, Vila had only three small 
hotels and Santo had only two; there were only six thousand visitor 
arrivals (Great Britain Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1973, 
20). The Solomon Islands did not reach six thousand tourist arrivals 
until 197 5 (Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance 1980, Table 3) due 
to its low capacity in both international air service connections and 
tourist accommodations (Boutilier 1979, 10-11 ). The British colo-
nial government of the Solomon Islands paid little attention to devel-
oping tourism; nor has the national government since independence 
(Boutilier 1979, 19; PATA 1985a, 28). Papua New Guinea devel-
oped a tourist industry earlier; by 1975, it boasted some eighteen 
thousand "holiday" tourist arrivals (Williamson 1977, 31-33). 
Tourism in the Solomon Islands, and in Vanuatu in particular, 
has grown significantly since 1975 due to improvements in regional 
aviation (Kissling 1982, 53, 61), creation oflarge hotels and resorts 
in the islands, and special attention given to tourism in national 
economic development plans (PATA 1985a; PATA 1985b; Phil-
emon 1985). In 1984, the Solomon Islands received 10,700 tourist 
arrivals from overseas, and 8000 visitors who arrived by cruise ship 
(PATA 1985a, 3). An increase of visitor arrivals to 29,000 and a 73 
percent expansion in accommodation capacity by 1990 are recom-
mended by the United Nations Development Program and Pacific 
Area Travel Association advisers for the Solomon Islands (PATA 
1985a, 3). 
Vanuatu is attempting economic development through its tax 
haven status, the growth of a financial center in Vila, and by 
expanding its tourism sector (de Burlo 1987). Tourism now earns 
$20 million a year in gross revenue for Vanuatu (PATA 1985b, 19). 
In 1984 tourist arrivals totalled 26,000, and cruise ship passengers 
added another 64,000 visitors (PATA 1985b, 7). 
Tourist destinations require a supply of attractions as well as 
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superstructural and infrastructural components to meet travel mar-
ket demands. As with infrastructure, the islands rely not only on 
natural resources such as climate, coral reefs, beache~, and indige-
nous cultures, but also on what World War II left behind. As one 
Efate villager said, "When they [the American military] left there 
were plenty of things all over-houses, vehicles-many things left in 
all the islands." 
In addition to natural and cultural attractions, war relics and bat-
tle sites have for many years been basic attractions for tourism in the 
southwest Pacific (Boutilier 1979, 8; Parr 1975, 62). In the Solomon 
Islands, Guadalcanal attracts Japanese and American tourists be-
cause of its history as a main battle area of the Solomon Islands cam-
paign and the renown of such places as "Bloody Ridge" ("Edson's 
Ridge"), "Iron Bottom Sound," and the beaches where the First 
Marine Division landed, as well as various relics (e.g., parts of air-
craft and vehicles) scattered about the island (Boutilier 1979, 
30n11 ). The travel industry has also promoted the sunken troop ship 
(and former luxury liner) President Coolidge off southeast Espiritu 
Santo, Vanuatu, as it has the Kokoda Trail and Bomana War Ceme-
tery in Papua New Guinea (Hook 1981, 538). These places and 
relics of the war are now so much part of the tourist itinerary in 
these islands that they constitute tourist "sights" (MacCannell 
1976, 135). 
The new interest in the Pacific Basin has caused travel industry 
principals currently to promote a variety of destinations in the 
Pacific. In 1985 the Pacific Area Travel Association and the Ameri-
can Society of Travel Agents held a trade show together in Philadel-
phia at which the Pacific was a central theme. The Pacific division 
manager for United Airlines is reported to have stated that UAL will 
actively promote South Pacific "places that, unless you were in 
World War Two, you probably never heard of" (Levere 1985, 
12-14). 
As more people from japan and the United States travel overseas, 
there is a parallel effort in the travel industry to segment its market 
by promoting special interest tours (Van Doren and Lollar 1985; 
Moeran 1983). Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands are expected to 
gain the most from marketing efforts by concentrating on an 
"upscale" segment of well-educated people interested in the cultural 
and historical attractions of the islands, as well as in climate and 
watersports activities (PATA 1985b, 2; PATA 1985a, 34). Retired 
people form a special market for a variety of tours, including adven-
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ture tours to South Pacific island destinations for the "active afflu-
ent" and over-59 set (Crissey 1981, 113-114). Another special mar-
ket segment consists of veterans of World War II. 
For veterans of the South Pacific theater, a growing number and 
variety of tour packages is offered by specialized operators (Travel 
Weekly 1985, 20-36). In 1972 a former member of the First Marine 
Division and Guadalcanal campaign veteran, Al Bonney, created a 
"Sentimental journey" tour to the South Pacific for a group of vet-
erans, including a visit to Guadalcanal. Bonney tied this effort in to 
the Guadalcanal Veterans Association, whose newsletter he edited, 
and in 1984 formed a larger group, the South Pacific Veterans Asso-
ciation. He organized more than ten veterans' tours from 1975 until 
his death in 1984. The tours included visits to sights in Australia, 
such as the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne and the Marine 
Memorial at Ballarat, and in Guadalcanal (Bloody Ridge, Red 
Beach, Tenaru River, and air "flight-seeing" ofTulagi). 
Valor Tours is now also devoted solely to veterans' tours of the 
Pacific and caters to a wide range of veterans' groups-First, Sec-
ond, Fourth Marine divisions; Seabee battalions; Thirteenth, Twen-
tieth, Fifth Air forces, and others-and package tours to Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the Philippines, Saipan, 
and elsewhere (Robert Reynolds, pers. com. Feb. 1985). 4 In 
Vanuatu, Valor Tours groups visit Vila, Santo area, and Tanna, 
with optional excursions to other islands. Valor Tours uses the Royal 
Viking Cruise Lines extensively, and in April 1986 Royal Viking 
offered a "Pacific Memory Cruise" to Sydney, Espiritu Santo, 
Guadalcanal, Rabaul, the Admiralty Islands, Milne Bay, Port 
Moresby, Bali, Singapore, Manila, and Hong Kong (Valor Tours 
1985). With Valor Tours, Royal Viking Cruise Lines has offered a 
"Coral Sea Encounter Cruise" (Valor Tours 1984). 
Tours packaged for war veterans of the Pacific theater have 
become more conspicuous since 1972 as the thirtieth and fortieth 
anniversaries for the major events of the war have passed. In August 
1982, one hundred American and Japanese veterans of Guadalcanal 
met there with former coastwatchers, various ambassadors, and 
some Islanders to dedicate a memorial at Henderson Field (Bonney 
1982, 11; Mohs and Dunn 1982, 25). These international meetings 
will continue, given the importance of the events they commemorate 
and the appeal they make to the sense of history shared by the com-
batants. As tour operators institutionalize tours and war-related 
travel in the region, tourism by veterans and their descendants will 
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grow along with mass tourism in the region (Travel Marketing Maga-
zine 1985, 130). As a result, the historical site markers (MacCannell 
1976, 135-37) connected with World War II will be perpetuated as 
general tourist attractions. 
Veterans are not exactly standard holiday tourists. Veterans who 
return to Pacific Islands battlegrounds are making both group and 
personal pilgrimages (e.g., Manchester 1979). Not only do they 
leave mundane existences at home for a valued journey that takes 
them into "a non-ordinary sphere of existence" (Graburn 1977, 24 ), 
they return to a time and place (in mind and fact) that was in their 
earlier life quite extraordinary. They return to exotic places they last 
saw as members of a special kind of "tour" group (the military), 
during a time of fighting, fear, and destruction. These are "memory 
tours" of unique times and places, not just a departure from the 
workaday world for leisure and recreation. 
The remembrances of Pacific theater veterans bring out well this 
extraordinary quality of the wartime tourist experience. One Gua-
dalcanal veteran who returned there in 1982 for the airfield dedica-
tion is reported to have said, "Guadalcanal was the most traumatic 
period of my life" (Mohs and Dunn 1982, 25). Marine fighter pilot 
ace joe Foss, also at the 1982 gathering, commented, "It is a strange 
feeling to come back to a place where you were shot at and find busi-
ness going on quite normally, as if nothing ever happened" (ibid.). 
Pacific theater veterans with whom I have corresponded or spoken 
recalled first, and mainly, battle events on various islands and the 
injuries they sustained, or being "very young" and far from home. 
One veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign, Joseph Spaulding, 
encountered only two Islanders, both of the Solomon Island Police 
Force, working with coastwatcher Martin Clemens. He recalled: 
One or the other of these two natives would materialize shortly before 
we set out on patrol, guide us to our objective, retire to a safe distance 
when we· made contact, and, subsequently, accompany us back to 
headquarters. He would wait until I had requisitioned several pack-
ages of chewing tobacco, and upon receiving these would vanish. Pre-
sumably he returned to some point where he was less likely to be 
under enemy fire .... As to Guadalcanal itself, I saw only a small 
section that was tactically important, and that, of course, was battle 
ravaged. 
Combat troops and other military personnel in the Pacific theater, 
unlike those in the European theater, encountered radically different 
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environments (e.g., jungles or coral atolls) and an enemy and indig-
enous people different in appearance and culture from any they had 
direct experience with before (Terkel1984, 59, 64, 158). In general, 
combat troops and other military personnel had little contact with 
Islanders. 
Some veterans from Vermont were recently interviewed by stu-
dents of a high school history class and told their interviewers about 
battles being long and difficult, as in thirty-six hours of fighting in 
the Slot in the Solomon Islands. 5 Others talked of fighting and fear, 
"My first day in action [on Angaur] was about twenty-four hours 
long. It was quite frightening .... As I've said often in the past, I 
wouldn't do it again for a million dollars but wouldn't take a million 
dollars for my experiences. You do what you have to do when you're 
there, you know, you're trained to do a job and you do it;" or about 
malaria and rough living conditions, "They called us the Jungle Air 
Force and that's what it was. You didn't have any towns or cities. 
You went into an island and right into the jungle" (Burlington Free 
Press 1985). In part because of such sentiments, it may be that many 
of these men will not choose to return to the Pacific as "remem-
brance" tourists. Those of us who have been to the Pacific Islands 
only in peacetime should not be surprised that veterans who have 
not visited since the war and perhaps have put it out of their minds 
find it, as Joe Foss said, an incredibly different place, and greatly 
modernized at that. 
Most tourists require modern facilities and transportation. Veter-
ans on tour are like other tourists in this regard. They use tour 
operators' packaged services that include international-class hotels, 
airlines, cruise ships, and professional guides or tour leaders. Stand-
ardization by the travel industry of this special-interest tourism may 
enable limited room for direct contact with Islanders outside tourist 
service situations. Because of their age or retired status, American 
and Japanese veterans who take remembrance tours may have the 
time and money to travel to outer islands. Their special experiences 
provide them with the interest to make courteous (as well as profit-
able) tourists for island nations to encourage. The interest veterans 
have in the islands helps to create an atmosphere of mutual respect 
in their encounters with Islanders. 
The common experience of World War II sometimes bridges the 
cultural gap between Islanders and tourists of the war generation. 
On Ambrym, Vanuatu, for example, when the Lindblad cruise ship 
stopped in 1981 with its senior citizen tourists, Ambrymese were 
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delighted to see them, not just because the tourists were bringing in 
money for crafts and viewing a traditional ritual event. They were 
Americans of an age who remembered the war-even if they did not 
participate in it in the Pacific theater-and shared that memory with 
the Ambrym people. 6 In the flow of tourism in Vanuatu, where war 
relics are not a main tourist attraction (because it was not a battle-
ground), occurrences such as this are unusual. Ni-Vanuatu do, how-
ever, enjoy talking about "America" and often state a preference for 
more tourists from America because of wartime associations with 
Americans and a general belief that America is a rich country, the 
one with the most "power." 7 People on Tanna who have met 
Lindblad ships recall these encounters as good ones compared to 
those they have had with European, New Caledonian-French, or 
Australian tourists. 
Tourism is an industry that depends on standardized organiza-
tion. In South Pacific island nations, tourism is increasingly ori-
ented toward a pleasure-seeking tourist mass market. Its scale will 
mean challenges to the physical and social capacities of the islands. 
Although about 25 percent of visitors to the Solomon Islands are 
returning U.S. veterans, at least 40 percent are Australians on busi-
ness or holiday trips (Solomon Islands Ministry of Finance 1980, 
Table 4). For Vanuatu, 73 percent of visitor arrivals are Australian 
(PATA 1985b, 11). Another potentially large travel market for the 
South Pacific islands is Japan (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985c). Japa-
nese tourists in the southwest Pacific are now mainly young married 
couples or business travelers ( cf. Moeran 1983) and less often 
returning veterans. 
As tourism expands, special tourist types such as veterans become 
lost in masses of tourists, and resident responses to even those more 
benign tourists may become increasingly negative in tone (Smith 
1977, 5). The older generation of Islanders and veteran servicemen 
is passing. 'fhe present relation between the wartime heritage of the 
islands and the attraction of veterans as tourists will cease. Tourism 
is already contributing to changing relations with outsiders, and a 
younger generation of Islanders has grown up that does not recall 
the war (but see chapter 7) and will establish different relationships 
with foreign visitors (chapters 9 and 17). 
Islanders encounter tourists most frequently as employees provid-
ing tourism-related services in such roles as hotel workers, waiters, 
bartenders, taxi and tour drivers, guides, performers, or craft ven-
dors. In all these contexts, Islanders are no longer "working with" 
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visitors, as they say they were during the war. Instead, they are serv-
ing or hosting visitors they know will depart very soon, will pay for 
goods and services, and are often not particularly generous (de Kadt 
1979, 50). Whereas stories of the visitors of wartime stress their gen-
erosity and partnership with Islanders in "work," the attitude 
toward modern tourists is one of expecting "help" in the form of 
money. A man from the island of Ton goa living on Tanna, who was 
in the British police force in the 1940s and is now involved in tour-
ism as a tour driver and tour vehicle owner, explained: 
Tourists must come to give money to help us. We sell grass skirts, 
pawpaw, bananas to the tourists so we can get money. I have a truck 
for the work of tourists. I must pay tax for the roads, insurance, and 
petrol. The tourist is a way for the native to get money. We natives 
have nothing. 
Tourists purchase "custom" by paying to see dances and the like, 
and some Tannese are willing to allow this commercialization of tra-
dition. AJohn Frum ideologist ofWhite Sands, Tanna, decided that 
since tourists make films of "custom," including the ritual prepara-
tion of kava, which is only to be known to males, and since these 
films are shown widely in towns and overseas, "This is all a bad 
way .... It is finished now. You [tourists and other Tannese] 
showed tradition already. In my past women did not know. But you 
showed it." Another Tannese man said, "Some Tannese say that 
tradition is something not to be sold; others say that it is something 
to be sold. This thing came from white people. Before, we did not do 
this." 
A direct consequence of tourism for the values and attitudes of 
indigenous people is that they more frequently experience social 
relations with outsiders as being primarily commercial in content. 
This is a common occurrence with increasing density of tourism (de 
Kadt 1979, 61). Although the objectification of traditions may be 
seen in wartime trade, commercialization is a definite departure 
from the informal exchange relations and balanced reciprocity that 
were common with American military visitors during the war. 
At the Vila marketplace, tourists buy mainly fruits, dresses, and 
crafts, including shells, shell necklaces, and wooden objects. Women 
of the nearby villages as well as urban Fijians, Tongans, and Asians 
(from whom some ni-Vanuatu women learned to make tourist crafts 
and dresses) are the main producers and sellers of crafts to tourists. 
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For these women this is "tourist business." Women (and a few men) 
from areas dependent on the tourist trade because of shortages of 
garden land bring only curios, rather than produce, to market. A 
few years ago they reacted violently to having other Islanders selling 
crafts at the cruise ship wharf, which they allege is on their land. 
Two aspects of this market relation with tourists stand out as 
markedly different from the relations of trade with soldiers-its 
intensity and its increasing diversification. For example, when Era-
kor village women discovered that they could trade shells or "grass 
skirts" to American servicemen for food, candy, cash, or other 
items, they did it mostly on the basis of individual demand. Now 
there are regular places at which crafts are sold, and women of Era-
kor (and other villages) expend a great amount of time and effort 
preparing for the tourist markets (on the wharf, in town, and in vil-
lages), staying there for long hours in the hope of a sale. Many 
women trade in craft items to supplement other household income, 
but some are renowned as specialists in making and selling tourist 
handicrafts and regard this activity as a personal business venture. 
Cruise ship arrivals in Vila have augmented the curio trade 
because many tourists are disgorged into town on specific days each 
month. Boutilier (1979, 18) has noted that in Honiara cruise ship 
arrivals have produced a "sophisticated cottage industry in handi-
crafts." Women in Vila are similarly selling a widening array of 
goods from shells, dresses, shell baskets and bracelets, shell neck-
laces, wooden "knives," and miniature (wooden) canoes (made by 
men), to postcards, "tea towels," and other knickknacks bought in 
local Asian shops. 
Tourism is accelerating the rate of change toward commercializa-
tion in social relations as tourists travel more widely outside the 
towns and as Islanders in rural areas take crafts to town to sell or 
migrate to towns to work in tourist services. This is. most notable 
with the younger generation of Islanders. These young people know 
of World War II only through stories told by their elders. They have 
grown up with tourism, and the tourist is the kind of outsider they 
most often encounter. 8 In contrast to their parents and grandpar-
ents, young people often categorize foreign strangers first as "tour-
ists," rather than "American" or other nationality, especially in 
urban areas. That American servicemen in World War II gave away 
large quantities of things is recalled as unusual behavior for foreign-
ers at that time. Some Australian cruise ship passengers now throw 
coins off the ships' decks for children at Vila wharf, but today's 
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youth, who usually ignore tourists or seek cash and alcoholic bever-
ages from them, expect this behavior. However, older men and 
women who worked for the Australians at bases in Vanuatu are still 
attuned to evaluating tourists on the basis of cultural traits and their 
wartime experiences. Generational differences are an important fac-
tor in how Islanders conceptualize and relate to tourists. 
In many rural areas of Vanuatu, where tourists are less common, 
nationality is important for both old and young people as a key to 
the categorization of visitors. This is especially the case for places, 
such as Tanna, south Pentecost, and Espiritu Santo, where concep-
tions of "Americans" formed during the war are important in the 
context of specific ideological movements (Worsley 1968, 151; Lind-
strom 1981, 289). In these places, where many wartime laborers and 
defense force personnel were recruited, the war continues to stand 
out as an important historical reference point for people's relations 
with the outside world. The wartime influx of new kinds of outsiders 
remains a powerful reference that will continue to influence the 
understandings of even the younger generation. For example, 
young people have ideas about Americans that are based on the war 
stories of their elders and tend to evaluate international current 
events with some reference to those preconceptions and local 
mythologies; "America" continues to show its "power" against 
other nations. 
It is probable that tours for Pacific theater veterans of World War 
II will cease as that generation passes, but the attraction of the war-
time history of the Pacific Islands will remain. A proposed survey of 
attraction resources in the Solomon Islands (PATA 1985a, 34-35) 
and Vanuatu (PATA 1985b, 22) may be carried out in both countries 
for the purpose of tourism promotions. This marking of sites of war-
time events and relics-such as the sunken President Coolidge at 
Espiritu Santo or Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal-will eventually 
institutionalize them as tourist "sights" in the world of sightseeing 
tours (MacCannell 1976, 135-137). This institutionalization of 
places now visited by war veterans will perpetuate the remembrance 
of World War II for tourists and Islanders. 
Conclusion 
World War II devastated many Pacific islands and disrupted the 
lives of their residents, but it also brought Islanders into direct con-
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tact with a wide range of new ideas and technologies, as well as new 
kinds ofpeople (Oliver 1961, 371). The development of commercial 
aviation and tourism in the region has brought further changes to 
the islands of the southwest Pacific and to the lives oflslanders. 
Many groups of Pacific theater war veterans are now interested in 
traveling to former Pacific battle and base sites, and a number of 
tour operators package these "remembrance" tours for veterans 
groups. Veterans tours mark personal and group recollection and 
memorialization of events and places unique and special to these 
travelers. Veterans are tourists with a genuine interest in the history 
of the islands, not just the exotic climate. 
Wartime encounters between Islanders and American servicemen 
often created for Islanders enduring, positive impressions of Ameri-
cans. Islanders of the generation that witnessed the war also use that 
experience to evaluate today's tourists. Because many tourists to the 
southwest Pacific nations are ex-servicemen (both American and 
Japanese), there is some juxtaposition of "soldier" and "tourist." 
Modern mass tourism, conversely, also gives a younger genera-
tion of Islanders less attachment to the past in their relations with 
outsiders. However, the standardization of tours marking war relics 
and war event locations as historic "sights" for mass tourism might 
enable the remembrance of World War II to become a historic refer-
ence point in intercultural relations. In this its importance will out-
last the generation of Islanders, Americans, Japanese, Australians, 
New Zealanders, and others involved in the war itself. 
Notes 
This chapter is based on research conducted in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands in 
1980-1982 and on subsequent inquiries to veterans' groups in 1985 in the United 
States. I am gr.ateful to the people of the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu who helped 
me with this work and to the veterans who were so cooperative. My thanks also go 
to Laurie A. Kutner for her comments and editorial work. 
1. International tourism, made possible by the military technologies of World 
War II (especially long-range and jet aircraft), is becoming an important sector in 
the economies of western Pacific Island countries. National governments are giving 
more explicit attention to tourism development (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985b; Phile-
mon 1985). Regional airline companies such as Qantas, Air New Zealand, Ansett 
Airlines, and Japan Airlines are competing to establish control in a regional net-
work of air services through contracts to manage the national airlines of several 
island nations, including Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu 
(Kissling 1982). The major international and regional carriers bring mass tourism 
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into the islands through their linkages with hotel and resort corporations. Japan 
Airlines and Ansett Transport Industries, for example, both have interests in 
resorts and hotels in Vanuatu (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985a, 31-54; 1985b, 18). This 
growth in transportation and tourism is partly due to the economic rebound and 
expansion made by Japan following World War II. It reflects the vitality of trade 
relations between the United States and the East Asian-Pacific region (Perry 
1985, 50). 
2. Many Erakor village women have told me this. It seems that men who knew 
particular American servicemen arranged the wash work for women, delivered the 
clothes to the soldier, and received payment in clothes, other goods, or in cash. 
3. The social movement referred to as the John Frum cult appeared before the 
arrival of the Americans. It is well documented by Jean Guiart (1951, 1956). 
4. Reynolds is president of Valor Tours, Inc. 
5. The class was supervised by Robert Weir. 
6. Kirk Huffman (curator, Vanuatu Cultural Center), personal communication, 
December 1980. 
7. People speculate about which nation has more "power" -Russia, America, or 
some other. Ni-Vanuatu also often interpret distant foreign events heard about in 
the news media as though America is still fighting a war ( cf. chapter 3). 
8. Examples of regular tours to rural areas are those to Laulasi islet adjacent to 
Malaita, Solomon Islands (Boutilier 1979, 24), and to Chimbu, Papua New Guinea 
(Paula Brown, personal communication, 1979). 
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PART IV 
Joining In: 
Fighting and Working 
CHAPTER 14 
Kennedys "Army": 
Solomon Islanders at War, 1942-1943 
JAMES A. BOUTILIER 
FoLLOWING their attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the 
Japanese struck southward in an effort to establish a huge defensive 
perimeter. One part of their strategy involved the occupation of 
Melanesia, a move designed to enable them to threaten Australia 
and interdict the sea routes between the United States and Austra-
lia-New Zealand. Lying across their path were the Solomon Islands, 
a British protectorate since 1893. The British authorities in the Solo-
mons were entirely unable to provide the Islanders with protection 
in the face of the Japanese advance. Most of the European residents 
-planters, traders, and missionaries-were evacuated from the 
islands between 12 December 1941 and 8 February 1942, and the 
resident commissioner, W. S. Marchant, went into hiding on the 
island of Malaita with a few of his staff (see chapter 15). 
One other category of European remained behind as well-the 
coastwatchers. These were, for the most part, district officers who 
served near or behind enemy lines, reporting by teleradio on the 
movements of the Japanese forces. Their services were invaluable 
when the time came for the Allies to reoccupy the Solomons. Admi-
ral William Halsey, U.S. naval commander in the South Pacific, 
was later to observe with characteristic hyperbole that "the coast-
watchers saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific" 
(Horton 1970, 247). What he failed to say was that the Solomon 
Islanders saved the coastwatchers. Without the Islanders' support, 
the coastwatchers would never have been able to collect the intelli-
gence that made the coastwatching system so valuable; nor would 
they have been able to survive in Japanese-held territory. Nowhere 
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was this truer, perhaps, than in the case of Major Donald Gilbert 
Kennedy, DSO, who carried the war into the enemy camp. 
In this chapter Kennedy's activities in the periodjanuary 1942 to 
July 1943 are described. Kennedy was a man who was bigger than 
life. He needed "a wide screen on which to throw his shadow" (Hor-
ton 1970, 42). The war, and the unstinting support of the Solomon 
Islanders, made that possible. In focusing on Kennedy, I have done 
a disservice to the other coastwatchers who supported one another-
and Kennedy-as a matter of course. Similarly, I have done disser-
vice to a good many of Kennedy's "army" who remain nameless. 
Fortunately, however, some of them are known. The war was their 
struggle as much as his, and while his activities provide an element 
of continuity, I have attempted to highlight their wartime experi-
ences and accomplishments as well. 
"This Bold Conspiracy" 
By late January 1942 Rabaul had fallen to the Japanese, and Kieta, 
on Bougainville, was reported occupied. Marchant was obliged to 
decide what the British administration, based in the protectorate 
capital of Tulagi, should do in the face of the impending Japanese 
onslaught. Any notion of defense was "ludicrous" (British Colonial 
Office 1946, 9). The only forces available to Marchant were a tiny 
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Catalina flying-boat detach-
ment; an Australian Infantry Force (AIF) group consisting of 18 
men and 1 officer; and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
Defence Force (BSIPDF), established in September 1939, consisting 
of 3 officers, 1 British NCO, 1 Islander warrant, and 112 Islander 
other ranks. As the force was ill-trained and absurdly under-
equipped, the islands were "to all intents and purposes. defenceless" 
(ibid., 10). Yet total withdrawal, while militarily sound, was politi-
cally unthinkable. Since the Islanders, it was thought, would view 
evacuation as desertion, it was imperative that the fiction of British 
rule be maintained. "This bold conspiracy" (ibid., 12) would only 
work if the Islanders knew what the government was up to and lent 
their wholehearted support to British efforts. 
In practical day-to-day terms, a number of things had to be done: 
Europeans had to be sent south to Australia; the Islanders had to be 
instructed what to do when the Japanese arrived; plantation workers 
had to be repatriated to their villages; and a "scorched earth" with-
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drawal scheme had to be worked out for the district stations and for 
Tulagi, where the radio transmitter, government buildings, and 
wharves were of military value. 
The bulk of the European population was evacuated from Tulagi 
early in February on board the Burns Philp steamer Morinda. 
Shortly after, Marchant moved his headquarters to Auki on Malai-
ta. The repatriation and education policies he was obliged to leave to 
his district officers. One of them was Donald Kennedy, who, early in 
1942, held a roving commission covering Nggela, Isabel, the Russell 
Islands, New Georgia, and the Shortland Islands (Figure 5). Ken-
nedy was a born leader, a big, bluff New Zealander of Scots descent. 
He had served as schoolteacher, radio operator, and district officer 
in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony before coming to the Solo-
mons injuly 1940 (Marchant 1940). 
Kennedy had two major mandates early in 1942: to ensure that 
district and village headmen continued to carry out their duties, 
thereby maintaining a semblance of the British administrative struc-
ture, and, as an officer gazetted to the Defence Force, to activate 
coastwatching arrangements in his district (Noel 1945). The coast-
watching concept antedated the war and was the idea of Lieutenant-
Commander Eric Feldt of the Royal Australian Navy. Feldt was 
aware that Japanese fishing and pearling vessels had probably col-
lected hydrographic data in Melanesia in the 1920s and 1930s 
(Walton 1985, 44), perhaps in anticipation of possible campaigning 
in the area. He was also aware that the mountainous, jungle-clad 
nature of the islands made it possible for agents to work clandes-
tinely behind enemy lines, reporting on the movement of hostile 
forces. The system that he organized in the late 1930s was code-
named Ferdinand after the bull who preferred to smell flowers than 
to fight. In keeping with the name, the coastwatchers were expected 
to be passive, watching but not engaging the enemy. Coastwatching 
was a sufficiently hazardous occupation that most coastwatchers 
were content with this approach. Not so Kennedy. He found the Fer-
dinand approach too tame, for practical and personal reasons. While 
lesser mortals accepted coastwatching directives to avoid clashes 
with the Japanese, Kennedy appears to have largely ignored such 
instructions. His successes were such that few dared to complain. 
The Japanese had ... been ordered to make friends with the natives 
but they couldn't make friends with these natives while they were 
trusting me. Had I had one defeat from the Japanese, the thing would 
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have been completely different. Had I taken the advice of this Fer-
dinand thing of don't fight, let them do this and you keep out of the 
way, then it would have been different. But these people realized that 
while I was able to fight and able to lead them and to win in the little 
skirmishes we had ... they were on the right side. (Kennedy 
1969, 61) 
"The Fury and Flurry of Things" 
Injanuary 1942, as the "fury and flurry of things" (ibid., 46) was 
just beginning, Kennedy decided to move his administrative and 
coastwatching headquarters from Tataba, on the shores of Tanabuli 
Bay at the southeastern end of Santa Isabel, to the mountain village 
of Mahaga (map 3). From there he enjoyed an unrestricted view of 
the anchorage of Thousand Ships Bay and the ocean passage 
between Isabel and Malaita. Central to the coastwatching system 
was the teleradio network, which enabled coastwatchers to submit 
intelligence reports first to Tulagi, then to Marchant's temporary 
headquarters in the Malaita bush (for rebroadcast, after 7 May, to 
the Allied authorities in Vila, New Hebrides [Vanuatu]), and finally, 
following the American landings on 7 August, to Guadalcanal. Ken-
nedy recruited two European planters, Charlie Bignall and Frank 
Gorringe, to operate the teleradio, and they, together with a detach-
ment of Solomon Islands police, some medical staff, and about fifty 
carriers and messengers, completed the coastwatching complement 
in eastern Isabel (Kennedy 1943). 
Between February and April, Kennedy traveled throughout the 
central Solomons aboard the government auxiliary vessel Wai-ai, 
visiting villages on Nggela, Savo, Isabel, Vella Lavella, the Russell 
Islands, the Shortlands, and Choiseul. His biggest task. was oversee-
ing the rep~triation of Islanders from Malaita, Guadalcanal, and 
San Cristobal who had been serving as plantation laborers. Not only 
was repatriation necessary on humanitarian grounds-many of the 
laborers having been deserted by their employers when they fled 
south-but it was dictated by the anxieties of the local people, who 
were concerned about large numbers of unregulated strangers being 
abandoned in their midst. In addition, Kennedy sought to combat 
rumors about the administration's collapse, encourage the Islanders 
to move their gardens into the hills, establish secret caches of food 
and fuel, organize Islander coastwatching patrols under the direc-
tion of district and village big men, educate the people about dealing 
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with the enemy, and hide surface craft that might be of value later. 
These were increasingly hazardous duties since Kennedy was oper-
ating on the leading edge of the Japanese occupation zone in the 
northern Solomons. As a fellow coastwatcher observed, Kennedy 
enjoyed "no protection against [the enemy] except the loyalty of the 
islanders, his woefully small police force, and his own wits" (Horton 
1970, 43). 
One of Kennedy's major concerns involved what in English if not 
in customary law could only be regarded as looting. Contrary to the 
bland assurances of the postwar account, Among Those Present (British 
Colonial Office 1946), the Islanders did avail themselves of goods 
left behind in Tulagi, the Western District headquarters at Gizo, and 
deserted coconut plantations (Kennedy 1969, 61). In the resident 
commissioner's opinion, the Islanders experienced "serious demor-
alization" when they saw Europeans leaving the protectorate (Mar-
chant 1943). "The evacuation ofTulagi dealt a tremendous blow to 
British prestige everywhere," and all arguments of military necessity 
were countered with the statement that "the British, after claiming 
for years to be a superior people, ran away at the first threat of Japa-
nese attack" (Hogbin 1943). 1 As witnesses of the flight, the N ggela 
people were probably "more rudely shocked than anyone else." 
Looting began in Tulagi toward the end of January, and according 
to Marchant (1943) was probably in response to the example set by 
members of the RAAF and AIF detachments. Between mid-Febru-
ary and the end of April, every house in Tulagi was ransacked, while 
locals and unrepatriated laborers looted estates on Guadalcanal, the 
Russells, and elsewhere. "Native statements corroborate that loot-
ing was rampant" (Rodger 1943). 
Kennedy dealt harshly with looters. On one occasion he instruct-
ed a Nggela headman, Joe Oto of Leitongo, to investigate claims 
that members of a neighboring village, Togha, had been involved in 
looting Tulagi. Oto did as he was told and as he was confiscating an 
assortment of goods, including calico, axes, and chisels, was sworn 
at by the villagers. He reported this incident to Kennedy, who 
promptly attacked the seven malefactors, slapping three across the 
face and beating the remainder with his walking stick. "Time belong 
war, no savvy gaol, no savvy fine, killim no more" (During war-
time, there aren't any prison sentences or fines, just beating [whip-
ping]), Kennedy announced (ibid.). 2 The legal processes to which 
the people had been accustomed were now no more. For the 
moment, Kennedy was the law. 
On another occasion, Kennedy met Belshazzar Gina, a Solomon 
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Islander minister with the Methodist church in the Western Solo-
mons, on Ranongga in March 1942 and accused him of telling the 
people of the island of Simbo to loot Gizo. According to Gina, he 
had been instructed by District Officer Miller to make his way to 
Gizo to recover stocks of gasoline but on reaching his destination 
found the settlement in flames-in consequence of the government's 
scorched-earth policy-and did not go ashore. 3 Instead he saw three 
canoes laden with kerosene, bedding, and crockery heading for 
Simbo. Kennedy refused to believe Gina's explanation. He ordered 
his police to put the villages of Patusogara, Nusasibo, and Riguru to 
the torch in order to demonstrate to the people of Simbo that the 
authorities would not countenance looting. 4 To what extent the story 
is true is hard to say. I have independent confirmation of Kennedy's 
activities on Simbo but only Gina's 1977 recollections to go by in 
terms of the details. Certainly Gina had every reason to cast Ken-
nedy in a bad light. Quite apart from the injustice of false accusation 
if Kennedy's allegations were untrue, Patusogara was Gina's own 
village. Moreover, Kennedy was a notorious womanizer, and Gina 
alleged that Kennedy beat him about the head with a stick when he 
failed to procure a young woman for him. When a Marovo woman 
was obtained by one of Kennedy's lieutenants, she turned out to be 
one of Gina's relatives, a source of great shame for the Methodist 
minister. Kennedy, for his part, never trusted Gina, who was a 
cousin of George Bogese, an Isabel man who betrayed Kennedy and 
the coastwatching organization to the Japanese. Gina himself 
appears at one stage during the war to have directed Kennedy and 
his men toward ajapanese ambush at Viru Harbour, New Georgia. 
Whatever the case, there was very bad blood between the two men, 
a fact that makes each oftheir accounts suspect. 
The Wai-ai 
In mid-February 1942, Kennedy recruited Geoffrey Kuper, a part-
Solomon Islander, who had been serving as a Native Medical Practi-
tioner (NMP) on the Polynesian island of Rennell, south of 
Guadalcanal. 5 Kuper had gone to the Fiji School of Medicine before 
the war. His father, Heinrich, had been one of the pioneer planters 
and traders in the group and was the original owner of the 14-ton 
government sloop Wai-ai. Kuper came to serve with Kennedy on the 
Wai-ai as it toured throughout the Solomons (chapter 2). The master 
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of the Wai-ai and Kennedy's second-in-command was William 
(Billy) Bennett, a part-Solomon Islander from New Georgia (see 
Bennett, Gegeo, and White 1988). Like Kennedy, Bennett was a 
man of many parts: sailor, radio operator, mechanic, medical 
dresser, cook, and schoolteacher. 
Together, they sailed for the Shortlands in late March, visiting 
Faisi briefly before moving on to Choiseul Bay. Little did they real-
ize how close they had come to being captured by the Japanese. 
While the Wai-ai lay at anchor, two Japanese warships moved 
through the straits to put a landing party ashore on Faisi on 10 
April. Unaware of these events, Kennedy set course for New Geor-
gia, where he convincedJohn "Dutchy" Klaucke to transport Hugh 
Wheatley, NMP, a part-Solomon Islander (whose father, the En-
glishman Norman Wheatley, was the self-styled "king" of New 
Georgia early in the century), and a local dresser, Joseph Alene, to 
the Shortlands to treat an outbreak of dysentery and influenza. The 
three men blundered straight into the Japanese stronghold: Klaucke 
was never seen again; Alene made good his escape, paddling at 
night via Fauro to Choiseul; and Wheatley was sent to Rabaul, only 
to lose his life when the prisoner-of-war vessel he was traveling on, 
the Montevideo Maru, was torpedoed by an American submarine. 
In April, Kennedy ordered Gina (whom he had obliged to travel 
with him since the Simbo incident) to go to Ranongga to recover two 
vessels, the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) schooner Dadavata and the 
8-ton auxiliary cutter Joan, in the care of a part-Solomon Islander, 
Joe Martin. Gina made his way from Isabel to Choiseul, where he 
secured the services of a nineteen-man canoe. They crossed the Slot 
at night, avoiding Japanese naval patrols in the darkness and rain, 
and reached Vella Lavella at daybreak. Gina traveled on foot to 
Vonunu, the Methodist headquarters on the island, and sailed from 
there on the Cecily to Ranongga. According to Gin?-, Kennedy 
showed no appreciation of his efforts when he delivered up the two 
vessels to Isabel. "He just [took] me as an ignorant person," he 
recalled (Gina 1977, 3). 
During Gina's absence, Kennedy continued to bring stores from 
evacuated plantations to his outpost at Mahaga. Butter, condensed 
milk, rice, crockery, oil, and even iceboxes were lugged up the hill 
by local porters and hidden in the bush. While Mahaga seemed 
secure enough, Kennedy took the precaution of establishing an 
emergency base overlooking Kanggava Bay on Rennell. While he 
was on Rennell, Kennedy recruited six local men who were destined 
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to serve with him for fourteen months. They became his machine-
gun corps, efficient and reliable soldiers whose "coolness under fire 
had a steadying effect" on the other men in Kennedy's "army" 
(Kennedy 1943). It was just as well that Kennedy had organized a 
fall-back position, for on 3 May the Japanese occupied Tulagi, and 
he and his followers found themselves behind enemy lines. 
The following day aircraft from the carrier USS Yorktown attacked 
Tulagi, sinking the Japanese destroyer Kitutsuki and damaging sev-
eral other naval vessels. It appears that survivors from that attack or 
the Battle of the Coral Sea, which took place immediately after (5-8 
May 1942), were rescued and brought ashore on the island of Savo. 
They were treated there by George Bogese (often spelled Bogesi), a 
Native Medical Practitioner from Isabel (Kuper 1972). When the 
Japanese on neighboring Tulagi learned that their comrades had 
been saved, they came to Savo and took Bogese into custody. Recall-
ing these events thirty years later, Geoffrey Kuper maintained that 
the Tulagi invasion force had included a Japanese civilian named 
Shima, who had run a small commercial concern in Suva prior to 
the war and had known Bogese when he was enrolled at the Fiji 
School of Medicine. 
It is unclear at present how Bogese was "turned around," but it is 
clear that he hated Kennedy. Once again the issue was Kennedy's 
womanizing. The people from Bogese's district on Isabel (his family 
lived on Sigana Island) had complained to the resident commis-
sioner about Kennedy's conduct, and Bogese and Kennedy had 
fallen out. Bogese and Gina were related, and Bogese's wife's 
brother, a man named Supa, had helped Kennedy and Kuper hide 
the Wai-ai at Sigana Bay on the southeastern Isabel coast. The stage 
was set for mistrust, treachery, and-in British eyes-treason. 
At daybreak on Sunday, 1 7 May, Bogese directed two Japanese 
landing barges, carrying one hundred troops, to the island ofKolare 
near Mahaga on the southeastern coast of Isabel. Scouts informed 
Kennedy that the Japanese were recruiting Bogese's relatives to act 
as guides in preparation for an attack on the coastwatching head-
quarters. The situation seemed desperate. All of the south Isabel 
carriers deserted, and Kennedy and Kuper were left with only five 
police from north Isabel and the six Rennellese. Together, they 
made ready to destroy the camp, but at the last minute the com-
manding officer of the Japanese detachment received word that he 
and his troops were to return to Tulagi. 
In the meantime, Supa had alerted Bogese that the Wai-ai lay hid-
JAMES A. BOUTILIER 
den in a creek nearby. Thwarted in their efforts to get at Kennedy, 
the Japanese decided to destroy the vessel as a parting gesture. Hav-
ing heard engines in the distance, Bill Bennett had dispatched two of 
his crew to reconnoiter. They returned almost immediately to 
announce that "two boats are coming" (Bennett 1977, 3), and at 
that moment the barges hove into view. Under instructions not to 
allow the Wai-ai to be captured, Bennett doused the little vessel with 
gasoline. Just as he was doing so, a tracer bullet from a Japanese 
barge hit the ship, and "the whole bloody kaboodle went boom." 
Bennett was trapped momentarily in the tangle of mangrove 
branches that had been strewn over the upper deck as camouflage, 
but he managed to plunge through the flames into the sea. A 
moment later the Wai-ai blew up, and he pulled himself ashore, ter-
ribly burned. The local people attended to him for two days until 
Geoffrey Kuper arrived to give him medical treatment and take him 
back to Mahaga. 6 
It was obvious that Kennedy and his band were no longer safe at 
Mahaga. Not only did the Japanese know the location of the 
coastwatching station, but there was increasing evidence that the 
Isabel people were withdrawing their support, which was vital to 
Kennedy's survival. The day after the Wai-ai was destroyed, Ken-
nedy reported to Marchant that the district headmen at Maringe 
and Hograno had deserted with their followers and that half the 
intelligence reports he was receiving from the Islanders were "suspi-
ciously false" (Kennedy 1942). Gina recalled urging the local big 
men to tell Kennedy that they were frightened for their lives and to 
make it seem to be their own idea. Whatever the case, toward the 
end of May Kennedy left Mahaga for Rakata Bay aboard the 14-ton 
former SDA auxiliary ketch Marara. Once there, he discovered that 
the Japanese had begun to use the bay as an anchorage, so he 
worked his way around to Veavea on the southwest flq.nk of northern 
Isabel. However, this location proved unsatisfactory as well, because 
all of the ~vidence suggested that the main Japanese supply route 
from Rabaul to Guadalcanallay to the west of New Georgia and not 
down the Slot (New Georgia Sound). 
What was needed was a new base, unknown to Bogese, from 
which Kennedy could monitor Japanese activities and carry out dis-
trict administration more effectively. One place that recommended 
itself was Seghe, the site of Harold Markham's coconut plantation at 
the southeastern tip of the island of New Georgia. The location was 
superb. The admiralty charts of the area (which Kennedy suspected 
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would form the basis of general Japanese intelligence assessments) 
portrayed the Seghe Channel incorrectly as being blocked by "foul 
ground" and coral reefs. However, not only did the waterway pro-
vide relatively easy access to both the Slot and Blanche Channel (a 
route much used by the Japanese for barge traffic to and from 
Munda), but it was ample enough for flying boats to land in front of 
the plantation. 
Seghe: The Eye of the Storm 
Leaving Geoffrey Kuper behind to supervise the coastwatching 
organization on Isabel (see chapter 2), Kennedy departed for Seghe 
early in July 1942. His first task was to establish a new headquar-
ters. Markham's old home served as a residence for Kennedy and a 
seventeen-year-old Rennellese woman, Magiko Sago, whom he had 
brought along as his mistress. Leaf houses were built for his New 
Georgian carriers and scouts. The teleradio was located in a shack 
half a mile into the bush, "getaway roads" (as he called them) were 
cut through the jungle, and secret caches of food were established 
(Lord 1977, 210). In addition, a corrugated tin and barbed-wire 
stockade was erected for prisoners of war, trenches were dug, and 
lookout and antiaircraft gun emplacements were put in place. An 
armory was built to house Kennedy's catholic assortment of weap-
ons obtained from downed American and Japanese aircraft, enemy 
soldiers, and Allied sources. "Enemy equipment captured by the 
armed scouts included six barges (one of which was later destroyed), 
one twenty-millimeter cannon, two Hotchkiss-type machine guns, 
one Bren-type machine gun, two submachine guns, twelve pistols 
and about sixty rifles. Ample stocks of ammunition were also cap-
tured and in most of the actions ... Japanese arms and ammuni-
tion were used by the Scouts" (Kennedy 1943). 
Following the American landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 
1942, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Japanese air-
craft flying between the northwestern and the central Solomons. As 
most of them flew over Seghe, Kennedy was able to alert the Ameri-
cans at Lungga on Guadalcanal that they were on their way. At the 
same time, local coastwatching patrols throughout the New Georgia 
archipelago provided Kennedy with a constant stream of informa-
tion about the movements of Japanese naval and merchant ships. 
This intelligence was further supplemented toward the end of the 
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Kennedy's "Army," Seghe Point, New Georgia, June 1943. (Michael Cur-
rin) 
year, when Lieutenants Henry Josselyn and Dick Horton of the 
Royal Australian Navy were appointed as coastwatchers on Vella 
Lavella and Rendova, respectively. Kennedy was in constant com-
munication with both men by teleradio and local canoe patrols, and 
the information that they and their own networks of scouts provided 
was relayed by radio to Lungga or picked up by Catalina flying 
boats at Seghe. (Early in November 1942 the value of local assis-
tance was dramatically illustrated when Henry Josselyn made a 130-
mile journey by canoe through enemy waters to deliver a radio to 
Kennedy.) 
The Japanese occupied Giza in October, and as a result of Gina's 
scouting the Americans were able to dive-bomb the Japanese 
encampment and drive them off the island. At the same time, the 
Japanese occupied Viru Harbour, only nine miles from Seghe. Once 
again Gina was sent to reconnoiter the Japanese position .. He 
entered the camp with two young companions, and they quickly 
determined the location of the enemy dumps, guns, and barges. The 
Japanese were accustomed to having Islanders appear now and 
then, though by this stage in the war fear of the enemy and Japanese 
raids on garden plots had driven most of the local people into the 
bush (Siosi 1972, 1; Paia 1972, 1). Suspicious for some reason, one 
of the Japanese soldiers stopped Gina and interrogated him, in the 
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process hitting him on the side of the head with a rifle butt. "I just 
remembered God's will and the hundreds of thousands of people 
praying for salvation from war," Gina recalled (1977, 5). Shortly 
afterward, the threesome managed to escape, and, equipped with 
intelligence from Seghe, the Americans were able to launch a series 
of major air strikes against the Japanese outpost. 
The Japanese were well aware of Kennedy's activities but were 
not aware of the exact location of his base. They sent out patrols 
repeatedly to probe the jungle and scan the coast toward Seghe. 
Unless threatened directly, Kennedy was happy to pursue a live-
and-let-live policy, but once the enemy penetrated what he called his 
"forbidden zone" he worked on the principle of total annihilation. 
On a number of occasions he and his men wiped out enemy patrols 
or overwhelmed Japanese detachments that strayed too close to 
Seghe in their barges. Total annihilation not only left the enemy 
fearful and uncertain, but it helped alleviate the problem of prison-
ers. Kennedy's stockade was frequently full of prisoners, who had to 
be guarded as well as competing for the extremely limited supplies of 
food. The Seghe "garrison" had access to a few plantation cattle and 
some local garden produce. According to Bennett (1977, 5), the gar-
rison lived off the village gardens on a rotational basis, one village 
per week. However, the Islanders resisted feeding the enemy. "We 
don't mind feeding you and your force," they informed Kennedy, 
"but we don't feel like feeding Japanese prisoners. Either you can 
give them to us and let us deal with them or you can get rid of them" 
(Kennedy 1969, 55). In December 1942 a Japanese destroyer and 
three cargo vessels were destroyed by American aircraft at Wickham 
anchorage south of the island of Vangunu. Kennedy and his scouts 
managed to recover about ten tons of rice and dry rations from the 
wrecks (Horton 1970, 150). Eventually, Kennedy arranged for pris-
oners of war to be flown out by American Catalina flying boat to 
Guadalcanal, but in the interval prisoners were a problem. 
Kennedy's scouts and the local people were extremely adept at 
rescuing downed American pilots and capturing Japanese soldiers 
and airmen. (For example, the rescue in February 1943 of Lt. Bob 
Sorensen, USN, and four others is described by Lord [ 1977, 167].) 
GeorgeJamokolo ofKavolavata village, Nggatokae, was involved in 
one such episode. Thirteen Japanese flyers had made their way to 
the Levers plantation at Yandina in the Russell Islands. There they 
stole a dinghy and, having fashioned a sail from copra bags, set 
course for Munda, where the Japanese had landed on 24 November 
342 JAMES A. BOUTILIER 
1942. "The southern parts of New Georgia and the Marovo Lagoon 
[across which they were sailing] were risky areas for the Japanese," 
J amokolo recalled ( 1981, 1), "because of the ruthless effectiveness of 
coastwatcher Kennedy and his 'guerrilla army'." When the Japa-
nese sailed past Kavolavata to Sobiro, Jamokolo announced to his 
friends, "mi go lukim givim kaikai" (I'll go see them and give them 
some food). The Japanese revealed their plans to Jamokolo, whom 
they considered friendly, but others reported the enemy's where-
abouts to Kennedy. He came with his men and attacked the Japa-
nese in the middle of the night. Eight of them were killed, and of the 
five that escaped one was shot at in the water and presumed dead. 
However, he survived, and J amokolo was pressured by one of Ken-
nedy's scouts to bring him in. When J amokolo delivered the man to 
Seghe, he was shot by Kennedy as he tried to leap out of the canoe 
into the sea. 
A HardMan 
Kennedy had a complex and powerful personality, and his relation-
ship with the Solomon Islanders was only partly determined by his 
successes as a big man, organizing affairs, executing skillful am-
bushes, and protecting their interests. There was a dark side to his 
character. "Kenti," as he was often called, was a man much given to 
suspicion, jealousy, and brutality. He never forgave those who 
crossed him or those whom he suspected of being less than loyal. He 
was insanely jealous of Magiko and tried to keep her confined to the 
house so that none of the men could speak to her. Magiko remem-
bered him as a kind and sensitive man early in the war. Later, how-
ever, he became "very hard" (Sogo 1977, 1). 7 He lived on the edge, 
his life constantly in danger. He drank heavily, and Bennett recalled 
how, after. the Americans reached Seghe in July 1943, Kennedy 
went "off his head" one night and tried to machine-gun nonexistent 
Japanese in the jungle ( 19 77, 6). 
His men were more frightened of Kennedy than of the Japanese. 
He demanded complete obedience, and when he judged that it was 
not forthcoming he would thrash the man involved or sentence him 
to "the drum." The victim was then spread-eagled over a 44-gallon 
drum and flogged to within an inch of his life with fathom lengths of 
loia cane (Kennedy 1969, 63). Kennedy, it seems, never adminis-
tered the punishment himself, preferring to let his lieutenants carry 
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out the sentence. In this way he maintained the fiction of impartial-
ity, a posture reinforced on at least two occasions when he had his 
favorite, Bennett, caned. (Gina argued [1977, 7] that Bennett had 
been unduly rewarded for his services as a procurer.) Willy Paia, the 
first Solomon Islander to work for the government (in 1926), acted 
among other things as Kennedy's chief scout and recalled that Ken-
nedy was a "very strong man [and that] everyone was afraid [of 
him]" (1972, 1). That assessment was echoed by Milton Siosi, who 
acted as a scout for the U.S. Marines when they advanced from 
Zanana Beach to Munda in July 1943: "My word, he whipped the 
people a lot" (Siosi 1972, 1 ). 
A victim of this treatment was one of the six Rennellese machine 
gunners, Timothy Togaka. According to Gina (1977, 7), Kennedy 
hit Togaka on the back with the butt of a rifle, and he vomited blood 
and died. Magiko So go confirmed that one of the six Rennellese had 
died at Seghe, that the Rennellese had a "bad feeling about Ken-
nedy," and that he was "very hard on them" (1977a, 1). "The name 
of the Rennellese who died after corporal punishment was Timothy 
Tongaka [sic]. He lingered for about two weeks .... no one remon-
strated because they had come to see that in war anything could 
pass. They lived in intense fear of K., and both [informants] stressed 
that the Western Solomons remained loyal to [the] British cause 
because they could visualize the consequences if K. found them 
guilty of any disloyalty" (So go 1977 b). 
One of the principal victims of Kennedy's brutality was Belshaz-
zar Gina. At one stage, as the Japanese were sending out patrols 
from Viru Harbour in search of Kennedy, Gina convinced the 
coastwatcher to allow him to conduct a reconnaissance of the Japa-
nese position. In due course he sent back word that there were about 
three hundred Japanese encamped on one side of the harbor and 
about nine unguarded barges on the opposite shore. Capable of 
attaining speeds of fifteen knots and carrying one hundred men 
each, these well-armed vessels made attractive military targets. Ken-
nedy, anxious to deny his opponents their maritime mobility, 
resolved to destroy the barges. Fortunately for him and his fellows, 
another member of his "army," Ngatu, the partly blind chief of 
Patutiva, had been keeping Gina under surveillance. He knew that 
Gina was not even at Viru Harbour and that the barges, far from 
being unguarded, were fully manned in anticipation of Kennedy's 
arrival. Ngatu was able to get word to Kennedy at the last minute, 
just as he reached the entrance to the harbor with twenty canoe-
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Kennedy's "Army" in training at Seghe Point, June 1943. Belshazzar 
(Billy) Gina stands behind one soldier helping him to sight his rifle. (Michael 
Currin) 
loads of fighting men (Kennedy 1969, 71 ). The Islanders demanded 
Gina's execution for treachery, but, according to Kennedy, he dis-
suaded them from that course. Instead, Gina was sentenced to one 
hundred lashes on the drum . When the count reached twenty-five 
and Gina's backside had been reduced to a bloody pulp, Kennedy 
halted the punishment. From then , Gina was under what amounted 
to house arrest at Seghe. 
The Viru Harbour episode raises questions about Gina's seem-
ingly contradictory behavior. Why was he prepared to risk his life 
for Kennedy on numerous occasions and to betray him on another? 
Was his alleged treachery a measure of the degree to which his rela-
tionship with Kennedy had deteriorated since the Simbo incident? 
Was he, in fact, honestly mistaken about the enemy dispositions or 
was he the victim of some "court" intrigue on the part of his col-
leagues? SDA correspondence (1968) suggested that there were "at 
least two men who tried hard to kill [Kennedy] in the midst of bat-
tle," but their shots from behind only grazed him. Further, the same 
correspondence maintained that "It was one of [Kennedy's] own 
men that went across to Munda and invited the Japanese to the 
Marovo Lagoon." Gina may have been the instrument or unsus-
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pecting victim of an unsuccessful scheme on the part of disaffected 
members of Kennedy's army. 
The Battle of Marovo 
Another victim of Kennedy's wrath was the Seventh Day Adventist 
pastor, Kato Ragoso, whose fate was intimately connected with 
another celebrated Kennedy exploit, the "Battle of Marovo." On 
the evening of Tuesday, 18 May 1943, ten Japanese entered the 
Marovo Lagoon in a whaleboat and came ashore to spend the night 
on the island of Vorusu near the SDA station at Mba tuna. 8 At the 
time, Ragoso was visiting people who had fled to Nono when the 
Japanese occupied Viru Harbour seven months earlier. Fearing for 
his family, he proceeded by canoe to Mbatuna only to discover that 
his wife and children had taken refuge on the island of Telina not far 
from where the Japanese were bivouacked. Alerted by his scouts, 
Kennedy reached Telina that night as well. He was furious with 
Ragoso for failing to report the enemy's presence in the lagoon and 
placed the pastor and Lodi, the government headman for Marovo, 
under arrest on board the Dadavata. 
Kennedy and Ragoso had crossed swords before, and mission pol-
itics may have been at the heart of the matter. Ngatu, a Methodist 
adherent and Kennedy's right-hand man, was allegedly jealous of 
Ragoso's authority in the Marovo area (Steley 1985), and, accord-
ing to Ragoso, Kennedy had attempted to "spoil" his life on several 
occasions by trying to hold court in an SDA schoolhouse on the Sab-
bath, trying to force SDA adherents to work on the Sabbath, and 
trying to persuade Ragoso to leave the mission and work for the gov-
ernment during the war (Ragoso 1945). Were (1970) stated that 
Kennedy was planning to hold court in the SDA schoolhouse in 
order to try some of the Simbo looters and wanted Ragoso to act as 
an assessor. Were maintained that Ragoso refused to take part in the 
proceedings because he would not condone the whipping of his own 
people (1970, 72). 
Additional evidence suggests (though does not confirm) that "a 
disaffected or disgruntled SDA" from Buini Tusu, a village near 
Seghe, may have been to blame for "feeding Kennedy lies about 
Ragoso's activities and loyalty" (Steley 1986). If this was the case, 
and Ragoso was indeed the victim of a calumny, it would go far 
toward explaining Kennedy's brutal and immediate response. Ra-
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goso was not one of Kennedy's scouts and was under no formal obli-
gation to report to him. Furthermore, if the sequence of events was 
as tight as it appears to have been, the pastor, having himself only 
just learned of the Japanese presence, was hardly in a position to 
communicate with the coastwatcher in time. Rather, it seems that 
Kennedy, his paranoia suitably fueled, gave vent to his own fears 
and frustrations by striking out at the nearest victim. 
Late that day, the nineteenth, word reached Kennedy that the 
Japanese had departed Vorusu and were heading for Vangunu. 
Ragoso was locked in a cabin aft (where he is said to have invoked 
Jehovah's assistance), and the Dadavata set off in hot pursuit. The 
Japanese had a five-hundred-yard lead, and as the gap closed a 
fierce machine-gun duel took place. Despite the jamming of their 
50-caliber Browning after three belts and Kennedy being hit in the 
upper leg, they kept fighting. One of the Japanese managed to hurl a 
concussion grenade, which stunned Kennedy and his crew, but a 
moment later the Dadavata, with Bennett at the wheel, rammed the 
whaleboat, and the Japanese were finished off in the water. It now 
appears that Kennedy was also meant to be a victim. Only months 
before his death in 1988, Bennett revealed that it was he, and not the 
enemy, who had fired the bullet that wounded Kennedy (White and 
Laracy 1988, 3-4). It seems Bennett had recently been flogged and 
used the heat of battle as a cover to attempt to kill the coastwatcher 
in revenge. Fortunately for Kennedy, an awkward angle of fire com-
bined with the movement of the ship to save his life, and he never 
realized that his own lieutenant had tried to kill him. 
When the Dadavata returned to Seghe, Ragoso was brought to 
"trial" before Kennedy, Bennett, the Nggela scout John Manebona, 
and three other men. During the proceedings (and we have only 
Ragoso's account for details), Kennedy allegedly struck Ragoso on 
the head with a rifle three times and, seizing his hair:, beat his head 
against a p.ost till he bled profusely. Recalling these events more than 
thirty years later, Magiko Sogo remembered that Kennedy beat 
Ragoso until he was almost dead. Ragoso's recollections and Magi-
ko's account confirm that the young Rennellese woman pleaded 
with Kennedy to stop. "Finish master, no killim more" (Stop, sir, 
don't hit him anymore), she is reported to have cried (Ragoso 1945). 
But the end was not yet in sight. One of Kennedy's men, Isoa, 
was ordered to flog Ragoso on the drum, and subsequently the pas-
tor was sentenced to be shot. It is part of SDA mythology that either 
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the gun would not fire or that "Thomas," as Kennedy was called in 
one account, was prevented by God from giving the order to shoot 
(Martin 1985, 12). If this was not sufficient proof of the victory of 
the forces of light over the forces of darkness, Kennedy's departure 
from the Solomons in September 1943 was interpreted as resulting 
from his disgraceful treatment of the man whose faith had been his 
shield. 9 
Kennedy had been invalided out of the protectorate, nearly a bro-
ken man. Alcoholism, loneliness, and stress had reduced him to the 
point where the resident commissioner was convinced that he was 
mentally ill (BSIP 1944). Kennedy's problems arose in part from, 
and were compounded by, the realization that he was no longer 
needed-at least not in the way he had been before. His war was 
over. At one stage he had been in the eye of the storm, caught 
between the Japanese in the northern Solomons and on Guadal-
canal. But the eye shrank as the Japanese occupied New Georgia 
and the Americans advanced west of Guadalcanal. For a brief 
period, Seghe was almost on the front line. Then in june 1943, the 
U.S. Marines, who had conducted a reconnaissance of Seghe three 
months earlier, returned to stay. An airstrip was constructed in the 
middle of Markham's estate, and the anchorage was given over to 
naval vessels. The front line moved slowly but steadily westward to 
Munda and Bougainville, leaving Kennedy and his army behind. 
He left the Solomons on 13 September. His men went back to their 
gardens, to working with the Solomon Islands Labour Corps, and to 
assisting the Americans and their allies "up west." Fortunately for 
the Islanders, the physical damage to their world was slight. Planta-
tions on the north coast of Guadalcanal and in the Munda area had 
been shot up badly, but local villages escaped largely unscathed. For 
most Solomon Islanders the war was over with the same inexplicable 
suddenness with which it began. 
Conclusion 
The war struck the Solomons like a tropical storm, suddenly, vio-
lently, and seemingly beyond human control. The old order dis-
solved with unsettling rapidity. British claims to greatness were seen 
to be hollow pretense. The Islanders were demoralized by the col-
lapse of colonial authority, and some of them availed themselves of 
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the goods left behind by the Europeans. The authorities called it 
"looting," and a number of Islanders acknowledged that what they 
had done was contrary to British law. Others no doubt viewed the 
abandoned spoils as legitimate booty, given the circumstances. 
Despite the dark and uncertain future, the Islanders remained 
overwhelmingly loyal to their colonial "masters." The fiction of 
British rule was maintained, and throughout the protectorate the 
Islanders for the most part served the British, the Americans, and 
the coastwatchers faithfully and resolutely. 
The same was certainly true of those who came within Kennedy's 
orbit, though the experiences of his army were not typical. The most 
obvious distinction sprang from Kennedy being a far more active 
coastwatcher than the others. Not only did he command a larger and 
more vital area for a longer period than did his colleagues, but he 
attacked the enemy. In addition to being scouts, carriers, messen-
gers, and interpreters, Kennedy's men were soldiers. They became 
seasoned guerrillas, exploiting mobility, surprise, and local knowl-
edge to great effect. Furthermore, they were operating in a friendly 
environment. In the words of the Chinese general, Chu Teh, they 
were the fish and the resident population was the sea. By providing 
assistance to Kennedy and his men and by denying it to the Japa-
nese, the local people made Kennedy's war not only successful but 
possible. As Kennedy recalled "the natives of the whole of New 
Georgia . . . had taken my word as Gospel. They treated me really 
well. They did not deviate for one second from the thing that I'd 
given them to do. I told them to get out of their villages, comfortable 
villages near sand beach, make your gardens . . . up in the hills 
where the Japanese will have a hell of a job to find you and you'll be 
safe. And with the exception of a few who lost their pigs by leaving 
them in their familiar positions they were safe" (1969, 60). When 
Kennedy did encounter difficulty, as with Bennett, Bogese, Gina, 
and Ragoso, it was usually the result· of personal antipathy rather 
than disloy~lty to the Allied cause. Men like Bogese probably 
thought more in terms of settling old scores than of advancing the 
enemy's fortunes. What complicated matters for Kennedy was the 
unpredictable way in which such factors as kinship, jealousy, reli-
gious sensitivity, and fear multiplied and translated danger from one 
part of the protectorate to another. But good fortune, skill, and the 
unswerving loyalty of the vast majority of the Islanders enabled 
Kennedy and his men to overcome those dangers and win their war. 
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Notes 
I am particularly grateful for the constructive criticism and kind support that I 
received from Graham Baines, Charles Forman, Dennis Steley, Geoff White, 
Lamont Lindstrom, and Sam Elbert in the reworking of this chapter. My thanks go 
as well to my Solomon Islander informants who made this account possible. 
1. The anthropologist Ian Hogbin was asked to comment on unrest on Nggela 
during the war. His confidential report, dated 30 October 1943, to Resident Com-
missioner 0. C. Noel, analyzed the reasons for the administration's unpopularity 
and contained observations that throw interesting light on the origins of the postwar 
nativistic movement, Maasina Rule. One of Hogbin's recommendations was that 
"Several thousands of copies of official publications describing the British war 
effort, as well as large numbers of such journals as the Illustrated London News might 
be distributed [throughout the Solomons] to counteract the effect of Life and other 
American magazines now [1943] so much in evidence." Among Those Present (British 
Colonial Office 1946) was a piece of British postwar propaganda designed to high-
light the Islanders' contribution to the war effort and perhaps to defuse some of the 
antiadministration sentiment arising at that time. For Hogbin's report, see 
WPHC, IC: BSIP/FC Kennedy Coastwatching. 
2. Allegations respecting Kennedy's brutality on Nggela were subject to lengthy 
investigation. See Hogbin 1943; WPHC 1944. Western Pacific High Commis-
sioner Sir Philip Mitchell (1944) noted that "after investigation by the district offi-
cer of the Nggela District, Resident Commissioner [0. C. Noel] considers that 
there is no need for further action in respect of allegations against Kennedy." 
3. District Officer Miller provided a detailed description of the destruction of the 
RAAF gasoline stores (250 44-gallon drums in the Burns Philp bond warehouse) at 
Giza on the morning of Tuesday, 27 January 1942. Why he would have instructed 
Gina to recover gasoline from Gizo is unclear under the circumstances (see Miller 
1942). 
4. During an interview in September 1969 Donald Kennedy recalled how he had 
found the Union Jack torn down at Gizo and defecated upon by the Islanders. He 
was convinced that Gina had put the Simbo people up to the looting. "I gave him 
[the police sergeant-major] orders to burn every second house," Kennedy recol-
lected. "He started and then I looked and I saw there was quite a number of kids, 
and I've got a soft spot for kids. I just couldn't think of them, bloody adults proba-
bly crowding the [remaining] houses and driving the kids out. So I said 'Every third 
house, sergeant-major.' He burnt every third house. We stayed and watched them 
burn. The whole damn crowd was standing there shivering, so I changed my mind 
and burned half of them or more. Well that story went all around the island of 
Guadalcanal, everywhere, and my word was law, wherever I went after that. Those 
people were enemies. They'd shat on the king's flag and they had done everything 
to indicate that they would be the first people to join the Japanese. Actually, none of 
them joined the Japanese and that was the reason, I'm satisfied. But had I been 
weak with them they would have" (Kennedy 1969, 62-63). 
5. By the time he joined Kennedy, Kuper was working at the clinic at the Aola 
district station on Guadalcanal (Kuper 1972, 4). 
6. Bogese was captured during the American reoccupation ofTulagi on 7 August 
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1942. The following month he was committed to three years' internment in Austra-
lia. When he returned to the Solomons in October 1945, he was arrested and 
brought to trial charged with an offense contrary to Section 27 of the Defence (Gen-
eral) Regulations, 1939. He was found guilty and sentenced on 3 May 1946 to four 
years' hard labor at Rove prison on the outskirts of the new capital, Honiara. Supa 
was reportedly captured at Tulagi by Bennett and taken back by canoe to Kennedy 
at Seghe, where he was at first jailed and then released to serve with the coastwatch-
ers. See BSIP 1946. 
7. Magiko and five of the six Rennellese members of Kennedy's "machine-gun 
corps" were flown from Seghe back to Rennell early in 1943 on a Catalina flying 
boat. Magiko was pregnant by Kennedy and had a daughter. The baby girl died of 
malaria in 1945 and was buried at Kanggava, Rennell (Sogo 1977a). 
8. Lord gave the wrong date in Lonely Vigil (1977), where he described these 
events as taking place in April. He based much of his account on the transcript of an 
interview with Kennedy without cross-checking his facts. For example, Kennedy 
recalled Ragoso's name as Punda, and this error and others found their way into 
Lord's account. 
9. Ragoso's diary entries for this period are frankly puzzling. The entry for 
Thursday, 20 May, describes how he was whipped fifteen times, questioned about 
the japanese, and informed that he was to be shot in the morning. The entry for the 
following day consists of one line: "Today the prisoners were making the wharf at 
the lagoon." There is absolutely no reference to his miraculous reprieve (Ragoso 
1943). 
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CHAPTER 15 
World War II Experience and Life History: 
Two Cases from Malaifa, Solomon Islands 
DAVID W. GEGEO 
AND KAREN ANN WATSON-GEGEO 
WoRLD WAR II brought many dramatic changes to the Pacific 
Islands, even where little or no fighting was experienced. Some of 
the most interesting changes, however, occurred in the lives of the 
men who were recruited by the Allies to work in labor camps, do 
coastwatching, or fight as guerrillas (see chapter 14). It is important 
to examine the experiences of these men in order to set the record 
straight about Islander contributions to the war effort, to understand 
how Islanders construed the meaning of the war, especially the rela-
tionships they formed with outsiders, and to clarify how their war 
experiences affected their lives. 
This chapter examines these issues through the accounts of two 
Kwara'ae men, Arnon Ngwadili and Isaac Gafu, from Dada'esalu 
village in West Kwara' ae, Malaita. 
Background 
We recorded Ngwadili and Gafu's personal accounts of their experi-
ences in World War II during our fieldwork in 1984 at Gwa'iliki vil-
lage, Malaita. We had explained to them our research on Islanders' 
accounts of World War II, with the aim of publishing some of their 
stories (Ngwadili et al. 1988). They were eager to share their experi-
ences and offered suggestions of others in West Kwara'ae whom we 
should record. The interview took place in the early evening, with 
only the two men and ourselves present. Gegeo began the interview 
by asking them to "talk about the war." Ngwadili and then Gafu 
gave narrative accounts, but soon the interview became a conversa-
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tion with both men comparing their experiences, thoughts, and feel-
ings. Gegeo occasionally asked questions for further information or 
clarification. The session lasted about ninety minutes. 
Our discussion in this chapter also takes into consideration 
accounts volunteered by other villagers who participated in the war, 
as included in our field notes from trips to Malaita in 1978, 1979, 
1981, and 1984. 
Malaita's War Involvement 
Malaita, the most populous of the six large islands composing the 
Solomons, was not the scene of any major battle during the war. Its 
direct involvement was primarily in supplying able-bodied men to 
the Allied war effort. Some Malaitans actually participated in the 
fighting, but most served as workers in the hastily formed Solomon 
Islands Labour Corps. At least three sites on Malaita were bombed 
during the war. In one case, the Japanese shelled buildings at the 
Anglican hospital at Fauabu, with no casualties. The other two inci-
dents occurred just prior to or during the American landings on 
Guadalcanal and Nggela, and both resulted in casualties. The japa-
nese dropped twenty bombs on the Fo'ondo Mission on the north 
coast on 6 August, killing at least six Islanders (Marchant, 6 August 
1942), and U.S. planes bombed two artificial islands in Langalanga 
Lagoon for no apparent reason on 7 August, killing between eight-
een and twenty-two inhabitants (Marchant, 7 August; Maelalo 
1980, 7). 1 On one occasion a japanese ship arrived in Auki harbor 
but withdrew to join the battle between the Americans and the J apa-
nese on Nggela. On two occasions in November and December 
1942, Malaita scouts and police were instrumental in helping Amer-
ican marines attack and destroy Japanese detachments in northern 
Malaita (Aubin 1942-1943, and see below). 
For West Kwara'ae, the episode remembered most today began 
with the japanese occupation ofTulagi on 3 May 1942, when Bishop 
Walter Hubert Baddeley fled from N ggela to join the British resident 
commissioner, William Sydney Marchant, at Auki, Malaita. The 
next day, the bishop, the resident commissioner, two British women 
schoolteachers, and a small group of Solomon Islands men went into 
hiding at the inland village ofFulisango (located about four miles up 
a ridge from Ngwadili and Gafu's home village and about eight 
miles from the west coast facing Guadalcanal and N ggela). 
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Malaita people experienced the terror of war, even if largely from 
a distance. They saw planes being shot down in the channel between 
Guadalcanal and Malaita, they heard the pounding of guns during 
the American campaign on Guadalcanal, and they lived in fear that 
Malaita could be invaded at any time and place. One night word 
came that the district commissioner had just ordered all living on the 
west coast of Malaita to abandon their villages and take refuge in the 
forest. People still talk about how the women pulled their sleeping 
children from bed and fled into the forest with them, and how the 
men spent the rest of the night laboring to erect shelters for their 
families in mosquito-infested swampy areas, using the dim light of 
dried bamboo and coconut leaves ( cf. chapter 11 for an account of 
similar evacuations of coastal villages on Santa Cruz). During this 
period people were prohibited from building fires at night and from 
fishing at sea so that they would not become targets for the combat-
ants. The stories we collected all emphasize the constant state offear, 
heightened by the unusual sounds of explosions and the sightings of 
battleships and airplanes. 
Arnon N gwadili and Isaac Gafu: Background 
Ngwadili and Gafu, who are both from Dada'esalu, present an 
interesting contrast in their backgrounds, war experiences, and sub-
sequent social roles. In his youth, Ngwadili completed junior pri-
mary schooling at Onepusu, the large South Sea Evangelical 
Church (SSEC) school in East Malaita. For awhile he was an 
orderly for the Malaita District Council and then took a variety of 
odd jobs in Auki (Malaita's commercial center). He joined the Solo-
mon Islands Constabulary as a policeman just before the Second 
World War began. In 1939 he was recruited into the ne»'ly formed 
Solomon Islands Defence Force and was sent to Tulagi on Nggela, 
where he and the other Solomon Islanders in the Defence Force were 
trained to fight. He was still there when the Japanese first bombed 
Tulagi on 22January 1942. 
The Japanese continued bombing Tulagi over the next few 
months and eventually occupied it in early May. In late February, 
Malaita District Officer C. N. F. Bengough selected Ngwadili and a 
few others to accompany Resident Commissioner Marchant as he 
moved his headquarters from Tulagi to Auki. One of the others 
selected was Salana Ga'a, who became an important political leader 
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in West Kwara'ae after the war. Ngwadili was chosen because he 
spoke relatively good English and was regarded as a stable, calm 
person. Bengough and the Solomon Islands police stayed in Auki 
when the rest of the party took refuge at Fulisango with Bishop Bad-
deley. On 2 December, when Marchant moved to Lungga on 
Guadalcanal, he took Ngwadili to be caretaker of his house and Ga'a 
as his bodyguard and companion. 
When N gwadili became involved in the war, he was a young man 
who had already traveled away from his village, received some 
Western schooling, spoke good English, had trained and worked in 
the wage-labor economy, and was accustomed to interacting with 
European church and government officials. In contrast, Gafu was 
an Anglican villager who had grown up in a very traditional life-
style. A quiet, gentle man, he had always lived in the shadow of his 
elder brother, who had been chosen as the head of his descent group, 
given special traditional training for the role, and had become vil-
lage chief by the time of the war. Gafu had not traveled far from his 
village and spoke only Solomon Islands Pijin in addition to his 
native Kwara'ae. Soon after the Americans made their landing on 
Guadalcanal, a call went out for Solomon Islanders on Malaita to 
join the Labour Corps. Gafu joined and arrived on Guadalcanal in 
December 1942 with the first Malaita units of the Labour Corps to 
assist with the American campaign. 
Ngwadili's War Experiences 
N gwadili was involved in the war effort from the beginning, and his 
account demonstrates an understanding of the war as a process-
troop movements, battles, weaponry, and events going on in differ-
ent parts of the islands simultaneously. This larger perspective also 
reflects his own location in the war, working for the resident com-
missioner and therefore having access to information and events at 
the governmental level. His account is punctuated with personal 
experiences and short narratives of events he remembers best, 
including quoted dialogue that reveals what he and others were 
thinking at the time. But many of the events he reported are second-
hand because he himself was never sent to the battlefield. 
First he described the initial Japanese bombings of Tulagi in Jan-
uary 1942 and the scene as he and others scrambled into foxholes 
and fired back, eventually shooting down one of the Japanese 
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planes. After Tulagi had been bombed three times and the Japanese 
were reportedly on their way back for a fourth time in late February, 
Ngwadili, with Solomon Islands policemen and others, walked 
across N ggela with Resident Commissioner Marchant and Bishop 
Baddeley to board three small ships and flee to Malaita. One of the 
most interesting parts of N gwadili's account was his portrayal of the 
argument over whether the Solomon Islands men at Tulagi should 
stay to fight with the Allies or flee to Malaita. He described how Ser-
geant Major Stephen Sipolo and Sergeants Sau and Falasi of the 
Solomon Islands Defence Force argued with Bishop Baddeley that 
the Defence Force should stay and fight the Japanese. But the 
Bishop won out in the end, arguing that if the Islanders fought, they 
might kill a few of the enemy, but "the Japanese will kill every one of 
you. And they will harm the village people." In the end, the resident 
commissioner agreed with the bishop. 
Ngwadili described how, while they were at Fulisango scouts were 
sent out to keep track of the Japanese and to assist the coastwatchers, 
who stayed in contact with the resident commissioner by wireless 
(see chapters 2 and 14). Two ships had been hidden on the eastern 
side of Malaita to provide escape in case the Japanese occupied the 
island. During this period a ship carrying forty Japanese soldiers 
landed at Auki wharf. Solomon Islands scouts hurried up into the 
bush to bring the news, and the Fulisango group radioed the Ameri-
cans at Santo asking for help. Ngwadili reported that the Americans 
radioed back, "All right, we will be there Friday morning at eight 
o'clock." The next morning came the American invasion of Nggela 
and Tenaru Beach, Guadalcanal. 
With the Americans needing more assistance, more Solomon 
Islanders began to be trained by New Zealanders on Malaita at 
Camp Baunani, where a Fijian battalion trained Solomon Islanders 
in jungle fighting. Ngwadili reported that again Bishop Baddeley 
intervened, ar:guing that "This is not our fight. It belongs to En-
gland. The Americans only came to help us." Ngwadili reported 
that this was the point at which Gafu and the men of his Labour 
Corps unit became involved in the war. 
A secondhand description was given by N gwadili of the American 
marine attack on the Japanese radio post at Afufu about 6 Novem-
ber 1942 (see Aubin 1942-1943; Wall1946; Fox 1962, 123; Horton 
1975, 89-90). From the time the Japanese first established the radio 
post in July 1942, Solomon Islands scouts gathered information by 
selling fresh food to the soldiers stationed there (see chapter 2 for 
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similar tactics on Santa Isabel). Prior to the attack, the Solomon 
Islanders cut a trail for a force of about fifty U.S. Marines, who sur-
rounded the camp and surprised the Japanese at morning prayers. 
All were killed immediately, except one taken prisoner and two oth-
ers who escaped but were subsequently hunted down and killed by 
the Solomon Islands police. (Estimates of the number of Japanese 
manning the post at the time disagree. Ngwadili's recollection of 
sixty is higher than either Aubin's (1942-1943) or Fox's (1962, 123) 
estimate of about fifty or Wall's (1946, 5) figure of twenty-three.) 
Ngwadili also recalled having been involved in the capture, near 
Afufu, of seven Japanese soldiers, one of whom turned out to be an 
important Japanese officer and former spy. Bengough told the Solo-
mon Islanders that "This man has more college education than I 
have," and that he had actually attended an American university. 
Although many Solomon Islanders in the Defence Force fought in 
important battles and skirmishes, Ngwadili explained that he him-
self did not because of his duties as quartermaster and caretaker of 
the resident commissioner's house. He ended his account by discus-
sing how many Japanese and Americans were killed in the war and 
how many planes both sides lost in the battle for Guadalcanal. 
Gafu's War Experiences 
In contrast to Ngwadili's account, Gafu talked about the details of 
everyday life in the Labour Corps. His descriptions of the terror of 
war were graphic and personal. There was an immediacy to his 
account of what war was like for those who witnessed it close up. His 
surprise at the numbers of soldiers and the amount of materiel 
involved was also vividly portrayed. He, too, quoted lengthy dia-
logues between Solomon Islanders and American soldiers to portray 
the events he witnessed. Gafu was a firsthand witness on the front 
lines and remembered many more incidents in detail than did 
Ngwadili. Our summary of his account is necessarily short and 
omits many of these incidents. 
On 3 December 1942 the first two hundred Solomon Islanders 
were recruited into the Solomon Islands Labour Corps (officially 
constituted by the resident commissioner on 30 November). As 
Gafu put it, word came to Malaita District Officer Bengough that 
men were needed to work on Guadalcanal. Gafu was in one of the 
first six sections of Malaitans to join the Labour Corps at Auki. 
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These sections were each made up of twenty-five laborers, one of 
whom served as "sergeant." Gafu and many other single men joined 
in the hope of earning money for their wage labor. In early Decem-
ber 1942 they boarded the Maris Stella bound for Guadalcanal. Prior 
to their arrival, a new encampment site for the Labour Corps had 
been selected on the western bank of the Tenaru River (BSIP, C.O. 
Native Labour Corps to Resident Commissioner, 1 January 1943). 
Gafu recalled well the new recruits' reaction to the sight before 
them as they neared their destination. "We could not believe what 
we were seeing as we approached Guadalcanal," Gafu said. "Those 
big steamers and warships were frightening. We were so scared 
because this was something none of us had experienced before." 
By the time they arrived, the U.S. Marines had driven the J apa-
nese out of Tenaru, and the members of the Labour Corps set up 
their tents there in lines. Gafu and the others were horrified by what 
they saw. "The plantation was empty. When the Americans killed 
Japanese soldiers they would just leave them lying in the bush. You 
could see heaps of the dead bodies of Japanese soldiers. And we were 
so afraid. We had not seen war before." Eventually the Japanese 
bodies were all buried in holes, he added. 
Solomon Islands Labour Corps workers unloading beer on Guadalcanal, 
29 March 1944. (U.S. Army Signal Corps) 
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Solomon Islands Labour Corps workers unloading fuel drums on Guadal-
canal, March 1943. (U.S. Navy) 
Gafu described work in the Labour Corps as very heavy. At day-
break the American soldiers would come to collect sections of the 
Labour Corps, each of which worked in a different place. Gafu 
talked about the heavy work done on an airfield under the hot, tropi-
cal sun. "We became so absorbed with work that we did not know 
which day was Sunday or which one was Saturday. Every week was 
just like the one before. Every day was just the same. We had no 
time to rest. We just worked." Moreover, the work was fast-paced 
and dangerous, aside fromjapanese raids: 
The steamers and warships were constantly coming and going like 
that. At that time we went out to work lifting bombs and cargo for 
fighting onto big trucks. There were so many trucks. You had to look 
carefully when you went about. If you did not a truck would run you 
over. There were many people. We were there and all of a sudden the 
American soldiers arrived and, my goodness, it was difficult to count 
how many of them were disembarking from the ships. If you went 
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somewhere without knowing how exactly to get there, you might not 
make it ... We were afraid but did not stop working. 
During the year Gafu was on Guadalcanal, his section worked on 
a wide variety of tasks. They helped to build and repair airfields, 
unloaded ammunition and cargo, did laundry, and worked all along 
the coast building wharves and unloading landing craft. Other sec-
tions helped to guard supply depots at Lungga, Tenaru, and 
Kukum. Members of the Labour Corps were shifted around accord-
ing to the immediate needs of the Allied forces on Guadalcanal. 
During the early stages of the offensive, this meant that they were 
frequently where the action was heaviest, especially if they were 
involved in carrying supplies and equipment for the marines as they 
advanced. 
Gafu's account emphasized that work was punctuated by battle. 
He said that at first some of the Labour Corps members carried 
ammunition for Americans during the raids, but they told them, 
"You are not here to fight, because you do not know how. The japa-
nese may think that you came to fight. You must go back and con-
tinue working on the cargo." 
One of Gafu 's most vivid memories is of the Japanese shelling at 
Lungga, where the Labour Corps had its main camp, in January 
1943. Shelling of the camp had occurred before. The commanding 
officer at the camp described one such bombing that occurred 
shortly after the arrival of the Malaitans, possibly in late December. 
In his letter to the resident commissioner, he reported that many of 
the Islanders at the camp "became scared and demanded to be 
returned to Malaita." Five were permitted to go back to Auki, but 
they soon decided to return to the camp at Lungga. 
The second bombing-that described by Gafu-was much more 
serious than the first. It occurred late at night on 26 jaJ).uary. Gafu 
and some of the other laborers took refuge in the river. At daylight 
when the raid was over, they returned to their camp. "We looked 
and oh, my goodness, our people were dead! The bombs had 
smashed their heads into pieces and gashed their bodies." According 
to Resident Commissioner Marchant, eleven Malaitans were killed 
in the attack or died of wounds later, and nine others were wounded 
(BSIP, Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 11 March 
1943). This incident marked the single greatest loss oflife among the 
Solomon Islands Labour Corps. Gafu described how he and many 
others fled into the plantations in grief and fear. His account and 
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Marchant's telegram agree in describing how the Malaita laborers 
"walked out of camp and for some days refused to work" (but see 
British Colonial Office 1946, 34 for a very different portrait of this 
incident painted in wartime propaganda). According to Gafu, 
Bishop Baddeley arrived, prayed with the laborers, and convinced 
them to return to work. To avoid a recurrence of such a disaster, the 
main camp was divided into four smaller camps separated at some 
distance from each other, and Labour Corps recruitment was tem-
porarily postponed. (By the time of the second bombing the Labour 
Corps had 1100 members working on Guadalcanal.) At that point, 
Gafu's section was moved to nearby Koli. Gafu himself returned to 
Malaita in 1943 when his year of contract labor was up. 
Relationships with Outsiders and the Meaning of the War 
Both Ngwadili, who had some familiarity with Western life before 
the war, and Gafu, who had little experience with things Western 
before he joined the Labour Corps, were deeply affected by their 
experiences. This is noticeable in the amount of detail in their recol-
lections of wartime events forty years ago. For example, they still 
recall military terms for airplanes, ships, guns, and other war mate-
riel, as well as the names of American soldiers they knew. Both 
offered lengthy descriptions of procedures followed in the war, and 
of strategies and planning that went on. Yet neither gave an overall 
summation of what the war meant. As Gafu put it, 
There were so many things that happened during the war that I just 
don't know what to talk about. Things happened so quickly. Fear, too, 
made it harder for me to think clearly about some of the things that 
happened .... You would be looking at those things and just say to 
yourself, "Tsk! I couldn't describe all these things!" There were so 
many things that we had not seen before and ... simply did not 
know what they were. 
One area of their experience that both narrators focused on was 
the relationship of Solomon Islanders to the Americans, on the one 
hand, and to the British on the other. 
We have already seen in Ngwadili's account that the British 
Anglican Bishop Baddeley attempted to protect Solomon Islanders 
from direct fighting against the Japanese. Gafu reported that the 
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Americans similarly tried to protect members of the Labour Corps 
from identification as soldiers by the Japanese. Moreover, during 
Japanese raids, Gafu said, the Americans tried to see that the Solo-
mon Islanders were safely in their foxholes before taking cover them-
selves, and "they guarded our foxholes." 
Beyond this, both men talked about the friendliness, generosity, 
and equality with which American soldiers treated Solomon Island-
ers (see also chapters 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 ). An important feature in 
this treatment was the sharing of food, which assumes special impor-
tance because of the K wara' ae key cultural values of fangale 'a 'anga 
'sharing' (lit., "eating good") and kwaisare'e'anga 'feeding without 
expectation of return'. According to Gafu, the first few American 
troops arrived with only enough food to feed themselves, so the Solo-
mon Islanders ate captured japanese food. But when large numbers 
of American troops began arriving, 
They came with their cargo and you ate until you could not eat any-
more so you threw the food away. When the boxes would break open 
and food would fall out of them all over the place we would not take 
them because we were afraid as we never stole before. But the Ameri-
cans said, "You all eat these things. This is our food. Let us all eat 
while we are all still alive. If the japanese kill one of us [that is, if they 
kill either the Americans or the Solomon Islanders], there will be no 
more eating together." 
The unity of Solomon Islander with American reflected in this 
reported statement, together with its emphasis on sharing food, 
could seem almost sacred to the Kwara'ae. The Americans recog-
nized the role of good food in the Islanders' ability to work hard, 
Ngwadili and Gafu said. During lulls in the war, Americans often 
invited Solomon Islanders to visit them in their tents (see also Fifi'i 
and Akin 1988), and even during attacks they often shared meals 
together. Gafu went on to talk about the "loving" way Americans 
treated Solomon Islanders: "They outnumbered us, but there was 
not a feeling of white versus black among us. We all stayed together 
as if we were of one race .... They treated us that way and it was 
really good .... We all ate together." 
Both men were also surprised by and interested in black American 
soldiers. While the Labour Corps members wore lavalavas, black 
Americans wore uniforms like white American soldiers. From the 
Islanders' point of view, black American soldiers did the same work 
and had the same privileges as white soldiers ( cf. chapter 8; Fifi'i 
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Black American Seabees trading for clubs and betel nut at Halavo Seaplane 
Base, Nggela, September 1943. (U.S. Naval Construction Battalion Historical 
Center) 
and Akin 1988; but see also chapter 11 for different perceptions 
reported by Santa Cruz laborers). Ngwadili was also impressed that 
both white and black American soldiers-though much larger and 
stronger than himself-obeyed his orders to stay out of the resident 
commissioner's house. 
The extension of equality to Solomon Islanders by American sol-
diers was also given expression in the American reaction to the level 
of pay received by the Islanders. Ngwadili reported that the Ameri-
cans asked Gafu and other Solomon Islanders, "Why is it that you 
all come and join the war, and are doing the same kind of work that 
we are doing, but your government is not paying you well?" (Here 
Ngwadili's report indicated how Islanders clearly "compared notes" 
about the war after they all returned home and discussed their rela-
tionships with both the Americans and the British.) In contrast, the 
Americans told them, "We want to pay you like we pay ourselves, 
the same salaries. We want you to eat like we do because you do the 
same work that we do." The Americans gave Islanders boxes of 
goods and handed out cigarettes freely. 
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Both men expressed a very different feeling about the British dur-
ing the war-a feeling that both complemented and contrasted with 
their attitude toward the Americans. As Ngwadili summarized it, 
"the two reasons that we are still angry with the British are, bad pay 
and their taking away of the things the Americans gave to us" ( cf. 
chapters 8 and 10). The emphasis on Americans' sharing of food, 
not calling Islanders "boy," and treating them as equals was 
intended to contrast the Americans with the British. Both men dwelt 
at length on the low pay under hazardous conditions that the British 
colonial government gave the Islanders, which they reported as 
being $2 per month (pay was £1 in British currency per month for 
"privates" or general laborers and up to £5 for "sergeants" who 
were their section leaders). Disputes over laborers' pay occurred 
repeatedly during the war, as documented, for example, in a letter 
by the Labour Corps' commanding officer to Marchant reporting a 
"strike" organized by several section leaders (BSIP, 19 March 1943; 
again, see British Colonial Office 1946 for a different picture). 
Even worse, Ngwadili argued, after the war was over the British 
took back the goods given to Islanders by the Americans. In particu-
lar, Ngwadili complained, the British officials "said that we were not 
allowed to take any food, and so they threw cases of food into holes 
[and] used bulldozers to bury them." N gwadili pointed out that had 
this not happened, "our villages would have been filled with food." 
Other goods were burned by the British. These acts of confiscation 
seem to most anger N gwadili and Gafu even today ( cf. chapters 8 
and 10). As Ngwadili said, "The British came and took all the things 
and burned them. That was the thing that was really bad. I have 
been listening to the Parliament meetings there in Honiara on the 
radio in case the issue is raised, but nothing has been said about it" 
-which he attributed to today's Parliament members not having 
served in the war themselves. His statement implied that he saw 
today's Parliament as composed of young Solomon Islanders who 
were trained by the colonialists and are ruling the country as the 
British did. Both men argued that many Solomon Islands heroes 
were not decorated by the British after the war, attention going to 
just a few such as Jacob Vouza, a Guadalcanal man in the police 
force who was made a war hero by the Allies. 
As in many other parts of the Solomons, therefore, Kwara'ae peo-
ple who participated in the Second World War, or heard stories 
about it afterward, have strong positive feelings about Americans 
and a sense of having been wronged by the British. Even after sev-
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eral years of independence, the anti-British feelings linger and the 
pro-American feelings are strong. If anything, there is a sense 
among the older generation that the Americans may come back. 
After telling the story of John F. Kennedy's rescue, Ngwadili 
explained and Gafu corroborated that the Americans hid huge 
quantities of war supplies on Guadalcanal, underground in cement 
buildings: 
Those things still remain a secret. They said that they had hidden 
them for the next world war. There is a big town in the earth on 
Guadalcanal. The British and some other people have been trying to 
find it, but they have not succeeded .... The Americans made maps 
about those houses. They also wrote them down in their books .... It 
is not possible that the things in the houses could have gone bad, 
because they oiled them .... That was an incredible thing. It took 
the Americans six months to build those houses. 
The idea that the Americans may come back seems connected to an 
unspoken wish that they had never left. As Ngwadili wistfully said of 
the American soldiers, "My goodness, if they had stayed, the Solo-
mon Islands would have been America's possession! Solomon 
Islanders would by now be speaking American English. And we 
would have adopted American culture." 
Community Roles after the War 
After the war, N gwadili went back to his job as a policeman in Auki 
until about 1946, when his stepfather died and his mother asked him 
to return home. Back in the village, he decided to become a South 
Sea Evangelical minister, and the church sent him abroad to Austra-
lia and then New Zealand for theological training. No doubt his ease 
in making these transitions was assisted by his previous experiences 
working with the Solomon Islands police and various British officials 
during the war. 
When N gwadili returned to Malaita he spent several years as 
minister at 'Areo, a former SSEC village, which later moved to 
Kilusakwalo, near Dada'esalu. During these years he worked with 
the late Australian missionary Norman C. Deck, translating the 
New Testament and liturgical writings into Kwara'ae. After Deck 
retired, Ngwadili worked with other missionaries and various Sum-
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mer Institute of Linguistics translators who came to Malaita to pre-
pare translations of religious materials. Through these activities he 
became very well known among Europeans in the Solomons. 
In the late 1970s Ngwadili retired as a minister. He had become 
disillusioned with the church over retirement benefits for local min-
isters and over all the translating work he had done without being 
compensated. He turned his attention to getting the churches to rec-
ognize traditional Kwara'ae culture (see Keesing and Tonkinson 
1982 on the resurgence of Melanesian ideas of kastom), including 
retranslating church liturgies into proper Kwara'ae. Because of his 
previous role as a church leader and his new campaign on behalf of 
traditional culture, Ngwadili emerged as an important religious and 
political figure in the late 1970s. As a sign of his importance in this 
area, he was elected as a paramount chief for West Kwara'ae during 
a major meeting in 1978. 
About this time he was also widowed. In 1979 he married a young 
Anglican woman from To'ambaita (a language and culture area 
north of Kwara'ae), whom he came to know through relatives. In 
1980 the wife of a close relative of Ngwadili's died suddenly. Women 
in the SSEC village where they lived accused his wife of sorcery (the 
Kwara'ae think of To'ambaita people as potential sorcerers). An-
gered by what he regarded as a ridiculous charge, N gwadili returned 
to the religion of his childhood, the Anglican Church of Melanesia, 
and with his wife and young children, moved back to Dada'esalu. 
On his own he began traveling all over West Kwara'ae, assembling 
genealogies from all tribes and clans of the area in an attempt to con-
struct a history ofKwara'ae. 
Ngwadili seems to be a man caught between two cultures. In 
manner and outlook he is very Westernized, yet his primary interest 
now is in conserving and promoting traditional culture ( Jalafala in 
Kwara'ae, kastom in Solomon Islands Pijin). Similarly, h~ is caught 
between two religious denominations, sometimes attending one 
church and sometimes the other. His younger brother, who concen-
trated his efforts in business and politics, became very wealthy. 
Despite Ngwadili's prestige and the respect shown him by SSEC 
members and Anglicans alike, he does not see himself as a success 
vis-a-vis his brother, and attributes his poverty to the years he spent 
working for the church. 
Gafu returned to Malaita in 1943 and resumed a very traditional 
life of subsistence gardening. His elder brother, the head of their 
descent group, took advantage of Gafu's war knowledge and experi-
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ences to build his own reputation and influence. An experienced 
orator, he told stories he heard from Gafu as he went about from vil-
lage to village, thereby enhancing his prestige as a political leader. 
For Gafu, his elder brother's leadership role worked against his 
own possibility of becoming a political leader. A quiet, unassuming, 
noncompetitive man, he is respected today in Dada'esalu and the 
surrounding villages for his depth of knowledge, his humility, and 
his contribution to communal work. He is seen as a hardworking, 
dignified man who has raised a large family and earned the title of 
gwaunga 'i 'elder'. 
Conclusion 
World War II afforded Ngwadili and Gafu the opportunity to com-
pare two kinds of Europeans-Americans and British-and two 
ways of dealing with Islanders (see also Read 1947). Their experi-
ences enhanced their roles as leaders in their community (though for 
Gafu, his brother received more benefits from the experience than 
he himself probably did). "Enhancement" suggests that the war 
experience alone did not bring about new roles for these men so 
much as strengthen roles they were already in the process of 
building. 
In the future we plan to continue interviewing Kwara'ae men who 
participated in the war, as well as women who were left behind or 
who observed Bishop Baddeley's stay at Fulisango. We know of oth-
ers who seem to have used the war experience to build roles as reli-
gious or political leaders, and yet others will have returned home to 
create other roles for themselves, such as storyteller-educators or 
clown-entertainers (who do informal performances at social gather-
ings, often imitating people they have observed). One question that 
interests us is how particular experiences in the war may have 
affected the kinds of roles-secular or religious, educational or 
entertainment-that Islanders later took on. We also want to con-
tinue to pursue the relationship between individual Islanders' 
involvement in the war and their perception of what the war meant. 
Finally, Islanders have had several ways of reacting to the war. 
For some, the war was a traumatic introduction to Western life, and 
they have been unable since to remain comfortably at home in the 
village. They drift back and forth between town and village, and 
their children now follow the same pattern. The radical juxtaposi-
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tion of two cultures is unresolvable for them. For others, the display 
of material wealth became an irresistible beacon; they have re-
mained in town, pursuing the goal of wealth and sometimes even 
refusing to speak their native language. Finally, others like Ngwadili 
and Gafu returned to their villages and incorporated their war expe-
rience into their lives as a highlighted moment of traumatic educa-
tion that they have transformed and shared with others. 
Note 
In conversations with a former member of the Solomon Islands Armed Constabu-
lary, we learned that it was his impression that the bombing followed from a request 
from the British district officer for reprisals against suspected collaborators. While 
these impressions derive from firsthand accounts of radio messages sent to the 
Americans, recent historical data unearthed by Hugh Laracy (personal communi-
cation) shows that the bombing was done by American planes that mistook Langa-
langa for Coleridge Bay farther to the north where Japanese were suspected of hav-
ing a base. 
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CHAPTER 16 
Samoan Representations of World War II 
and Military Work: The Emergence of 
International Movement Networks 
ROBERT W. FRANCO 
WHEN Commander Benjamin F. Tilley arrived at Tutuila in August 
1899 he marveled at Pago Pago harbor, "a perfect fortress ... 
stronger for defense than Gibraltar." Eight months later eastern 
Samoa was ceded to the United States, and Tilley set out to establish 
a naval administration for the territory. He created a government 
that included only two new institutions, a judicial system and the 
Fitafita guard, who were to enforce court decisions and generally 
maintain order. Tilley formed the Fitafita in order to attract "the 
elite young men and thus bring them under the influence of the gov-
ernment" (quoted in Olsen 1976, 9-10, 21). During the 1920s and 
1930s employment with the naval administration brought a great 
deal of prestige to the Fitafita guardsmen. Darden (1952, 13) stated 
that the Fitafita were an important source of cash for their extended 
families ('aiga) and that guardsmen were "accruing prestige vastly 
out of proportion to their traditional status." 
In the early 1940s, World War II came to American and Western 
Samoa. When Samoans speak of this period they talk of the abun-
dant wage labor opportunities and the continuities of their military 
service to the United States. In the 1940s large numbers of 
Samoans, not just Fitafita guardsmen, gained access to opportuni-
ties for wage labor and military enlistment and a chance to redefine 
their status in relation to their traditional chiefs (matai). Hundreds of 
American and Western Samoans developed transportation, commu-
nication, and supply skills and, with the end of the war, were eager 
to succeed in overseas labor markets. In this way World War II pro-
vided a major stimulus to international migration by Samoans, a 
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migration that now encompasses a wide geographic expanse from 
New Zealand through Samoa to Hawaii and the U.S. mainland. For 
Samoans, as for other Islanders discussed in this volume (see chapter 
3), the aftereffects of World War II have been as disruptive as the 
war itself. 
During World War II in American Samoa, for the first time hun-
dreds of Samoans were allowed to volunteer for the U.S. military, 
either as Fitafita guardsmen or as members of the U.S. Navy or 
Marine Corps Reserve. When the naval station at Tutuila was 
closed in 1951, these recruits and their dependents, nearly a thou-
sand people in all, were relocated to Hawaii. From the 1940s to the 
present, Samoans have been volunteering to serve in the U.S. 
armed forces, and, as they have traveled to military bases in Hawaii, 
California, and Washington, they have found kin who have pre-
ceded them and established Samoan enclaves near these military 
bases. From World War II to the present, military enlistment has 
been a significant catalyst to migration and a major strategy for 
adapting to American urban environments. 
American Representations of Samoans during World War II 
In 1940, Pago Pago was only a minor naval station lacking "the 
facilities necessary to handle wartime logistical problems" (Olsen 
1976, 175-176). In the spring of 1940, Captain A. R. Pefley went to 
American Samoa to draw up plans for the development of defense 
capabilities on Tutuila. His development plan included the following 
points: 
1. Additional quarters for officers and enlisted men must be con-
structed; 
2. Expand commissary, storage, and refrigeration; 
3. A new dispen~ary and additional generators needed; 
4. Increase light and heavy machinery and equipment; 
5. Purchase additional land at Fagotogo and Utulei; 
6. Build garage, machine shop, and recreation facilities; 
7. Improve sanitation in Pago Pago and other areas; 
8. Develop a thorough agricultural program to feed the men. 
In November 1940 expansion of the naval station began. Later, this 
expansion program was part of a contract, "The Pacific Air Bases 
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Program," which included construction work at Pearl Harbor 
(Burke 1972b, 25). 
Much of this initial expansion on Tutuila was conducted under 
the administration of G. K. Brodie, director of the Public Works 
Department. From the naval records there appears to have been a 
great urgency to this expansion. For example, the records refer to 
"war clouds brewing" and "the clouds of war descending." Brodie 
felt that the necessary speed of the work was unfortunate and that 
there would be problems going from a "decrepit, minor Naval Sta-
tion" to a "Pacific Air Base" (Burke 1972b) in a short period. In a 
memorandum to Lieutenant Commander W. L. Richards, Brodie 
wrote: 
The labor situation is most unique .... In general, the native labor 
will be sufficient and satisfactory. However, there are several points 
that require special mention: a) Native Food supplies have to be main-
tained. The natives have one great fault; they have little foresight. As 
long as they have sufficient food in the ground for their needs, they are 
satisfied. They do not entirely grasp the fact that when we take most of 
their men for labor they will have to rely on the women, old men, and 
children for plantation work. We are making every attempt to encour-
age or force them to keep planting in excess so that there will always 
be adequate food to supply the men working. If their food supply fails, 
we will have to take over the task offeeding the island by the importa-
tion of rice and by fishing with dynamite. At regular intervals, native 
Public Works employees who have high standing with the natives are 
being sent out to check the plantation and put pressure on the chiefs to 
keep the planting going. This is an odd and perhaps illegal expendi-
ture, but it is almost mandatory under the circumstances; b) The 
natives can do a good 8 or 10 hours work a day, but when worked 
beyond that, they cannot keep up the pace. They desire to work as 
much as possible to get the money, but trials have proved that they 
cannot physically stand up under long working hours. (Burke 1972b) 
Brodie did not want to import laborers to work on the naval sta-
tion. Instead he felt that Samoan workers could be more productive 
if their diet were improved. He was also concerned that debilitating 
worms were negatively affecting Samoan workers, and he expressed 
a need for a "sustained deworming." His memorandum continued: 
The native diet consists almost entirely of taro, breadfruit, banana, 
and coconut ... not enough fish. It is necessary to furnish transpor-
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tation for the majority of the workmen living in outlying districts. If 
they were allowed to crowd into the already overcrowded villages 
adjacent to the station, the sanitation problem would be an active 
menace. Furthermore, by transporting them to their own localities, 
they are able to receive food from their own plantations and to some 
extent, work them in their off time. If forced to stay in the vicinity of 
the station, they would have to spend all their wages for food; this, of 
course, would soon lead to dissatisfaction on a large scale. (Ibid.) 
In January 1941 Samoans were employed on naval defense pro-
jects, working on the construction of fuel storage facilities, an air-
field and hangar, a dispensary, gun emplacements, shelters, and 
other facilities (Olsen 1976, 176). In February 1941 the governor 
requested that the insular defense force, the Fitafita guard, be 
expanded to about five hundred men. Three months later, in May, 
the commandant of the Marine Corps authorized the organization 
of the First Samoan Battalion, Marine Corps Reserves (Burke 
1972b), and this unit was not to exceed five hundred men. Early in 
1941, Fitafita guardsmen were trained in various defense situations, 
and later in that same year they visited villages on Tutuila and 
Manu'a, training the Samoan civilian population in military tech-
mques. 
On 1 March 1941 the Seventh Marine Defense Battalion arrived, 
composed of 443 officers and men responsible for shore defense. At 
this time a few gun emplacements and a small power-generating 
plant had been completed by a growing American civilian workforce 
and local Samoan labor. When Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 
December 1941, nearly thirteen hundred American civilians were 
employed on Tutuila. With the beginning of hostilities, these civilian 
workers had to be evacuated from Tutuila, where they were replaced 
by Seabees and Samoan laborers. After 7 December 1941 there was 
a "noticeable acceleration in the expansion taking place' 1 on Tutuila 
(Burke 1972b,. 40). Burke went on: 
When the Samoans heard that the U.S. was at war, they came in 
from all sections of the island armed with bush knives volunteering to 
do anything necessary for the defense ofTutuila. There was no longer 
any time to worry about expense or approval. Time became the valu-
able factor and the race against the Japanese was of prime impor-
tance. All able-bodied Samoans were called in to assist in building 
defenses. The women and children were encouraged to work on their 
land so that there would be no food shortage. At this time the Com-
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mandant was authorized by the Bureau of Yards and Docks to utilize 
all civilian personnel and equipment for any defense purpose he 
desired. (1972b, 41) 
In January 1942 Brigadier General Henry Larsen and the Second 
Marine Brigade Reinforced arrived on Tutuila to take command of 
the Samoa Defense Group. The operational plan for the Samoa 
Defense Group, which also included the Ellice Islands, Fiji, Tonga, 
and all the Pacific south of the equator and east of Tonga, excluding 
Easter Island, was drawn up by the commander-in-chief of the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet. Burke described the general features of the operational 
plan: 
The purpose of occupying these islands was to fill out the defense ring 
of Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia for protection of the essential sea 
and air communications between the U.S. and Australia and to pro-
vide a base area for future operations against japan. (1972a, 50) 
Later in the war Samoa became a staging area for campaigns in the 
Gilbert and Marshall islands. Samoa played an integral role in the 
early stages ofWorld War II, and Samoans sensed the urgency of the 
conflict. It was a war America needed to win. 
On 25 April 1942, Major General Charles F. B. Price relieved 
General Larsen. When Price took command of the Samoa Defense 
Group he was concerned that "hostile raids ... and strong land 
. and air attacks were possible in the near future" (Burke 1972a, 55). 
In April 1942 the first major Marine forces landed on Tutuila; the 
Seventh Construction Battalion arrived in july 1942, and the Third 
Marines Reinforced, comprising 4316 men, sailed for Tutuila in 
August of the same year. 
By October 1942 the U.S. military was preparing for a possible 
attack on Tutuila and for a protracted engagement. The role of the 
Fitafita guard in any defensive action was clearly specified: 
Fitafita section 1-Take the enemy forces under fire approaching 
within the east sector of the Naval facility. Control the spread of fire 
during lulls in the battle. 
Fitafita section 3-Take enemy forces under fire approaching within 
the malae area. Control fire ... safeguard essential material and 
records as directed. Be prepared to carry out Naval Station Logistic 
Plan One on order. 
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Fitafita color guard, American Samoa, 20 December 1944. (U.S. Navy) 
Fitafita section 4-Take enemy forces und~r fire approaching within 
the west sector ... control fire during lulls in the battle. 
Fitafita section 5-Take enemy forces under fire approaching within 
the rr;alae area. Be prepared to man fire truck on order. Power house 
detail control damage to Naval Station power supply. (Burke 1972a) 
Samoans were also active within the Supply Division at Pago 
Pago, which was viewed as one of the most important because it was 
necessary to "keep the logistics train functioning smoothly" (Burke 
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1972b, 129). The Supply Division consisted of2500 civilian employ-
ees, and it is assumed that most or all of these were Samoans. 
After Pearl Harbor, many ships were directed to Pago Pago. 
According to Burke, 
Ship arrivals jumped from three in December, 1941 to fifty-six in 
December, 1942. Shipping activity was intensive throughout 1943. In 
March, 1943, 121 vessels passed through Pago Pago harbor. Shipping 
arrivals declined after February, 1944, from fifty per month to less 
than twenty. (1972b, 135) 
There was a great deal of military activity in Samoa between jan-
uary 1942 and March 1944. In October 1942, there were 14,371 
American servicemen on Tutuila and Upolu. During the following 
twelve months the number decreased to 9491, and by February 1944 
only 2080 American servicemen remained in Samoa (Burke 1972a, 
75). The "Marine Era" on Tutuila ended on 1 March 1944, when 
the base reverted to a naval station. The naval commandant was 
then responsible for the "roll up" of the base; that is, he made avail-
able a huge amount of supplies and building materials to be sent to 
the forward bases in the northern and central Pacific. The naval sta-
tion was given a new, less urgent mission (Burke 1972a, 7), pro-
viding: 
1. Limited anchorage facility 
2. Permanent fueling facilities 
3. Minor naval repair depot 
4. Supply facilities 
5. Communication facilities 
6. Weather observation station 
7. Limited aviation facilities 
8. Hospital facilities 
9. Internal security using any personnel available 
Even in 1945, more than seven hundred Samoans were working as 
stevedoring personnel using cargo-handling equipment, cranes, 
trucks, and trailers, and reports from Tutuila remarked "Ships are 
promptly discharged to full limit of labor and equipment available" 
(Burke 1972a, 13). 
In general, the U.S. military presented positive assessments of the 
Samoan labor force, especially during the period of intense military 
activity, 1942-1944. 
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Throughout the entire war period Samoan personnel were used wher-
ever possible releasing the Navy personnel for more vital jobs. The 
Samoans performed very satisfactorily. Although the Samoan did not 
have the stamina of a Caucasian, he could work for about ten hours a 
day without losing efficiency. (Burke 1972b, 131) 
The U.S. military was also present on Upolu and Savaii after 27 
March 1942. The greatest concentration of American troops was on 
Upolu, as Savaii was considered too rough and mountainous for air-
fields, and there were no anchorages for larger ships. Through nego-
tiations with A. C. Turnbull, acting administrator in Western Sa-
moa, and other representatives of the New Zealand government, the 
United States was able to secure tenure over 5000 acres of land for 
the duration of the war. The land was to be developed into an air-
strip using U.S. military personnel and Samoan workers. The 
Samoans were paid five shillings per eight-hour day if they were 
laborers and eight to sixteen shillings per eight-hour day if they were 
foremen or specialists. It appears that the Western Samoans were 
also eager to work, as one report stated that "sufficient labor is avail-
able at all times" (Burke 1972b, 46). In addition to assisting military 
personnel with the construction of an airstrip, Western Samoans 
also worked in roadbuilding. As the war moved westward beyond 
Samoa, Western Samoans worked to maintain the airstrip as an 
emergency facility. 
Olsen, in his fine history of American naval administration in 
Samoa, summarized some of the beneficial and disruptive effects of 
Samoan participation in World War II: 
One of the most important benefits that Samoans would derive . 
was the experience and training Samoan mechanics and craftsmen 
gained working alongside American civilian contract employees and 
the Seabees. As a result after the war, Samoans were competent to 
construct, maintain and operate the Island Government facilities. 
With the exception of the Public Works officer and his assistant ... 
all the employees of the Public Works Department were Samoan, in-
cluding draftsmen, surveyors, foremen, machinists, heavy equipment 
operators, plumbers, electricians, refrigeration mechanics, welders, 
and clerks. Also, during and after the war, Samoans working for the 
naval station learned valuable trades that allowed them to open their 
own small businesses, such as small auto repair shops, paint shops, 
and carpentry services. Other Samoans who had enlisted received 
veteran's benefits allowing them to further their education. (1976, 
177-179) 
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However, Olsen went on to argue: 
On the whole the impact of World War II was disruptive despite the 
benefits Samoa gained as a result of the war. The very foundation of 
Samoan society-the matai system-was threatened .... The re-
placement of Samoa's plantation economy by a wage economy gave 
the young men ... a feeling of independence gained from having 
money in their pockets rather than being dependent on their matai 
who controlled the family's lands. (1976, 179) 
In 1945, Governor Hauser addressed the American Samoan Fono 
in these words: "We have much to do, as native industry, agricul-
ture, education, and the like suffered greatly when you made your 
all-out effort for the U.S. and our allies" (quoted in Olsen 1976, 
186). Governor Hauser warned the Fono that the wartime prosper-
ity would soon be over. This prosperity is probably best reflected in 
the growth of the assets of the Bank of American Samoa during the 
period. Between 30 June 1941 and 30 June 1945, the bank's assets 
grew from $309,768 to $1,804,281 (Olsen 1976, 178). 
In the period 1945-1950, the American Samoan Fono asked the 
naval administration to address three major issues. First, a request 
was made to give all Fitafita guardsmen and Samoan Marines 
American citizenship, but the request was withdrawn when ques-
tions about citizenship and land ownership were raised. Second, 
ChiefTuiasosopo complained from his position within the Fono that 
during the war years the military administration had inappropri-
ately selected lower-ranking chiefs for government positions. Third, 
in the discussion over a constitution for American Samoa, it was 
decided to remove a clause prohibiting "involuntary servitude" 
because the Fono was afraid that such a clause might restrict the 
authority of matai. These issues show quite clearly that American 
Samoan political leaders, even after the disruptions of World War II, 
still placed great value on their matai system and its prerogatives in 
economic decision making. Further, the citizenship issue foresha-
dowed an ongoing concern over citizenship status and land tenure 
questions. 
The period 1940-1950 was a decade of rapid population growth in 
American Samoa, no doubt partly due to the presence of the U.S. 
military (see Keesing 197 3). By 1951, the wartime prosperity was 
ending, and Samoans were finding it difficult to readjust to a low-
ered standard of living. Lewthwaite, Mainzer, and Holland vividly 
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described the diaspora that accompanied the closing of the U.S. 
naval base in American Samoa in 1951: 
So when the General R. L. Howze, the last scheduled naval transport, 
sailed on 25 June 1951, it carried many members of the disbanded 
Fita Fita Guard north to Hawaii .... And when, in 1952, the Presi-
dent]ackson called on short notice to pick up dependents, the authori-
ties were faced with something of a rush. For many claimed relatives 
in Hawaii and seized the opportunity for free or low-cost naval trans-
portation, and though the hastiness of their medical and financial 
screening was to provoke Hawaiian protest, almost 1,000 [Samoans] 
embarked for Honolulu. (1973, 135) 
Samoan Representations of Military Work, 1940 to the Present 
The following discussion is based on interviews conducted in Samoa 
during 1984 with ten Samoans, six of whom were members of either 
the Fitafita guards or the Samoan Marine Reserve during World 
War II. Since four of these men retired from the U.S. military after 
thirty years of service, their statements will be used to elucidate the 
process of Samoan enlistment in military service to the present. 
Falani, 1 a retired government worker from American Samoa, dis-
cussed his memories of the 1940s in Tutuila: 
Most of the Samoans got jobs working with the marines. The govern-
ment hired local people to help the marines. The people helped build 
houses for the marines to stay in and barracks to store the equipment. 
There was more labor needed, so the government had to bring people 
from Western Samoa before the war. The working hours were limited 
to eight hours a day, but some people worked for ten to twelve or even 
twenty-four .hours a day. When the war began people were forced to 
work and most of them worked for two or three days in a row. The 
government told the people that if they don't work, the MP truck 
would take them to jail. In most of the families we seldom saw men. 
Most of them went to work except for break time, during which time 
they could be at home. But within several hours they were called on 
duty again. The women were then in charge of the families. The 
Samoans worked hand-in-hand with the marines as if the marines 
were Samoan. The marines wanted the Samoans to work hard for 
them building bases for their own protection. The people were forced 
to work, and if they didn't they would end up in jail. There was at that 
time a judge named Blake. If he found you during working hours 
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doing nothing, he would ask you what you were doing. If your answer 
was wrong, then you would be punished. During night shifts, Blake 
would walk around with his civilian clothes to check on the workers . 
. . . When the war came, money began to flow into the island. Beside 
the increased jobs in government, most of the women did laundry for 
the marines and got money. The navy and marines made contact with 
the local people through the village mayor. They looked for skilled 
men in each village. The people who were chosen would have to sit a 
certain exam in order to get a better job. In those days there were no 
newspapers. Everything that the marines wanted from the people 
would go through the village mayor. There was a blackout on the 
whole island and everything was controlled by the marines. At night 
no one was allowed to walk around in the village or make noise. If you 
were seen by the marines, they just called you three times and if you 
don't show yourself, they shoot you. Most of the Samoans who 
sneaked around in the night were asked where they were going. When 
the marines found them they took them to their destination. That was 
for the protection of the Samoans. The Samoans liked to work with 
the marines unless they got mad and ruined everything .... Regard-
less of the hard times, the marines and the Samoans did work hand-in-
hand. After the war there were many people who left the island. The 
navy base was closed and the marines were shipped to the United 
States to finish their service. 
This account is in general agreement with the ones that will follow 
later and with the historical material from the Department of the 
Navy. On one point, however, there was disagreement among 
Samoan informants. Falani was the only one who mentioned 
Samoans being forced to work under the U.S. military administra-
tion. There are indications in the historical accounts discussed ear-
lier that some force might have been applied in getting Samoans to 
produce the maximum from their agricultural lands, but in general 
it seems that Samoans were eager to earn income through work with 
the U.S. military. (For a comparative look at the issue of forced 
labor during the war see Robinson 1981; and chapters 15 and 17.) 
An older Samoan teacher, when asked, "How did Samoans respond 
to the work activities introduced during World War II?" replied, 
Like flies around carrion, magnificently. They built airports. Others 
said of Samoans "they can't handle machinery; they are a farming 
people. We tried for years to tell them not to dig a hole with this fool-
ish stick 'oso, and we showed them all these modern planting tech-
niques, and after three months of training we go away, and they pick 
ROBERT W. FRANCO 
up the stick and do the same damn thing they've been doing for hun-
dreds of years," and much of what they said was perfectly true. And 
there were many who said Samoans were unteachable. Somebody 
showed up with great big tractors and overnight they were building 
airfields and putting up modern communications. Every piece of road 
on Tutuila, Samoans help build. They were ready, willing, a very 
capable workforce, very versatile. 
This informant went on to discuss the incentives that drove the 
Samoan worker during the early 1940s. 
Five million dollars went through here in a three-year period, 1942-
45. That's an awful lot of money. The place had never seen so much 
money. Samoans could see a point to the work, the money, and there 
was a war; there were the Japanese whom we were fighting. It wasn't 
secular work; there was a holiness to the whole thing. There was a 
great bigja'alavelave (a problem requiring the mutual support of the 
entire extended family, or 'aiga); we all had to go to work. Samoans in 
World War II were willing to do more than they were asked to. Look 
at all these people coming to our islands; there must be a big fa 'alave-
lave. We must help these people; this is our country; we are Ameri-
cans. The money was wonderful. The Samoans were happy doing 
that kind of work. I think they were happy and they volunteered in 
droves for the army and navy. 
An American Samoan matai agreed that there was no need to force 
the Samoans to work. He stated, 
The Samoans saw the importance of the war work ... and saw the 
work as a big opportunity .... It was all so new and fast. After the 
Samoans understood the new working conditions they worked enthu-
siastically for the marines. 
Finally, with respect to the issue of whether Samoans were forced to 
work, an older Samoan service veteran stated: "I loved the work I 
did for the marines. I felt like Nathan Hale when he said 'I regret 
that I have only one life to give for my country.' " 
With the end of World War II, American Samoans faced the real-
ity of limited employment opportunity, and, with the departure of 
the navy in 1951, another sudden change confronted the young 
Samoan worker. The older Samoan teacher provided an illuminat-
ing picture of the changes that confronted Samoans in the 1940s and 
1950s: 
Military Work and International Movement from Samoa 385 
Even before Pearl Harbor, the U.S. government sensed that there 
would be something. As early as the summer of 1941 there were 
already marine contingents beginning to land. Already a road was 
being improved and people were hired all over the place. Before that 
the navy only did as much work as was necessary to keep the navy 
base functioning pleasantly and the rest was "benign, kind neglect." 
In many ways that was wonderful, and in many ways it was absolutely 
terrible. So that there was almost no work and what there was was for 
the navy and for the government. Pearl Harbor was the biggest sud-
den shift into a money economy psychology that could have happened 
to the place. The departure of the navy, well, that was the navy's 
move. When the navy left, the two hundred Samoan families had to 
go. They had enlisted in the U.S. Navy, and when the navy left, when 
the navy base was closed here, those who enlisted had to be relocated. 
What made the later Samoan exodus so easy and so successful is that 
the U.S. government actually created-around naval bases-safe, 
intact Samoan communities to which other Samoans could go. Pearl 
Harbor, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Francisco, the Samoans could 
move to these areas because there were Samoan military communities 
to meet them. From these places, the Samoans moved out and the 
mess began. Some Samoans wanted to leave here because they had 
work skills and nowhere to use them. If they were just people looking 
for jobs they might have turned around defeated and come back 
home. What made the footholds was that the navy made the transition 
a safe, workable, easy one. They gave these sailors communities 
around bases, with commissaries. Once firmly established, other 'aiga 
members join them in search for work. 
This informant clearly believed that the navy pullout from Samoa 
led directly to the establishment of the Samoan migration network in 
the United States. Another informant who worked for the U.S. mili-
tary immediately before, during, and after the war, also moved 
along this network, and his life and work history present an intri-
guing picture of the Samoan response to military work, from the 
1940s to the present: 
In 1937, the best jobs were bus driver, truck driver, school teacher, or 
the Fitafita. In 1940, I worked for the Public Works Department as a 
general laborer, for 15 cents an hour. When the navy contractor came 
down, I worked as roadman for the surveying of the Tafuna airstrip 
for 28 cents an hour. Then I succeeded to heavy equipment operator 
for 37 cents an hour. When I got my paycheck, I thought it was gonna 
kill me; it was so much money. I immediately turned it into liquid and 
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did a little gambling. After four to six months of heavy equipment 
work for the navy contractor, the Seabees arrived and we got a chance 
to work overtime. At that time the number of marines on the island 
was so tremendous you could hardly move. The Fagotogo central area 
(malae) was in bad shape because it was a heavy storage area, things all 
over the place. In the six to eight weeks after Pearl there was tremen-
dous activity. General Larsen and the marines arrived and there was 
martial law. The attorney general, Baracco, was very mean; he did 
not care about us. He said, "No more gambling," and if you were 
caught gambling you had to go before him in court. He would find out 
how much we had in the bank, and then he'd roll the dice. If he won, 
he would take some of the money from your bank account. If he lost, 
he'd say, "You're lucky, no fine." He got a lot of money from us, but 
that money was used to build the governor's building and the hospital. 
All able-bodied Samoans were required to work, but all were moti-
vated to work. The U.S. was making a big drive in the Pacific. We 
built a supplemental airport at Leone. I was making 67 cents an hour. 
In 1944 I took a test to become a teacher because this was the best job 
then. I taught school from 1945-1950. The pouring of American 
troops into Samoa is something I will never forget. The ships kept 
coming in, ships moving around the island, and ships anchored at the 
mouth and the harbor ready to come in. As soon as they finish unload-
ing, they moved out, the next one came in, dropping off marines and 
supplies. 
There were many training areas between Leone and Vailoatai. Ten 
to twenty nets were hanging down and the marines are climbing up. 
The marines came and took over the island. When the Seabees 
arrived, everyone worked, even old ladies, because they saw the value 
of the money. That's what makes things go. The time came in 1946 
when the jobs became fewer and fewer. When I saw the marines work-
ing on tanks, vehicles, tractors, and cars, I got interested in that kind 
of work. After 1946, we could go to school if we wanted to. :I'he gov-
ernment would pay us and we'd go to school. Go to school to get the 
paychecks. A1: that time I told myself to go to the U.S. and join the 
armed forces. Then the navy came to pick up the dependents and the 
Americans here. My brother was in the Fitafita guard. I asked him ifl 
could go with him. He said, "No, you shouldn't go; stay here with 
dad." "Wait a minute," I said. "We have four kids here, they can 
take care of the old man. We can go up there and look for a better 
job." My brother didn't like the idea because I asked him to pay my 
fare as a dependent on the ship, ten dollars for meals actually. I went 
to Hawaii in 1950. We arrived on a Saturday night. It wasn't much of 
a surprise, except the lights way up on the mountains looked just like a 
Christmas tree. The following Monday, I went to look for a job. In the 
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afternoon, I went to Shell Oil Company, and they hired me as a 
laborer. I made a good impression, and after a week they told me, 
"You can be a permanent employee." They gave me a truck to service 
the airplanes at the airport for three months. I still wanted to get into 
the Marine Corps, but I didn't believe I could. I was thirty-two years 
old when I went to the U.S. I wanted to get into the civil service, so I 
went to fill out the application at Pearl Harbor. My first week at Shell, 
I cleared $134-1 was about to fall over. But what I really wanted was 
to become retired with retirement from the government. In my life 
I've seen so many people retire from the navy and the Fitafita. I 
wanted to become retired. I was a very good asset to Shell, to their 
outdoor work. But I wanted to try Pearl Harbor. I'm not the kind of 
person who says, "I'll stop here." I want to see if I can do better, like 
to see how high I can go with the small education I have. I went to 
Pearl Harbor, and I had to make a choice. They gave me a job as a 
crane operator on the pier for preparing ships. As an apprentice I 
made $3 an hour. I worked three weeks at Pearl Harbor; after two 
weeks I got a paycheck. I got into the Marine Corps Reserve, and 
they sent us to San Diego for boot camp. Federal law said I'd get my 
job back. In December 1950 I went to California and returned to 
Hawaii after ninety days. I noticed a big difference in California. In 
Samoa, you see a car accident you ask, "Anybody hurt?" In Hawaii, 
you see a car accident you ask, "Anybody killed?" In California, you 
see a car accident you ask, "How many killed?" 
The first week at San Diego, there was a big group of Samoans, an 
all-Samoan platoon, ninety-six of us. They ask me to be the inter-
preter. The Samoans knew how to speak English, but they were 
scared. In San Diego, I got some ideas on how to manage life in the 
U.S. I had to pay respect to the drill instructor [DI). I didn't care 
about the language barrier. I'd talk to him. If I had to show the 
Samoans I was angry I'd do it. The DI told me to be the interpreter. I 
said, "Yes sir, I'll do it." 
I returned to Hawaii, and right away I wrote a letter to the battal-
ion CO in San Diego. I really wanted to serve as a regular marine. It 
was all I could say, like a broken record. I left my heart in San Diego, 
not San Francisco, but San Diego. They made a man out of me in San 
Diego. I went from 240 pounds, what I weigh now, to 190 pounds. 
They really trimmed me down. I felt so young then, but I was thirty-
three. In the letter I praised the Marine Corps, they gave me a chance 
to serve. It was a handwritten letter, sort of a joke. Then one day Cap-
tain Matthew called me in at 9:00AM. I said, "Yes, sir!" He said, "Do 
you know what a chain of command is? Why didn't you follow it?" I 
answered, "Sir, I felt if I did that my letter would go in your waste 
paper basket, sir." Captain Matthew said, "Better sit down. I'm 
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going to call Pearl Harbor; if you're one minute late, I'm going to 
hang you. But pray that you will never be in under any of my com-
mand." "Sir, is that a threat, sir?" I replied. He was so mad at me. 
But he had the sergeant fill out all the papers, and he said again that I 
should not be one minute late, but be at Pearl Harbor at 9:00 AM 
sharp the next day. I said, "Ay, Ay sir," turned around, and left. 
I called Pearl Harbor because I know the guy there. I told him, "I 
was told never to be late one minute, but tonight I'm happy and I'm 
going to drink. I'm joining the armed forces." My friend asked, 
"What time you supposed to come in?" I said, "Nine o'clock." He 
said, "OK, come in at ten." But I was scared, could be a bait. But 
next morning I came to work before nine o'clock. 
I went back to Camp Pendleton. I was in the marines twenty-one 
years, enjoyed every minute of it. Fair treatment, you know it. Some 
Samoans don't have it. They think they're kings. That doesn't make 
it. I left the marines in 1973. I went to Korea in 1952 but did not go 
ashore. At that time they called a cease-fire. I know five Samoans who 
fought in Korea, but more than thirty fought there. In the 1950s and 
1960s the military was the easiest way to get a job in the States. You 
could earn good money in the service and get good jobs. I got twenty 
weeks of mechanical training at Camp Lejune. Sometimes the mili-
tary is flexible with their entrance exam. Sometimes they like to get 
the Samoans in and get the training from there. Now the Samoans 
have the idea of going in for two years and then coming right out 
because they get educational benefits. This idea is new, its coming in, 
the people don't like it. 
After Camp Lejune, I went to a base in Virginia. They picked me 
for training on a new grader and for operations training. They sent us 
up to cut the mountains down when I was back in California at Port 
Hueneme. There was no family for me in California, but other 
Samoans in the military had family, so we go over and they fed us. 
Maybe a nice-looking young man would try to make ways with the 
man's wife or daughter, then the man would cut you off and you had 
to leave. When I was in Southern California, I had family in San 
Francisco, so I drove up. They asked for money and said they were 
running short of everything. A Samoan would find 'aiga everywhere. 
Samoans flow to Samoans. If I need support, I can go see my Samoan 
family. But if my parents can give me money, I don't have to go to the 
'aiga. This is what I will teach my children. I have money for them, so 
they don't need to go to 'aiga if they want to go the U.S. I went into 
the military because I wanted to become retired and see the benefits 
that come back to me. I didn't care too much for education. Now I 
know; I wish I could be young again so I could go back to school. 
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Three older Samoans, who have retired from the U.S. military 
and now reside in Hawaii, discussed their twenty- or thirty-year 
careers in the military and government work in similarly favorable 
terms. One of these men was a Fitafita guardsman and band mem-
ber from 1932 to 1948. In 1948, he came to Hawaii, where he was 
stationed at Fort Shafter in Kalihi. Two years later he volunteered to 
be an individual weapons instructor and was transferred to Schofield 
Barracks in Wahiawa. From 1952 to 1954 he was in Germany, where 
he rejoined the division band. In 1954, he returned to Hawaii, but 
there was no position for him as a band sergeant. Because he already 
had twenty-two years in the service, he could request where he 
wanted to be stationed, so he chose Hawaii and was named an infan-
try sergeant. In 1962, after thirty years, he retired from the service. 
When asked what he got out of his military experience, he replied: 
I improved my own leadership abilities. I learned courtesy and disci-
pline. I was once the governor's orderly for Governor Milne in Amer-
ican Samoa. This governor saluted everyone he met, even women and 
children. I remember that respect. A person must have that respect. I 
learned leadership. I know how to treat people; sometimes there were 
more than sixty people in the barracks. I gained a lot of leadership in 
the army. I've taken that leadership into the community. I respect the 
older people, because in their younger days they were somebody else. 
Sometimes I see the drunk people. I never drink, and I watch them, 
and I try to help them. I know how to handle drunks. When I volun-
teered to be a weapons instructor, they asked me what I knew about 
teaching. I said, "I know the techniques and I know the discipline." I 
believe the more you put in, the more you get. I should have come out 
of the military better than I did. I learned leadership and the disci-
pline. In Samoa, discipline started in the family. Palagis [Europeans/ 
Americans] aren't disciplined early, so they don't like military disci-
pline. In Samoa, if my child wanders off to a distant village and mis-
behaves, anyone can spank him. We call that discipline; here they call 
it child abuse. Palagis don't like all the courtesy in the military; 
Samoans don't find it so difficult. 
Another of the older Samoan military retirees had joined the mili-
tary in 1941 and stayed in until 1945. He entered the vocational 
school the navy opened in American Samoa in 1946. In 1952, he 
went back into the marines, where he received supply training. In 
1961 he retired from the military and went right to work in the Civil 
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Service Supply Division in Honolulu. He told his two sons the posi-
tive things about military service, and they both are now serving in 
the U.S. military. He speaks proudly of his sons: 
My oldest boy is a certified civil engineer, first class builder. He's been 
in sixteen years. My youngest boy is also an engineer. He's been in 
eight or nine years. They will both stay in more than twenty years. 
They are stationed in San Diego. I was stationed in San Diego in 
1955-1958. There weren't too many Samoans there then. 
The third Samoan military retiree interviewed in Hawaii joined 
the regular navy in 1945 and went to the Navy Training Center in 
San Diego in 1946. After twenty years' service he left the navy with 
a disability retirement. He emphasized that the navy gave him the 
time to study the Bible. He learned to respect his elders and those of 
higher rank. He also felt he gained leadership ability in the service 
and said, "My pension makes me happy." 
The American Samoan matai, a service veteran of World War II, 
who has remained in Samoa for most of his life, discussed some of 
the practical benefits of his career in the service. 
In the military, during the war, I was a general supply assistant. We 
used to take the PBY supply boats [seaplanes] to Western Samoa each 
week; sometimes we'd take ice cream to the Americans on Upolu. 
Later, I was in charge of the mess hall. That work helped me in my 
job running this cafeteria. Also now when there is a big fa 'alavelave or 
a big Sunday meal (to 'onai) I know how much food will feed so many 
people. 
One Samoan who had worked for the U.S. military during the 
war complained about how Samoan workers were later freated by 
the Department of Interior administration: 
I had worked in supply for the marines and later the navy. I continued 
working right until 1953. But then the Americans came down and 
after a couple of years working here they got a raise in pay. They told 
me because I was not an American citizen I wouldn't get a raise. Well 
that was enough for me. I quit and came back here, and now I have all 
these breadfruit trees and plenty of taro to sell in the market. 
Older Samoans interviewed all speak favorably of their experi-
ences in the military. The speaker just quoted had his experience of 
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felt-discrimination during the Department of Interior administra-
tion. Older Samoans in general have probably communicated their 
positive experiences to their sons and their sons' sons. But what of 
the experience of these second- and third-generation Samoan Amer-
ican servicemen? What have been their incentives and experiences 
within the American military? 
When the same group of older Samoans was asked about the cur-
rent incentives for Samoans to join the military the strongest incen-
tive seemed to be the "retirement benefits." One Samoan who cur-
rently works for the Veterans Liaison Office in American Samoa 
gave rough estimates of the modern-day incentives for military 
enlistment: 
Of the 900 veterans in American Samoa today, 238 served either 
twenty or thirty years in the military. After twenty years they have 
already picked up their children and come right back to Samoa. 
Today, the younger Samoans go in, about 20 percent go in because 
they want the retirement benefits. Another 30 percent go in for the 
educational benefits, but that's something new. The rest go in for 
money or job training. 
Increasingly it seems Samoans are joining the military for nonre-
tirement reasons. The older Samoan teacher stated that in the 1950s 
and 1960s, many Samoans joined for retirement benefits and just 
"to get away," "to travel." Now with so many Samoans overseas it 
is not necessary to join "to get off the rock." The American Samoan 
matai related that the "G.I. Bill educational benefits" now work as a 
powerful incentive to join the services. He too emphasized that this 
was a recent development, as "parents can't afford to pay for educa-
tion." Some Samoans see the military as a work opportunity or as a 
means to get job training. This matai also pointed out that many 
Samoans go in for what they think will be a two-year stint, but after 
their first enlistment period, they change their minds and decide to 
stay in until retirement. He concluded the discussion with the state-
ment, "We are real proud of our young men for serving the United 
States." 
Younger Samoan servicemen in Hawaii seem to be comparing 
their military options with their employment opportunities in the 
wider community. Each new enlistment period brings at least poten-
tial salary increases as well as bringing them closer to retirement. 
They can assess their chances of using a military-learned job skill in 
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the Honolulu labor market and weigh that income-earning potential 
against the military service options. 
Samoans in Hawaii still see the military as a generally positive 
work opportunity. A survey conducted in the Kalihi, Hawaii, area in 
1983 gathered information on the military experience of sixty-six 
Samoans. Eight of these Samoan servicemen spent twenty years 
or more in the military, and the average length of enlistment was 
8.6 years. Forty-eight of these servicemen were perceived as hav-
ing improved their employment potential because of their military 
experience. Since the 1952 voyage of the USS Jackson from Ameri-
can Samoa to Hawaii there has been a close relationship between 
military participation, migration, and employment, and the close 
interaction of these three processes continues today (Franco 1985, 
312-313). 
Informants in American Samoa were asked about how the wider 
Samoan community views the returning service veteran. The 
answers to this question, not surprisingly, emphasized that it varies 
according to the individual veteran. Again, the informant with expe-
rience at the Veterans Liaison Office presented some rough esti-
mates: 
Many of the vets are working for the government and this is seen as a 
good role; about 28 percent work for the government. These Samoans 
are making a contribution to the economy and getting benefits for 
their families. About 26 percent retired from the service and are now 
working part-time or full-time. They are important men in their vil-
lages. About half the vets go back into the reserves and combine that 
income with some farming. They give up one weekend a month. 
Some have a bad record of discharge and probably 10 percent are not 
interested in being useful to the government, to their famili<;:s, or to 
their villages. Quite a few of them are running around looking for 
beer. 
Military work, in and of itself, is not perceived as prestigious, but 
if an individual uses that military experience for the benefit of gov-
ernment, family, or village, he is viewed with respect, and he is 
positively identified as a Samoan veteran. A Western Samoan 
matai remarked: "Samoans see military work as faigaluega i le malo 
'work for the government'. This gives military work much more 
prestige." 
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Conclusion 
During the 1940s a rapid increase in the number of wage-labor 
opportunities stimulated large-scale rural-urban migration to Pago 
Pago. Job skills acquired during World War II gave Samoans the 
confidence to begin moving internationally-American Samoans to 
Hawaii and the U.S. mainland, Western Samoans to New Zealand 
-in the early 1950s. These early international movers were proba-
bly more highly skilled than any later wave of Samoan migrants. 
The initial migrants to Hawaii and the U.S. mainland established 
Samoan communities around military bases, and these "ethnic 
enclaves" have provided, and continue to provide, points of entry 
for new Samoan migrants. 
Samoan representations of their experience with, and in, the U.S. 
military show a great deal of continuity. Samoans speak proudly of 
their performance during World War II, and they speak proudly of 
the performance of their sons and daughters in the U.S. military 
today. There is no doubt that Samoan perceptions of work, and 
overseas labor force opportunities, were shaped by their experience 
of World War II. 
Note 
All names assigned to informants are pseudonyms. 
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CHAPTER 17 
Working Encounters: Oral Histories 
of World War II Labor Corps 
from Tanna, Vanuatu 
LAMONT LINDSTROM 
THE LARGEST single employer ever to engage labor in Vanuatu 
(New Hebrides) was the American military. 1 World War II was a 
critical event in the labor history of the Pacific as a whole. Above 
and beyond its sometimes voracious, sometimes sporadic demand 
for unskilled labor, the war for a time transformed the existing eco-
nomic means and relations of production in the Pacific. On those 
islands the combatants chose to occupy and develop, military 
authorities recruited and organized "labor corps." In structure and 
economic function, these wartime production groups diverged con-
siderably from traditional relations of subsistence labor based within 
family, lineage, and neighborhood. Similarly, wartime labor corps, 
although reflective in part of existing plantation gangs and other 
colonial labor practices, also differed significantly from the preced-
ing forms (Geslin 1956, 278-279). No copra here, the new product 
was war. 
Before the war, no airfields and very few roads existed in Vanuatu 
(map 9). As the main productive line of war action moved north-
ward, it left standing in its wake enlarged communication, transpor-
tation, and public utility installations, which became (and today 
remain) the heart of Vanuatu's economic infrastructure (see chapter 
13). The American-built road that circles Efate was initially named 
"Efate, U.S. route #1" (Heinl 1944, 250, 256). Islanders, in addi-
tion to the novel experience of having their labor disciplined, also 
encountered exotic sorts of technology in putting to work imported 
martial machinery and knowledge. Some were as simple as the 
wheelbarrow; others as complex as bulldozers, airplanes, municipal 
water systems, and base hospitals. 
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Although wartime labor corps in Vanuatu came into existence 
with the arrival of U.S. forces in the first half of 1942 and were 
mostly disbanded before the end of hostilities in 1945, the local 
importance of the labor corps experience has long outlived the war 
itself. Postwar changes in Islander identity and sociopolitical aspira-
tions are as much relics of the war as are the infrastructural contri-
butions, roads, airfields, crashed planes, abandoned Quonset huts, 
and other debris left behind when Truman brought home his troops. 
Apart from relations of combat itself-typically brief if sometimes 
intense-the war also engendered more mundane and more routin-
ized cross-cultural relations between Islanders and outsiders on an 
unprecedented scale. Encounters with Americans, their allies, and 
the Japanese stimulated the social imaginations of all parties and led 
many war workers to rethink their relations with Europeans and 
colonial regimes (Geslin 1956, 277-278). 
In this regard, World War II had a major influence on the tropo-
logy and ideology of a number of postwar social movements, includ-
ing that of John Frum on Tanna, an island of southern Vanuatu. 
Elsewhere in the Pacific, it prompted more direct political action, 
such as the Maasina Rule of the Solomon Islands (Keesing 1978; 
Laracy 1983; chapter 15). The war is frequently held to have been 
partly responsible for sparking these ensuing movements, some-
times described as "proto-nationalistic" (Worsley 1968, 255; Guiart 
1951). The experience of wartime labor corps-the wider relations 
and questioning knowledge workers encountered and circulated-
constituted more than a temporary modification of existing modes of 
Pacific production. The war's practice (its altered opportunities for 
travel, communication, material exchange, and work) in the end 
affected and challenged, more generally, the discourses and truths of 
ruling colonial economic and political regimes. 
The erstwhile combatant nations have entered the season of war 
anniversaries-a season that looks to extend into the twenty-first 
century. Perhaps more than any other twentieth-century event, 
World War II fuels a complex historical industry. Its apparatus-
which includes archives, war memorials and other sites of historical 
knowledge storage, periodic national ceremonies and holidays, and 
printed, electronic, cinematic, and video productions-generates a 
constant output of war texts, which satisfy and feed several markets. 
Beyond academic circles, such markets include the popular taste for 
war stories and battle-site tourism (chapter 13), as well as various 
state ideologies-which relentlessly recollect victorious national 
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truths. Here, as war history serves public memory ("lest we for-
get"), so it serves acknowledged veracities of national identity, of the 
"right" relations between peoples, and of the present's necessary 
relation to the past as known. 
As with the ex-combatants, so with those Pacific Islanders over-
run, caught up, and challenged by an extraneous, intrusive war. 
Here, too, war stories enunciate present statements of identity and 
desire, of self and other, and of the past in the present. Most of these 
island war "texts," however, are stored in personal memory; unlike 
the historical discourse practiced by the victors and vanquished, 
they circulate orally. In conversation, Islanders throughout the 
southwest Pacific continue to tell and retell stories of their experi-
ences during the war. 2 These oral texts, which continue to shape def-
initions of identity and attitude toward the Pacific rim countries, 
chronicle war history from an island point of view. 
In Vanuatu, the most intensive war experience was labor; the 
most routinized wartime encounters were working encounters (see 
chapter 16). In early 1942, the U.S. military agreed to establish an 
advanced operating base on Efate in counterpoint to the Japanese 
movement into the Solomon Islands. Several companies of troops 
from New Caledonia landed at Port Vila on 18 March 1942 to 
secure the island. A much larger fleet steamed into the harbor on 4 
May (Garrison 1983, 13). At its peak, the island's garrison, com-
prised close to fifteen thousand servicemen. The attack and then 
defense of Guadalcanal and subsequent Japanese defeats soon 
shifted the war's front line farther to the north. In June, the U.S. 
military began to construct a much larger base on Espiritu Santo, 
165 miles or so closer to the fighting in the Solomons: 
As the war moved northward, the two advanced bases in Vanuatu 
(Third Island Command "Roses" and Fourth Island Command 
"Buttons") gradually transformed into behind-the-lines supply, hos-
pital, transit, and repair facilities. Aside from a few ineffective 
bombings, Vanuatu was never a battleground; people escaped the 
injurious effects of combat that others in the southwest Pacific suf-
fered (see, e.g., chapter 3; Robinson 1981 ). Base operations, how-
ever-particularly cargo unloading and storage-required consider-
able inputs of unskilled labor. The Americans turned to the 
relatively large population of Tanna, an island about 140 miles 
south of Efate, for a large percentage of their labor needs. 3 
It has been more than forty years since the Americans withdrew 
from Efate. Even so, older Tannese men vividly recall and often dis-
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cuss their experiences of the war. Some of these accounts have been 
formalized in narrative and song. My aim here is less to establish the 
historical facts of the labor corps and their operation than to attempt 
an understanding of the recollected and acknowledged truths of that 
wartime experience as currently circulated in common island dis-
course: How do people today represent the war; and why do they 
continue to retell war stories? 
Island Laborers 
It was standard American World War II policy to recruit local la-
bor to supplement quartermaster, engineering, and transportation 
units, thus freeing troops for combat (Coakley, Cocke, and Griffin 
n.d.). The American military generally worked through or with 
colonial powers to recruit and supervise indigenous laborers. In the 
Pacific, labor agreements with the British, Australians, and French 
generally limited tours of duty to 90 or 180 days; this and other colo-
nial restrictions affected the total number of workers on duty at any 
one time. 
Even so, in many parts of the southwest Pacific, the large majority 
of able-bodied men engaged in at least one tour of military labor 
duty. Labor requirements during the peak period of Pacific base 
operations exceeded the capacity of many local labor pools, absorb-
ing nearly all available hands. In October 1943, for example, the 
U.S. military employed fifteen hundred New Caledonians out of a 
total Melanesian population of approximately thirty thousand. 
Labor corps strength on Guadalcanal (organized by colonial author-
ities as the British Solomon Islands Labour Corps) exceeded two 
thousand (Coakley, Cocke, and Griffin n.d., 2-3). All}ed forces in 
Papua New Guinea employed at least 49,500 workers with monthly 
average labor strengths exceeding 34,499 in 1944. Workers there 
were recruited by agents of Australian New Guinea Administrative 
Units (ANGAU) (Robinson 1981, 23; Ryan 1969, 540). The Allies 
also signed on an unknown number oflocallaborers in Dutch New 
Guinea with the assistance of the colonial Netherlands East Indies 
Civil Affairs Detachments (Coakley, Cocke, and Griffin n.d., 11 ). 
The U.S. military and the Pacific colonial powers frequently held 
divergent interests in the recruitment and supervision of labor. The 
Americans aimed to secure large numbers of recruits and to keep 
them healthy enough to perform arduous and long hours of work. 
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Government agents, on the other hand, were typically concerned as 
far as was feasible to maintain prewar relations of colonial domina-
tion and to reserve a supply of labor for local plantation, business, 
and domestic needs. The colonial governments, therefore, passed 
various regulations in an endeavor to control military use of local 
labor. In Vanuatu, such laws served to restrict the number of labor-
ers the Americans might recruit and to define the sort of work that 
might be performed (for example, New Hebrides Condominium 
Joint Defence Regulation no. 8 of 1944). Furthermore, colonial reg-
ulations limited the wages the U.S. military could pay its workers, 
thereby protecting the interests of local planters and businesses that 
otherwise could not compete in the labor market and, moreover, 
feared postwar wage inflation. Colonial labor regulations also 
attempted to restrict informal encounters and interaction between 
Islanders and American or Allied servicemen in order to prevent the 
circulation of anticolonialist and other dangerous knowledge. 
The war's working encounters undoubtedly exposed the ruling 
powers to new hazards-both economic and political. The colonists 
in both the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu confronted serious local 
challenges to their authority (challenges that culminated, for exam-
ple, in the postwar Maasina Rule and John Frum nationalistic 
movements). Voices among both the Islanders and the Americans 
publicly questioned the political authority and the economic devel-
opment abilities as well as the past accomplishments of the ruling 
powers. Echoes of Islander calls for the Americans to retain a pres-
ence in both archipelagos after the war's end bounced about the 
U.S. Congress. Some Americans, at least, were not altogether will-
ing to restore power to impotent, had-to-be-saved-from-the-Japa-
nese European colonists whose heyday obviously had come and 
gone. 
In Noumea, for example, relations between the Free French civil 
and American military authorities were never altogether smooth. 
Conflicting interests influenced the recruitment and supervision of 
labor. In May 1942 Major General Alexander M. Patch requested 
that the French governor establish a camp to house approximately 
480 dock workers employed by the Americans as stevedores, long-
shoremen, winch operators, hatch tenders, and jitney drivers. The 
camp, namedJoe Louis and located at a Melanesian school in Man-
travel, was initially administered by an appointed French "colonial 
chief of camp." The U.S. Army agreed to pay all camp and labor 
expenses, including the salaries of the French labor supervisors. 
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By January 1943, however, the army officer in charge demanded 
to assume day-to-day supervisory responsibilities to ensure that his 
workers received proper food, medical care, and sanitation services 
(Wyman 1944). Under sole French administration, 
sanitation was bad, so bad as to present a health menace. Sick call was 
very high. The majority of French supervisors were low grade ... 
native pay was very low, causing several minor strikes ... it was no 
longer possible to acquire sufficient food, of a satisfactory nature, and 
it was impossible to furnish any clothing or equipment. (Wyman 
1944, 1-2) 
The Americans' eventual appropnatwn of camp administration, 
leaving the French only titular authority, addressed these problems 
and also, according to American reports, improved labor recruit-
ment: "Good personal relations with the local gendarme and tribal 
chiefs have been instrumental in obtaining, for the most, a good 
quality and quantity of labor. This was not true when recruiting was 
solely a French function" (Wyman 1944, 5). 
Although agreeing to American de facto operation of the camp, 
the French continued to restrict tours of labor duty to 90 days 
(extended to 120 under American pressure), forbid reenlistments, 
and limit wages to 20.50 francs per 54-hour work week. Moreover, 
the French colonial authorities insisted that the U.S. military turn 
American payroll funds over to their Native Affairs Office, which 
then used the money to pay indigenous laborers working at U.S. 
military installations (Wyman 1944, 5). ANGAU in Papua New 
Guinea and the British in the Solomon Islands similarly insisted on 
organizing and controlling local labor, thus limiting as much as pos-
sible the military's function in these areas, as well as restricting the 
informal encounters between American and Allied servicemen and 
local workers (see Robinson 1981, 80; White et al. 1988). 
In Vanuatu, as in New Caledonia, the U.S. military first worked 
through colonial authorities, but soon took over day-to-day labor 
recruitment and supervisory responsibilities. The American mili-
tary's usurpation of civil control oflocallabor perhaps related to its 
amused yet exasperated evaluation of the condominium government 
(Geslin 1956, 267-271; Wallin 1967, 18). 
The ground element of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF 212 first 
recruited labor in Vanuatu to work on airfield construction in April 
1942 (Wallin 1967, 19). On their arrival in May, forces of the army 
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and the navy's Construction Battalion (Seabees) assumed construc-
tion and other logistical responsibilities on Efate including those of 
labor procurement. For the army, ColonelS. D. Slaughter, general 
staff officer in charge of logistics (G-4), assigned these recruitment 
duties to his assistant G-4, Major George Riser (Garrison 1983, 80). 
For the navy, H. N. Wallin, officer-in-charge of the Third Naval 
Construction Detachment (of the First Naval Construction Battal-
ion), turned over labor recruiting and supervision to Thomas 
Beatty, boatswain first class (Wallin, personal communication). 
Beatty is renowned on Tanna even today as the famous "Tom 
Navy" (Paul1974, 6-10). 
The Americans needed labor to work at the several military instal-
lations they began to build on Efate, at Port Vila, Havannah Har-
bor, and Quoin Hill. When their needs rapidly outstripped the pop-
ulation of Efate, then approximately three thousand (Wallin 1967, 
18), they turned south to Tanna, which provided the majority of the 
one thousand or so workers who served on Efate that year: 
The American forces at Vila are now employing 950 natives secured 
from several islands, but mainly from Tanna, on a three months con-
tract. They are paid 45 shillings, or $7.50 per month. They are 
worked 10 hours per day and given every other Sunday off. The 
arrangement at Santos [sic] is similar. (Hudgins 1942; see Wallin 
1967, 29; OCMH n.d.a, 186) 
Most labor recruitment took place in 1942, during the initial period 
of base construction and organization, but Tannese men worked for 
the navy on Efate at least until 1944 (United States Navy 1944). 
Some records indicate that the army stopped the official use of local 
labor in May 1943 (OCMH n.d.b). Labor requirements and 
strengths no doubt declined on Efate throughout 1943 and 1944. 
Labor needs elsewhere in the archipelago were less than on Efate. 
A few men worked at the eight or so coastwatching stations estab-
lished throughout northern Vanuatu and the Santa Cruz Islands 
(Garrison 1983, 42-49; chapter 11) and received wages of one 
pound per month in addition to food and tobacco (Patten 1942, 7), 
comparable to wage levels for the Solomon Islands Labour Corps 
(British Colonial Office 1946). 
Other Islanders worked on Espiritu Santo. Here, the Americans 
began construction of Fourth Island Command Base installations in 
June 1942 (Wallin 1967, 26; Garrison 1983, 88). The U.S. com-
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Tannese labor corps recruits with American supervisor, Major George 
Riser ("Tom Army"), on Efate, Vanuatu, 1942. (Steven Slaughter) 
mand ordered an airfield built at Palikulo large enough for B-1 7 
bombers to support "Watchtower," the invasion of Guadalcanal in 
August that year. Seabees, struggling to build and open this airfield 
for business in only twenty days, immediately recruited island labor 
to assist in the construction work (Wallin 1967, 27). After the open-
ing of base installations on Santo, island labor strength rose to at 
least six hundred in 1943 (Major A. G. King, personal communica-
tion). However, military recruitment and quartering of workers 
ceased altogether on 20 December 1944, following in part the condo-
minium's imposition of restrictions on Islander employment with 
the military (Kralovec n.d., 442). 
By this time, too, army medical officers, discovering significant 
malaria and filariasis counts in labor recruits, cautioned against the 
use of large numbers of island workers and further advised that they 
be kept apart, as much as possible, from American troops (Major 
A. G. King, personal communication; Robinson 1981, 80). An 
army survey of workers in March 1943 suggested that 26 percent 
were carriers of filariasis. On Santo, as on Efate , the navy continued 
to employ workers after the army had stopped recruiting (Major 
A. G . King, personal communication). 
On Efate, however, through 1942 and 1943, nearly a thousand 
men from Tanna (out of a total population of fewer than six thou-
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sand, about two thousand of whom were adults) encountered, 
interacted, and worked with American labor supervisors and Ameri-
can servicemen. Although the condominium civil authorities had 
contracted at first to procure and administer local labor, the military 
took over labor recruitment, as at Camp Joe Louis in Noumea, 
when colonial agents failed to meet labor quotas (Paul1974, 7). The 
Americans also assumed supervisory responsibilities after workers 
complained about the food and housing they received from the Brit-
ish and the French. Thomas Nouar, in charge of a labor gang from 
southeast Tanna, recalled 
The time when we landed, the Americans didn't provide any food for 
us to eat. The French and the English demanded to feed us. They fed 
us but gave us bad food. We starved; there was no food. They gave us 
Fiji taro to eat-Fiji taro and rotten bananas, woody manioc. People 
nearly died the hunger was so bad. We still went into the ships and 
worked on this bad food. It was poorly cooked, what they gave us. I 
was our boss, so I took it and went and put it down in the face of the 
big boss of the Americans. I don't know his name, but I showed it to 
the boss in the ship. The ship boss took me and explained the problem 
to a boss living on the small island Iririki. He told me to throw the 
food into the launch. The launch sped to the islet Iririki, and I went 
into the office with the food on a plate. We went to see an American 
officer. A general. I brought the food and showed them what we were 
eating-stinking salt meat. It stank even though we boiled and boiled 
it. Bad Fiji taro. He took the food and led me, the police coming along 
with guns, and we two went to find two other big-men sitting in 
another office. One was white and one black. We went in, and they 
discussed the problem, and at the same time, that evening, the Ameri-
cans had already sent us rice. And they gave us meat. And gave us dif-
ferent fruits and all different foods. And they gave us clothing, old 
clothing; they stacked up used clothing in a huge pile. Trousers, coats 
-you passed by and if you saw your size you took it. And boots, and 
hats, shirts ... We perhaps ate [French] food for a month until we 
refused and the Americans began to feed us. When America fed us, 
men ate but couldn't finish it all. (1983; cf. chapter 13) 
The working encounters between the Tannese and the American 
military were a relatively brief episode in the history of labor rela-
tions in Vanuatu. These war-induced alterations in local relations of 
production were, for the most part, militarily specialized and tempo-
rary. Nonetheless, people today recollect and frequently represent in 
stories their wartime labor experiences. The war's working encoun-
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ters have influenced and still continue to affect local political rela-
tions as well as understandings of self and of the outside world. 
Willing Workers 
In Papua New Guinea, where the war was close at hand, military 
demands for labor exceeded the number of Islanders willing to put 
up with the burdensome and dangerous work, poor wages, and 
sometimes harsh treatment. ANGAU conscripted workers, chasing 
people down in their villages. It was forced to extend the length of 
labor contracts up to three years and sometimes beyond, to use 
police to control labor gangs, and to chastise deserting or dilatory 
workers with caning and other sorts of punishment (Robinson 1981, 
21, 50, 65, 70, 78; Ryan 1969, 540-543). In New Caledonia, labor 
relations were also occasionally tense. Both Tonkinese and Melane-
sian workers organized strikes in the early days of the war (see 
Wyman 1944, 2). In Vanuatu, contrarily, the Tannese were anxious 
to recruit to work. They suffered adverse and unaccustomed condi-
tions of labor without much complaint: Islanders were "genuinely 
friendly and incredibly eager to help any Americans" (Heinl 
1944, 239). 
The disparate willingness of Tannese labor volunteers vis-a-vis 
Papua New Guinea conscripts no doubt relates to the different sorts 
of labor and labor conditions in each area as well as to operative 
colonial labor policies. However, Tannese wartime volunteerism 
also began in the instructions of their island's latter-day culture 
hero, John Frum (Guiart 1956; Lindstrom 1979, 1981; chapter 13). 
News of the enigmatic John Frum first came to the attention of colo-
nial authorities in 1940. A shadowy figure, he appeared at night at 
Iamwatakarik kava-drinking ground near Green Point on the 
island's southwest coast. Whether or not astute intellectual entrepre-
neurs conjured up this apparition for their own ends, John Frum 
since has taken his place in the island's pantheon of knowledgeable 
ancestors, didactic culture heroes, and spirits of place. 
John Frum's message to the faithful changed from one that ini-
tially supported the government and island missions to one more 
anticolonialist in character. He ordered his listeners to resume their 
customary practices of dancing and kava drinking (both set aside in 
the mission period) and to withdraw support from European govern-
ment agents, traders, and missionaries. In response, the condomin-
I 
l 
1 
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ium district agent, concluding that a small group of troublesome 
men were conspiring to delude their fellows, instituted a series of 
arrests and deportations that were to continue for the next seventeen 
years. 
Word of America had begun circulating within movement conver-
sations at least by September 1941. The government intercepted a 
letter sent from Port Vila to Tanna that spoke of John Frum's son 
traveling to America to bring back the king (Guiart 1956, 410). The 
ideological reference here to America may have been in fortuitous 
counterpoint to the British and the French then governing the 
islands. Fischer (1964) has suggested that colonized people call upon 
any known outside power perceived to be unlike local colonial 
authorities in order to challenge ruling economic and political 
inequalities. Whatever the reasons for the movement's doctrinal 
appropriation of America, this was a successful shot in the dark. Six 
months later, an American occupying army arrived in force at Port 
Vila. It arrived, moreover, desperate for Islander unskilled labor to 
unload its ships and to clear airfields for the upcoming Solomon 
Islands campaign. 
If the Americans desired labor, the Tannese desired to work. Island 
men were keen to travel north to Vila to join the labor corps (leaving 
behind a politically tense situation at home). As Nouar noted: 
At the time the Americans came, we were ignorant. But one of our 
spirits, John Frum, had predicted this. He advised us that Americans 
would come. We were ignorant of planes, but he was the first to say 
that planes would arrive. We were ignorant of many things, but he 
said that trucks for us would arrive; there were no trucks on Tanna, 
but John said that they would come .... We were ignorant of 
America. But at that time they came to fight we knew that it was 
America. One here had said the name of America. John Frum, a 
being who lives here on Tanna and away in America, was the first to 
say the name of America. We were ignorant about America, but John 
Frum explained, and afterwards we went to see. We understood .... 
Perhaps you would say that what he spoke here was a prophecy. John 
Frum's prophecy spoke truly. He predicted things which happened 
later .... We saw America as the prophecy John Frum had predicted 
we would. (1983) 
The journey north to work for the Americans on Efate was doubly 
significant, combining as it did elements of pilgrimage as well as 
contravention of now devalued colonial and mission truths. 
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The military, having John Frum to thank for worker esprit de corps, 
was occasionally nonplussed by the enthusiasm. In October 1943-
after most Tannese workers had returned home-a John Frum 
spokesman, Neloiag, organized his followers to construct an airfield. 
On this, American planes might land at Tanna as well as at Efate. 
U.S. military authorities agreed to transport colonial police and 
New Hebrides Defence Force members to Tanna on the USS Echo (a 
supply and transport vessel) in order to put down this doctrinal 
insurrection (O'Reilly 1949, 201-203; Barrow 1952; Guiart 1956, 
184-188). Two American intelligence officers who went along as 
observers informed those movement supporters who had gathered to 
clear a runway in the forest that "American forces had no connec-
tion with J onfrum and that they did not want an airport built on 
Tanna because they and the British and French were fighting the 
Japs in the Solomons" (Patten and Carson 1943, 2). 
This local enthusiasm-or rather, this ideological appropriation of 
America-persuaded island men to engage in unknown relations of 
military production and to submit themselves to novel forms oflabor 
practice and discipline. Colonial recruiters first sent requests for 
labor to Tanna through a system of assessors-local subalterns 
working under island district agents. When this message reached 
southeast Tanna, Nouar recalled: 
We were living and we heard that America had come to Vila, at that 
time. In wartime. And they wanted to gather up some men. We left as 
a company-my company here at Port Resolution .... We gathered 
together, the big-men of [America] talked and set a date and told us to 
come in the middle of the night to meet the ship at Lenakel. We made 
ready and prepared a feast to say farewell to one another in the vil-
lage. Pigs were killed and fowl, tuber puddings were m;;tde, kava was 
drunk. After our feast, in the evening, .we left along the big road walk-
ing at night. ... The beach was full of people crying. Women and 
men cried. Since we were going away, the Americans said to us that 
they would like us to dance. We danced. We danced at sea and heard 
the ship's deck resound. (1983) 
On the beach at Lenakel, officers of the USS Cape Flattery, which 
had detoured to Tanna while returning from a supply voyage to 
Noumea, took down the names of Nouar and other embarking 
workers. When the ship reached Efate, the military issued the new 
labor recruits numbered dogtags and distributed them in labor 
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camps at various places about Port Vila (such as Tebakor). One or 
two so-called boss boys, appointed because of their command of 
Pidgin English (Bislama), led each labor team, generally composed 
of men from the same language group. After the Americans came to 
assume day-to-day responsibilities for labor supervision, they also 
provided worker housing (tents and cots), clothing (including boots 
and coats for cool nighttime work), cigarettes, food (pairs of men 
from each gang rotated cooking chores), transportation to and from 
work sites (trucks arrived at labor camps each morning to fetch 
workers), medical care (for example, the experimental and generally 
worthless wartime malarial prophylactic atabrine), and occasional 
nights of entertainment (for example, cinema viewings). 
In Vanuatu (as opposed to New Caledonia, for example) island 
workers mostly undertook unskilled labor only. They unloaded 
cargo (Nouar [1983] recalled in particular bombs and Marsden mat-
ting), provided garbage and janitorial services, worked with mos-
quito abatement crews to cut grass and spread oil on standing water, 
and gardened in vegetable farms the military ordered its quarter-
masters to plant. Nevertheless, in so doing, they served complex 
military technologies. The Tannese worked on and inside the holds 
of liberty ships; they moved cargo in and out of large refrigerated 
storage facilities; they traveled to work on large military vehicles; 
they ate foods processed and packaged in the United States and pre-
pared in military messes. They observed bombers returning from 
the Solomons; fighters circling overhead to protect the bases; air-
raid drills punctuated with klaxon alarms and defensive artillery 
action; tractors and bulldozers clearing roads and fields; telephone 
systems, radar, and weather observation posts; weaponry; the 
wounded and the dead flown in from the front, ambulances, and 
base hospitals. 
Moreover, the work was rigorous and the organization of labor 
considerably unlike what Islanders had experienced before within 
either the local subsistence or the colonial economies. Although 
some of the men who joined the labor corps had previously worked 
on colonial copra plantations, the war's organization of unskilled 
labor was as much martial as it was industrial or plantational in 
character. The military established work squads (which ate and 
bunked together). It established chains of command. It uniformed 
workers and numbered them with dogtags. It organized workers' 
leisure as well as labor hours. It instituted labor shifts of up to ten 
hours, with some men working days and others working nights 
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under lights. Workers had only one day off every two weeks. Nouar 
recalled little time available for anything else but work: "The work 
was hard night and day. If we fooled around, Japan would beat us. 
We didn't rest. Night and day, night and day, night and day. Hard 
work" (1983; cf. chapter 15). Under this regimen, a number of 
workers fell sick and several from southeast Tanna died and were 
buried on Efate in American blankets. 
These working encounters with exotic technologies and martial 
productive relations-working encounters, moreover, illuminated 
in part by the auspices of John Frum-inform people's recollections 
of the war today. By 1946, the Americans had won and gone home. 
Before this, the various labor corps had disbanded and the Tannese 
too had returned home to their island. However, people continue to 
rehearse these few months of wartime experience in story and song. 
More than a passing exploitation and modification of island labor, 
the war bequeathed new knowledge with which to chart and express 
altered postwar political identities and oppositions. 
War Stories 
In a conversational, nonliterate society, history exists as memory 
only. There is no written text. Instead, there are stories whose con-
tinued existence depends solely on their retelling. Here, more so 
than in textualizing literate/electronic orders of discourse which 
store knowledge externally, the past exists to the extent it speaks to 
the present. War stories, in this regard, must make good stories ( cf. 
chapter 2). How has the war become island history? Why, here, are 
war stories told and retold? 
Contemporary Tannese statements about the war-either freely 
delivered or elicited in interview-enunciate a number of elemen-
tary themes. In most of these narratives, the principal motif is that of 
exchange (chapter 7). Island war stories, as apologues of American 
wealth and generosity, enumerate a litany of goods received: rice, 
bread, meat, cake, fruit, boots, hats, coats, shirts, trousers, blan-
kets, knives, forks, plates, cups, pots, pans, cigarettes: 
It wasn't like [today] when cigarettes are scarce, they gave us freely 
many cigarettes. If I sat to rest, I had plenty of cigarettes .... They 
gave freely many long cartons. One would give us his, another give us 
his, and another give us his so that we worked hard to smoke them all. 
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Those were cigarettes. The Americans gave us cigarettes. Our ciga-
rettes. They gave us food, gave us cigarettes. Rice, meat arrived, pork 
arrived, chicken arrived. Bread, they gave us bread to eat. They 
cooked and sent bread-small bread, large bread, long bread, all 
sorts. (Timothy 1983) 
Narratively represented, this exchange is not one-sided, but recip-
rocal (see chapter 10). In return for goods, the Tannese provided 
labor to assist the defeat of japan. The stories relate not simply blind 
American generosity but ongoing relations of reciprocal exchange: 
"America came here and asked for help to beat the Japanese. We 
worked so hard together we nearly died. If any Americans remem-
ber me, they might send me some cigarettes-that's all I want. If 
they don't remember me, that's all right too" (Timothy 1983). The 
continuing narrative rehearsal of the establishment of these wartime 
relations of exchange presents a case for a special relationship-a 
relationship that the Tannese and Americans might resume at any 
moment. 
War stories also represent American wisdom-powerful knowl-
edge that those men who traveled north to work perceived and occa-
sionally learned-for example, "We joked sometimes and they also 
taught some of us boxing. How to hit people. They taught us to hit 
ourselves" (Nouar 1983). 
War stories particularly chronicle that secret American knowledge 
which appeared to parallel local magical practice (chapter 12). 
Radar and other communication devices, which permit one to see 
yet not be seen, or to talk when at a distance, have counterparts in 
local tradition: 
We carried large glasses to the tops of trees. You climbed to the tops of 
banyan trees and installed the glass there. Men sat there, shooting, 
looking off towards Japan. If one saw a Japanese set out, he would 
warn people. These things of the war. If he saw one [ship] leave and 
reach the passage he would say "something over there has set out." 
America watched it. The glass was long. You went and saw well things 
far away. In Japan. You saw well the ships of Japan. A glass. It was 
like a round glass. An engine was inside. It permitted monitoring the 
words of America and those things of Japan .... It was off-limits, 
people couldn't go there. But sometimes an American who was good 
to you called you to come and look in secret. No one told. It was like 
that. The accomplishments of the wise, right? They are wise to be able 
to look off so far. (Timothy 1983) 
LAMONT LINDSTROM 
War narratives, in drawing these cultural parallels-apart from 
making sense of exciting, unfamiliar experiences-also assert an 
identity between Tanna and America. 
The retelling of Tannese war stories has served to emphasize this 
connection. Enunciating the exchange relations, and even closer 
identities that unite Tanna and America, island war narratives make 
several different statements. One of these statements, certainly, has 
been anticolonial. The identity between the Tannese and their war-
time employers that war stories assert serves to highlight the absence 
of balanced relations and shared identity between Islanders and the 
British and French colonial authorities. Tanna and America thus 
unite in distinctive opposition to the colonial powers. 
Island pundits went to work adducing further cultural similarities 
that identified America with Tanna. War workers analyzed astutely 
military practices and organization in terms of certain of their own 
cultural structures. They diagnosed the military's divisions (army, 
navy, marine, "Negro") and figured that these mirror traditional 
island moiety structures. Origin narratives shifted, slightly, to 
account for an initial mythic separation of two brothers-the one 
staying on Tanna, the other lost away in America. The war occurred 
to celebrate their reunion (Lindstrom 1979; chapters 3, 9, 11). 
If we appraise wartime labor corps with a postwar vocabulary not 
common in the 1940s, island laborers were exploited and their 
American military supervisors patronizing if not worse. If the Tan-
nese already knew America through the construals of John Frum, 
the Americans already knew Tanna by virtue of cinematic and liter-
ary representations of savage cannibals, fetid jungles, and South Sea 
idylls, not to mention the acknowledged racial truths about blacks 
and whites within the United States. A few cinematic entrepreneurs, 
led by the American Martin johnson, had made small. careers out of 
filming counterfeit cannibal feasts in Vanuatu itself-and these texts 
were only bit parts within a larger commercial apparatus for the 
appropriation and representation back home of the true Pacific (for 
example, Heinl1944). · 
Workers called their American supervisors "master"-although 
sometimes also "brother" (Schutz 1968, 312; Mead 1966, 173-177). 
And the Americans called their employees "boy"-but sometimes 
also ':joe, or Dick or Jimmy, whatever. They named us. John. They 
called us anything. They gave us any kind of name. They acted so" 
(Nouar 1983). The Americans also amused themselves with local 
dances-but sometimes joined in the dancing: 
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We danced all the time, night and day. One danced on shore and on 
the deck of ships .... If the cold was bad, the Americans said "Okay, 
dance, dance, dance!" and men danced and danced .... The sol-
diers too danced at night. . . . When we danced some came to dance 
with us, to try to dance too. They tried to dance like us. They swung 
their arms and stamped their feet. (Timothy 1983) 
Official reports occasionally complain about the quality of local 
labor-but U.S. officers also appreciated its assistance: "We are 
deeply indebted to these hard working natives who supplemented 
my work force. Our work load was so great and the schedule so tight 
that we needed every pair of hands and legs we could get" (Admiral 
H. N. Wallin, personal communication). 
No matter the inherent economic and other inequalities within 
wartime labor relationships, there were effective unities of purpose 
that brought the Americans and the Tannese together. In significant 
areas, both joined to oppose the colonial condominium government. 
If the military agreed on paper to limit Islander wages to protect 
condominium economic interests, American servicemen nonetheless 
augmented those wages with food and goods, and occasionally must 
have blamed the condominium for tying their hands so that they 
could not give more. Tannese workers today certainly do: 
America didn't say it wanted to maltreat us, but the French and the 
British stood in the way. They paid us badly .... They blocked, pre-
vented. They only let America feed us, but America didn't give us 
money. The French and the British gave money to us. They paid us, 
but the money was small! We worked hard for it .... What bad treat-
ment. (Nouar 1983) 
In general, U.S. military interests aimed at the short term while 
their allies sought to do what they could to ensure the continuation 
of colonial economic and political relations into the postwar period 
(Mead 1966, 184). Beyond the Tannese desire to establish material 
exchange relationships (which converged with the American desire 
for a well-fed and healthy work force), other interests worked to 
oppose military and civil authority. Some of these related directly to 
the exercise and scope of that authority itself. Worker Nase Kapa-
ho's war stories-we need not worry about their factuality-tell how 
he eluded condominium police in hot pursuit by racing from town to 
military camp in order to find a laughing refuge behind protective 
American military police. 
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Many American servicemen had little love for their own military 
authorities let alone those of the colonially tedious British and 
French (cf. Robinson 1981, 182). Despite agreements and orders to 
keep a measure of distance between Islanders and servicemen, some 
Americans were interested to meet and speak with workers-if, 
sometimes, only to draw upon their local knowledge of the hide-
aways of available women. Thus, as Nouar recalled: 
They were good men but they wanted women. They searched for 
women .... They asked us where they could get women. But there 
were no women .... If they wanted to steal a woman they said 
"suksuk." They said thusly, this word "suksuk." They all wanted 
suksuk. 4 They all said it. Asking us this we all joked and laughed. 
(1983) 
Tanna war stories describe numerous sorts of informal interactions 
between Americans and Islanders (such as the boxing practice 
Nouar recalled). These include the sharing of food, gifts of money 
for small services, the consuming search for women, and the occa-
sional sharing of homemade alcohol-"jungle juice, torpedo juice." 
A considerable percentage of the American servicemen passing 
through Efate were black. The black Twenty-fourth Infantry Regi-
ment, a unit of the old segregated army, was a major part of the force 
that landed at Port Vila on 4 May 1942. Approximately 3400 men of 
the army's landing force of 4612 were black (OCMH n.d.a, 158). As 
the Twenty-fourth Infantry moved north toward the front, other 
black servicemen arrived to undertake engineering, supply, and 
transportation duties at the base. 
Tannese workers encountered these black servicemen engaged in 
various tasks: 
Some Negroes were soldiers, some lived on ships, some w'ent with the 
army, some did the work of the marines, some the work of the navy, 
some lived on ships and worked. Some drove trucks, lots of Negroes 
drove trucks. The Negroes .... They were good men, but they too 
wanted women. They searched for women .... When they called 
out, they didn't say-they called us "brother." Brother, their broth-
ers. They didn't say that we were no good. They liked us, and because 
of this our hearts were happy with them. Eh, the Americans! (Nouar 
1983) 
Nouar also recalled a black serviceman named jesse who understood 
a little Pidgin English. (Heinl [1944, 249] recorded friendships 
between black servicemen and local children). The significance of 
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the wartime black American presence for relations of exchange and 
identity between Americans and Melanesians has often been sound-
ed in the postwar literature (Mead 1966, 177; Worsley 1968, 172; 
Robinson 1981, 161, 173, 182, 187; chapters 7, 8, 9, 15). 5 
Since 1945, the war stories that people have circulated-and thus 
maintained within their historical repertoire-continue to enunciate 
the goodness of America: "Americans are good men. Love was in 
them. They were good men. Kindness" (Nouar 1983; see also chap-
ter 15). America's postwar withdrawal and absence no doubt have 
kept the Tannese heart growing fonder. Island war stories, as they 
tell of the goodness and kindness of America, implicitly criticize the 
postwar badness and meanness of the British and the French (Read 
1947, 108-111; Worsley 1968, 126, 151, 161, 173; Inglis 1969, 514; 
chapters 7, 8, 10, 15). On Tanna, war stories are good stories inso-
far as they serve (or once served) to enunciate an island challenge to 
the colonial authorities-a narrative charting of a political disjunc-
tion that culminated in national independence in 1980 (Inglis 1969, 
524-525). Recollections of the Tannese identity with wartime Amer-
icans became part of the metaphoric furnishings of this opposition 
between Islanders and outsiders. Properly arranged, they sketch 
relations oflikeness and unlikeness (see chapter 4). 
War stories make good stories for reasons of internal island politi-
cal identities and oppositions as well. Various political factions on 
Tanna have attempted to appropriate war memories: to stake a 
claim to America. In particular, the John Frum movement tropolog-
ically incorporated a range of wartime elements, including symbolic 
red crosses, ritual drill teams commanded by sergeants, carefully 
preserved military uniforms and dogtags, the logo "U.S.A." used as 
a body-paint design, and American flags (Lindstrom 1981). Here, 
Islanders narrate stories that, in asserting their differential, compet-
ing exchange relations with America (asserting, moreover, that such 
relations continue into the present), serve to trace out those cleav-
ages that oppose island political factions. 
Similarly, the elders nowadays also make use of history; their 
war narratives serve to counter the stories of the ignorant young. In 
this case, the young are considered ignorant of those war times 
when work, as represented in stories, was meaningful and exciting. 
The young may tell tales that flash their modernity and rehearse 
their travels to today's Port Vila; but their stay-at-home parents 
can always mark these stories down-depreciating them in terms of 
wartime working encounters with America when the world really 
moved. 
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Conclusion 
War stories have made good stories, becoming and remaining part 
of island historical knowledge, by virtue of their capacity to continue 
to make statements about the present. In the recent present, Island-
ers have cultivated and achieved national independence. War stories 
record the early period of this process of self-identification. The 
war's working encounters-however hard and exploitive this labor 
may have been-provided Islanders with the experience of a new set 
of relations of labor and production, and novel technologies as well 
as other exotic knowledge. 6 Wartime working encounters, culturally 
plotted into war stories, have enjoyed continuing exchange value 
and political utility within island discourse. These stories too are the 
war's history: the Pacific theater according to Islanders who were 
there. 
Notes 
I gathered war stories from Tannese labor corps veterans in 1982 and 1983. I also 
returned to Tanna in 1985 to discuss the possibility of future ethnohistorical 
research on the war in Vanuatu. I would like to thank the University of Tulsa's Fac-
ulty Research Program, the University of Tulsa College of Arts and Sciences Sum-
mer Faculty Grant Program, and the Institute of Culture and Communication, 
East-West Center for research assistance. On Tanna, I thank especially chiefs Tho-
mas Nouar, Rapi Timothy, Jack Uiuai, and joel Iau for entertaining and informa-
tive stories. 
1. That is, until a recent expansion of the national civil service. 
2. Few of these have been textualized in print (but see Ravuvu 1974; Robinson 
1981; Schutz 1968, 300-312; Keeble 1980). The generation of people who directly 
experienced the war is now elderly. Although war texts (whether informal or rela-
tively formalized in story or song) will no doubt continue to circul'lte after its pass-
ing, the next few years present a unique-if final-opportunity to document the 
local significance of the war among those Pacific Islanders who lived through it. 
3. Historical information that documents the operation, effects, and significance 
of wartime labor corps on Efate may be obtained from military, governmental, and 
other war archives, from those surviving Allied servicemen who were involved in 
recruitment and supervision of the labor corps, and from the Tannese men, now 
respected elders, who traveled north to work for the Americans in 1942. Although I 
rely in part on an initial search of U.S. military archives and on correspondence 
with a number of American servicemen stationed on Efate during the war, this 
chapter draws principally on oral histories I collected on Tanna in 1982 and 1983. 
My nationality, too, was an important factor in the interview equation (Lindstrom 
1979; see chapter 7). 
4. Suksuk may derive from Samoan susu 'breast', 'milk' or Fijian susu 'to nurse'. 
Oral Histories of Labor Corps from Tanna 
5. Some Tannese workers, however, recall being afraid of black troops (cf. 
Robinson 1981, 103; chapters 10, 13). This is an important area for further ethno-
historical research-both in Melanesia and in the United States. 
6. "One island attendant in an officers' mess became a regular reader of the New 
York Times" (Heinl1944, 256). 
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172, 176, 191, 192, 195-197, 202; on 
Normanby, 231, 234, 237-242, 249, 
252,253 n. 3; in Palau, 117-120, 
122-125, 127-131, 133-137; on 
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love, 223; protective, 7, 176. See also 
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209,218, 226n. 3; in Solomon 
Islands, 44, 47,272,338,341, 347; 
in Vanuatu, 271,407 
Police: military, 172, 196, 411; in 
Papua New Guinea, 192-195,211, 
213, 215, 404; in Solomon Islands, 
Index 
31,314,332,356-357,358-359, 367; 
in Vanuatu, 304,307,406,411 
Postwar development, 4, 22, 26-30, 
33-34, 299,301-304,312,319-320; 
on New Britain, 177-179; in Palau, 
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Australia, 205,210,272,313,329,377 
Babeldaob, 118, 122, 127, 129, 132, 
136 
Baunani, 354, 358 
Belau. See Palau 
Biak, 16, 218 
Bikini, 14, 86, 91, 144 
Borgen Bay, 170, 188, 202 
Bougainville, 16, 22-24, 32, 48, 62, 
171, 176,330,347 
Buna, 218, 286 
California, 374, 385, 387-388, 390 
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Dobu,206,231-234,252, 254n.5 
Dufflslands, 258, 261, 269 
Dutch New Guinea (Irianjaya), 16, 24, 
32. See also Biak 
Efate, 300,304-305,307,309,312, 
412; laborers on, 32, 305-306, 401-
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294 
Kwajalein, 14, 76, 76 
Kwara'ae. See West Kwara'ae 
Lae, 16, 192 
Laulasi, 24, 321 n. 8 
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353-3 70; government headquarters 
on,48,58,329,332 
Manus, 16,192,221 
Marakei, 152 
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Marshall Islands, 14, 15, 105-106, 377. 
See also names of individual islands 
Meden, 78-80, 83-86, 94 n. 12 
Milne Bay, 33,206,221,224, 226n. 6, 
227n.12, 231, 313; effectsofworking 
at, 221,224, 235; foreigners at, 247, 
249, 254 n. 7; laborers at, 205-207, 
215,216,217-218,234,249. See also 
Misima 
Misima, 205, 206, 208-215, 219, 223, 
225 n. 2, 226 n. 7 
Mortlock Islands, 14, 98, 106 
Munda,334,341,347 
New Britain, 19, 30, 167-183, 187-203. 
See also Kaliai; Kilenge 
New Caledonia, 7, 16, 28, 32,377,397, 
399-400,403,406-407 
New Georgia, 32, 48,308,331,334-
336,338-350 
New Guinea, 6, 7, 9, 23-24,187,209, 
218; fighting on, 171, 176, 192,271, 
287 
New Hebrides. See Vanuatu 
New Ireland, 16, 24, 192 
New Zealand, 21,301,329,367,374, 
393 
N gatik. See Sapwuahfik 
Nggatokae, 334, 341 
Nggela, 16, 48, 257, 267, 302-303, 
331-333, 349n. 2, 355-356,358, 
365 
Nguna, 17 
Nidu, 26, 257-276, 356. See also Santa 
Cruz Islands 
Nissan, 22, 25 
Normanby, 8, 33, 206, 231-255 
Northern Mariana Islands, 25, 106. See 
also Rota; Saipan; Tinian 
Noumea, 16, 399, 403, 406. See also 
New Caledonia 
Pago Pago, 374, 378-379 
Palau, 5, 8, 21, 25, 29, 117-146,283 
Panaeati, 206,208,212-213, 227n. 13 
Papua,6,207,209,212-213,217, 
227n. 10 
Papua New Guinea, 12, 13, 16, 30, 
158, 174, 176, 198, 201; Australians 
in, 23, 43, 198; cargo cults in, 15, 29; 
laborers in, 32, 33, 398, 400, 404; 
Pacific Islands Regiment in, 21, 31; 
Palauans in, 119, 120, 124; tourism 
in, 311-313, 320n. 1, 321 n. 8. See 
also Bougainville; Buna; D'Entrecas-
teaux Islands; Dobu; Gona; Kokoda; 
Louisiade Archipelago; Manus; 
Milne Bay; Misima; New Britain; 
New Guinea; New Ireland; Nissan; 
Normanby; Papua; Port Moresby; 
Rabaul; Trobriand Islands; Vanati-
nal 
Patutiva, 334, 343 
Index 433 
Peleliu, 117, 118, 122, 126-129, 131-
132, 132, 138, 143-144 
Pentecost, 300, 319 
Pingelap, 14, 106 
Pohnpei, 13, 14, 25, 30, 33, 86, 98, 
104-114;Japaneseon, 8, 100-102; 
people of, 8, 21, 98, 279-295 
Ponape. See Pohnpei 
Port Moresby, 16, 192, 194, 205, 210, 
212-213,313 
Port Vila, 260, 300, 303, 332, 413; 
bases at, 302, 397, 412; laborers at, 
304, 305,401,405, 406-407; tourists 
at, 299,311,313, 317-318; trade at, 
307-308,317-318 
Rabaul, 169, 170, 171,234, 338;Japa-
nese at, 48, 187, 192, 195,201,210-
211,238,330 
Rakata Bay, 44, 45, 46, 48-49, 66, 
67 n. 2, 69 n. 8, 70 n. 10, 338 
Ranongga,334-336 
Reeflslands, 258, 266, 268-270 
Rendova, 334, 340 
Rennell, 16, 32,335-336,341, 350n. 7 
Rota, 21 
Russell Islands, 32, 46, 331-333, 341 
Saipan, 21, 90,313 
Samoa, 5-6,27,30-31,33. See also 
American Samoa; Western Samoa 
San Cristobal (Makira), 16, 271, 274, 
332 
SantaCruz Islands, 15, 26, 30, 34,215, 
227n.11, 257-276,302,401. Seealso 
Nidu 
Santa Isabel, 8, 10, 17, 24-25, 32, 43-
70, 331-332, 336-339 
Sapwuahfik, 14, 15,17,33,97-114 
Satawan, 14, 105 
Savaii, 380 
Savo, 16,332,337 
Seghe, 32, 334, 338-350 
Sepik,23-24, 192-193 
Shortland Islands, 331-332, 336 
Sikaiana, 15, 16, 20, 149-164 
Simbo, 334, 335, 345 
Solomon Islands, 16, 22, 267, 302, 329-
352; Americans in, 7, 10, 28, 267, 
268, 309; Fijians in, 7, 21, 31; labor-
ers in, 304, 398, 400, 401; Maasina 
Rule in, 29, 396, 399; tourism in, 
301,311-316,319, 320n. 1, 321 n. 8. 
See also Choiseul; Guadalcanal; 
Malaita; New Georgia; Nggela; 
Rennell; Russell Islands; San Cristo-
bal; Santa Cruz Islands; Santa Isa-
bel; Sikaiana; Tulagi 
Stewart Island. See Sikaiana 
Suavana. See Rakata Bay 
Sudest. See Vanatinai 
Tahiti, 29 
Talasea, 170, 176, 187, 189 
Tanna, 15,18,34,300,305-306,395-
415; John Frum movement on, 15, 
178, 306, 319, 321 n. 3; tours to, 313, 
316,317,319. SeealsoVanuatu 
Tarawa, 105 
Tenaru, 360, 362 
Tinian, 102 
Tonga, 7,27,377 
Torokina, 32 
Trobriand Islands, 206, 212-213, 
227 n. 12, 254 n. 5 
Truk, 14,105-106,210,294 
Tulagi, 32, 259, 302, 303, 350 n. 6; 
Americans at, 267, 337, 349 n. 6; 
bombing and evacuation of, 48, 257, 
261, 330, 333, 356, 358; Japanese at, 
68 n. 5, 337, 356 
Tutuila, 373-377, 379, 382, 384 
Tuvalu, 27, 33,331,377 
Ujelang, 14, 75-76, 78, 88-91, 94n. 13 
Ulithi, 25 
Upolu, 379-380 
Vanatinai, 19, 25, 27, 33, 178,205-
227, 270 
Vanikoro, 258-261,263-265,272-274 
Vanuatu, 29, 32, 34,260,300,321 n. 7, 
332, 395-415; Americans in, 17-18, 
265; bases at, 5, 7, 268; tourism in, 
299-307, 309-313, 315-319, 
320 n. 1. See also Efate; Espiritu 
Santo; Port Vila; Tanna 
Vella Lavella, 22, 332, 334, 336, 340 
Vila. See Port Vila 
Viru Harbour, 334, 340, 343-344 
Western Samoa, 309, 373, 380, 382, 
393. See also Samoa 
West Kwara'ae, 353, 354-359, 368-369 
Wewak, 16, 192 
Woleai, 110 
Yap, 294 
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